



Project Start Date: 1.9.2016

Project Duration: 30 months

### Deliverable 3.1 Regional Stakeholder Reports

Deliverable details	
Deliverable number	3.1
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Due date	30/4/2017
Delivered date	30/4/2017
Reviewed by	Rachel Barrett, Anne Holohan
Dissemination level	PU
Contact person EC	Carla Rocha-Gomes

		History of Changes	
Date	Version	Person in Charge	Description
20/04/2016	v0.1	Rachel Barrett	Inclusion of figures in Executive Summary and summary report, revision of interviewee tables, revision of content of summary report, revision of formatting.
XX/XX/2016	v0.2		
XX/XX/2016	v0.3		

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## GAMING FOR PEACE

Gaming for Peace (GAP) was launched in September 2016. GAP is an EU H2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation project and the length of the project is 30 months. The main goal of GAP is to develop a curriculum in relevant 'soft skills' (cooperation, communication, gender and cultural awareness) for personnel from diverse organizations working in the field of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations. This curriculum will be embedded in an online role-playing game and renewed and updated by returning personnel playing the game. GAP fills a gap in training and offers an efficient and inexpensive way of delivering universal and standardized training in these skills.

The requirements to effectively operate and partake in conflict and post conflict situations for preventive measures and peacebuilding, compels the best of expertise and individual skill to adapt to fraught and complex environments. The demands on peacekeepers in recent years have been unprecedented and the need for specialised and more professional training has also increased. GAP, therefore represents an essential online training game for civilian, police, military, NGO personnel, humanitarians and others involved in peace operations worldwide.

Although personnel involved in peace operations generally have 'traditional based skills', (e.g. intelligence, investigation, weapons handling etc.) soft skills such as communication, cooperation, gender and cultural awareness and negotiation are less well emphasised. The GAP project proposes to fill this recognised training gap; embedding a base curriculum of soft skills that facilitates coordination and relationship building in an environment of organisational, gender and cultural diversity.

The GAP project will therefore identify the main characteristics and concepts in the field of conflict prevention and peace building and locate new areas for improvement and enhancement in existing training. Comprehending the intricate and often dangerous environment in which peace keepers are expected to operate, also requires a keen knowledge of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The ability to foresee and surmount social, cultural, or historical barriers necessitates the most up-to date training for peacekeeping. Gaming for Peace represents an innovative technique for the training of personnel involved in peace operations.

### List of Acronyms and Abbreviations:

BDI	Bulgaria Defence Institute
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
COS	Chief of Staff
DFI	Defence Force of Ireland
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
GAP	Gaming For Peace
ICPNI	The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland
IOM	International Organization for Migration
K-FOR	The Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MDP	Ministry of Defence Police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NICO	Northern Ireland Cooperation Overseas
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
PSP	Portugal State Police
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
UN	United Nations
UNIPTF	United Nations International Police Task Force
UN-MIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo


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## Executive Summary


The skills necessary for successful implementation of roles and remits on conflict prevention and peacekeeping mission are varied and complex. The training requirements for all personnel undertaking peacekeeping work are plentiful and incalculable, however it is evident that peacekeeping personnel from all backgrounds - military, police and civilian - receive more focused training on personal safety and security as opposed to soft skills. As identified in work package 2 Soft skills can be considered a personal attributes that allow an individual to efficiently and effectively relate to another. Participants from the military, police and civilian organizations reasoned that soft skills were critical not just in relation to engagement with local but particularly in non-operational situations including interacting daily with international colleagues and other organizations on mission.

The purpose of this deliverable is to review the outcomes of the stakeholder consultation to identify what soft skills are needed and how they are currently improvised or not, in practice. In total X interviews were carried out across 6 partner countries incorporating military, police and civilian personnel who had been deployed on peacekeeping missions.



**Table 1:** Interviewees across sectors by country

Reflective of the comparable low number of female peacekeepers out of the 153 interview participants 43 are female.



**Figure 1: Gender of Interviewees**

This deliverable will present the regional reports of the collated and analyzed data from the partner countries and critical conclusions will be drawn. Each regional report considers three distinct but interrelated themes – communication, cooperation and trust. In addition the regional reports conclude with advice for future peacekeepers in terms of soft skills based on the responses of key stakeholders and end-users. The concluding chapter of the report will discuss the findings with respect to three main areas: communication, cooperation, and trust. Examining these findings it will aim to collate the data together to address the three core questions of the review in relation to identifying soft skills training experiences and needs:

- What soft skills are identified as being needed?
- What training did participants receive in soft skills?
- What are the improvisations that people made in the absence of training for these skills?

The findings presented here emphasize that the three areas of focus for the GAP training competencies (communication, cooperation, and trust) should not be treated in isolation, rather they are interdependent skills. Communication as an overarching theme should be viewed as comprising soft skills that are characterized by the professional and personal contexts that peacekeepers encounter on deployment. Interview data indicates that communicative soft skill needs are distinct dependent upon the role and remit of an individual on deployment. Military and senior officers viewed communication as a central tenet of leadership and the ability to communicate strategically on an organizational level and with serving officers of a lower rank is critical. Consequently the soft skills needed for personnel operating primarily within that militarized and organizational context differs from lower ranked officers and police officers responsible for engaging directly with local people.

The regional reports highlight not only the soft skills elicited from the experiences of personnel deployed on peacekeeping missions but also it is evident that there is an almost ubiquitous absence in training in soft skills across all regions and across all organizations. It is striking that given the importance attached by participants to soft skills not only in terms of achieving success on mission

but also on a personal basis in relation to emotional intelligence and capacity to respond to daily-life situations. The reports also evidence the improvisations made by participants in the absence of appropriate and sufficient training in soft skills and it is important to note that the successful improvisations should not be viewed in isolation from previous utilization of soft skills to build relationships with other people. Analysis of the improvisations made by participants across the regions indicates that soft skills on a micro-level established relationships that engendered communication that beget cooperation. It is a cyclical process predicated upon the implementation of core soft skills.

The conclusions drawn from the data collected from interviews with key stakeholders and end-users supports the gaps in training identified in work package 2. In particular there is an absence of coherent, codified, internationally accredited standards of soft skills training in addition to a discernible disconnect between training processes prior to deployment and experienced realities as articulated by stakeholder participants. The isolated and fragmented nature of pre-deployment training, both in relation to the failure to ensure all international peacekeepers are trained to a comparable standard and also in terms of training content with an over-focus on security skills to the detriment of communicative soft skills, highlights the potential of a virtual learning training software.

## 1. Introduction

The extensive nature of conflict prevention and peacekeeping work necessitates a wide range of roles and responsibilities on mission. All participants on peacekeeping missions undertake some form of training, usually prioritizing personal safety and security training prior to deployment. However, it is often overlooked that a critical aspect of being deployed on conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions is interaction and engagement not only with local people but primarily with other international colleagues and organizations. The lack of appreciation of and preparation for this complex communicative situation exemplifies the over-stretched nature of training in relation to conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions.

The GAP project has already identified the need for new and effective forms of training (Del. 2.1 and 2.2) and the task for this report is to review the outcomes of the stakeholder consultation to identify what soft skills are needed and how they are currently improvised or not, in practice. Analysis of the data collected from interviews highlights the acute need for more standardized, coordinated and coherent training processes. The data collected from interviews with individuals who have been deployed on conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions emphasizes the ubiquitous lack of appreciation from a training perspective of the key role soft skills play on mission. When soft skills were implemented on mission participants cited experiential learning from their previous employments and deployments coupled with natural human skills and capacity to interact and engage with other people as the overarching driving force underpinning their competence in doing so.

The review of the data collected from interviews with participants across all the regions indicates support for a coherent, harmonized training strategy in order to ensure a coherent, internationally recognizable training standard. Given the multi-faceted nature of conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions and the impact of an ever-changing international peacekeeping remit the production of the GAP training game is a propitious addition to the training landscape. The virtual learning environment is considered ideal to fill the vacuum observed by interview participants between the inadequacy of classroom based pre-deployment training, both in relation to soft skills and traditional personal security training, with the experienced realities of daily life on mission. A bi-product of the GAP training game is the capacity to incorporate a range of situational training scenarios into a demonstrable and tangible learning environment. A significant barrier in precluding the application of soft skills identified by participants concerned the lack of understanding between military, police and non-governmental peacekeepers, consequently a virtual learning experience could add greater awareness of the roles and responsibilities of other organizations and individuals on mission.

This review will begin by presenting the findings and analysis from each regional report before key conclusions are drawn pertaining to the soft skills that are needed and how they are currently improvised or not, in practice. The objective of this work package is to identify best practices from stakeholder and end-user perspectives and experiences. This report draws upon the regional interviews with key stakeholders who have been interviewed around a range of interrelated issues focusing on the soft skills processes and methods that they have used, are currently using and what they would like or need to use in the future. This report, and work package 3 generally, is designed to build upon and crystallize the learning and conclusions from work package 2 whilst determining



additional gaps in soft skills training for individuals deploying on conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions.

## 2. Methodology

This section will focus on the methodological approach adopted by GAP researchers across all regional partners in the collection, collation and analysis of data to identify what soft skills are needed and how they are currently improvised or not, in practice. The research strategy is predicated upon a qualitative research method utilizing a semi-structured interview approach. 'Qualitative research implies recognition of processes that are not readily susceptible to measurement in terms of quantity, amount or frequency. Its emphasis is on capturing or obtaining an in-depth understanding of the interactional processes as manifested during a particular study'<sup>1</sup>. The interviews across all regions were performed within a semi-structured framework in order to ensure that the key themes such as communication, cooperation and trust were discussed but as the aim of the interview was to elicit the perceptions and thoughts of the interviewees it was important to retain a degree of flexibility that allowed new ideas to surface.

With semi-structured interviews, the interviewer still has a clear list of issues to be addressed and questions to be answered. However, with the semi-structured interview the interviewer is prepared to be flexible in terms of the order in which the topics are considered, and perhaps, more significantly, to let the interviewee develop ideas and speak more widely on the issues raised by the researcher. The answers are open-ended, and there is more emphasis on the interviewee elaborating on points of interest.<sup>2</sup>

In order to ensure consistent application of interview questions and structure of interview procedure GAP partners agreed an interview guide and a list of appropriate questions to guide interviewers. The interview guide (see Appendix) was then altered following consultation with interviewers after an initial interview phase to ensure that any emergent themes were being acknowledged and relatable data collected across all regions. The interview questions were tailored according to organizational affiliation of key stakeholders and end-users in order to acknowledge the nuanced operational role and remit of military, police and civilian personnel.

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<sup>1</sup> GARNER M., WAGNER C. and KAWULICH B., (2009) 'Teaching Research Methods in the Social Sciences', Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, p.63.

<sup>2</sup> DENSCOMBE M., (2010) (4<sup>th</sup> edn) *'The Good Research Guide for small-scale Research Projects'*, Buckingham: Open University Press, p.175.

## 2.1 Ethical Considerations:

In order to fully comply with the ethical issues identified in conjunction with the ethics board all GAP interviewers observed the following policies.

- \* Data Collection: All participating individuals were provided with information sheets on the project and asked to sign consent forms. This ensured that all participants are aware of GAP policies on handling, storing and retaining their data, their right to withdraw and the policy on incidental findings.

- \* Data storage: Interview data was immediately transferred off recording devices and encrypted. Access to un-anonymized data was strictly limited and only anonymized data can be transferred amongst consortium members. Consent forms will be kept in a secure and separate location from transcripts and game play data.

- \* Data protection: The content of data produced by the GAP project will be specified, and we will provide copies of appropriate authorizations according to the legal requirement of the area where the research is planned to take place. This includes all partner institutional/college ethical approval committees, operating under the auspices of EU regulations on Data Protection and Privacy, notably the Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) and the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679).

- \* Original recordings will be stored for the duration of the project (2.5 years); after this time they will be irreversibly destroyed by overwriting the file with other sound. The consent forms will be stored at a different location to the transcripts and recordings for the duration of the project. Then they will all be destroyed by shredding of hard copies (informed consent) and irreversible overwriting of soft copies. Those who collected original recordings in each jurisdiction will be responsible for destruction of the aforementioned material in this manner at the end of the project.

## 2.2 Coding

In order to maximize the potential of the data contained within the regional reports and to enable to elicitation of key findings from intra- and inter-regional analysis a collaborative approach involving all partners in discerning codes was established. Subsequently a three-tiered coding strategy was identified as the most efficient and effective way of reviewing the collected interview data (see Appendix).

The purpose of coding is to break the material down into components that can then be recompiled/assembled to understand particular themes. There are different levels of coding: **overarching themes** and then **sub-themes and sub-sub themes**. 3 levels of depth overall.


**For example:** [HINDERED COOPERATION] is an overarching theme. [DIFFERENT IDENTITY] is a sub-theme of communication. [GENDER[[NATIONALITY], ORGANIZATION,][RELIGION]are sub-sub-themes.

Each regional partner coded their own data using NVivo, a software package designed for use in coding qualitative data, and utilized the agreed coding structure in analyzing their data for the production of regional reports that are the basis of this review.

### 3. Regional Stakeholder Report: Bulgaria

#### 3.1 Summary Details of Interviews

The data contained in this report has been gathered through stakeholder consultation with members of the Bulgarian military including the Air Force, Army, and Naval Service. The data set for this report consists of interviews collected from twenty-eight participants. Eight of these interviews were with members of the Bulgarian Air Force, nine were with members of the Bulgarian Army, and the remaining eleven interviews were with members of the Bulgarian Navy. Basic demographic, included gender breakdown of interviewees, is presented in Figure 1 and Table 1 , below. Interviewees were varied in their job roles and seniority, achieving a diversity of respondents. Most interviewees had been on two or more deployments; however 13 out of the 28 interviewees had one deployment experience.



**Figure 2:** Gender distribution of BDI interview participants

Pseudo-Name	Gender	Branch	Rank/Job in Org	No. of Deployments	Deployment locations
Yasen	Male	Army	Commander	1	Iraq
Grigor	Male	Army	Corporal	1	Iraq
Borislav	Male	Army	CIMIC	2	Afghanistan, Bosnia
Tereza	Female	Air Force	Private	1	Afghanistan
Viktor	Male	Air Force	Commander [Logistics]	1	Bosnia
Zlatko	Male	Air Force	Driver	1	Iraq
Ivan	Male	Navy	Sailor	4	Mediterranean
Elena	Female	Navy	Communications Officer	1	Mediterranean
Rada	Female	Navy	Sergeant	1	Mediterranean
Dimitri	Male	Navy	Master Chief Petty Officer	7	UNIFIL Mar Ops, Mediterranean, Libya
Sophia	Female	Navy	Supply Officer	3	Mediterranean
Peator	Male	Navy	Ass. Air Defence Operator	7	UNIFIL Mar Ops, Mediterranean, Libya
Roza	Female	Navy	Communication Officer	3	Mediterranean, Atlantic
Anastasiya	Female	Navy	Major [PR/Psychologist]	8	Mediterranean
Todor	Male	Navy	Sailor	4	Mediterranean, Libya
Mira	Female	Navy	Seaman	5	Mediterranean
Kiril	Male	Navy	Lieutenant Commander	8	UNIFIL Lebanon, Mediterranean, Libya
Ana	Female	Air Force	Administrative	1	Bosnia
Andon	Male	Army	Master Sergeant	2	Afghanistan, Bosnia
Dimo	Male	Army	Staff Officer	1	Afghanistan
Niki	Male	Army	Private	1	Iraq, Afghanistan
Milen	Male	Air Force	Sergeant	4	Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Cambodia
Bogomila	Female	Air Force	Personnel Officer	2	Afghanistan (Kabul)
Snezahana	Female	Air Force	Translator	1	Bosnia
Stoyan	Male	Air Force	Major	3	Afghanistan (Kabul x2, Kandahar)
Hristov	Male	Army	CIMIC	2	Afghanistan (Kabul, Kandahar)
Nadia	Female	Army	Logistics Staff Officer	1	Afghanistan (Kabul)
Nikolai	Male	Army	Platoon Commander	1	Afghanistan (Kabul)
Total: 28					

**Table 2:** Summary table of BDI Participants

## 3.2. Communication

Communication was recognised by the participants as an important skill for overseas missions. In certain roles, notably those that necessitated a high level of coordination and cooperation with other organisations, effective communication skills were regarded as essential. With the exception of training as part of CIMIC (Civil-Military Coordination) roles, no formal communication skills training were mentioned by the participants. When participants spoke about their pre-deployment training they almost exclusively described it in terms of physical, tactical, or operational preparation. However, this does not conclusively mean that no communication training took place, but possibly that these skills were not considered a high priority for preparation in the eyes of those who were fulfilling operational and tactical roles.

Another common theme that emerged was the reliance of international missions on the use of English for communication among organisations and in some cases with the civilians. Language competency and proficiency was something that continually arose, whether in examples of the use of translators, improvised communication solutions or, in one case, self-directed learning. Interrelated with this point, is the need to establish and maintain good relationships in order to enable good communication.

A discussion of the concept of communication is presented in the following sections below. This discussion explores on the subthemes of humour, trust, gender, hand-over and preparation, linguistic competence, perspective taking, and culture with respect to communication in the military context.

### 3.2.1 Communication within Own Organisation

The role of gender within the organization was a recurring theme within the data, and also arose in relation to communication. Women have only been recruited relatively recently as part of the Bulgarian military. And, in the Navy context, women have only been eligible to volunteer for deployment on missions since 2007. In the Navy in particular, the presence of female officers working alongside male colleagues is a fairly novel development for deployment missions.

Within the Navy, Anastasiya notes that sometimes conversation between male and female colleagues may be slightly censored, in that male officers will often clean up their speech when talking to female colleagues [BDI-Anastasiya-23.02.2017-CD]. Dimitri echoes this by saying that he feels it's inappropriate to make jokes, or talk crassly with female colleagues, something that would be a normal occurrence among the male staff. He adds that some of his male colleagues, even if they have wives or children at home, have difficulties in knowing *how* to speak to females who are part of the crew [BDI-Dimitri-22.02.2017-CD].

Sense of humour as a means of developing relationships or coping with the realities of deployment was also noted in some of the interviews conducted with Defence Forces Ireland. It is part of the daily culture, but it may not sit well with everyone. Todor notes that humour is an important aspect of forging relationships and creating a good atmosphere on the ship. He remarks that if a member of

the team does not have the same sense of humour; it is a personal issue, and something they need to address to in order to be part of the team [BDI-Todor-23.02.2017-JC]. Elena, another Navy officer, states that women don't possess the same sense of humour as men. She thinks that, consequently, they are perhaps too easily offended by the jokes that their male colleagues might make [BDI-Elena-22.02.2017-JC].

Pre-deployment training is often aligned with updated information from the base, but the issue can be that sometimes your unit may be the first one arriving at the base. Borislav mentions briefly that during hand-over the previous team advised the new team using their experiences on how to deal with Afghanistan Army, on how to behave. This is an example of communication and transfer of knowledge within the organization. [BDI-Borislav-01.03.2017-SC]. It is important the information is up-to-date to ensure good preparation. Milen gives a simple but practical example: as the country of deployment is usually in flux, it can experience drastic economic inflation; therefore the estimates given to officers for the cost of buying personal items may be inaccurate by the time they arrive [BDI-Milen-02.03.2017-MG]. On a related note, Andon states that in terms of preparing to go overseas, no one advises on what personal items to bring in terms of toiletries or other utensils. He considers practical advice like that to be useful in terms of preparation [BDI-Andon-01.03.2017-MG].

For Milen, so many kinds of information are important for deployment that sharing experience is vital. One experience may not be informative for one person but it could be extremely useful for somebody else. Equally, a decision taken in one situation may have been the best course of action, but when transferred to another context it could be the wrong path to take. Milen thinks that it would be useful to compile these personal stories, and that past experiences should not be underestimated. He gives the example of a commanding officer who tried to introduce a training program for the Afghanistan Army. Another officer who had previous experience working in Afghanistan with their military twenty years ago informed the commander that he had witnessed a similar program being introduced to the Afghani with little success. His comments were overlooked and the program failed [BDI-Milen-02.03.2017-MG].

With regard to returning officers, Niki states that it would be helpful for those who have returned to share their recent experiences with those who are preparing to deploy [BDI-Niki-01.03.2017-MG]. Bogomila states that, in her experience, sometimes the teachers have never participated in overseas missions, and that is important for them to have had experience in this context. This is beginning to change as an increasing number of military personnel have experience of deployment. Her role in peacekeeping missions was quite unique and in this sense she considers that it would be very beneficial to be able to share experiences specific to the role with the person who is next charged with it [Bogomila-BDI-02.03.2017].

### **3.2.2 Communication with Police Forces**

There are no substantial findings present in the data to describe communication between the Bulgarian military and police forces.

### **3.2.3 Communication with Other Military**

The Bulgarians consider it easy to work alongside military units from other countries due to a shared military culture and the presence of NATO standards. It is easy to understand other military

personnel in comparison to civilians and members of NGOs, because of the shared military mental model.

As previously noted, competence in the English language is regarded as a key communication skill. One member of the Navy states that, fundamentally, it is important to have good a good standard of English as this is the common language of the mission and facilitates communication [BDI-Anastasiya-23.02.2017-CD]. However, language competence is not always part of pre-deployment training. Dimitri gives an example that during an international Naval training exercise, which involved operational training for night boarding, that international Navies worked together to share techniques. He adds that this can be somewhat difficult if those involved can't speak English. He encountered this exact problem when he was participating in an exercise. He assumed the responsibility for translating and relaying instructions to others on his team, despite not feeling fully confident in his abilities to do so [BDI-Dimitri-22.02.2017-CD].

Another example of initiative with regard to communication was described in an interview with Zlatko, a member of the Air Force, who served overseas in Iraq. He explains that his role was to work on checkpoints and patrols alongside American soldiers. On arrival in Iraq he could not speak a word of English, but through making an effort to continuously speak with the Americans and to seek them out in his free time, he managed to establish a good level of competence through which to communicate. In the absence of specific language skills, participants state that communication is achieved through the use of hand gestures and facial expressions.

Competence in communication via English is more a matter of being understood as opposed to being linguistically competent. It is not important to speak grammatically, but to speak so as to be understood. Language is simplified and the shared military background is important communicative framework to enable understanding. For example, NATO uses a standard terminology, so military terms and acronyms are popular and common across military organisations; they are used almost organically [Nadia-BDI-01.03.2017-MC]. Similarly, Roza, a Naval communications officer, mentions the use of standardized code words, another example of facilitating communication among international ships in the mission's fleet [BDI-Roza-23.02.2017-CD]. However, while this approaches eases the burden of the language barrier among military organisation, Nadia notes that the use of these terms in communication with a civilian would be unsuitable as it would be challenging for any non-military person to interpret [Nadia-BDI-01.03.2017-MC].

Anastasiya adds that the communication among a fleet of ships improves over time but it is also important to have good technologies to support communication [BDI-Anastasiya-23.02.2017-CD]. This comment is also reflected in an interview with a Naval communications officer, Elena. Elena describes that while she was on deployment as part of a fleet of European ships, other units in the fleet could communicate through a satellite data communication system called G-chat, which the Bulgarians did not possess. The Bulgarian crew had to resolve this issue through the use of radio nets and also through shore meetings in order to maintain effective communication with the other vessels [BDI-Elena-22.02.2017-JC]. Agreed approaches – whether through terminology or technology – help to facilitate effective communication.



### 3.2.4 Communication with International NGOs

Most Bulgarian personnel reported limited or no contact with NGOs with the exception of CIMIC officers. Part of their role consists of liaising and coordinating with NGO personnel. Hristov remarks that this requires a different set of skills than liaison with military personnel. He states that the military mindset is very much about giving and following orders, in comparison dealing with NGOs is more of a diplomatic process, he compares it to being a politician. It is a time-intensive process to establish trust with NGO personnel, to get to know each other, and to see how they can work together for mutual benefit [Hristov-BDI-01.03.2017-MC].

Another important component of the CIMIC role is managing the commander's expectations as to how NGOs function and what they can offer. It is critical to communicate both the NGO's own mission goals, and the importance of maintaining the 'diplomatic approach'. Hristov adds, that being from the military, one often has to adopt the mindset of the civilian perspective in order to make the CIMIC role work. In this regard, civilian NGO staff who are suitably experienced could make a valuable contribution to CIMIC training [Hristov-BDI-01.03.2017-MC].

### 3.2.5 Communication with International Civil Servants

In most cases Bulgarian personnel did not interact with political or governmental officials. One exception was those working in an administrative capacity as part of their role on deployment. On this topic, Ana notes that working in an international environment can present communication challenges. She states, *'For person like me, it was my first deployment, I didn't know how to interact with my international colleagues because we have, here in Bulgaria, we have one way of communicating, they have completely another.'* She speaks positively of her time in Bosnia but, in comparison, she mentions a Bulgarian colleague who did not like engaging with the others, and seemed to avoid building relationships with her colleagues [BDI-Ana-02.03.2017-MG].

In the work environment, different nationalities offer different approaches and this can certainly present communication challenges. Ana's solution was to always ask a lot of questions regarding her work to avoid misunderstandings or miscommunication. Additionally, international staff can differ in their work ethic, or the sense of pressure that they feel from their job. Ana recalls an Italian colleague with a very relaxed approach to completing tasks and meeting deadlines, a perspective that herself she did not share and could not comprehend [BDI-Ana-02.03.2017-MG].

### 3.2.6 Communication with Local Government

There are no substantial findings in the data to describe communication between the Bulgarian military and local government.

### 3.2.7 Communication with Local People

In Hristov's role with CIMIC in Afghanistan, communication with the local people was forbidden as it was viewed as dangerous. However, the nature of his role in meeting with the Afghani Army with the local towns and villages meant that it could not be avoided. He noted that sometimes the faces of the local people are friendly, and sometimes they are angry. Judging facial expressions was important for determining how they are being received. Sometimes children would wave at his unit arriving and they would return the wave, if people wave or smile they do the same. The CIMIC officers are trained not to express too much, not to show aggression, or to look intimidating. It is forbidden to communicate too much with the locals and for the vast majority of soldiers this policy is

adhered to. However, Hristov mentions that after two or three months of deployment, he decided to support the local economy during his patrols by visiting local shops. He deemed his decision to be safe and the locals, in turn, assured him of his safety. This was a decision made by Hristov rather than a standard practice and not part of training. However, benefits in terms of trust and goodwill were valuable [Hristov-BDI-01.03.2017-MC].

Because of the instability of the surrounding environment, some mission contexts see personnel confined to base and therefore, depending on their role, they may never meet with anyone from the local population. On his second mission to Bosnia, while working in administration, Borislav mentions that his boss was quite strict and would not allow him or his Bulgarian colleagues to visit the city although their international colleagues were granted this permission. In part, this curtailed their social activities and led to some frustration among the Bulgarian staff members on the team [BDI-Borislav-01.03.2017-SC]. In comparison, Ana describes that she was allowed to explore the city in free time off and had good relationships with the local population. She noted that being Bulgarian, and therefore geographically close, culturally similar, and linguistically similar, contributed to being able to create a positive relationship with the locals [BDI-Ana-02.03.2017-MG].

Elena mentions that she was a slightly cautious about the prospect of interacting with the local people in Turkey while on shore leave, as a female visiting a Muslim culture. The liaison officer who was working onboard with the crew at that time was able to offer her advice and to let her know about the region they were visiting, and that it was a more 'Western' region than other parts of Turkey, so this advice assuaged her fears. She regarded this knowledge from a local as beneficial. She also adds that having a country profile as part of cultural awareness training, in some respects, may be unhelpful as it could descend into stereotypes or generalisations and it is better to discover the culture for yourself in this regard [BDI-Elena-22.02.2017-JC].

### **3.3 Cooperation**

Naturally, working alongside other organisations and militaries to achieve the mission aims requires cooperation. Cooperation was regarded as an important part of peacekeeping missions. Trust and communication were factors that enabled cooperation. In addition, working in an international environment alongside other militaries was seen as an opportunity to learn from others. Similarly, the participants spoke positively about the benefits of exercises and training opportunities with regard to cooperation.

#### **3.3.1 Cooperation within Own Organisation**

Yasen spoke about the benefits of international missions for the Bulgarian military. He was present on the first deployment of Bulgarian soldiers who participated in an international NATO mission. He notes that many soldiers volunteered to go to Iraq in order to gain experience and to learn from the international environment. In one sense, they did not know what to expect and he states that the Bulgarian commanders had to demonstrate great flexibility to adapt to this new context. He regards it as a time that paved the way for other officers on future deployments, in that they took this experience back to share with the Bulgarian military at home. [BDI-Yasen-01.03.2017-SC].

Similarly, Zlatko was impressed working alongside the American Army. He considered them to be better in terms of preparation and disseminating plans, he has not has the same experience in the

Bulgarian Army, *“you know what will happen ten minutes before the mission”*. He said that he considered himself to be a very patient person before the mission and while on deployment, but that this patience has worn off because he witnessed that things could be done differently [BDI-Zlatko-02.03.2017-SC]. Cooperation with others organizations present opportunity for learning for one’s own organisation.

### **3.3.2 Cooperation with Police Forces**

There was one example of cooperation between military and the local police force. Nikolai was a platoon commander responsible for protection of the airport’s external protection in Afghanistan. He states that if there is a problem with the locals, that the local police will be called to manage the situation. There are standard operating procedures in place for how to react to contact, however with non-threatening situations it is best not to shout or argue with the locals and just to refer the matter to the police. Communication is usually achieved via a translator that the local police chiefs will bring to accompany them, or through hand and facial gestures if a translator is not available. Their relationship with the Afghan police was very good, and the Afghani police consider the Bulgarian officers to be very friendly. The Bulgarians regularly bring bread and coffee with them when visiting police posts, and this gesture is appreciated [BDI-Nikolai-01.03.2017].

### **3.3.3 Cooperation with Other Military**

Kiril states that cooperative Naval missions, under NATO, were previously concentrated on protection and counterterrorism. However, since 2013 there has been a shift in focus following the influx of migrants from Africa to Europe, and operational training has concentrated on preparing the Navy to deal with encountering traffickers and migrant vessels [BDI-Kiril-23.02.2017-JC]. The Navy regards cooperation as an important component in carrying out joint missions at sea. Dimitri remarks that there is never any major difficulty in cooperating as the NATO publications set out how the different actors should work to achieve the mission [BDI-Dimitri-22.02.2017-CD]. However, the possibility of having more training in cooperation alongside other militaries would be beneficial [BDI-Todor-23.02.2017-JC]. Similarly, Dimitri mentions that international training exercises present a good opportunity to work with and learn from other Navy fleets. Specifically, they present the opportunity to learn from the techniques and practices of others [BDI-Dimitri-22.02.2017-CD].

Good communication is emphasized as an important quality to facilitate cooperation and to coordinate activities. For example, Roza notes that when communication is lost between ships, it is very difficult to take action effectively. As an example, she alludes to taking action against a hostile ship; effective communication is needed to ascertain the position of the target ship and but also to ensure the safety of other surrounding ships is maintained [BDI-Roza-23.02.2017-CD].

Once again, the issue of gender and communication was raised when discussing working alongside other military organisations. In some cases being a female officer tasked with communication was regarded as a positive. For example, Kiril states that female radio operators onboard Navy ships are often receive a better reception than their male counterparts. He claims that in many situations, particularly during intense exercises, that there is a marked difference in the response of those onboard the other ship to a female officer than a male. Likewise, he has noticed a similar positive reception of female communication officers with merchant vessels and civilian ships [BDI-Kiril-23.02.2017-JC].

Conversely, communication as a female military officer can present challenges depending on the cultural context. Borislav points out that his role as a military advisor to the Afghanistan Army would be difficult to carry out as a female. He states that because of the cultural differences regarding women, Afghani soldiers would not be prepared to take advice from women on weapons and ammunition. The unit who were responsible for delivering this training could not, realistically, be comprised of female officers only or they would not be taken seriously [BDI-Borislav-01.03.2017-SC].

Like Borislav, Yassen was also charged with advising the Afghanistan Army. They advised them on how to use weapons, how to defend themselves, how to act in formation, and other basic military training to ensure the protection of the region. The plan was to develop a local school as the site for the training base. In the early stages of this relationship, Yassen arrived in a military convoy to establish a military base for training the local army. The locals did not accept this and they were not willing to cooperate. Their concern was with regard to having a military base situated beside local residences, where, they were afraid that the local women would be visible to those at the base. The Afghani people were angry about the decision. As a precaution, and to ensure safety, Yassen and his staff left the site. This decision was taken also to show respect and to preserve relationships with the local population and military [BDI-Yassen-01.03.2017-SC].

As noted in Section 3.2, the Bulgarians view the development of good relationships as a way to help promote cooperation. Stoyan was deployed to Kandahar in 2011 as a member of a senior advisory team to the Afghan military. He speaks very positively of the Afghan Colonel who was the Commander of Kandahar. Stoyan describes him as a natural leader and very personable. The Colonel made effort to get to know the Bulgarian soldiers at to ask about their families, he explained that the inquiry is a gesture of respect in the Afghan culture. At the military recruit training centre in Kandahar, Stoyan recognised that there was not enough supplies for the recruits in terms of weaponry and clothing. Using his contacts with the American team in charge of logistics he arranged for additional supplies to be procured [Stoyan-BDI-02.03.2017].

The use of good relationships to promote communication is not confined to dealing with the local military. Milen provides an example from within the camp during his deployment to Afghanistan. There was an issue with the air conditioning at the camp so the machine gunner couldn't sleep at night, and there were concerns that this would affect his job. A Tanzanian officer was responsible for the air conditioning maintenance, however, he did not have the necessary parts to make the repairs and obtaining them was proving difficult. Milen struck up a conversation with him about a soccer player with a Bulgarian-South African connection, and gave him a gift of a tie with a lion motif - a symbol of both the Bulgarian Army and the Bulgarian football team. Milen adds that soldiers from Africa refer to themselves as lions, and so he thought it would be a fitting gift. The Tanzanian officer made a great effort to obtain the parts and to make the repairs [BDI-Milen-02.03.2017-MG].

### **3.3.4 Cooperation with International NGOs**

There are no substantial findings present in the data to describe cooperation between the Bulgarian military and international NGOs. See Section 3.4 on communication with NGOs.

### **3.3.5 Cooperation with International Civil Servants**

There are no substantial findings present in the data to describe cooperation between the Bulgarian military and international civil servants. See Section 3.5 on communication with international civil servants.

### **3.3.6 Cooperation with Local Government**

There are no substantial findings present in the data to describe cooperation between the Bulgarian military and local government.

### **3.3.7 Cooperation with Local People**

Before the mission in Iraq, Milen received training on the Iraqi culture, the Islamic religion, and the current conflicts existing in Iraq. He recalls learning about negotiation during his cultural training. Milen gives the example of murder and that if a serious incident such as this were to happen that Iraqi people tend to respond in kind. However, to avoid retaliation the two parties involved can negotiate a payment in place. The training pointed out that under the European approach there would obviously be state involvement through the court system, but that in Iraq the matter can be settled among the parties involved. This knowledge was extremely helpful with regard to understanding the Iraqi approach to settling disputes [BDI-Milen-02.03.2017-MG].

Dimitri mentions that cultural awareness training as part of the Navy pre-deployment included contained a lot of training on how to interact with women from Muslim cultures that may be present on ships that are boarded. Their training was practice based, with female crew members assuming the role of the Muslim females. He noted that he regarded this as a more useful form of learning than lecture-based training [Dimitri-22.02.2017-CD].

## **3.4. Trust**

Trust is regarded as an essential quality for peace-keeping missions. Trust among colleagues within the Bulgarian military is very much evident from the data. In part this is due to existing relationships; half of the Bulgarian contingent on a mission may be from the same unit, and their training for pre-deployment tends to build upon already established trust.

The military context requires that this level of trust is present. Roza notes that in the Navy if the ship is in distress they could be in a position where they are alone at sea and with no guarantee of when assistance will arrive, so the ship's crew needs to be able to rely on each other [BDI-Roza-23.02.2017-CD]. Ivan notes that the trust within the organisation, within a given team in particular, is resolute. However, the trust between the Bulgarian military and other organizations, even when working together, is a different relationship [BDI-Ivan-22.02.2017-JC].

A common theme that emerged was the use of informal practices for developing trust both within members of the organization, and among organisations. Socialising was regarded as a good opportunity to build trust and relationships among those within the organization and also with those from external organisations. Another theme that emerged concerned the level of trust placed in the competence of female officers. Finally, methods for establishing trust with local armies and the local population while on deployment are described in Section 4.7.

### 3.4.1 Trust within Own Organisation

In discussing how to earn the trust of others, many interviewees referred to their personal qualities. For example, Anastasiya states that she is always honest and trustworthy; she is a Navy psychologist and ensures that the personal information that is revealed to her confidential [BDI-Anastasiya-23.02.2017-CD]. Ana, an administrative staff member charged with handling confidential information, mentions that others place their trust in her because she is reliable, and she has demonstrated that she can be counted on [BDI-Ana-02.03.2017-MG].

Similarly, Ivan states that his experience makes him trustworthy, he has been with the military for a long period of time and considers himself to be an experienced officer. He regards his professional competence as a reason that others would be willing to put trust in him. The presence of experienced officers can also be a source of guidance for inexperienced officers. Elena mentions that on her first deployment she looked to superior officers onboard the ship for guidance. She claims that she felt underprepared, so their assistance was reassuring and helped her to settle into her role. She clarifies that feeling underprepared was not due to any deficits in pre-deployment training but something that could only be rectified through actually being on deployment [BDI-Elena-22.02.2017-JC].

Social activities were regarded as important both for relaxing after duties but also for establishing relationships. Dimitri notes that being out of uniform and the restrictions of their working roles helps in getting to know people [e.g. BDI-Dimitri-22.02.2017-CD]. Kiril describes one sailor who was very popular among the ship's crew. During the night watches, the sailor would tell amusing stories to an audience of off-duty crew members who would gather. He would entertain them with funny stories of fake sexual exploits. Kiril comments, *"it was like a show"* and that *"the next day there would be discussions on what stories he told the last night."* He regarded it as a positive memory that helped to build relationships and camaraderie onboard [BDI-Kiril-23.02.2017-JC].

In the early days of women joining the Navy, Dimitri notes that women were given easier tasks and roles than their male counterparts because they were viewed as less able. He states that the culture is changing and that now women are expected to fill the same roles as men. It is only from 2007 onwards that women were eligible to volunteer for Naval missions, and Dimitri notes that the Bulgarian Navy could benefit from the experience of other Navies on how to improve and create a more inclusive environment for female crew members [BDI-Dimitri-22.02.2017-CD]. There is still some residual sentiment that women are less capable because they lack physical strength. The opinion here is that they should not be on deployment (or their participation limited to less physically demanding roles), and that in some cases their presence is viewed as a distraction.

This was a perspective expressed by both male and female military personnel. For example, Elena believes that the military is a work environment for men, and one that is not suitable for women. She regards women as too emotional to be in the military and she considers this to lead them to some irrational behaviour. She gives an example of her own behaviour regarding one of her subordinate officers. Although she considers him to be good at his job, she doesn't like him personally, and for this reason she often gives him a tough time. She thinks a man in her position would not do the same [BDI-Elena-22.02.2017-JC].

Mira is more positive about the role of women in the military, she views them less physically strong but equally capable to carry out the work. She notes that men were reluctant to work alongside women in the beginning but that the culture has changed now. Yet, she still regards it as a man's job and that the majority of the army should be comprised of men [BDI-Mira-23.02.2017-JC]. Dimitri notes that there is a benefit to having female officers as part of the Navy crew, particularly for boarding operations, where they female officers and tasked with searching female passengers [BDI-Dimitri-22.02.2017-CD].

Elena finds that as a woman in the Bulgarian military you must always prove yourself capable of doing the job [BDI-Elena-22.02.2017-JC]. This idea of proving oneself was also discussed in an interview with a female truck driver, Tereza. She mentions that she must continuously attempt to win the respect of her male colleagues when she is transferred to a new unit, new base, or while with a new group on deployment. She accepts this as the way things are for a female in the Bulgarian military, but at the same time she is frustrated that she constantly has to prove herself. She feels that she earns her acceptance through demonstrating her competence as a driver and during drills [BDI-Tereza-02.03.2017-SC]. On a similar note, Elena mentions that it is difficult for officers who are both female and young to be taken seriously by their subordinates. This may also be the case for young male officers with subordinates, but to a lesser degree. She remarks that the dynamic is not a situation that older male officers in the Navy would be comfortable with [BDI-Elena-22.02.2017-JC].

### **3.4.2 Trust with Police Forces**

There are no substantial findings present in the data to describe trust between the Bulgarian military and international civil servants.

### **3.4.3 Trust with Other Military**

On an operational level, Mira states that as a lower level officer determining whether to place trust in another organization does not fall to her, higher level officers determine this for her [BDI-Mira-23.02.2017-JC]. This is a sentiment that is shared in the army also; the trust in other military is implicit even if it is not as strong as the trust within their own unit or organization.

Socialising was again viewed as a means to develop trust in personnel from other militaries on a personal level. Viktor states that at his camp the Greek military and the Bulgarian military would train together and do sports together during their free time. He regarded this as a way to build up trust and relationships [BDI-Viktor-02.03.2017-SC]. Zlatko mentions that countries that are culturally similar will often band together on the military bases, he gives the example of the Polish and the Bulgarians having a good social relationship [BDI-Zlatko-02.03.2017-SC]. Social events also provide the opportunity to learn about the culture of other nations. Dimo notes that international military on the base will come together to support each other's' national holidays like American Thanksgiving, Australia Day, Bulgaria Day, and so on [BDI-Dimo-01.03.2017-MG].

On a personal level, in the Navy, the situation is slightly different as there is less opportunity to mix with crews from other nations. Mira notes that while on deployment as part of the Bulgarian Navy, her ship's commander advised the crew not to have personal communication with the crews from other international ships during shore leave because they would inevitably discuss work and their



duties and could reveal classified information Bulgarian Navy do not have personal relationships with officers from other vessels, and so they treat the ship as a unit in terms of trust and cooperation [BDI-Mira-23.02.2017-JC].

Current political tensions external to the mission or to exercises can influence the trust and cooperation between militaries. Roza, a Naval officer, remembers an incident that occurred during an international Naval training exercise hosted by Bulgaria. Both Russia and Georgia were participating in the exercise, which was taking place not long after Russia had invaded Georgia, and tensions were high between the two groups. Georgia were given the role of a hostile vessel, and Russia claimed that they would treat them as hostile if they had cause to. As a result, the exercise did not go ahead [BDI-Roza-23.02.2017-CD].

In his role as a military advisor in Afghanistan, Andon stated that there was a lack of trust between his unit and the Afghani military *"...you're talking to your counterparts and you're supposed to trust him because he is your counterpart but at the same time, you're also worried that you cannot trust him, you can only trust your own troops."* He describes how the lack of trust presented a sense of tension and danger in not knowing what to expect [BDI-Andon-01.03.2017-MG]. Borislav, who also served in an advisory role, gives a striking example of the importance of trust. His unit, alongside their American counterparts, were tasked with regularly meeting with the Afghanistan Army to give advice on weapons and equipment maintenance. At one of these meetings, the commander of the Bulgarian team who were present prior to the Borislav's deployment was ambushed and shot, and the Bulgarians then returned fire. Understandably, this dissolved the trust between the Bulgarian and Afghan soldiers. Borislav's team, the replacement team, had to then rebuild the trust between the two armies in order to continue this work [BDI-Borislav-01.03.2017-SC].

The Bulgarian Army was very hesitant at first about resuming work with the Afghanistan Army, but they decided to continue. They began by bringing token gifts, such as pens, notebooks and Bulgarian souvenirs, as a gesture to the Afghanistan Army as a means to re-establish trust. Borislav spoke about how the Afghani showed them hospitality in return by offering them sweet tea and sitting to drink with them. The interviewee also mentioned that talking about their countries' common history with the Russians was also a means of building the relationship. [BDI-Borislav-01.03.2017-SC].

Andon mentions that knowing about the local culture and religion can help to improve trust, but it is also a matter of demonstrating mutual respect [BDI-Andon-01.03.2017-MG]. Bogomila, from the army, states that as a woman it is very different for her to be able to interact with Afghan personnel, so she claims that her approach to build trust is also different. Again, she makes the gesture of bringing small gifts like Coco Cola or cookies, to be polite and build rapport, but she does not initiate contact. She acknowledges the role of women in Afghan society is completely different and so she tries to reflect this in her own interactions. For example, in conversing with Afghani soldiers, she waits for them to initiate conversation, and she never asks about family unless they have brought it up first. She says that these kind of things need to be understood better prior to deployment [Bogomila-BDI-01.03.2017-MC].



#### 3.4.4 Trust with International NGOs

Trust between military and NGOs is very important although most troops have no direct interaction with them. It is mainly an issue for CIMIC and it is not always part of their role. Trust is built up on a personal level and requires diplomacy. Establishing trust requires breaking out of the military mindset and understanding the civilian point of view. IOS NGO activities can impact the military operations also so this is important but also important that the commander understands this. See Section 2.4.

#### 3.4.5 Trust with International Civil Servants

There are no substantial findings present in the data to describe trust between the Bulgarian military and international civil servants.

#### 3.4.6 Trust with Local Government

There are no substantial findings present in the data to describe trust between the Bulgarian military and local government.

#### 3.4.7 Trust with Local People

In dealing with the local people in Afghanistan, Andon emphasises the importance of good relationships, *“In my humble opinion, only the locals can keep you safe there. If you go out, no matter how heavily you’re armed, if you go out among them in the local society, only they can save you. They can take care of you.”* [BDI-Andon-01.03.2017-MG].

Andon notes that he has an interpreter to assist him with his advisory role. This individual is briefed before they meet with the Afghani military as to the goal of the meeting. The interpreter in turn advises Andon on how to behave and communicate. This is an informal part of their role, but is considered to be extremely valuable. The first stage of the process is to develop the relationship, the second is to understand the Afghani military and its needs, and the third is to provide the advice. Yet, it is important not to be viewed as simply stating advice, the relationship between both parties is crucial. Andon notes that one way of building up relationships is to mention a historical theory that Bulgarians are derived from the same ancestry as the people of Afghanistan. He views this as a way to break down the perception that the NATO soldiers are completely dissimilar to the local people [BDI-Andon-01.03.2017-MG].

Stoyan describes how he attempted to earn trust of the Afghanistan leaders. He notes that that although Bulgaria is predominantly Christian, there are some Muslim regions. Prior to deployment, he met with local Imams in Bulgaria and received Korans and other books to take over as gifts to take over as a gesture to the Afghan Commander. The gesture was very well received. He also notes that it is important to show respect not only to commanding officers but also to the community and the local children, as they will retain these impressions [Stoyan-BDI-02.03.2017-MC].

Zlatko was responsible for patrolling in the military base, which was comprised of both military and local civilians. He describes the relationship with civilians as hot and cold. The local civilians could be verbally abusive towards the Bulgarian soldiers. He states that that they were not physically aggressive but verbally so, and that although they try to establish mutual respect between the military and the local populations, that this is understandably frustrating. He describes one event hosted by the local elders, to celebrate the opening of a new school. The locals prepared a sheep

and the NATO soldiers and the locals ate together, although he was reluctant to eat the food [BDI-Zlatko-02.03.2017-SC].

Yasen recalls a story that happened to him on the checkpoint. When leaving the base, the soldiers would often try to be surrounded by local children because if there were children present at the checkpoint it would deter hostile behaviour. Yasen describes a day when he was among a group of soldiers at a checkpoint. The group was undersupplied in terms of provisions for their shift and was very hungry. A local child, about five or six, who arrived to the checkpoint with a plate of lamb and bread her mother had prepared for them. The girl said that she was a Christian, but the soldiers suspected that she was saying this to gain their trust. The soldiers were forbidden to accept food, but were hungry and did not want to disrespect the locals. As the senior officer, Yasen had to make the decision. He gave the girl a picture of the Virgin Mary and asked the girl who it was, when she recognized her, after that he accepted the food [BDI-Yasen-01.03.2017-SC].

Milen describes an incident in which an explosion occurred in Iraq. A small child was severely injured and his father a local farmer was carrying him in his arms and pleading with the soldiers to take him to the hospital in the ambulance. But the soldiers were reluctant to allow him into the vehicle because the farmer himself may be concealing an explosion, which was a genuine concern. The soldiers wanted to take the child alone. Milen based on his experience did not regard the farmer to be a threat. He also based his decision on what he knew from Islamic philosophy about the relationship between fathers and their first-born son, and remarked that his knowledge of the culture helped inform his decision-making. It was still a high risk to accept, but he felt assured that he could justify his decision on the basis of his training [BDI-Milen-02.03.2017-MG].

### **3.5. Advice for Future peacekeepers in terms of soft skills**

#### **3.5.1 Sexuality**

There is a lack of clarity regarding the LGBT policies that are in place. Dimitri mentions that the Bulgarian military are still quite conservative when it comes to sexuality and LGBT in the military. A few male participants joked that they would be reluctant to work alongside a gay person, as they would be too distracted by their male colleagues to concentrate on their responsibilities. The comments were intended in jest. And one of the participants stated that if he were to work with gay officers in the future he would probably have a different opinion, and it would not be an issue. Anastasiya notes that issues can arise if other members are aware of an individual's status as LGBT. This can lead to jokes regarding sexuality or ostracizing the individual. She adds that this problem can usually be stopped if the commander intervenes, and makes it known that this behaviour will not be tolerated. The military culture ensures that his orders will be adhered to [BDI-Anastasiya-23.02.2017-CD].

Regarding tolerance for sexuality in the military, one member of the Navy mentioned that if a member of staff is LGBT and it is not common knowledge there is usually no issue. Kiril states that although he has not encountered any LGBT people in the Navy, that he does not think that they would be easily accepted as part of a crew. He explains that this is not exclusively a military problem but more of the Bulgarian perception of LGBT people and sexuality [BDI-Kiril-23.02.2017-JC].

### 3.5.2 Cultural Awareness

Cultural awareness training is considered to be valuable, particularly for those who will have interactions with the local population or military. Additionally, there is wide acknowledgement that it is respectful to understanding the culture and customs of the environment in which you will be working even if contact with the local population is minimal. Cultural awareness training always forms part of pre-deployment. However, the extent of this training and what it comprises can vary greatly.

For example, as Yassen's team was the first deployed on an international mission their cultural awareness training was a new addition. They were told the basic information about the Muslim religion. He was interested to learn about the culture, but only in relation to how it would be helpful to his responsibilities. Despite what he considered shortcomings in his cultural awareness training, in his work with the local population, Yassen respected the Muslim locals' observance of Ramadan; he fasted during the day, and did not distribute food to the community until after sundown, and then ate with the locals afterwards. He also ensured that there was a prayer room set up in the local military training school so attendees could observe prayer. His experience shows taking initiative with regard to cultural awareness [BDI-Yasen-01.03.2017-SC].

Before being deployed to Bosnia as administrative support, Ana notes that her one week of cultural awareness training was very basic and mostly concentrated on the current political state of Bosnia. She also demonstrated initiative by doing her own research on the local culture on the internet before taking up the position [BDI-Ana-02.03.2017-MG].

Before deployment, people naturally hold stereotypes about personnel from other countries. Working alongside people from different nationalities can change these perceptions. Milen claims that despite differences it is easy to find a way to communicate on a common level, talking football with Italians or Hollywood and films with Americans [BDI-Milen-02.03.2017-MG]. Most of Kiril's interactions with people from the Arabic culture have been through contact with officer on international military training courses. He claims that their behaviour does not match up with the stereotypes that are often presented, but that perhaps they too are demonstrating cultural awareness while working abroad. He adds that the most striking thing is that they behave more liberally than he would have expected, *"a little bit too liberated sometimes"*, for example, trying alcohol which they would not do back home and that this experience challenged his stereotypes [BDI-Kiril-23.02.2017-JC].

Currently, cultural awareness is covered mainly through the issuing of the Smartbook reference, which contains useful information about cultural and religious sensibilities at a basic level; however, it doesn't provide much instruction about many of the minutiae of social interactions, that is, in terms of what one should actually do to build up good will. Andon claims that while basic military training is understandably standardized, it is important that additional training is always tailored to the mission destination. In terms of political and cultural guidance, there are perhaps changes over time or according to specific regions of the country. It is important that these differences are reflected in the training content. Further to this, the content needs to be current to give an accurate representation of what will be experienced on the ground [BDI-Andon-01.03.2017-MG].

The need for both cultural-sensitivity and job specific instruction arose in speaking with Zlatko who was involved in searches at checkpoints. Zlatko states that he received some training before deployment but he felt that the training was completely mismatched with what he was expected to do at the checkpoint. The training involved real-time simulations but they did not match what was expected when he was in Iraq, almost to the extent of being the opposite; because of this he did not consider them to be helpful at all. He states *“you learn everything there, at the moment”*, for example, he claims that when women are travelling alone there is usually no issue, but that issues can arise when women are accompanied by their husbands who may be more protective. Because of this, the initial days in this position were difficult as he felt he had to learn on the job and in the first month almost every day was different [BDI-Zlatko-02.03.2017-SC].

Additional training could be helpful in terms of sensitivity. For example, Zlatko remarks that he found the local people in Iraq to be very unhygienic. He recalls that while on checkpoints, performing searches, dealing with the locals was unpleasant because of body odour [BDI-Zlatko-02.03.2017-SC]. Dimo mentions something similar and notes that it is something that his friends in the military had warned him of before going on deployment [BDI-Dimo-01.03.2017-MG]. Milen states that the inclusion of smells is important for creating an accurate atmosphere within the game. He describes that newcomers, and even experienced officers, deployed to Afghanistan were disorientated by the intrusive smells of livestock and farming. According to Milen, it is an environment that they are completely unfamiliar with, and he describes soldiers perfuming their personal space in camps to cope [BDI-Milen-02.03.2017-MG].

### **3.5.3 Emotional Intelligence & Support**

Regarding the concept of GAP, Yassen, a Bulgarian CIMIC officer, states that games to teach soft skills should be role-playing exercises that are conducted in person. He comments that in person, you remember things differently, more effectively, as opposed to through the medium of the computer. He adds that it is more advantageous to be able to witness peoples' reactions and their eyes within the situation and in real time. Understanding different approaches, the perspective of others, respect for the local population is extremely important. He regarded the inclusion of stories and personal experiences as very illustrative for learning. [BDI-Yassen-01.03.2017-SC]. It was considered important by a number of interviewees that realism be a part of pre-deployment training. Both in the US and in Poland Bulgarian personnel encountered training using scenarios and actors playing roles to simulate potential conflict situations. This was considered very useful.

Milen states that he sees the advantage of a tool like GAP in being able to capture and record the experiences of previous deployments. He sees this application of information as valuable for those going on future deployment in terms of their preparedness and managing stress. He adds that it may also be a cathartic experience for some people to have the opportunity to contribute and share their experiences. In this sense, he considers it a means to be able to create a sense of community and for people to see the value of their work, and to know that it is meaningful [BDI-Milen-02.03.2017-MG].

Roza mentions that she would like to see some form of training on 'emotional intelligence' included as part of pre-deployment preparations. As the crew on Navy ships are away for long periods of time the atmosphere of the ship is very important and this can be affected by the mood of even a few individuals. She added that, in her view, women are more stable in this regard. She felt that this

would be a good contribution to the game to explore the personal emotional reactions of crew to unexpected situations [BDI-Roza-23.02.2017-CD]. Mira mentions that working in close quarters with her colleagues on the ship over an extended period of time can become frustrating and difficult to deal with. She, personally, feels that at times it can make her more emotionally reactive and she thinks that she would like to have better patience to deal with this situation [BDI-Mira-23.02.2017-JC].

While pre-deployment training is important for personnel going on missions their families often do not understand what it means to be in that position, on deployment. Nikolai states that soldiers often divorce when they return from missions, as is his experience. He describes that while he is on deployment he feels that it is necessary to separate his family life from his duties overseas. Understanding the importance of the work is necessary for reconciling with difficulties back home. But he proposes that there should be support for families, not just for those on deployment. Wives and husbands who are not military do not understand the commitment and responsibilities to military colleagues. It is important to express the purpose and function of their work in order to gain support from home [Nikolai-BDI-01.03.2017].


## 4. Regional Stakeholder Report: Ireland

### 4.1 Summary Details of interviews


The Defence Forces of Ireland (DFI) were interviewed as part of the Gaming for Peace (GAP) project during a three-month period, from December 2016 to February 2017. In total, twenty-eight interviews were conducted by six individuals from the GAP consortium. The DFI have a unique insight into the complexities of international peacekeeping having participated in numerous UN peace operations since 1958. While Lebanon and most notably UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) dominates Irish peacekeeping duties, members of the DFI have also participated in European led missions.

The duties performed by the DFI on overseas missions and the challenges inherent in peacekeeping was clearly demonstrated throughout the interviews. There were several overlapping themes gleaned from the interviews including the informal nature of communication and cooperation. Naturally, interviewees also differed considerably in their roles and viewpoints, ranging from the many echelons of the DFI at both senior, middle ranked and junior levels. In addition, the interviewees varied in ages from their early twenties to mid-fifties. The two youngest participants from the Irish Navy were aged twenty-four. All members of the DFI volunteered for missions abroad. The many perspectives from the interviewees are dissected and analysed under the rubric of communication, cooperation and trust and the final section assesses the advice the interviewees had on peacekeeping in general and specifically in terms of soft skills. A more nuanced understanding of the role soft skills in deployed personnel is a critical part of the Gaming for Peace project.

It should also be noted that while the DFI can be said to be the umbrella name for the Defence Forces in Ireland, members of the DFI can come from the Army, the Naval service and the Air Corps. The Naval Service consists of much smaller numbers than the army and while there are about 9,000 members of the DFI, only about 1,000 members come from the Navy. There are currently over four hundred DFI members serving on overseas missions in 2017. The GAP interviews therefore represent about 7 percent of the total numbers of deployed personnel. However, of the twenty-eight DFI interviews conducted, fifty-seven percent were members from the Army and forty-three percent came from the Navy. The following chart demonstrates the number of participants in the GAP interviews from the Irish Army and the Navy as well as the gender breakdown of interviewees.



**Figure 3:** Organizational breakdown of interview participants by gender.



**Figure 4:** Gender distribution of Defense Forces of Ireland Participants

Some interviewees spoke of the DFI's promotion of gender equality and current campaign to enlist more females into the Defence Forces, however, the prevalence of male peacekeepers in peacekeeping missions continues. The fact that international peacekeeping is largely male dominated also meant that fewer numbers of females were interviewed. This was particularly so in relation to the army interviews. The following demonstrates the total breakdown of gender within both the army and navy participants.

Although Navy officers can be deployed with the Army and serve overseas, in recent years the Irish Navy has served on Search and Rescue Operations in the Mediterranean Sea under 'Operation Pontus'. As GAP has previously documented (D2.1, D2.2) peacekeeping has become a multifaceted and challenging phenomenon. Nowhere was this more visibly demonstrated than in the Irish Naval

Ships' rescues of thousands of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea. All Navy interviewees spoke of the impact of 'Operation Pontus', from an emotional and difficult standpoint to the joyful and rewarding scenes of witnessing something that they were very 'proud' to be part of. The emotional content in the interviews was quite prominent from the beginning. In this respect, it must be acknowledged that this form of peacekeeping was very different from the more traditional aspects of peacekeeping and has stretched even the meaning of 'humanitarian missions'. The Navy served as part of a multi-lateral effort involving several ships rescuing migrants and supporting the Italian Marine Rescue Co-Ordination Centre. The following figure reveals the extent of the migration routes into Europe and the Mediterranean Sea route where the Irish Naval ships operated.<sup>3</sup>



Evidently while there are strong similarities between army and navy duties and roles, particularly so in communication and discipline, there are also clear differentiations. Notwithstanding that, Operation Pontus must be assessed in a different format to the army not just in the area of land-based versus sea-based peacekeeping but largely due to a unique set of circumstances. Many participants mentioned some very stressful scenes and difficult experiences and the 'shock to the system' of seeing the migrants, especially so in trying to cope with the number of dead bodies that were brought onto their ships. This is largely reflected by all the interviews in that these were no ordinary missions. Operation Pontus had a singular goal and as one interviewee put it 'we were saving people's lives as opposed to peacekeeping'. Several mentioned that despite the challenges, they still had a job to do and the positions of the navy crew members varied considerably in their duties from electrician to seaman to search and rescue officer. In contrast, the DFI army participants covers junior and senior ranked military personnel with jobs/roles ranging from a Lieutenant Colonel, to privates, to a UN Trainer. The interviewees had been on deployments in 15 different countries with every respondent bar 1 having been deployed at least once to the Lebanon. See table below.

<sup>3</sup> See UNHCR. 'Missing Migrants Project. International Organisation for Migration and 'The world's congested human migration routes: <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/09/150919-data-points-refugees-migrants-maps-human-migrations-syria-world/>



Pseudonym	Gender	Branch	Rank/Job in Org.	No. of Deployment	Deployment Locations
Ann	Female	Navy	Navy Supply		Mediterranean
Claire	Female	Army	Captain	1	Lebanon
David	Male	Navy	Officer	1	Mediterranean
Eoin	Male	Army	UN Training Instructor	2	Lebanon
Eric	Male	Army	Captain	5	Lebanon, Afghanistan
James	Male	Navy	Lead Mechanic	1	Mediterranean
Jim	Male	Army	Trooper	2	Syria, Lebanon
Jim	Male	Navy	Seaman	1	Mediterranean
JM	Male	Army	Sergeant	18	Lebanon, Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Chad, Somalia, Eretria, Sudan, Afghanistan
Joe	Male	Army	Corporal	4	Kosovo, Lebanon
Liam	Male	Army	Captain	1	Syria
Lucy	Female	Navy	Engineering Officer	1	Mediterranean
Matt	Male	Navy	Seaman	1	Mediterranean
Matthew	Male	Navy	Search and Rescue	1	Mediterranean
Michael	Male	Army	Brigadier General	10	Lebanon, Chad, Kosovo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, BiH
Mick	Male	Army	Corporal	3	Chad, Lebanon, Syria
Morris	Male	Army	Private	1	Lebanon
MP	Male	Army	Lieutenant Colonel	9	Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Balkans, Kosovo, Liberia, Congo
Natalie	Female	Navy	Petty Officer: Electrician	3	Mediterranean
Noel	Male	Navy	Lead Gunner	1	Mediterranean
Patrick	Male	Army	Lance Corporal	2	Liberia, Lebanon
Paul	Male	Navy	Petty Officer (Engine Room)	1	Mediterranean
Philip	Male	Army	Rifleman	1	Lebanon
Richard	Male	Navy	Seaman	1	Mediterranean
Sally	Female	Navy	Navy Supply	1	Mediterranean
Thomas	Male	Army	Corporal	4	Liberia, Chad, Lebanon
Total 26					

**Table 3:** Summary table of Defence Forces of Ireland Participants

## 4. 2. Communication

### 4.2.1. Why Communication is Important

Within peacekeeping missions, the ability to communicate is an important factor in ensuring a successful outcome, which revealed itself when reviewing the qualitative data of interviews collected from the DFI. When asked directly about how communication was in their various deployments among the various different actors they encountered, participants noted their experiences in the field and how it impacted them both personally and more broadly in terms of the objectives of their missions.

The respondents at all ranks interviewed recognised the importance of communication and linked to the success of the mission. There was a notable split however in *why* respondents felt communication was for their role. Senior army personal recognised its importance regarding communicating with senior people across different types of organisations and armies, communicating the mission goals to junior military personal goals and saw communication as part of good leadership. Senior military personnel felt that they had received extensive training in communication. Respondents with more junior roles communicated very little with personal from different types of organisation, and relatively rarely with military personnel outside the Irish contingent, only occasionally interacting with other militaries sharing the same base. These more junior staff felt that communication with local people was key, particularly while out on patrol. While the more junior staff felt that they were told about the importance of communicating and interacting with local people on a day to day basis, 3 respondents from the army felt that they would have liked more practical advice on how to do this.

Many respondents noted the importance of informal communication to build relationships, whether it be with the local population or with people they collaborated with from other militaries, examples included playing sport with other militaries who shared the same base and visiting local markets and shops. Many respondents felt that informal communication was something that the Irish Defence Forces did particularly well and that it set them apart from other militaries.

Effective communication was also key objective for navy interviewees. For one interviewee, being level headed but being direct in communicating with the migrants was important. Because language barriers existed within the many different nationalities and cultures, communicating through hand gestures which are ‘fairly universal’ became an essential element for putting your message across. In addition, working under pressure at various times during their three-month deployment at sea, meant that good communication between crew members was critical to the success of the mission. In the following sections and subsections, differences in communication with other organisations are revealed in the interviews, particularly when dealing with other militaries, concerning their nationality and cultures, whether or not they are a professional or voluntary army and whether or not they are from a combative national army. How to communicate with the local population and with local people of influence was also a common theme. Illustrative examples of the participant’s experience of *Communication within and between Organisations*, and incidents of improvised solutions to *Problems in Communication with other Organizations* can be found in Parts 2.2 and 2.4 respectively.

#### **4.2.2 Communication in Own organization**

In relation to the army, there were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication among their own organisations. Respondents noted that living and training together for a long period of time before deployed meant that they had built up personal relationships that made communication easy. One junior respondent, Morris, noted that living and working with the same people day after day can lead to some frustration and petty disagreements.

Similarly, navy participants noted that living in confined spaces and in close quarters on a ship also produces a very tightly bonded crew. At the same, this can also produce challenges. With so many migrants on board, over 700 on one occasion, maintaining order among the migrants meant good communication between the crew on board. In one particular incident, Lucy mentioned the need to communicate with a fellow crew member who was being too 'emphatic' with the migrants, giving some of them more clothes than others or extra food. This created mayhem on the ship because then everyone wanted more then. Lucy points out that before they left for the Mediterranean they had sat down with the ships' doctor and decided what the food allocation would be. Too much or too little could make them ill so they needed to get the balance right. Nonetheless, fights broke out between the migrants vying for more than the 'rules' allowed. The crew had to find ways to calm the situation, communicating effectively but using authoritative tones. Lucy also had to communicate with her fellow crew member about why they had such rules on the ship in relation to the migrants. In any case, lessons were learnt and the crew member did not repeat this action again.

#### **4.2.3 Communication with Personnel from police forces**

Only two of the respondents from the army noted any prior experience communicating with police. Although these respondents both felt that the organisations were relatively similar and this made communication easy, one respondent, Joe, felt that while he was in Kosovo the local police force were somewhat unprofessional and there was suspicion of corruption. This he felt could make military wary of handing over crime suspects to the police, which led to a more confrontational communication style between military and police in that context, which in turn hindered successful collaboration.

#### **4.2.4. Personnel from other militaries**

The army respondents stated that outside their own contingent, they interacted most frequently with personnel from other militaries and the personnel interviewed felt that armies were broadly similar in their communication style. The respondents felt that the Irish were 'just a lot friendlier than other armies' and that other armies could be too 'rigid and serious' in the way they communicated, particularly armies from the Northern European countries. Four out of the respondents mentioned the American army were more difficult to communicate and work with, projecting an aggressive image with one interviewee Joe describing them as particularly 'macho and 'gung-ho'.

However, navies generally dealt with other navies on friendly terms and in the Mediterranean good communication and cooperation was essential. The Irish navy were in close contact with the Italian authorities specifically, and also had an Italian officer on board directing them with communications details and cooperation with other ships in the area. According to one interviewee, 'communications

would be very concise', 'very operationally focused'. The standardised way of communication was also mentioned as 'just dealing with people 'with different accents'. Essentially, as the interviewees pointed out, 'everyone had to work together', whether it was the 'German navy', 'the British navy', the 'Italian navy' or the Irish navy.

#### **4.2.5 International NGOs**

One army respondent, Eric, noted communication with NGOs as overall very negative. He felt that the different operational styles caused them to 'butt head' on different occasion with their disorganisation and unclear and varied mandates also mentioned. Michael also commented on how NGOs use 'very interesting language – like stay out of the NGO battlespace', but when things happen to them, 'they realised that we (the military) could actually do something to protect them...and at the same time they could maintain their own sense of neutrality.'

In addition, the navy often had a negative view of NGOs. Even though they were doing the same thing as the military ships in rescuing the migrants, they again had different operating styles. A navy interviewee, Jim commented, 'NGOs were hard work'. The navy had their SOP – standard operating procedure – a way of doing things, 'a routine, whereas they would be all gung-ho, it doesn't work like that.' Jim felt that the navy had a routine way of doing things which was better and since NGOs didn't have this, they 'only got in the way.'

#### **4.2.6 International Civil Servants and Local Government**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication with local government and international civil servants.

#### **4.2.7 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with own organization**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication among their own organisations

#### **4.2.7 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with Personnel from police forces**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication among from other police forces.

#### **4.2.8. Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with Personnel from militaries**

Improvised solutions in communication with personnel from other militaries tended to pivot around the importance of social and informal interaction, friendly communication, socialising together and asking questions about the other person's families and life outside the army, as very important in improving relations and the ability to communicate and collaborate together in a professional context.

Three of the more junior respondents from the army, Jim, Philip and Morris mentioned being based at a compound in the Lebanon which was shared by just the Irish and the Finns, with the Irish and Finns largely going on separate patrols to the Finns and the two contingents rarely speaking to each within the compound. Morris noted that this made the base feel 'cliquey'. Philip mentioned that the Irish soldier's organised sports day or games where soldiers would come together and this helped greatly develop camaraderie which he felt helped in future interactions. Joe mentioned an exercise

which he described as an 'exchange' where a couple of Irish soldiers would go on a Finnish patrol and vice versa and he felt this was a good idea. Eoin mentioned how a former Finnish representative came over to Ireland to brief them on Finnish culture, how to interact with the Finns and what their cultural idiosyncrasies were. This was in order to give the Irish a greater understanding of the interactions and communications between cultures.

#### **4.2.9 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with International NGOs, International Civil Servants, Local Government**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding improvised communication with international NGOs, international civil servants and local governments.

#### **4.2.10 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with Local people**

Improvised solutions in communication with local people depended on the particular country of deployment and often the year in which the participant went, with tensions higher during certain periods than others. In general, a lot of communication occurred while on patrol, in markets and in shops. Although it was stressed to DFI soldiers in pre-deployment training on the importance of interacting with the local population in an informal and unthreatening manner and being a visible presence, military personnel felt that the short rotation period and living separately in the barracks hindered them having meaningful communication with local people. Senior military personnel felt they communicated little with the local people in the country they were based as they got more and more senior.

At times, problems with interpreters arose. The main common issue concerned being weary of whether they were accurately conveying the message that they were told to convey, and the response they were giving back. Because of cultural differences, it also involved treading a line of cultural awareness while at the same time ensuring that they made it clear that there was a certain way of doing things that had to be adhered to, this was noted by one respondent who had been deployed to Kosovo. Where possible, the participants tried to learn some of the local language in order to avoid using interpreters to speak directly with the local population to build a relationship with them. Patrick and Thomas mentioned that they wished that they had been taught a tiny bit of Arabic although they knew they would never speak it they felt that a few phrases would communicate respect to the local population.

Good communication was also important in order to get information from the local people. By establishing bonds, the people were willing to speak out and help the military with intelligence. MP, a Lieutenant Colonel who had been on 9 missions, including three to the Lebanon, described an incident where there had been a clash between junior French peacekeepers and people from a local village in the Lebanon. MP visited the house of one of the village leaders who he had built a relationship with over different missions over in order to find out had happened previously. He had built a trusting relationship with this man through taking tea in house, where the village leader would share valuable information with MP about rebel groups and criminal activity, and where MP would listen to the village leader about what the community needed and involve the Irish contingent in a solution, when possible. MP said that this relationship was strengthened by talking about their respective families as they had children of a similar age and by these informal interactions over tea.

A couple of key incidents of improvised communication involved participants being placed in potentially dangerous situations. One such incident involved Jim in Syria being taken hostage along with another private and NCO by 60-70 civilians suspected to be linked to Hezbollah when the patrol drove into the grounds of a football stadium that was of limits. The group of the civilians believed

the patrol to be part of the Israeli forces and that they were gathering intelligence. The group were unarmed but very aggressive and massively outnumbered the patrol, threatening to take their weapons and threatening at one point to kill them after pouring petrol on the car while they were inside. The patrol was held captive for 6-7 hours before the situation was resolved through contacting a local bank manager who was respected in the community and who knew the Irish contingent. During this 6-7-hour period the patrol never used or threatened to use their weapons, they said they spoke in calm voices and tried to use body language that communicated a lack of aggression. For example, showing your palms which Jim said he was thought about as a culturally way of communicating non-aggression. It was noted that communicating in a calm manner in these types of situation was essential but could also be very difficult when stressed.

## 4.3 Cooperation

### 4.3.1 Why Cooperation is important

Within a peacekeeping setting cooperation remains another important factor. This dimension became apparent when reviewing the data collected from the DFI participants on the project. When asked about how cooperation was in their various deployments, participants noted the implications and impacts of good and bad cooperation in the field, which impacted them personally and even more broadly in terms of the overall objectives of missions.

When participants stated that good cooperation occurred, the knock-on effects are described and discussed in generally positive terms, making mission objectives, day-to-day jobs and interactions, and performing job roles easier and appear to result in fewer issues down the line. In a similar fashion, when cooperation was not good, the knock-on effects are generally negative and seem to result in further obstacles to achieving the goals of the missions and becoming a further hindrance to personnel achieving their objectives or adequately performing their roles on the mission.

An interesting point that arose from the interviews conducted with the participants was in relation to whether they recognised or noted that they received any specific training that focused on aspects of cooperation with the various actors potentially working within the mission region. The more junior ranked officer felt that they had had little in how to cooperative with other types of organisations or even other militaries with Morris stating that he felt that was more just the concern of senior military personnel.

In general, the DFI respondents felt they had been clearly instructed on who they would collaborate with within their own and other militaries, with more personal evaluation and decision making needed from senior military personal with regards to who within the local community to approach.

In terms of what respondents believed helped cooperation occur, a wide array of responses was elicited, these included things like the role and impact of good leadership; personality (humour and friendliness); some also mentioned the impact of training on the likelihood of cooperation.

The strongest theme that emerged in relation to this was the importance of informality for cooperation, similarly there were some variations within this theme, but overall interaction with other their own and other military contingents beyond formal and work centred interactions, was seen to positively impact on the realities of cooperation in the field. A few respondents mentioned, for example, eating in restaurants, and talking with others as a way of building rapport and trust with other actors, enhancing cooperation.

In contrast to this, respondents were also asked in a number of interviews as to what they believed hindered cooperation in the field. Generally speaking, the main theme that emerged from respondents' interviews with regard to what hindered cooperation tended to correspond with differences in identities and operational style of different militaries and organisation (although cooperation with different types of organisations was low in this sample of respondents). The aggression or combative nature of some other militaries was mentioned, as well as differences in training and preparation of some contingents. Eric, who had had dealings with NGOs, mentioned a wide difference between the operational style and goals of militaries and NGOs and how this hindered cooperation.

In the following sections and sub-sections, aspects and examples of cooperation from within the field are examined, as drawn from the experiences of the DFI participants, specifically examining each of the potential actors in due course (where relevant). Furthermore, section 3.3 and its subsequent components will examine the ways in which some of the participants reported and discussed their own improvised solutions to problems surrounding cooperation with the various actors in the field.

#### **4.3.2 Own Organisation**

Some members of the navy mentioned difficulties in cooperation within their own organisations. Lucy, for one, felt the captain did not always cooperate or understand the 'position of those on the ground', or those on deck dealing with the migrants. The goal of the captain was to get the migrants on the ship as quickly and as safely as possible. How he wanted to do that was in contrast to members of his crew. He wanted to keep the ship positioned in a certain way depending on the sea waters, but the crew wanted the ship turned so they would be in the shade and not affected by the sun's rays. According to Lucy, 'he was indoors in a cool environment', but we were on deck, so there was a disconnect there. This happens when command make decisions which their subordinate don't understand. As Lucy added, 'his agenda is different to ours but I think he needed to be more cognisant of our agenda as well.' Managing and cooperating effectively with crew members is essential to effective missions.

#### **4.3.3 Personnel from police forces**

Only a small number of army respondents had prior interactions with police, with the 4 respondents that mentioned dealing with police, 3 mention that a fear of the local police being corrupt or unprofessional had hindered cooperation.

#### **4.3.4 Personnel from other militaries**

The aggression or combative nature of some other militaries was mentioned, as well as differences in training and preparation of some contingents. Joe described the American army as particularly 'macho' and 'gung-ho' and that this had made them more difficult to cooperate with. Many of the respondents had worked closely with the Finns in the Lebanon and felt that they could be 'more standoffish' than other contingents and this could make them difficult to cooperate with.

#### **4.3.5 International NGO's**

Eric who worked as an army captain in Lebanon and Afghanistan, mentioned prior experience of working with NGOs. His experience of cooperative with them was negative overall. He mentioned

that they were competitiveness with each other in terms of funding, that there was a lack of willingness to cooperate and problems in beginning cooperation with NGOs – ‘we just have very different approaches’.

In addition, as previously mentioned, the navy also had interactions with NGOs. While some participants said they had limited encounters with NGOs, others pointed out the negative dimensions and lack of understanding as well as contrasting views. Although Jim commented that NGOs ‘get in the way’, he also noted that it was probably just a military thing. Unlike many other organisations, militaries have routines as well as discipline. Militaries had a certain way of dealing with the migrants whereas NGOs have another.

For one, Lucy felt that NGOs did not respect the fact that at the end of the day ‘we are a military vessel’ and they are not free to come and go as they please. Lucy claims that NGOs are volunteers and as such they don’t have the training or the understanding, ‘they think they are doing something good and they’re not’. Confusion then happens when you have so many organisations working in conjunction with each other when there is no system in place or standardised approach. The lack of understanding between these different organisations resulted in hindered cooperation.

#### **4.3.6 Local People**

Most participants felt they cooperated with the local population in very limited ways and were separate from them because of living on bases. Junior staff felt that they had only a surface level of interaction with them on patrol and senior mentioned interacting with local people less and less as they rose up the ranks (MP).

#### **4.3.7 Improvised solutions to problems in cooperation with own organisation**

There were no real examples within the interviews for this particular setting; mostly it was in relation to others.

#### **4.3.8 Improvised solutions to problems in cooperation with other organisations**

In the sub-sections below there are examples of improvisations for cooperation problems in relation to specific actors where they appeared in interviews with participants.

#### **4.3.9 Personnel from own organisation**

No specific examples or sufficient data on this, it was stated the cooperation was made easy from long periods of training before deployment.

#### **4.3.10 Personnel from Police forces**

The respondents in this sample had very little interactions with local police with those interactions happening at roadblocks. Two more junior respondents felt at times that they were handing people over at roadblocks in Kosovo to police that they feared could be corrupt but had to as it was a transition period where they were handed back power to the police.

#### **4.3.11 Personnel from militaries**

Jim described an incident where the Finnish and Irish militaries cooperated particularly well together. The incident occurred on the ‘blue line’ between Israel and Lebanon. The Finns worked together to calm and deescalate the situation when the Lebanese forces wanted to react with violence when they believe the Israeli to be entering Lebanese territory.



#### **4.3.12 International NGO's**

As previously mentioned, interaction with NGO was sometimes negative. On the army side, Michael mentioned how the military needed to understand the culture of the NGOs in theatre. What the military does not study is the culture of the NGOs themselves, which is really important in order to work with them and that 'often proves the greatest difficulty.' NGOs however cannot be placed in one particular grouping, because each NGO has a particularly way of doing things, they are all separate organisations.

#### **4.3.13 International Civil Servants and Local Government**

No specific examples or sufficient data on this.

#### **4.3.14: Local People**

As mentioned above there was little formal cooperation between the military and local people. Patrick and Jim in terms of army relations however mentioned that local shopkeepers could be a great source of information. While on patrol in the Lebanon and that this was another advantage of visiting local shops and markets regularly, if there was violence in the area they would let them know and also they were able to give them information about what the community needed.

Jim mentioned being held captive by Hezbollah for a number of hours in before using their network to get in touch with a local bank manager whose ability to 'vouch' for them helped resolve the situation.

### **4.4. Trust**

#### **4.4.1. Why Trust is Important**

The value of trust in peacekeeping missions was revealed in the interviews as having central importance, often arising in interviews under questions on communication and cooperation. Respondents felt that trust underpinned the strength or weakness of the interactions in terms of communication and cooperation that participant's encountered while on deployment. Two of the senior ranked respondents, Michael and MP, linked trust with leadership skills. MP noted the ability to trust junior staff was a key skill of leadership, knowing when to monitor and knowing when to trust a junior member of staff to complete tasks alone 'letting them make mistakes is difficult but necessary'.

Trust was universally recognised as important, but at the same time difficult to develop in the context of peacekeeping. Reasons mentioned for this:

- The short rotation period on missions for military personnel with the average deployment being six months. This was seen to hinder the development of trust between colleagues and between military personnel and the local population. MP mentioned that he felt it was almost unfair to form a deep trusting relationship with local people when you would leave after 6 months and not know what would happen after you left, whether the peacekeepers who replaced you would treat the local people in the same way or whether those same local people would be injured or killed in the conflict. A few of the respondents mentioned it was difficult to get local people to trust you as they knew you were there for only a short period.

- The experience of conflict made local people reluctant to trust new people. Two of the respondents who had been to Kosovo, Joe and JM, felt that people were wary of peacekeeping personnel because of prior experience of corruption with their national security forces. Mick mentioned that he felt a lower level of trust for many of the locals in Syria because of not being able to decipher who could be a member of Hezbollah.
- The level of difference between militaries on peacekeeping deployments was mentioned as an initial barrier to trust. Although differences were mentioned in terms of nationality, culture and operational style, the main difference mentioned that hindered trust was difference in terms of prior training, preparation and skills. Respondents from the DFI felt that other it was difficult to trust the abilities of some other armies on deployment.
- There is a tension between trusting people and cautious/following procedure.
- There is trust in your own force more as you know them from training back home but also that this could lead to cliques forming between different military contingents.

#### **4.4.2 Strategies to build Trust among Organizations**

There was very little data that emerged in relation to strategies to build trust among different kinds of organisations as the majority of respondents had very little experience outside working with militaries. However, a number of strategies were mentioned on how to build trust among different military contingents through informal interaction including:

- It was mentioned that going for meals together was important, where possible outside of the barracks.
- Finding out about colleagues lives outside of work, asking about people's families, histories and interests.
- Playing sport together. Patrick described sharing a barracks with a Pakistani contingent where initially the two contingents interacted with each other little. Patrick mentioned that the two contingents bonded over a shared interest in cricket after Ireland doing well in cricket that year and later played the sport together. Patrick said he felt this had a positive impact and how they trusted and collaborated with one another in work.
- Several navy crew members mentioned the lack of trust and understanding between the military and NGOs. Some felt that the NGOs don't see the military as having the same agenda as the NGO. On Operation Pontus they were both trying to do exactly the same thing. Yet, 'you are still a military, you still have weapons.' As Lucy commented, 'as part of the military, I am under orders, so I am there to do what I am instructed to do, they (NGO) are not, they are there out of choice...there is a disconnect.' In this way, you 'need to have a real understanding of each organisation you are dealing with, additionally, it can often be based on personalities involved and how skilful they are in dealing with contradictory views and issues.

#### **4.4.3. Strategies to Build Trust with Locals**

The main strategies for building trust with the locals involve displaying professionalism, typically by leading by example and working hard. Other themes that repeatedly came up were the importance of reliability, honesty, friendliness and being genuine.

There were limited opportunities for military staff to interact with local people in a meaningful way, although many of the respondents mentioned that they were actively encouraged to visit local,

shops and markets and be a visible presence in the local community. The majority of respondents indicated that they had been told about the importance of gaining the trust of the local population. Patrick described how he did not feel that this was something that was stressed to all military contingents in the same way. He mentioned how the Finnish contingent drove in armoured vehicles with the windows rolled up and never stopped in local shops while out on patrol and this led to the local population not trusting the Finns as much as the Irish and he felt that the local people would not have shared information with the Finns like they did with the Irish. The importance of coming across as non-aggressive in general was mentioned and the Irish felt that they came across as less aggressive than many other armies.

All DFI respondents had been to the Lebanon and felt that the Irish being in the Lebanon since the 1970s had helped develop trust.

There was a consensus among senior respondents that any invitations to have informal drinks by the locals should be accepted, even in instances where the participants did not necessarily want to, for example taking a shot of raki in Kosovo. There was a feeling that a failure to accept would cause problems and jeopardise the trust they were trying to build.

By building personal relationships through mingling and showing respect to the local population, and not taking sides in areas of ethnic conflict, greater trust was able to be formed. Participants mentioned that learning even a few words of the language was very important to show respect and build trust with the local population.

When asked about the benefits of having female peacekeepers many of the male respondents mentioned that local people, particularly women and children, were more likely to trust female peacekeepers as they see them as softer and less aggressive. The only female respondent, Claire, however felt that this is because male peacekeepers 'hold back' from engaging with women and children and that male peacekeepers should be encouraged to do this more in order to develop the trust of the local community.

Developing a trusting relationship with a local leader was mentioned as an important step to getting the trust of the wider population. MP mentioned how he used an old contact from a previous mission who was influential in the community to get information about a confrontation between villagers and peacekeepers. Jim mentioned being held captive by Hezbollah for a number of hours before using their network to get in touch with a local bank manager who helped resolve the situation.

#### **4.5. Advice for Future peacekeepers in terms of soft skills**

- Valuable to hear from the direct experiences of people who had been peacekeeping before, particularly people who had been deployed in the same region. Some respondents mentioned training where a native from the country they were about to be deployed to came and talked to them about their country, history and culture and they found this particularly useful.
- Two participants would have liked more preparation in communicating with people who had been through trauma/conflict.

- Important to communicate non-aggression, both verbally and non-verbally. Jim mentioned it would be useful to have practice and go to interact with local people at road blocks which would happen frequently.
- Should be prepared for the social stress of being on a mission, family problems, isolation, working and living with colleagues 24/7.
- One participant commented that in giving advice, the individuals need to be true to themselves and work within the parameters: 'They have the skillsets, they know what they can and can't do', and sometimes their 'platoon sergeant needs to be listened to more than you think because it isn't a game, it's for real.'


## 5. Regional Summary Report: Finland

### 5.1 Summary Details of interviews

The interviewed Finnish military and civilian crisis management experts can be seen as distributed in the various tables and figures below. Over all the sample of participants of Finnish varied within the different aspects perhaps most noticeably in terms of age and the deployments of participants within different peacekeeping or crisis management operations. The age of participants varied from 30 to 60. Moreover, the level of deployment experience varied from one operation to several operations. The experts had worked in a diverse range of regions. Also, the interviewed crisis management experts have participated in both, civilian crisis management missions and military crisis management operations.

In total, 13 regions were listed among the 29 participants, with the three most popular regions of deployment being: 1) Afghanistan (with 12 persons); 2) Kosovo (11 persons); and Lebanon (8 persons) and then Bosnia and Herzegovina (6 persons); (see Table 1). In the area of gender, (as is shown in figure 1 below), there was a reasonable split, eleven of our interviewees were female, and a further eighteen interviewees were male.

Both, basic training for crisis management and more detailed pre-deployment training were addressed important before entering to crisis or conflict regions. The level of training before the mission was generally seen rather positive by Finnish crisis management experts. Almost all respondents have had training about local culture and on negotiation skills before the deployments. The further trainings on soft skills varied based on the job/position that person were deployed to. As a finding, liaison officers and higher positions received more training on soft skills before the deployments.



**Figure 5:** Gender distribution of Finnish military crisis management participants.

Name	Gender	Rank/Job in Org	No. of Deployments	Deployment locations
Anna	Female	Liaison Officer	1	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Antti	Male	Duty officer, Liaison officer	2	Kosovo, Afghanistan
Hank	Male	Spokesperson, Intelligence analytic	2	Kosovo, Afghanistan
Kalle	Male	Chief	3	Kenya
Pekka	Male	Sergeant	3	Kosovo, Lebanon
Pekka	Male	Analyst	5	Somalia
Päivi	Female	Duty Officer	1	Afghanistan
Saija	Female	Liaison Officer, Chief Officer	3	Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon
Sami	Male	Military observer	4	Syria and Israel Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Harry	Male	Senior Instructor	5	Syria & Israel, Kosovo, Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Hely	Female	Trainer	1	Somalia
Jared	Male	Did not specify	7	Afghanistan, Lebanon
Susanne	Female	Liaison Officer	2	Afghanistan, Kosovo
Paresh	Male	Adviser COS	1	Afghanistan
Adam	Male	Adviser	2	Afghanistan
Laura	Female	2IC	1	Kosovo
Maria	Female	CIMIC Officer	1	Lebanon
James	Male	Team leader, Commander	4	Syria and Israel, Kosovo, Ukraine
Kiia	Female	CIMIC Officer	3	Kosovo, Lebanon
Aino	Female	Chief operation officer	2	Georgia, Ukraine
Chief	Male	Chief for personnel and logistics	5	Syria, Lebanon, Balkans
Matt	Male	Adviser	3	Afghanistan, Lebanon
Jack	Male	Chief of staff	3	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Keijo	Male	Operation officer	1	Afghanistan
Ben	Male	Chief operating officer	2	Cyprus, Macedonia
Benjamin	Male	Officer	2	Afghanistan, Iraq
Lars	Male	Platoon Leader	4	Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon
Elle	Female	Public Affairs Officer	1	Afghanistan
Ada	Female	Political Adviser	2	Georgia
<b>Total = 29</b>				

**Table 4:** Summary table of Finnish Interviewees

## 5.2. Soft Skills: Communication

### 5.2.1. Why Communication is Important

When reviewing and analysing the importance of communication experienced by the Finnish military peacekeeping experts (Finnish Defence Forces), the communication is identified very essential in every peacekeeping mission or crisis management operation. When asked directly about “how communication was in their various deployments among the various different actors they encountered”, participants addressed their experiences in the field, which were the possible shortfalls and solutions for better communication among key stakeholders. As a starting point the military the practices to figure out who to talk and meet with is set in the hierarchy. In the most of the cases, the military personnel (e.g. liaison officer) given by tasks and all the meetings are set up. The team leaders normally give a list of persons to be meet in the coming weeks.

Firstly, most of the interviewees underlined the importance of communication and information sharing in peacekeeping operations. In the operation area, the different operations and missions as well different organisations have the key focuses which may affect positively in terms of exchange information since all may receive added value from the communication. There was a diversity of experiences related to communication among other organisations. All the experts addressed the need of communication among local government and local population. One military expert stated *“...one very famous saying was that in Bosnia we are supposed to talk to people and ask how they feel about that, are there any tensions about the parties, it’s all about communication.”* The communication is natural part of peacekeeping work. The communication was seen crucial in key leader engagement and gaining information which may lead toward to achieve desired goals of the mission or operation. One respondent, Pekka, said that your communication skills naturally affects to the mission, national background and even your occupations.

Secondly, in a meta-level, the communication was identified/defined in multiple ways such as via language, use of interpreter, attending to the meetings, using different communication channels (e.g. emails, phones, radios), facilitating unofficial talks and discussions, ability to feel (e.g. presence) and so forth. Few interviewees stated the importance of face-to-face meetings in order to observe the body language. A number of participants (approximately 15) referred, in various ways, to the importance of commonality in relation to what helps communication between own or other organisations. Within this, there were commonalities in terms of common language; culture; nationalities; shared visions and goals. In addition, the gender differences in communication were identified by few interviewees. The gender related communication challenges and solutions mainly focused on local background and cultural aspects (such as a need of having only women discussions). The ability to communicate can make a difference also in order to avoid further conflicts or risks. Among own organisation, the importance of talks was felt crucial since there might be a lack of freedom and long time periods stayed inside the camps. Although, an interesting finding was, that the communication was seen very crucial skill and further investments to training of communication skills would be beneficial. One expert stated that *“If we would invest more in communications skills and communicating we would avoid a lot of conflicts”*.

In the following sections and subsections, differences in communication with other organisations are revealed in the interviews, particularly when dealing among militaries, humanitarians (such as NGOs) and locals the differences in communication were identified. Illustrative examples of the participant's experience of communication within and between organizations, and the solutions to problems in communication with other organizations can be found in Parts 2.3 and 2.4 respectively.

### **5.2.2 Experience of Communication within Own organization**

The experiences of communicating with personnel from own organisation, in general, positive and conducive to ensuring effective working environment. Most of this centred to the clear structures, hierarchy among military personnel as well as shared facilities (camps, lofts). Also within military the personnel follows the NATO processes which means that communication methods were always similar.

The good experiences varied from the information and reporting practices to daily meetings at the HQ level. Most of the experts who were deployed in Afghanistan mentioned the information gathering from observation area and sharing information between personnel as good and effective communication practices. An interesting finding was identified by female Finnish military personnel, of which most respondents noted that in the same premises the cooperation goes pretty smoothly, since personnel is spending the free time together. Also during the free time, in the camps or loft house the ranks did not play too large role. Some respondents addressed the importance of face-to-face meetings in communication to enable to observe the body language.

Experiences of difficulties within own organisation typically focused on high security standards especially in terms of information sharing or decided communication methods. One interviewed civilian Finnish crisis management expert, Aino, shared her experiences about lack of common language among mission in Ukraine. She mentioned that there was lot of police men in the mission who did not speak English at all. Some same national personnel needed to translate every internal issues for those people. Especially in the case of security briefing this may cause some communication challenges when you are not aware if the person really understood it.

### **5.2.3 Personnel from police forces**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication among personnel from police forces.

### **5.2.4 Personnel from militaries**

In general, most of the experts shared the smoothness to communicate with other military since the personnel have core values, training, phases and terminology. The tensions that arose related to the lack of communication among bigger operations especially doing intelligence work operations and national agendas that affected to follow the operation mandate. If the communication among bigger operations and mission were little it effected towards the locals as confusion.

### **5.2.5 International NGOs**

There was a minimal experiences shared via interviewees about communication with international NGOs. One theme that came up when communicating with international NGOs was that humanitarian actors may have a negative approach towards military organisations and operations. Some interviewees mentioned that military always aim to safe and secure the environment; this was



not always seen positively by humanitarian. In addition, some frustration arose when non-governmental aid organisations worked with private money and private funding.

The challenges in communication with NGOs or civilian interlocutor focused on definitions and terms that were not common among militaries and NGOs. One respondent, James, mentioned that there was a need to translate your speech to civilian language in order to understand each other. He thought that military must aim to learn this joint language to work in collaboration with civilians.

#### **5.2.6 International Civil Servants, International organisations (EU, UN, OSCE, NATO, OECD, IOM)**

When reviewing the response, there was a huge variation between regions in number of other international organisations represented in the country but also in the level of doing the level in personal level. The level of cooperation was strongly connected to the work description or position of person. The higher positions (such as team leaders or commanders) and liaison officer were mainly doing the cooperation with other international organisations and civil servants.

Most of the interviewees answered either the positive experiences or challenges in communication with other internationals. In terms of peacekeeping missions, communication with international civil servants and international organisations appeared to be the smooth. For example Pekka, as some other interviewees described that from his perspective he did not have any problems in terms of communication with international organisations like UN, OECD or IOM. Also Laura stated that the communication was smooth with other internationals such as with UN since the organisation also have clear goals and organised way to approach issues in the field.

The experiences of differences in communication, Sami mentioned UN policy which he saw very strict in terms of publicly say your opinions or ideas. He said that basically the personnel must speak the organisation language. Nevertheless, it was also stated by several of the respondents that there are several stakeholders who wanted to hold the information which affected to lack of information sharing.

#### **5.2.7 Local Government**

The key finding, stated by almost all respondents, about this topic was the lack of common language which led to possible misunderstandings between people. Normally military personnel do not speak the local language at least fluent and they must have the interpreter which changes the communication totally. The language barrier and use of interpreter also require the training. In the situation of using interpreter some respondents noted that there are always something lost in translations. Generally speaking Finnish military personnel stated that the training on how to use interpreter is in a good level in current training system.

In Afghanistan, even the access to and reaching the local authorities and local government representatives were sometimes challenging and problematic. Hank said *"...for example (in Afghanistan) if you wanted to discussed with this people face to face the arrangement took weeks."* The same was noted in the conflict regions which were lacking basic infrastructures (e.g. Kosovo earlier). Few respondents noted that the presence of military personnel with helmet, armed vehicle and body armament may cause challenges to communicate with local government representatives.

Most of the respondents addressed the importance of communication with local representatives and key leaders. In Lebanon the communication with village elders was important. One respondent, Jack described how the communication with locals such as politicians, municipal leaders, local authorities, like police or customs, it was always kind of different point of view and very different topics that were covered. Nevertheless, a few respondents noted that the conversations must stay in a safe area.

An interesting finding was how sometimes the communication with local authorities and governmental representatives caused security risks for local people. Harry described the situation in Afghanistan: *"It depends of the security situation. We avoided the situation to really engage with the local population because the Taliban or other realise that some of the locals were discussing with the international organisation representatives, the family or the people who did that were then threatened and in some of cases the family members were even killed, really. I saw it. For example my interpreter, even though he was official interpreter and worked with me 13 months, even his family didn't know exactly to whom he was working t."* Also in another case in Ukraine, Aino described the similar situation: *"That because the situation was so hostile and so. So difficult, that there were people who didn't want to talk with us. Who saw that we were NATO, US spies. And even though we tried to say that we are from the OSCE that Ukraine and Russia are also members of these organizations but people were very scared and really didn't want to say anything because also they were scared that if, if it means some problems for them, if they are seen to talk with us."*

Related to this theme, most of the interviewees shared their experiences about communication which might lead to the misunderstandings between military personnel and local representatives. Maria shared her experience from Lebanon, where she shook hands with local male Mayor who was terrified after he noticed that Maria was female. She continued with telling how these kinds of communication differences may lead to destroy the reputation or challenges in cooperation afterwards.

#### **5.2.8 Solutions to Problems in Communication with own organization**

As a solution, one respondent raised operationally the competences and skills in radio communication because main line communication is based on fast situations. Another one pointed out that face-to-face meetings are good in practice when you can easier understand the other side and see the body language.

#### **5.2.9 Solutions to Problems in Communication with other organizations**

The solutions in communication with personnel from other organisations primarily involved the ability to adapt to flexible working methods, to understand the audience and the competence to change your language accordingly. Figuring out similar goals helped the talking with persons and getting closer. Also more attention can be paid to how to give positive first impression.

As one of the participants, Pella, noted, while he generally had a good relationship working with personnel from other organisations, it involved never starting to talk business immediately because understanding and feeling the other person is important to get the sense how to approach the issues particular with this person.

#### **5.2.10 Solutions to Problems in Communication with Personnel from police forces**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding solutions in communication with police forces.

#### **5.2.11. Solutions to Problems in Communication with Personnel from militaries**

There was only one substantive finding arising from this theme. The clear chain of command was seen very important by one respondent.

#### **5.2.12. Solutions to Problems in Communication with International NGOs**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding solutions in communication with police forces.

#### **5.2.12. Solutions to Problems in Communication with International Civil Servants and International organisations**

Interviewees found out that good communication with international organisations and NGOs is to raise understanding between organisations and find the common interests. As also regarding other themes, few respondents pointed out how the informal communication such as chit-chatting and drinking coffee with internationals ended up being a good way to share information. CIMIC Officer Maria described that this way of communicating might be seen challenging especially for Finnish military. However, she pointed out that informal communication might be even more productive way than traditional methods. One respondent, Kalle, described that in the formal discussions it is important to have a common understanding and find the common interests by end of the meeting.

#### **5.2.13. Solutions to Problems in Communication with Local Government**

Already in preparation phase, before the deployment, personnel should be trained to communicate with local government and local people. As an example, one respondent described *“We had for example different kind of scenarios, for example when you are conducting a foot patrol and you meet locals, how to talk to them, how to use or how to cooperate with interpreters. And a to be aware of the women’s rights or women’s position in Afghan culture.”* Beyond from preparation and training, some respondents addressed the relevance of handover process and learning from the experts who were deployed just before his/her deployment.

In a very practical meta-level, one respondent, Harry, described the key protocols for meeting and communicating with local leadership and administration. The person should have always prepared for the meeting, have the agenda, know the backgrounds and always end the meeting to sum up what have been reached. In the net time, the sum up conclusions can be repeated to continue from the last meeting points. Another respondent, Antti described that good communication devices helped the communication.

Very important solution was given by senior level expert, who stated the importance of approach in communication as a starting point. Moreover he described the improvised the possible solution to communication problems *“...the main thing, you listen to them, let them talk, let them give proposals, because they have already, they know the system, they have been doing this business for a long time, they have a different kind of system, we just can’t sell our own system straight away to Afghans and tell that this is the best one. And this is a little bit problem with the US guys.”* Also from

Maria's point of view the creation of networks through interactions with locals provides possibilities for early warnings and helps the conducting the work even better.

The interpreter were normally local people from the region which helped also the military personnel to gain more information about cultural information and they were also seen valuable in different communication situations giving advice about companies, villages, cultures, geographic and ethic history. Few respondents addressed the importance of having "kind of sense how to discuss and how to lead the way" with local representatives.

#### **5.2.14. Solutions to Problems in Communication with Local people**

The solutions in communication problems or challenges with local people tended to pivot around attitude, behaviour, cultural awareness, trust and communication styles, experience and being aware of the dangers. Military personnel normally have strict guidelines how to communicate, what information can be provided, how to behave and respect the culture. In general, for military personnel it seems naturally to aim to follow these guidelines.

Most of the interviewees described the need of understanding the local culture (especially in Muslim countries) in ways to communicate. Antti noted that strong Muslim culture in Afghanistan led the communication especially with women; how to behave with local women, how to talk with them.

### **5.3. Cooperation**

#### **5.3.1. Why Cooperation is Important**

Nevertheless in the military side and in military peacekeeping operation there might be some classified information, as some experts noted, the cooperation and information sharing is seen as key for conducting successful operations by all respondents. One respondent, Jack addressed that nobody could do anything without cooperation. The cooperation is necessary. For Also few experts addressed that too many investigations failed because somebody was holding the information and it was not shared due in time.

In terms of what respondents believed helped cooperation included several things like clear structures among troops; understanding of the culture; understanding of the local history; commonalities to share the information (e.g. security issues); regular meetings; joint trainings before the deployments (e.g. between civilians and militaries); open minded and respective attitude. Opposite to Finnish work oriented protocols in cooperation, the interviewees addressed the importance of longer commitment, trust building and getting familiar before entering to the key topics. Bringing in the added value and have similar goals was also seen valuable to successful cooperation among other organisations and locals.

The respondents were also asked in interviews as to what they believed hindered cooperation in the field. Generally speaking the main topic that emerged from responses was the number of different organisations working with so different purposes, own agendas and goals. Especially certain big countries were pointed out as having own national agendas in the peacekeeping operations. Several interviewees addressed the challenge with the length of deployments (normally 6-12 months) which hinders naturally the cooperation with other international organisations and locals. Effective training

and successful handover processes may help this according to respondents. Moreover, the bad reputation of certain organisations may hinder the cooperation with local governments and local people.

In some cases in conflict zones, the country may lack of basic structures when the cooperation should be started between organisations. One interviewee, Harry, described the cooperation situation which actually made a difference in Kosovo, when the country was in so called “zero situation”. He described that there was no structures, no authorities, no local police, not even other international organisations like UN. Only the deployed military troops were presented. There were lots of good ideas provided by normal people, but it was even hard to identify the key civilian leaders from the local populations. Harry identified that the cooperation between military and the first deployed civilian OSCE representative who had the extensive understanding of the civil society was the first important starting point for further work in the operation. The cooperation helped to reach the local communities and meet the local authorities together.

### **5.3.2 Experience of Cooperation within Own organization**

The experiences of Finnish military personnel within own organisation generally focused on information sharing, situation picture and communication methods. Based on the reviewed interviews it seems that the national things are shared among own HQ but from multinational HQs the information was sometimes missed. The role of intelligence and HUMINT assets was mentioned several times in communication within own organisation.

### **5.3.3 Experience of Cooperation with Personnel from police forces**

Some experts noted that the cooperation with personnel from police mission (e.g. in Kosovo) was natural especially among same nationalities. Mainly the cooperation focused on sharing the official or unofficial information. In a meta-level Päivi, who worked in Kosovo, described how the cooperation focused mainly on sharing information in unofficial ways and it was based on personal relations.

### **5.3.4 Experience of Cooperation with Personnel from militaries**

In general, the cooperation with military troops was clear, good and open (15 respondents). Especially in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, the regions may not be safe for civilian, which means that also Finnish military crisis management experts mainly cooperated with military and police. Also it was stated that in most cases the cooperation happened especially among militaries with no bigger problems.

In terms of cooperation, few interviewees addressed that in the conflict and crisis zones there might be personnel among militaries who may have their own national agenda beyond from operation agenda and goal. This may affect to the attitude for cooperation and information sharing. For example, Päivi addressed that normally personnel of military operations have the same goal, but there were some cases when she was not confident if all persons were actually working for the peace operation.

Another issue that revealed itself was that sometimes the multinational units may hinder the cooperation because of misunderstandings. The main reasons for misunderstandings was described

as different backgrounds, ranks and language. Antti described that sometimes it can be confusing that who is giving orders when there are different ranks and positions.

### **5.3.5 Experience of Cooperation with International NGOs**

Since the peacekeeping operations that the respondents were deployed are normally in hostile environment the NGOs were not always represented in the field because of the security situation. One theme within this was the short projects that were mentioned in several interviews. Some respondents (n=5) addressed that normally international organisations (such as EU, NATO, UN, OSCE) operate several years in the area or region. Opposite to this the international NGOs may have projects for year or few years. For example Susanne describes she noted that sometimes they may raise the hopes and expectations of locals in the beginning of the project. In most of cases, the projects were not finished well or the goals of the projects were not achieved. This may cause harm to locals as well as to other organisations working in the field.

Other international professionals (such as civilians) sometimes not understand the hierarchies and professional career processes of military personnel. This was experienced a minor challenge by the Finnish respondents.

### **5.3.6 Experience of Cooperation with International Civil Servants, International organisations (UN, OSCE etc)**

A number of interviewees announced that there was a certain level of cooperation among other international organisations.

### **5.3.7 Experience of Cooperation with Local Government**

According to the responses there is a variety between experiences about what helped cooperation in the field with the local government. The most common findings were the knowledge and skills to work with interpreters; knowledge about culture; and identified contact persons.

One experience of cooperation among local police was identified by respondent called Antti, who noted that every time when there was traffic or fire in some buildings and may dispatched their troops to the side the local police informed them. That was a good example of cooperation among local representatives.

The experiences what hindered the cooperation were the lack of understanding the local context and cultures. These challenges were pointed out especially by the Finnish crisis management experts who worked in Afghanistan and Lebanon (Middle East). One expert noted how normal procedures of formal meetings in Afghanistan which differ a lot from the Finnish traditional meetings. Another one, Matt, described how the skills and competences of the local persons may be totally in different than internationals have. As an example he mentioned the understanding of planning in working routines which was not familiar for Afghans at all.

### **5.3.8 Experience of Cooperation with Local people**

According to Finnish crisis management few experts, the attitude towards foreign soldiers or operation itself sometimes hindered the cooperation. Moreover, in some cases there was too little resources strengthen the cooperation. Lack of resources to visit in key cities or towns hindered the

cooperation. The security situations affected strongly to the possibility cooperate with local authorities and local population.

#### **5.3.9 Solutions to problems in cooperation with own organisation**

Within own organisation the regular cooperation methods and practices, such as morning meetings, were seen as key for success. As an example one respondent, Sami, noted that within military it is clearly set how the meetings are run, who talks and when. Sami pointed out that it is important to share the knowledge and good communication practices by experienced personnel before the person enters to deployment. The experiences of communication took place also through informal activities such as in free time activities such as during jogging. The role of these was seen also valuable way of communicating.

#### **5.3.10. Solutions to problems in cooperation with Personnel from own organisation**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding solutions in cooperation with own organisation.

#### **5.3.11. Solutions to problems in cooperation with Personnel from Police forces**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding solutions in cooperation with police forces.

#### **5.3.12 Solutions to problems in cooperation with Personnel from militaries**

According to this theme, one respondent released how the unofficial contacts and friendships for example with NATO were important in terms of building situational picture and receiving information. He gained lot of information through unofficial discussion beyond from official meetings.

#### **5.3.13 Solutions to problems in cooperation with International Civil Servants and international organisations**

In terms of this topic, it is crucial to know or get to know with other person representing the other organisation. As with communication solutions, also with cooperation the personal contacts and relationships for example with civilians were seen as one way to cooperate successfully.

#### **5.3.14 Solutions to problems in cooperation with Local Government**

Like within the solutions to cooperation problems, also according to this theme it was seen very crucial by few respondents that the local governmental representatives are in the lead and internationals are supporting. In most of the cases, in terms of cooperation, it seems that internationals aim to lead the process and locals may not even have the willingness to contribute to that direction. For example, senior level Keijo described that *"There should be some mandatory to do such and kind of steer the wheel that they will be going into the direction that they want and we can kind of support them. Not so that we give them direction, that here is what we want to do based on our cultural awareness what we should do and it might differ quite a lot from the local point of view."*

In a meta-level, the regular informal visits and observations with local representatives and authorities helped the cooperation also in formal settings. These informal visits and observations built some common discussion points and small talk possibilities for military personnel to be discussed in further cooperation with local representatives. As a good practice, Matt stated to



consider having the cooperation relationship only between person and himself (one-to-one) especially in the case of any problems or if negative aspects that needed to be addressed. Also, the skilled interpreter was identified in several interviewees in terms of successful cooperation with locals.

The gender awareness in successful cooperation was mentioned by some Finnish experts. Especially with Muslim countries the military personnel must have the awareness of how to cooperate with different gender groups such as children, elders and females of the population. In terms reaching successful cooperation requires understanding how to meet and who talks with certain population groups. As an example from Lebanon operation, when talking to the Mayor of Bint Jubail, who was the most respected authority in the area, the military personnel had to have commanding officer discussing with him. Conversely, when you meet with Syrian refugee females the female officer will be the best person to talk with them.

### **5.3.15 Solutions to problems in cooperation with Local People**

The experts, who patrolled and so cooperated a lot with local people, addressed the experiences where the posture and carrying him/herself as a military person actually matters in front of locals. Maria for example noted out it is quite important to understand how you carry your gun and yourself when you meet with locals, especially with females and children. She mentioned that locals might be strongly traumatised and terrified after the conflicts.

Even though most of the interviewees addressed that the cooperation with locals is important, a number of Finnish respondents clarified how you should not get too close, be a bit careful and avoid taking any sides. For example Laura, described how the Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo immediately noticed if they visited only in other ethnic group restaurants (like owned by Albanians or Serbians only).

## **5.4 Trust**

### **5.4.1. Why Trust is Important**

The value of trust in peacekeeping missions was revealed in the interviews as having central importance in crisis management operations. Moreover, when reviewing the responses it is clear that trust building relates strongly with other soft skills, such as with communication and cooperation, while on a deployment. As an example, in most interview cases when asking about cooperation and communication, the trust building was mentioned in line with responses.

According to most of the interviewees, the trust building is a rather long process which requires credibility and familiar people. As a saying from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jack defined “...*you have to stay away a couple of years from Bosnia to notice that the grass is growing*”. Harry described that trust building is like mountain climbing.

The levels of trust with local organisations and local people varied depending on the mission. The levels of trust were also very much mission dependent. When asking about who the interviewees would trust in a potentially dangerous situation, the most of the respondents said their own team or



own organisation. Only in few cases, the respondents mentioned that they would trust on local authorities in dangerous situation.

Moreover, the importance of good reputation, being trustworthy and respectful were the key findings noted within this theme. It was addressed that few missions and operations have or had a bad reputation which directly affect to the trust building between other organisations and especially with local stakeholders. Although the importance of being trustworthy and respectful of the cultures of the countries that the participants were in was stressed, the rotation cycle (normally 6-12 months) affected to the trust and confidence building among local representatives. If there was a lack of good handover process, the newcomer needed to start everything from scratch.

#### **5.4.2 Strategies to build Trust among Organizations**

First of all, most of the respondents (28 respondents out of 29 respondents) mentioned a trusted relationship within own troops and team members. This theme arose when it was asked who the respondent would trust in a potentially dangerous situation. Only one civilian respondent addressed that in civilian missions you might be in a situation where you are by yourself and only one to actually trust is yourself. Moreover, the Finnish mentioned the trusted relationship being natural among Nordic troops and other Europeans. Also International organisations were mentioned to be trustworthy. In the case of local NGOs and private business some respondents noted that it might be seen as more difficult since they might have own agenda and chosen sides.

Among militaries the good trusted relationships were based on good information sharing and exchange of information. An interesting point was that respondents answered that Finnish normally have a good reputation in crisis management and peacebuilding which helps the trust building in both, to build the trust among own troops, other organisations and locals. To address the importance of reputation and behaving of internationals during the deployment may help to build the trust all actors.

When asking how to make people to trust to her/his self, foremost the respondents answered about importance of keeping the word (being trustworthy), being polite and building good relationships. Antti pointed out the realistic point of view, that in military peacekeeping you must be in line with you position and profession strongly. Being nice and friendly is naturally part of individual behaviour but beyond that you are conducting your business as a peacekeeper.

#### **5.4.3. Strategies to Build Trust with Locals**

Firstly, the importance of being honest and keeping the promises were pointed out by almost all respondents as starting point and one of the key strategy in building trust especially among locals. Trust building takes time and requires frequent interaction. Few respondents that one should be interested in locals and provide added value for them somehow.

Secondly, in trust building the respondents mentioned the competence to listen and giving the feeling that locals were actually heard. Senior level and experienced person from Finnish Defence Forces Harry described that a trust building starts with identifying the key local leaders or other relevant actors. Then meeting with them regularly and making them feel confident. After that the

actual climbing starts. To reach the real trust takes years and normally the person might be only 6-12 months in the region.

The good strategy that repeatedly revealed itself was to show professionalism, doing the work well and being polite. Moreover, few respondents saw it important to learn to know other person that you have something to relate to. Within military there are strict guidelines for example in information providing, so normally the good behaviour and respect of the local culture were the key aspects in trust building with locals.

## **5.5. Peacekeeping personnel recommendations for soft skills training**

Most respondents valued the soft skills being important during the deployment. The need for more training on soft skills were mentioned plenty times. The interviewees identified that the real life experiences by former experts and colleagues were seen successful practices in training before the operation. The relevance of up to date information from the local context and region was highlighted especially by the respondents who have had several operations and deployments.

In addition, the respondents identified key advices and training topics that would support the preparation in terms of cooperation. One respondent addressed that bringing in the local knowledge already in training phase would benefit all actors. In terms on local context, also engagement competences would be seen beneficial to be trained. Separately, to train on how to share information and how to build situational awareness were noted by plenty experts. The needs on training differ between different positions (e.g. liaison officer must cooperate a lot with other organisations and locals).


Beyond from basic responses on communication or cooperation skills, few respondents described that more training on comprehensive approach, especially understanding how to deal with civilian organisations would be beneficial. One respondent mentioned that this is not covered well in current training curricula. Also, some respondents mentioned that basic level understanding and skills on local language would make a huge difference in trust building and approaching the local stakeholders.

In terms of gamified environment, the respondents addressed the importance of real life scenarios to be used in final game production. If possible, the behavioural topics could be covered in the gamified version even though it might be challenging to find clear dos and don'ts from this field. The cases are always context related.


## 6. Regional Summary Report: Northern Ireland

### 6.1 Summary Details of interviews

The majority of respondents were drawn from two primary sources – The Police Service of Northern Ireland (9 participants) and Northern Ireland Cooperation Overseas (7 participants). The interview cohort was ameliorated by the participation of 6 civilians with extensive expertise in administration of post-conflict arenas. Of the 22 total participants 4 were female and 18 were male (see figures 1 and 2). The PSNI deployments were solely located in two countries – Bosnia and Kosovo. Northern Ireland Cooperation Overseas in conjunction with civilian participants broadened the deployment locations of the interview cohort to 22 countries as indicated in Table 5 below.



**Figure 6:** Gender of interview participants



**Figure 7:** Organizational breakdown of interview participants by gender.

Pseudo-Name	Gender	Organization	Rank/Job	No. of Deployments	Deployment locations
Jack	Male	NGO	Psychotherapist	10	Myanmar, Palestinian, Abkhazia, Serbia, Bosnia, Georgia & Armenia
Lee	Male	Government & NGO	Trainer	7	Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Malawi, Iraq, South Africa.
Lucy	Female	Government & NGO	Community worker	12	Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Middle East, Madagascar, Libya, former Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Burundi, Nigeria, Rwanda.
Ross	Male	Government & NGO	Election observation and fact-finding	6	Cambodia, Bosnia, Palestine, Lebanon, Philippines.
Sam	Male	NGO	Trainer	3	Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro.
Daniel	Male	NGO	Conflict Negotiator and Election Expert	7	Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Philippines, Syria.
Roger	Male	NGO/UN	UN Consultant	5	Afghanistan, Cyprus, Libya, Sri Lanka, Syria.
Adam	Male	NICO	Consultant	6	Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia, Jordan, Kenya
Chris	Male	NICO	Consultant	5	Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo, Qatar
Jake	Male	NICO	Consultant	5	Kosovo, Ethiopia, Guyana, Bosnia, Mexico
Jeremy	Male	NICO	Consultant	3	Bosnia, Middle East, Central Europe
Rebecca	Female	NICO	Consultant	4	Jordan, Montenegro
Sarah	Female	NICO	Consultant	9	Jordan, Montenegro
Aaron	Male	PSNI	Detective Chief Inspector	2	Bosnia, Kosovo
David	Male	PSNI	Constable	2	Kosovo
Gary	Male	PSNI	Inspector	2	Kosovo
Jim	Male	PSNI	Constable	1	Kosovo
Kevin	Male	PSNI	Sergeant	2	Kosovo
Peter	Male	PSNI	Constable	2	Kosovo

Rachel	Female	PSNI	Sergeant	2	Kosovo, Bosnia
Robert	Male	PSNI	Constable	1	Kosovo
Simon	Male	PSNI	Sergeant	2	Kosovo
<b>Total = 19</b>					

**Table 5:** Summary table of Civilian, NICO and PSNI participants.

In order to contextualize the conclusions drawn from the interviews with research participants it is useful to consider the organization they are employed by – the majority of participants were drawn from the PSNI and NICO.

### 6.1.1 Background to NICO

NI-CO is a **not for profit, public body** owned by Invest Northern Ireland. Established in 1992 with the aim of promoting Northern Ireland's vast reservoir of skills and expertise to economies in transition, the organization has enjoyed significant success over the last 2.5 decades and is now recognized as one of the leading providers of public sector training and capacity building in Europe.

As the central marketing arm of the NI public service, NI-CO's primary role is to promote and share the benefits of international engagement and sustainable development to government departments and agencies wishing to build relationships with their overseas neighbours and avail of the increasing number of opportunities presented by the international donor community.

NI-CO is dedicated to the pursuit of building efficient, accountable and sustainable public sector institutions capable of managing donor aid effectively to implement positive change and tackle poverty reduction. Over the last 25 years, the organization has successfully exported the Northern Ireland skills base to support the delivery of over 600 training and institutional capacity building projects across 84 countries.

#### The NI-CO Success Story

NI-CO's work over the last 25 years has succeeded in placing a positive image of Northern Ireland on the international stage and has given credibility and credence to the Northern Ireland skills base which has so much to offer transitional economies across the globe.

NI-CO has chosen to focus on those sectors where particularly high levels of expertise have been established according to the unique economic, social and political characteristics of Northern Ireland and for which market opportunities exist with the international donor agencies.

Many of the challenges which have been tackled by Northern Ireland government agencies to counter problems of social and economic instability are directly relevant and transferable to counterpart organisations in developing market economies. In particular, strong comparisons can be drawn between the NI situation and other similar 'conflict' areas throughout the world e.g. West Bank, Western Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa. This provides NI-CO with a number of 'niche' areas of expertise that can be identified in few other European regions.

One of the key factors which distinguishes NI-CO from the classical consultancy model is that NI-CO can offer **government to government expertise**, providing experts who can assist at practitioner as well as a theoretical level. This constitutes a significant selling point for the organisation. The 'practitioner' label is one that NI-CO promotes rather than 'consultant.'

Many of the challenges which have been tackled by Northern Ireland government agencies to counter problems of social and economic instability are directly relevant and transferable to counterpart organizations in developing market economies. Problems of state stimulation of economic growth, issues of competition for and attraction of inward investment, difficulties of working with different ethnic and religious minorities and the general mixture of economic and social development agencies run by the public sector, are all factors with which beneficiaries in our target markets can readily identify. NI-CO's ability to deploy experienced Northern Ireland 'practitioners' - as opposed to consultants - who can work alongside counterparts overseas in a co-operative environment, is a major factor in establishing its credibility as a quality provider of institutional capacity building and training services overseas.

## Key Sectors

NI-CO has traditionally focused on those sectors where particularly high levels of expertise have been established according to the unique economic, social and political characteristics of Northern Ireland. Adopting such an approach has given Northern Ireland a distinct competitive advantage over our competitors and has allowed the company to nurture a strong reservoir of expertise in a number of highly specialist areas which reflect the current focus of donor funded technical assistance and institutional capacity building programmes.

### 6.1.2 BACKGROUND TO PSNI

The ending of the armed conflict in Northern Ireland and Northern Ireland's ongoing transition to a more peaceful society has been widely regarded as one of the most successful examples of global peace building and conflict transformation. Grounded in the term "post-conflict peace building" coined by Butros Butros Ghali, the reforms suggested by Chris Patten, a former conservative MP and Governor of Hong Kong, precipitated a radical shift in the leadership, structure, composition, and oversight of policing in Northern Ireland, ultimately creating the PSNI of today.

The difficulties surrounding policing in Northern Ireland were (and are) immense, arising from the disputed nature of the state and the role of the police in securing that state. The largely Protestant Unionist and Loyalist communities sought to maintain Northern Ireland's position within the UK, while the largely Catholic Nationalist and Republican communities opposed the continuation of this political framework.

Following the first phase of the Northern Ireland peace process, which was focused on the political negotiations between the two governments and the local political parties, primarily to reach an agreement over the form and content of any future political institutions in Northern Ireland, the multi-party negotiations reached a conclusion on 10 April 1998. The text of what became known as the Belfast (after the location of the negotiations) or the Good Friday (after the date on which the agreement was concluded) Agreement was signed by the British and Irish governments and the ten political parties.

The Agreement provided for the formation of an international panel to develop proposals for a thorough reform of all aspects of policing. The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (ICPNI) was established in June 1998 under the chairmanship of Chris Patten. Its report, published in September 1999, is widely considered to have produced a model blueprint for a modern police organization [sic]. The report provided for a new body to be called the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) to replace the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). The ICPNI set out the terms of reference for the review in the following manner, *"Taking account of the principles on policing as set out in the Agreement, the Commission will inquire into policing in Northern Ireland and, on the basis of its findings, bring forward proposals for future policing structures and arrangements, including means of encouraging widespread community support for those arrangements. Its proposals on policing should be designed to ensure that policing arrangements, including composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos and symbols, are such that in a new approach Northern Ireland has a police service that can enjoy widespread support from, and is seen as an integral part of, the community as a whole"*.

Assistant Chief Constable commented that “The purpose of Patten was to provide a new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland. The recommendations are about ensuring a police service that is:

- Effective and efficient;
- Fair and impartial;
- Accountable;
- Representative of society;
- Protects and vindicates the human rights of all.

Patten provided an opportunity for the police service in Northern Ireland to put in place new systems and structures to ensure better, more effective policing”.

The Patten Report was accepted by the British government, which agreed to implement all 175 recommendations. The report received a diverse response from the political parties, with the general view being cautious. The Unionist parties were broadly opposed to any changes to policing, while Nationalist parties had wanted a more radical transformation than that outlined in the report. Eventually, most parties agreed to support the proposals and to participate in the oversight bodies designed to build public accountability. The exception was Sinn Féin, which was cautious in its response and refused to endorse the proposals. The party had wanted a complete break between the old RUC and the new PSNI, rather than a transition that involved existing police officers retaining for their posts while the organizational [sic] change took place around them. After a period of public debate, the police reform process began and the RUC was formally transformed into the PSNI in November 2001

At the time of the change, the Chief Constable Sir Ronnie Flanagan said the important issue [in the transition from RUC to PSNI] was not the religious or gender head count, stating, "Much more important is the creation of a culture where equality for all is offered and where respect for cultural diversity and for individual dignity is the order of the day ... to help bring about, hopefully, a more a peaceful future for all the people of Northern Ireland,". When addressing internal perceptions of the change Sir Ronnie stated, “Look, this Title and this Crest - let nobody here be in any doubt, it means as much to me as it means to anybody. But as an organisation which is no stranger to pain, if we get the great gain of young Catholic men and women, if this is a chill factor to prevent young Catholic men and women coming forward to join our organisation in numbers that we have never ever been able to achieve in the past, then that great pain will be worth the pain of the change in the title and the crest”.

On 4 November 2001, the PSNI was established. On the same day the Northern Ireland Policing Board was set up. Three days later the Policing Board held its first public meeting. Almost exactly one year earlier the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland had been formed. And in December 2003 the first Human Rights Monitoring Framework for policing was published.

So within a period of just over three years, accountability and human rights had been firmly established within the paradigm of policing in Northern Ireland.

At a recent conference marking 15 years of the PSNI, the current Chief Constable, George Hamilton said, “Accountability and human rights are the foundations for effective policing; and as we reflect



back over the last 15 years, I think we can be proud of how we have built on these strong foundations.

The result has been a transformation in policing and a broad acceptance of the policing structures across the community that we serve. Department of Justice research puts confidence in policing at just over 80%; in other independent research the figure is even higher. This is a truly remarkable achievement that is often forgotten in our 24/7 news agenda.

“It is people, who make change possible. The stories behind these confidence statistics are stories of bravery, resilience, hard work and commitment shown not only by the police officers and staff of the PSNI; but also by the community and by partners who work with us. The results can be seen every day. It is people who make change possible. The stories behind these confidence statistics are stories of bravery, resilience, hard work and commitment shown not only by the police officers and staff of the PSNI; but also by the community and by partners who work with us. The results can be seen every day.

The change programme undertaken by the PSNI has been challenging and at times difficult. The PSNI of today is a modern, diverse organisation supported and held to account by all sections of the community in NI and is globally recognised for the standards of policing it delivers and for the journey of change it has taken.

### **6.1.3 Policing overseas**

In July 1999, during a visit to Kosovo, Tony Blair agreed to send approximately 60 RUC officers within the group of 100 UK police to assist in the UN peace-keeping mission. Subsequently, the Chief Constable, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, was asked by the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, to release an adequate number of officers, the expertise of the RUC in policing divided communities having been recognised by the Prime Minister and deemed necessary for this particular peacekeeping mission. The RUC then put out a request to its officers for the UN-MIK (UNIPTF) in Kosovo, receiving well in excess of 400 applicants. (At the same time the MDP was also asked to provide a similar number of officers.) Following the selection of RUC officers, pre-deployment training was undertaken in Northern Ireland and included first aid, ambush drills and weapons training; some officers considered that local and practical information about Kosovo was inadequate and would go on to form their own judgments (Napolitano, 2010). Following the initial 3 week's in-house training, the first cohort of 73 officers were sent for further training to the Garda Siochá'na College at Templemore. Sending Northern Irish police officers to Eire for training was considered to be 'significant' in the wake of Patten's recommendation for closer cross-border links between the two forces. The Garda was able to share the knowledge and expertise from previous overseas missions to Bosnia, Eastern Slovenia and Cyprus. At the close of training, 68 RUC officers left for Kosovo including a Superintendent,<sup>2</sup> Inspectors, 6 Sergeants and 59 constables. Two officers were then returned home shortly afterwards to be replaced by officers who had been put on the reserve list. During the Kosovo mission, RUC-PSNI officers were repeatedly praised for their professionalism and expertise as much by local people as by police officers from across the world. MP Norman Godman wrote to RUC Chief Constable Sir Ronnie Flanagan stating that he had visited Kosovo in 1999 and had met a number of RUC officers with whom he had 'discussed the duties they had to perform in that

conflict-ridden province and I came away deeply impressed by their professionalism. More importantly, I was told by their Chief Officer, a man I believe you have met, that the 60-strong RUC contingent was his best group of international police officers. . . Similar compliments were paid to your officers by senior UN officials, army officers and representatives of NGOs. The RUC can be justly proud of these fellow-officers.’ Indeed, the use of RUC–PSNI officers was deemed to be particularly successful in two particular areas: their expertise in managing hostile divided communities and their experience of police–military relations. In both Kosovo and Bosnia, RUC officers were posted to specific towns (e.g. Banja Luka and Mitrovica) where they were given a direct line into the military: ‘the credibility that you have with all your Northern Irish experience elevates you straight away: the local officers were perhaps more open and willing to engage with some of these issues than with officers with different backgrounds in policing. At that time, the Troubles were still quite recent and the locals could relate to that as well. We were used to working with the British military and provided a level of expertise’.

This expertise was extended to the management of divided communities. Mitrovica was a prime example: a town of approximately 95,000 Albanians and 15,000 Serbs, 25 miles north of Pristina that was geographically separated by the Ebar river, with the Serbs in the north and the Albanians in the south. Hostility between the communities extended to the UN presence: ‘any arrests or enforcement of the law against the Serbian community could result in Serbs wrecking the place and attempting to close it down . . . and set against this was the hostility with Albanians in the south, a flicker of a switch could change this into a very violent situation . . .’

The situation confronted by UNMIK was one of instability, serious public disorder, shootings and bombings, members of the RUC (and then RUC–PSNI) cohort would comment that this was not ‘so alien’ and a situation they were used to dealing with back home. This view was not shared by police from some countries with little experience of violent situations who ‘swung between total inaction and complete over-reaction . . . We used our experience to weigh up situations much better . . . in the early days when there was a lot of hostility from the Serbs towards CIVPOL, our experience of working in Northern Ireland with hostile communities helped a great deal’. One example of this was in March 2004 when ‘extremist’ Albanians launched an attack against Serbian enclaves in Mitrovica. Over a 3-day period, 29 churches were destroyed, Serb villages razed and international police and K-FOR units repeatedly attacked. As the situation deteriorated still further, a ‘gun battle’ ensued in which 7 people were killed and over 50 wounded. This resulted in serious civil disorder occurring throughout Kosovo. The International Crisis Group report of April 2004 criticized the UN and K-FOR for total inaction and loss of control though stated that if it had not been for a handful of police officers from Northern Ireland (there were four in Mitrovica at that time) the situation could have been lost.

This may read as pure sensationalism but there has been considerable anecdotal evidence of RUC–PSNI officers taking the lead in serious public order situations in Kosovo, and in having the experience to deal with situations arising from policing openly hostile and deeply divided communities. Specifically, selecting RUC–PSNI in Kosovo reflected the UK government’s effective use of a pick and mix approach for mission recruitment. The RUC–PSNI along with the MDP, represented the only UK police who could provide the level of firearms expertise required. Importantly, the RUC–

PSNI could draw on their wide-ranging experiences of policing both low level and high end policing within deeply divided communities and provide sufficient numbers of UK officers over a prolonged period. The deployment of RUC–PSNI officers continued with yearly rotations of between 50 and 60 officers and was gradually decreased with the transfer of international police from a UN-led to the European Union-led EULEX mission in 2008. As of May 2010, there were just three PSNI officers serving in Kosovo providing monitoring, mentoring and advising.

This RUC–PSNI skill set has been carried forward and enhanced following Patten’s recommendations and the subsequent wide-ranging reforms undertaken after the Police Service (Northern Ireland) Act (2001). The concept of best practice within the realms of public order management, for example, is rooted in public order legislation and common law and governed by the European Convention on Human Rights. Additionally, it is bound by the PSNI Code of Ethics, introduced in 2003, which is unique amongst UK police. Additionally, the development of the use of ‘proportionate force’ is bound not only by UK and Northern Ireland legislation but through the PSNI Use of Force Policy. This expertise has been exported internationally not only through peacekeeping missions but through a wide number of ad hoc training programmes and twinning arrangements.

Country of Deployment	Male	Female	Total	PSNI	NICO	CIVILIAN
Kosovo	11	1	12	10	1	1
Bosnia	6	1	7	3	2	2
Iraq	1	0	1	1	0	0
Malawi	1	0	1	0	0	1
Syria	1	0	1	0	0	1
Albania	1	0	1	0	1	0
Macedonia	2	0	2	0	2	0
Croatia	1	0	1	0	1	0
Jordan	2	2	4	0	4	0
Nairobi	1	0	1	0	1	0
Qatar	1	0	1	0	1	0
Montenegro	2	2	4	0	3	1
Yugoslavia	1	0	1	0	0	1
Georgia	1	0	1	0	0	1
Armenia	1	0	1	0	0	1
Afghanistan	2	0	2	0	0	2
DR Congo	0	1	1	0	0	1
Sudan	0	1	1	0	0	1
Middle East	0	1	1	0	0	1
Cambodia	1	0	1	0	0	1
Palestine	1	0	1	0	0	1
Lebanon	1	0	1	0	0	1

**Table 6:** Summary table of countries interview participants deployments by organization.

## 6.2. Communication

### 6.2.1 Why is Communication important?

Communication is a critical component to any policing and securitization approach and the context of a peacekeeping and conflict resolution mission intensifies the importance of communication. Data drawn from interview participants highlights that communication was central to the success or failure not only of the aims and objectives of missions but also to the personal well-being of individuals on deployment. The ability of police officers to communicate with locals and also with fellow international police officers within operational and social contexts was vital.

Communication within the context of an international post-conflict peacekeeping deployment is not limited to verbal expression or the use of language but includes the ability to communicate through intermediaries, in particular language assistants, and also the awareness of the power of non-verbal gestures. It was emphasized that communication with local people through a language assistant was critical in maintaining control and de-escalating conflict. In demonstrating to local officers how to perform a stop and search on a busy Kosovar street Kevin stopped a man and communicated through the language assistant. In order to communicate accurately the language assistant mirrored the mannerisms and intonation of Kevin including laughing when Kevin laughed. The effect of this was communication with the local people was reflective of Kevin rather than a detached and fragmented interaction and Kevin was able to use humour to defuse potential hostile communications. Given the importance of communicating through language assistants it is interesting to note that no participants were trained in how to work with an interpreter. Indeed, the majority of participants acknowledged that the success of tasks on mission could be dependent upon the ability and competency of a language assistant.

Communication through language assistants was a problematic issue shared by many participants. Adam explained that existing cultural and societal perceptions over the status of educated language assistants often manifested in impairing communication between English speaking individuals and local people. Language assistants were regarded as a privileged and well-paid position for local people on missions and Adam discerned that some language assistants in Bosnia, who were earning up to three times as much as local police officers, were behaving in an elitist manner. By interceding in the situation and explaining that such behaviour was not acceptable and would not be tolerated Adam was able to build trust with local people and officers. The extrapolation of the soft skills of honesty and reliability are key components in effective communication.

Both policing and civilian interviewees expressed a commonality of the importance of clarity and brevity in directly communicating with military and governmental bodies. Policing participants identified the experience and knowledge of engaging with military personnel within a Northern Irish context as central to establishing working relationships on mission. The soft skills cultivated in operating with the British Army in Northern Ireland focused on the ability to adapt to the necessary form of direct and succinct communication critical within a military context when information received on the ground needs to be relayed quickly for centralized decision-making purposes.

Civilian interviewees highlighted the power of neutrality within peacekeeping negotiations that places great importance on the impartiality of communication between parties to conflict. Daniel, in reference to working as a peacekeeping envoy on negotiations between two governmental bodies, commented that when considering communication skills it is necessary to understand the drivers and dynamics of the target audience. In a peacekeeping role impartiality and neutrality of international civilians inculcates an important facet of communication and the need to alter language but not message when engaging with differing sides to conflict. Daniel maintained that the soft skills of communication pertain to sensitizing the use of language and expression with different audiences but not changing message.

The following subsections will consider the experiences and problematic nature of communication drawing on data from research participants. It is important to note that although the interviewees operated in a myriad of peacekeeping roles and deployments several commonalities can be drawn in relation to communication. It will be noted that communication at its most basic form is about conveying information from one person or place to another and consequently there must be a recognition, and by extension an alteration in style of communication, of what is needed by the target audience.

An underlying theme that emerged during the interviews with police and civilian participants was that peacekeepers needed to comprehend that the mission was not about them and not to take any vitriolic interactions personally and to keep perspective. An important tool to be able to do this was to not interact with people, be they fellow organizational colleagues or local people, in solely a formal setting. Peter reasoned that communication was inhibited when officers only engaged with people whilst on duty and it was only by socializing informally that people could see their human side and in turn they weren't always meeting locals as victims and perpetrators. The dynamics of communication alter significantly between formal and informal contexts, from a policing perspective it is the nuanced difference between policing priorities and actual community needs

### **6.2.2 Experience of Communication within Own Organization**

There were no substantive findings from the interviews with participants in relation to communication among their own organizations. Several police interviewees noted that on the first deployment due to the pressing political pressure on the British Government to deploy policing and military officers the process of recruitment and providing officers with equipment was notably more efficient than had been expected.

### **6.2.3 Experience of Communication with Personnel from police forces**

The initial experiences in communicating with personnel from other police forces were stultified by the circumstances within which units were formed. Interviewees remarked that on arrival they were deployed into units that contained police officers of varying ability and ranks and the absence of specific soft skills to facilitate and cultivate a collegiate identity amongst the multi-national police force ensured that communication was limited by innate politeness and a pre-occupation with not offending other personnel from the mission.

Communication with other international police officers is critical and participants noted that in order to accurately convey messages an understanding of the competency and comprehension of those who are being communicated with was required. The need for clarity in communication was exemplified by the behavior of American officers who were described as requiring spoon-fed commands and instructions and participants stated that Americans were short sighted and would not comprehend the implications of actions. In contrast, for example, other international officers when borrowing equipment or vehicles would ensure all materials were returned in working condition on time, however, American officers were lax in such attention to detail resulting in the creation of hostile attitudes amongst police officers. The improvised solution to this issue was to be exact and precise in the commands given to American officers to preclude the escalation of tension between officers. The soft skill needs identified here are two-fold. Firstly that in a multi-national police unit it is vital that communication is tailored to the cognizance of individuals within that unit. Secondly the soft skills needed included an ability to recognize how to alter your method and means of communication rather than expecting other people to be able to become accustomed to your communicative techniques.

The stringent nature of peacekeeping missions can necessitate that soft skills be implemented in a hard manner. For example, a Senior American Officer instructing a police unit that any disturbances at a basketball game in Kosovo that was expected to attract approximately 5,000 people would result in the individuals identified being taken from the arena and beaten so as to send a message to locals regarding what behaviour would be tolerated. Gary, on observing the briefing by the American officer needed to utilize soft skills of communication that such a police response was not permissible but it was necessary to do so in a hard and decisive manner so that all the officers would be clear on what behaviour was expected of them. The corollary of the implementation of soft skills by Gary to his officers was that at the basketball game rather than physically respond to incidents they were expected to identify suspects and intervene in a non-confrontational manner.

The soft skill needs identified in relation to international police officers was to be aware not only of deficiencies and vast chasms of competencies but also how to utilize the abilities of officers you are working with. A related aspect of competency was identified as having a nuanced understanding of officer bias and national agendas that could serve to undermine the success of a mission. As a regional commander in Kosovo Gary was instructed to appoint a Russian deputy and discovered that outside of work the officer lived in a house with other Russians based in senior positions at other stations. Gary was concerned about the exchange of sensitive information but rather than dismiss or ostracize the officer Gary decided that it was necessary to work with the officer on the basis of what is best for achieving the aims of the mission.

#### **6.2.4 Experience of Communication with Personnel from militaries**

In Kosovo policing personnel experienced significant communicative issues in working with military personnel, in particular a Norwegian Battalion. Chris pointed to the function and remits of both the military and the police units and the subsequent manner in which each carried out their role as central to the deterioration of communication between the organizations. However, it was strongly emphasized by police interviewees that in general they could communicate and work with military personnel more effectively than other international police officers due to their prior experience with the British Army in Northern Ireland through which they had learned specific soft skills that facilitated engagement.

An additional facet that influenced cooperation with police officers was the preference of military to work with police officers from the UK owing to their application of skills in working and engaging with military personnel as well as their ability to speak English that was the language of the mission. Consequently, police officer participants indicated that having been put in positions of influence at the behest of military personnel they then had significant cooperation issues in interacting with international police officers who felt discriminated at being overlooked for key jobs and roles on deployment.

Systematic communication is a key component of missions in imparting intelligence gathered in a uniform manner. Peter noted the importance of unilateral means of communication between military and policing personnel when discussing a specific incident that escalated into conflict between international police officers and locals in a village in Kosovo. Following the arrest of local militia intelligence was received that some locals wanted to make a small protest in response to the arrest of militia regarded as local heroes for their role in the war. However, the intelligence indicated that there was no will to harm anyone or inflict damage in any way and Peter passed this intelligence by way of formal document to the centralized command unit. Two days later two grenades were thrown at the wall of the police station but on seeing an international police officer exiting the station the individual responsible threw another grenade towards a local business whilst fleeing. The international police command mistakenly regarded the attack as being on local businesses and sought to respond with armed patrols. This mistaken conclusion was drawn from a failure to consult and infer intelligence gathered by local officers.

#### **6.2.5 Experience of Communication within International NGOs**

Police and NICO participants noted irregular contact with NGOs and the majority of any interaction was stimulated by police in seeking NGO assistance with non-policing issues and in a peacekeeping context with structures decimated in conflict zones the only recourse was to call in NGOs.

#### **6.2.6 Experience of Communication within International Civil Servants**

Participants expressed strongly negative feelings towards both the UN and the EU. In particular, civilian participants deployed by the United Nations opined that communications within the UN was problematic owing principally to two key features. Firstly, the rigid bureaucratization of communications with UN officials was considered as an impediment to establishing effective working relationships on mission. Secondly, participants noted the split nature of the UN between the centralized headquarters, who were presented by participants as academic and legal experts with no knowledge of the field, and the field officers responsible for working on the ground on

mission. Participants argued that the competing knowledge and lack of awareness of each other's position and role resulted in chasmal communications between UN field operatives and UN headquarters staff.

Roger, who was employed as a mediation specialist by the UN, was the only participant to acknowledge a positive aspect of UN communication in relation to the twice-daily security briefings that he receives even when not on active deployment that enables him to keep abreast of developments in areas he has been deployed to.

#### **6.2.7 Experience of Communication within Local Government**

The only reference to communications with local government focused on interviewees expressing the need for peacekeepers to be aware that members of local governments in post-conflict areas retained associations with former combatants. Interviewees posited that it was critical that in communicating with local government officials that peacekeepers understood that parallel structures of governance between democratic processes and residual control of groups such as the Kosovo Liberation Army were prevalent. In relation to the soft skills necessary to engage with parallel structures of formal and informal processes participants believed strongly that their experiences of working in Northern Ireland during the conflict and post-conflict contexts was critical in engendering the necessary knowledge and understanding that was transferable to the peacekeeping context.

#### **6.2.8 Improvised Solutions to problems in communication with own organization**

There were no substantive findings from data collected in interviews with participants regarding problems in communication with their own organization.

#### **6.2.9 Improvised Solutions to Problems with Personnel from police forces**

Improvised solutions with personnel from police forces centred upon utilizing soft skills to respond to difficulties arising from perceived low competency levels amongst international police officers. Participants were positive in their view of German and Italian officers but were negative towards African and American officers. Participants emphasized that within a peacekeeping context it is necessary to alter your means of communication dependent upon the target audience. In particular, several participants who were given senior command roles on deployment stated that in order to communicate effectively with American officers who were considered as gung-ho and over-reliant on use of weapons, messages and orders had to be delivered forcefully and firmly. Participants highlighted the need when communicating with all international officers that commands were delivered clearly and succinctly. When communicating orders and commands to personnel from non-English speaking countries Aaron counselled that it is important to be aware that an officer who says 'yes' when you are conversing with them that doesn't necessarily mean they have understood and that 'yes' might just be their default response.

#### **6.2.10 Improvised Solutions to Problems with Personnel from militaries**

Centralized command structures and decision-making process in conjunction with competing remits and functions of police and military within peacekeeping missions often escalated conflict with locals. David discussed a situation when the army decided to conduct house searches for weapons without informing the local police unit. Consequently, when weapons were subsequently discovered



the military would demand that the police arrest the occupants of that house against a background of inflamed and angry local residents. Police officers who had a remit of building intelligence systems and building relations with local people were faced with quelling escalating tensions but also cooperating with military orders. David explained that the police developed a process to handle such instances of explaining to local people that the weapons would be confiscated and they would be arrested but they would be rapidly processed and released. The solution was to de-escalate the tension as calmly as possible and police the situation they were faced with but to de-brief the next day with military personnel that their actions were disproportionate and ineffective for the stated aim of the mission.

#### **6.2.11 Improvised Solutions to Problems with International NGOs**

Civilian participants deployed through the UN highlighted the problematic cooperation between headquarter staff and field workers. For example, Roger mediated between UN headquarter people who were seeking information through completed monitoring forms from each field office in order to develop and fund local peace initiatives. Local field officers were incorrectly completing the monitoring forms, as the language used in the questions was incompatible with their field practice. Roger devised a system that involved a deployment exchange of personnel moving from headquarters to field offices and vice versa for site visits so that all parties gained a further understanding of each other's working environment and alterations could be made to the processes of communication.

#### **6.2.12 Improvised Solutions to Problems with International Civil Servants**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication with international civil servants.

#### **6.2.13 Improvised Solutions to Problems with Local Government**

In a transitional context of a post-conflict society the establishment of local governments is inherently problematic. In particular, participants noted the importance of communicating not only with the correct officials but also in the correct manner. Adam relayed a difficulty that precluded the instigation and participation in training of criminal justice system officials in Bosnia. The European Union in writing to ask the Minister for Security to support the training of officials in Bosnia had erroneously written to the Minister for Interior and in doing so had offended the Minister for Security. Consequently, the failure to coordinate contact with appropriate individuals impeded the training process.

#### **6.2.14 Improvised Solutions to Problems with Local People**

There was a dichotomy of responses on the issue of cultural competence of knowledge in relation to communication with local people. There was a distinct lack of nuanced cultural knowledge imparted through soft skills training prior to deployment and when training did occur both police and civilian participants maintained that it was too generic and not referable to the particular areas they were deployed. Adam, a senior ex-police officer working for NICO, experienced that in communicating with local people it was best to do so in English as to attempt to interact in native languages often induced the unwarranted possibility of offending local people if the intonation or dialect used was incorrect.

Communication can be actionable and visual through practice not just verbal expression. For example, communication between police units and local people in Kosovo was noted by participants to be distant in that police and military routinely only left their compound when on uniformed armed patrol. Gary, a regional commander of a police unit in Kosovo decided it was critical to establish communication with local people that police officers used local community resources such as education and recreational facilities. Gary explained that even though the military compound was fully equipped with a gym he and other officers employed a local personal trainer and used the community gym in order to be seen within the community. As well as contributing to the community economy the purpose of the interaction was to be seen in the community with key individuals and to build a visual communication with local people. Gary noted that communication with young males in the gym was fostered not audibly but initially through physical competition over who could lift the heaviest weights and grew into a inter-community inter-organizational engagement as the military, the police and the community would play in football, cricket and rugby matches on a weekly basis. Policing and communicating with locals is about more than applying laws and regulations. This is evidenced by Peter who noted that a major issue in rural Kosovo was the chopping down of forest trees by Albanians in Serbian areas. The military and policing response initially in not regarding woodcutting as a serious community issue and warranting of police action failed to understand the significance of the impact of woodcutting on the Serbians in the area. Peter participated in meetings with the local community and it was explained that livelihoods were being lost and it was, in fact, the most critical issue to that community. Peter instigated patrols in the forest to prevent the woodcutting on the basis that within a peacekeeping context the aim of mission to respond to the needs of communities necessitates that policing goes beyond mere adherence to application of rules and laws.

## **6.3. Cooperation**

### **6.3.1 Why is cooperation important**

Cooperation is of critical import on peacekeeping missions and the success of a deployment can depend on an individual and organizational capacity to establish cooperative structures. Given the importance of peacekeepers being able to cooperate with other international officers as well as engaging with other organizations and local people, it is interesting to note that no participants could remember having received training in how to cooperate either on a professional or personal level. Several participants indicated that they believed there was an implicit expectation that cooperation would be necessary but prior to deployment no training or advice on how cooperation should be instigated was considered. In addition, participants noted the difference in expected cooperation on a macro-organizational level with experienced cooperation on a micro-level whilst in the field. This issue was particular acute in the levels of cooperation between military and police units and the inability of individuals to be able to improvise solutions to cooperation problems on the micro-level. Several participants stated that the only action following a lack of cooperation or a disagreement with military personnel was to report the issue to their superior officers but it was noted that relations and levels of cooperation did not improve at any stage of the mission.

Daniel, a civilian peacekeeper, maintained that interpersonal skills were vital to the successful communication of information that impacted critically on the difference between information being heard and actually being listened to. Indicative of the interpersonal skills that could be utilized to establish trust and confidence, both with other members of the peacekeeping mission and local people, was demonstrating sensitivity in informal settings. Being aware of and paying due deference to cultural practices of breaks, lunch times, prayer times, engenders confidence amongst people and can make cooperation more accessible.

### **6.3.2 Experience of cooperation with Own Organization**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication with international civil servants. The only reference to any experience of cooperation with their own organization by participants referred to the efficiency of recruiting, equipping and the training of police officers for the first RUC/PSNI deployment to Bosnia. Participants who experienced that deployment believed the process was expedited due to the commitments made by the British Government to deploy personnel as quickly as possible. Three participants made reference to cooperation with their own organization in permitting extended leave on return from mission.

### **6.3.3 Experience of Cooperation with Personnel from police forces**

Participants identified the strategic organizational aim of equality of representation of nationalities as an impediment to cooperation. From a policing perspective it was stated that the competency of other nationalities, particularly African officers, was deficient and in hostile conflict situations those officers could not be relied upon. Participants discerned that Italian and German officers were of a comparable or even higher standard to themselves and in order to ensure their own safety on missions they would try and associate themselves with officers from Italy and Germany where possible, while at the same time disassociating themselves from officers in whom they had little or no trust.

### **6.3.4 Experience of Cooperation with Personnel from militaries**

Some participants noted a positive working relationship with military, specifically the British Army. Participants indicated that when cooperation and interaction with military occurred in a positive manner it was due to two factors. Firstly, as police officers in Northern Ireland participants had experience of cooperating both strategically and on the ground with the British Army and as such had acquired the specific soft skills of communicating directly with military personnel. Secondly, participants stated that the military on mission were keen to cooperate with police officers from Northern Ireland, as they were secure in the knowledge that they had been vetted prior to deployment. Participants noted that due to the lack of appropriate vetting procedures in place regarding other international police officers, particularly officers from African countries, both the military and themselves were wary of cooperating and relying on some officers.

Negative experiences of cooperating with military centered upon the competing remits and roles of military and police units. Several participants, including Aaron and Kevin, pointed to the lack of a coordinated strategic agreement as not only inhibiting cooperation but as rendering any cooperation non-existent. Aaron related an experience of visiting a hospital and discovering that there had been significant misappropriation of international peace money but no arrests were possible after Aaron was informed by military commanders not to pursue the matter. Aaron believed the lack of

cooperation was based upon the competing agendas of military and policing strategies with the military aim of maintaining peace at all costs abrogated any attempt by Aaron and his fellow officers of developing policing processes.

### **6.3.5 Experience of Cooperation with International NGOs**

There were few findings from data collected in interviews on cooperation with international NGOs. Several participants noted that any engagement with NGOs was in relation to non-policing issues and the NGOs were consulted at the behest of police officers to assist with specific situations. An example of the role of NGOs in cooperating with police was exemplified by Jake who noted that due to the lack of long-term strategic interventions in relation to vulnerable women trafficked to work in brothels police were unable to act beyond raids. Due to the lack of established legislative processes the criminal justice approach was ineffective and following raids there were no processes for responding to the needs of trafficked women. Cooperation with the NGOs was vital in creating a system where trafficked women could be housed securely in a safe house and then repatriated or relocated under the guidance of the NGO with protection provided by the police.

### **6.3.6 Experience of Cooperation with International Civil Servants**

The importance of communication and cooperation on an individual level in addition to an organizational level is evidence when macro-level strategic policies impact on micro-level realities. This was highlighted by Kevin who experienced a situation with local people who were Serbian wishing to sell their property in Kosovo to their long-time Albanian neighbours in order to move back to Serbia. Having established that no intimidation was involved in the protracted sale it was evident that it was not a policing matter but a civil issue. As a result of socializing with civil servants Kevin was able to ascertain that an international prohibition on the sale of houses was in place as the international community considered any sale to be a form of permissible ethnic cleansing. Having established contact with civil administrators Kevin was able to put the local people in contact with the civil servants responsible for upholding the block on the selling of property in the area. The importance of communication and cooperation is evident in this situation when macro-level policies engender conflict on a micro- and meso-level.

### **6.3.7 Experience of Cooperation with Local Government**

The only mention of specific difficulties in cooperating with local government was in relation to Bosnia where the canton system of regionalizing government structures necessitates 10 cantons with 10 different prime ministers heading 10 different cabinets. The differences in legislation, religious and political affiliation and the volatile nature of relationship inter- and intra- the cantons is considered to complicate communication and cooperation for peacekeepers.

### **6.3.8 Experience of Cooperation with Local People**

Cooperation with local people was stymied by tensions over the perceived lack of impartiality of international police officers. Perceptions over bias or prejudice was attributed to police by local people and an example of this was given by Gary who took strategic decisions on assuming command control for a police unit in Kosovo. The previous regional commander had based the unit headquarters on the Albanian side of the river because the Serbian side had been considered too difficult. Gary attributed that assertion of too difficult to have resulted from a strategic policing error to make token arrests in trying to establish and assert legal authority. Gary regarded this error as

trying to impose policing on a community not building an environment conducive to effective policing. In reversing the strategic policing approach and re-locating the police unit to the Serbian side communication and thus cooperation with local people was fostered. The location of the police unit was critical to establishing cooperation as the police officers resided in the community, worked in the community and importantly stimulated the economy of the area by socializing in the community. This improvised solution to relocate the police unit provided the opportunity for the practice of soft skills of communication in both a professional and personal capacity to not only emerge but also activate cooperation between police and local people.

### **6.3.9 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Own Organization**

There was no data collected from interviews regarding improvised solutions to problems in cooperation with own organization.

### **6.3.10 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Personnel from own organization**

No mention of improvised solutions to problems in cooperation with other organizations.

### **6.3.11 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Personnel from police forces**

NICO participants responsible for delivering expert training in operational policing and forensic investigations for police officers in post-conflict areas discovered an issue regarding participant and institutional cooperation. It was concluded that a barrier to successful implementation of recommended policing practices following intensive training was the legislative differences across policing jurisdictions. For example, Adam observed in Bosnia and in Kosovo that in certain areas police practice was led by judicial prosecutors and there were discrepancies between the legal code and the criminal procedure code that police were operating under. To overcome this impasse NICO experts included both prosecutors and police officers in pre-training reconnaissance so that all training is directed to be applicable to the nuanced legislative procedures that police officers participating in the training will then operate in line with.

With regards to German officers, whilst acknowledging that they were highly trained and reliable colleagues, their rigid adherence to protocols instigated a breakdown in communication between international police officers and local people. Aaron discussed a gun amnesty in Kosovo being administered by German police officers that was due to officially end at 12 o'clock. On arrival at the station after the closure of the amnesty Aaron encountered the German officers attempting to arrest a local person who had arrived with guns and grenades to give in under the amnesty but he had arrived after 12 o'clock. Aaron and his colleagues refused to allow the Germans to arrest the local person and following a heated discussion with the Germans Aaron devised a solution that involved telling the local person to leave the weapons but go home. Aaron and his colleagues then took the weapons and ammunition and buried it in a nearby forest area to be discovered a short time later and it was declared as found by officers rather than deposited under the amnesty. The overarching aim of the amnesty to remove weapons and ammunition from the community had been achieved but the lack of cooperation and flexibility from Germans officers could have undermined public confidence in international officers. Aaron emphasized that compassion and empathy were

central tenets of the approach necessary to garner a reputation of honesty and impartiality with local communities.

#### **6.3.12 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Personnel from militaries**

Problems in cooperation with military personnel were presented as being founded upon the different remits and roles of the organization on mission. Jake regarded the tension arising from the military retaining control of all strategic decisions following their arrival on mission to securitize and stabilize conflict zones. However, this retention of power and a keep the peace at all costs approach was in contrast with police units attempting to establish normalized policing processes. Participants did not elicit effective improvisation approaches that they utilized but specifically mentioned that they would often intervene between local people and military when conflict had escalated due to the use of force by military.

The only improvisation method mentioned highlighted the flexibility that police officers possessed in comparison with military personnel. Simon recounted an experience that demonstrated the flexibility of police powers and how that allowed police officers to respond to the issues of local better in a more empathetic and appropriate way than a stringent military restrictive approach. A bridge in Kosovo could be closed by the military seeking to restrict access between each side of a river that was regarded as belonging to separate Albania and Serbian communities by the placing of a barbed wire fence. The military personnel deployed to guard the entrances to the bridge could not deviate from their orders not to allow any people across the bridge. However, when international police officers were instructed to assist the military with guarding access to the bridge they were not subject to such strict orders and could allow certain people, such as NGOs and trusted locals, across the bridge. The corollary of the flexibility in approach was that the police were able to develop better relationships with other organizations and local people despite increased tension, and by consequence less cooperation, with military personnel.

#### **6.3.13 Improvised Solutions to Problems in cooperation with International NGOs**

Participant engagement with NGOs was sparse on a daily basis excepting specific situations when NGOs were an important resourced on non-policing issues within a peacekeeping context of countries devoid of care systems. The transitional nature of peacekeeping missions and the volatile nature of conflict areas necessitated cooperation between military, police and NGOs and each have a critical role and remit of operation. Direct engagement and cooperation between organizations is critical in holding each respective organization to account. Jake identified the role of the military as securitization but it was the role of the police and NGOs to stabilize and normalize environments within the parameters set out by the military. In this context cooperation was necessary to establish and maintain boundaries of control so that no organization over exerted influence and that each organization performed their operational remit.

#### **6.3.14 Improvised Solutions to Problems in cooperation with International Civil Servants**

Insufficient data from which to draw conclusions.

### **6.3.15 Improvised Solutions to Problems in cooperation with Local Government**

The symbiotic relationship between local governments and the criminal justice system in a post-conflict situation can induce systemic corruption that can undermine cooperation between government officials, peacekeeping deployments and local people. Jeremy pointed to the abuse of process through the corruption of a judge in Bosnia resulted in a man charged with the rape of a girl he had abducted being released due to having been declared medically insane by a local doctor whom he had bribed. The judge, who had also been bribed according to Jeremy, refused to try the case due to the evidence of the doctor. Jeremy, on the advice of a local officer instructed the judge that if he accepted the defendant was not fit to stand trial then he was legally required to take his driving licence off him, which he did. Jeremy and his colleagues pursued an improvised solution through their knowledge of the law to achieve the aim of prosecuting the defendant for the original crime of rape. The police set up a checkpoint near the defendant's house and every day they arrested and charged him for driving without a driving licence. Eventually the man became so frustrated with the actions of the police that he returned to court to state he was not insane and, having revoked his plea, he subsequently was tried for rape.

### **6.3.16 Improvised Solutions to Problems in cooperation with Local People**

Kevin experienced apathy towards engagement with international police officers from local people in a village in Kosovo due to the local community have become exasperated at the ever-changing personnel assuming policing responsibility for the area. Kevin empathized with local people on realizing that the police commander in the area had been changing every 6 months necessitating new relationships having to be developed and local people had had enough of constantly having to engage with new officers. Kevin instigated monthly community meetings with the community in addition to corresponding directly with recognized community leaders to facilitate an exchange of information and to directly try to impart ownership over policing in the area to local people.

## **6.4 Trust**

### **6.4.1 Why Trust is Important**

Within a peacekeeping and conflict resolution context trust is a multi-faceted concept that is critical to the professional and personal communications of people on deployment. Trust is not unidirectional and participants noted that trust, mistrust and lack of trust characterized relationships between individuals within peacekeeping missions, between organizations and with local people. It is important to note that participants highlighted the dichotomy between mistrust of others on mission and possessing a lack of trust. The nuanced difference between not possessing trust in people and actively not trusting others is an important distinction to be drawn. Contextual trust emerged as a theme in the research to indicate that implicit trust was not possible in a peacekeeping situation, however, a qualified trust in people usually developed. Ross, a civilian deployed by the UN to observe election processes, characterized qualified trust as the difference between trust and belief in that as a UN worker when someone approaches him on mission he trusts them to engage with him but is aware not to believe what he is told. Ross maintained that the reason for only possessing qualified trust in individuals is due to the absence of the requisite knowledge and skills to be able to critically engage and deconstruct interactions with local people and other nationalities and organizations on mission.



Police participants discussed parallel structures that served to delimit the trust they would place in newly recruited local police officers with historic conflict connections with organizations such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The soft skills upon which police on deployment based their narratives of trust was gained not through training but through experiential knowledge from working within a Northern Ireland society during a conflict and post-conflict period. Training and experiential learning are not mutually exclusive concepts and soft skills instructed in training but cultivated in a working environment were critical in developing strategies for building trust.

All participants that had lived or worked in Northern Ireland during the conflict and post-conflict period believed that that backstory engendered lived and learned history and knowledge that was critical to building trust and commonality whilst deployed on peacekeeping missions. In order to build trust it was necessary to establish credibility in the eyes of local people. Participants explained that it wasn't merely talking about the conflict in Northern Ireland but being able to talk to the conflict in that they could demonstrate that they had a role to play in not only the resolution but also in a personal capacity they could talk about how they and others were effected by the Troubles. By demonstrating openness and being candid about their experiences participants believed they were then seen by local people and organizations as more credible and trustworthy.

Lee, a civilian deployed in Afghanistan, observed that trust was established informally in stressful situations. Whilst on lockdown in a diplomatic enclave due to the riotous protests of 80,000 people seeking to attack the US Embassy Lee noted how the reactions and behaviour of colleagues served to build trust and communication between individuals. Trust in this instance went beyond security and intelligence communications to focus on personality, coping mechanisms and a dependency on each other. Lee emphasized that it was positive in such a stressful situations that normalized routines of socialization such as eating together, playing games together and talking with one other enabled people to deal with stress and tension whilst building trust in the team around them.

Delivery of information and demonstrating that you could be trusted to deliver on promises were key components to developing trust with local people. Trust is not a unidirectional construct and participants, especially police officers, stated that responsibility lay on international peacekeepers to establish relationships of trust and credibility with locals, rather than vice versa. To achieve this aim officers deployed a myriad of strategic approaches. Gary, a regional commander in Kosovo, discussed a tiered approach to garnering trust that began with being seen training in a gym and being challenged by local young men to weight lifting contexts to then asking them if they fancied a beer in a local bar afterwards. This relationship then developed and they started to bring issues and problems to him and he was able to then decide whether to help them or not. However, Gary emphasizes that because a relationship has been established with them then it is possible to be able to explain why it may not be appropriate to help them. This honest exchange of information is at a level that could not have been achieved without the time and effort taken to establish a relationship. To be able to develop relationships with people based on trust participants highlighted the role of being seen in the community.

An important method of creating trust with people is delivering on promises. A participant demonstrated by discussing an experience of a school bus taking children to an Albanian school



being prevented from passing through a Serbian village by a roadblock and the militarized response was to deploy 32 armoured vehicles of soldiers to ensure the bus was able to go through the village. Gary, on identifying the waste of resources and the disproportionate response to a localized issue, approached the roadblock alone and conversed with Serbian people who would have seen him socializing in their village in coffee shops and local restaurants. Gary discussed the matter civilly and exchanged his position and the need for the roadblock to be dismantled while trying to understand the grievances that had led to the roadblock being erected in the first instance. By negotiating with the Serbian villagers Gary committed to look into why there was armored vehicles coming through the area and he would be back within 48 hours to discuss a solution. By doing so and delivering on promises and sharing information villagers were not forced to resort to blocking roads and protesting. It is important to note this example demonstrates that the utilization of soft skills is not an isolated strategy and it was only by being seen in the village within an informal, social context that Gary was able to then engage with the local people on the roadblock in a non-confrontational manner.

#### **6.4.2 Strategies to Build Trust Amongst Organizations**

No participants recalled receiving any training on how to build trust among organizations and believed that any strategies they utilized were based on previous police training but primarily on natural human nature and personal social skills. Socializing was identified by participants as engendering trust and friendships between international officers across organizations. Robert and other police participants discussed the impact of each national unit hosting social evenings based on their culture and cuisine that others were invited to. In particular, participants noted that Asian and African officers who felt ostracized were enthusiastic in welcoming anyone who came to their houses for coffee or a meal. It is important to note that communication in both formal and informal settings can be used as tools for creating relationships that then enable trust to develop. Simple communal interactions and connections can be developed by chatting to people over coffee and participants such as Chris noted that by remembering people's names and asking about their families lead to enhanced quality of interactions and familiarity.

Participants responsible for delivering training to other organizations on mission, in particular local police officers, were diligent in altering scenario based exercises to include local street names, individuals and regulations to relativize information for local officers. A bi-product of amending training to reflect the local environment was that it allowed the international experts the opportunity to build a rapport with locals. Additional alterations, as mentioned by Adam, included an awareness of local bus schedules that meant if a class went beyond 4 o'clock in the afternoon then participants would have to wait several hours for the next bus. By developing a training schedule that reflected the travel needs of participants Adam was able to establish a mutually respectful relationship with local officers.

Irrespective of policing competency or language difficulties participants concluded that common traits and principles of policing enabled international police officers to develop trust in one another.

### 6.4.3 Strategies to build trust with Locals

Assimilation and contribution to community was identified as key strategies to building trust with locals. Rather than fostering interactions with local people based on skills developed through formal training participants considered human qualities such as acting in a considered and polite manner as central to establishing relationships within the local community. Adam, a former police officer employed as a subject matter expert by NICO, explained that in order to assimilate with locals he makes a conscious decision to dress in a comparable style to local people and would not wear suits and formal attire when the locals are dressed in jeans and a t-shirt. Additionally stimulation of local economy was identified by policing, NICO and civilian personnel as important to demonstrating respect and building trust with local people. By staying in family run hotels rather than police compounds, socializing in local coffee bars a visual presence is established and routine conversational interactions take place on a daily basis. Gary believed that socializing with locals was a mutually beneficial process that enabled international officers to become live to the experienced hardships of local people they were serving. Gary extrapolated that having frequented a local bar after using a community gym he was approached by a local man who asked could he assist with security for his brother who wished to move house but was scared to do so due to the hostile nature of the area he was moving from. Gary viewed such interactions as intelligence gathering that were more accurate on a micro-level than information provided from centralized police intelligence through the form of briefings.

Communication with victims and providing them with information was seen as a strategy for building trust with local people. Due to the short-term nature of peacekeeping deployments local people struggled to build continuity with recognizable police officers. On arrival in a Kosovar village as station commander Kevin was faced with apathy from the local Serbian population who were frustrated that the police officers within the area had changed multiple times in a short period and each change brought a different style of policing. Kevin, empathizing with and understanding the frustrations of local people instigated a weekly meeting to exchange information with locals and to attempt to give them a certain degree of ownership and insight into the reasoning behind policing processes.

Aaron, a police officer deployed in Kosovo, built trust with locals by gaining a reputation for being the officer that didn't carry a gun. Having been issued with a handgun Aaron made a conscious decision not to carry his gun, against mission regulations, after witnessing the scared look on a child's face when she seen him arrive at a house in full police uniform including body armour and carrying a gun. The strategy not to carry a gun was borne out of the view that all military personnel looked alike and local people could not disassociate between police and military, a situation aggravated by the prevalence of a language barrier.

Simon and Gary who participated in playing sport with local people in a village in Kosovo noticed that the local community recreational facilities could only be used in daylight due to damage to the generator during the conflict. The international officers decided to organize and run fundraising events to raise money for a new generator to power the floodlights to enable the facilities to be used at all times of the day. The events and the subsequent purchase of a new generator aided

integration of and relationships between international police officers and local people and demonstrated a commitment on behalf of the officers to the local community.

## **6.5 Peacekeeping personnel recommendations for soft skills training**

Participants advised that future peacekeepers should be mindful of the aims of the mission and the needs of public they are there to work with and not to assume that the aims of each are congruent. By utilizing soft skills of communication and cooperation to assimilate and integrate with local people peacekeepers can gain an awareness and understanding of the critical issues facing local people. Daniel, a civilian peacekeeping negotiator, recommended that future peacekeepers whilst learning of the history of conflicts prior to deployment it was advisable not to get over-immersed in detail as the role of peacekeeper was to assist with solutions and progress not with minutiae over cause.

Kevin who deployed to Kosovo on two separate missions counseled that peacekeepers should be conscious of the need to use soft skills on themselves as much as with other people. By this, Kevin explained that on his first deployment he overextended himself massively by undertaking an unsustainable workload and on the second deployment he was careful to limit work and pay attention to his own wellbeing and the wellbeing of fellow officers.


With specific reference to soft skills participants recommended future peacekeepers recognize the need to attain the ability to communicate with differing target audiences. Daniel pointed to the need to be able to alter the means and methods of imparting messages without changing the message. The neutrality of peacekeepers was critical on missions and with neutrality comes power and it was considered important by participants that future peacekeepers were aware that their neutrality could be undermined if their soft skills were not exacted in practice. In relation to the practice of soft skills Lucy believed that soft skills in training should be learned through real-life scenarios and not in a classroom as it was only by action and experience that requisite skills could be developed.

Participants identified an absence of nuanced and context specific cultural awareness and sensitivity training. Even when training had been undertaken participants believed it was not reflective or cultural experiences of missions in that it was too generic and did not relate to the areas and environments of deployment. However, Jack and Rachel advised future peacekeepers to use a lack of cultural awareness and stereotypes as an opportunity to build rapport with local people. Jack maintained that over-education of cultural insensitivities can foster a climate in which people feel unable to communicate for fear of causing offence and that any training should be designed as anecdotal in order to maximize opportunities for engagement and interaction.

## 7. Regional Summary Report: Poland

### 7.1 Summary details of the interviews

A total of 21 respondents were interviewed. Gender breakdown: 3 female and 18 male respondents. The ratio actually corresponds to the breakdown of gender in Polish contingents; this is illustrated in Figure 8, below.



**Figure 8:** Gender distribution of Polish interview participants

Nationality: 18 were Polish, 3 males were Ukrainian that took part in missions abroad<sup>4</sup>. Ranks and job breakdown: 3 civilians, 18 military of various ranks. Average deployments per head: 2,5.

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<sup>4</sup> The research on Ukrainian military that took part in ATO will be carried on for deliverable 3.2. due to the specificity of the mission and the necessity of including hybrid warfare experiences into scenarios in the game if it is to cover all EU needs and future deployments.

	Pseudo-Name	Gender	Organization	Deployments	Countries
1	Sportsman	Male	Armed Forces of Ukraine	2	Kosovo, Chad
2	Baton	Male	Armed Forces of Ukraine	1	Kosovo
3	PK	Male	Armed Forces of Ukraine	3	Iraq, Kosovo, Ukraine
4	Agata	Female	Civilian - IMC	2	Afghanistan, Syria
5	Jarek	Male	Polish Armed Forces	1	Afganistan
6	Robert	Male	Polish Armed Forces	1	Afganistan
7	Julita	Female	Polish Armed Forces	2	Iraq, Afghanistan
8	Mariusz	Male	Polish Armed Forces	5	Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan
9	Krzysztof	Male	Polish Armed Forces	1	Lebanon
10	Greg	Male	Polish Armed Forces	3	Bosnia, Afghanistan
11	Foxtrot	Male	Polish Armed Forces	3	Bosnia, Chad, Afghanistan
12	AZ	Male	Polish Armed Forces	2	Afghanistan
13	Wieslaw	Male	Polish Armed Forces	2	Afghanistan, Bośnia
14	Darek	Male	Polish Armed Forces	2	Syria, Iraq
15	Goliad	Male	Polish Armed Forces	5	Chad, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo
16	Andrzej	Male	Polish Armed Forces	1	Syria
17	Klemens	Male	Polish Armed Forces	1	Lebanon
18	Jac	Male	Polish Armed Forces	1	Iraq
19	Wojtek	Male	Polish Armed Forces	3	Lebanon, Syria, Iraq
20	Ola	Female	Polish Armed Forces (civ)	1	Lebanon
21	Jacek	Male	Polish Armed Forces (civ)	2	Afganistan, Iraq

**Table 7:** Summary table of Polish participants

It is important to note here that in general, training was limited to the general tactical training and concerning soft skills, there was only the cross-cultural competence module, which did embrace most of all basics of cross-cultural communication (including some language) and basic do's and don'ts. As to the quality of the training, the expertise provided was sometimes inadequate to what was on the ground (the problem of specialists that were regional experts but never deployed). Such training lasted from couple of hours to 2-3 days. In case of rapid deployments there was no preparation before, everything was improvised already on deployment.

Majority of respondents found it more-less sufficient, since there was usually a follow-up on deployment and a variety of improvised and unofficial training initiatives happened there (colleagues who were already there shared experience, they discussed various matters in free time and were instructed then also on matters of their interest, et. al. ). However, majority would like to have some more training with people from the region (locals).

Also, there were some interesting cases of improvisation concerning gaining situational awareness. As one of the Ukrainian military members deployed in Kosovo and Iraq noted, children – and their presence or lack of it, was an indicator of an approaching threat. Also, thanks to the good cooperation with local people in either Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo, soldiers and NGO workers were given lots more information from unexpected sources than they expected, which greatly aided the completion of mission goals.

## 7.2 Communication

### 7.2.1 Why Communication is Important

Majority of interviewees indicated that although communication is crucial for efficient functioning of a contingent and the achieving of mission goals, hardly anybody received any specialized training related to it, unless they were in specialized units such as CIMIC, HUMINT or the information affairs (press) detachment. Concerning training that majority of respondents got, it was in cross-cultural communication (basics of everyday communication with the local population or organizations, gestures to be avoided, some basic phrases in the local language), hardly anybody was instructed or trained how to communicate efficiently with other militaries/organizations in the field, apart from strictly technical matters on military communication and confidentiality of information.

It was often stressed that language itself (not sufficient knowledge of English or the local language) was a source of communication failures, and that translators not always did their job properly, on the other hand, in some instances they also served as cultural advisers and would save a potentially threatening situation.

Particular attention here has to be put to cross-cultural communication, which proved a challenge not only in case of contacts with the local population, military or authorities, but also within a multinational contingent. The aspects of communication that were underlined as the most problematic ones were: not understanding the valued type of communication in a given group (direct/ indirect, high/low context, demanding a lot of relationship building before negotiations or straight-to-the business et. Al.), misunderstanding gestures (in particular using gestures that were neutral , not understanding the non-verbal communication and difficulties in estimating how much bodily contact, proximity, eye contact is demanded in a given context.

Also gender made a difference, in particular in case of local women in Lebanon and Syria, where one of the respondents almost got into trouble since he spoke and looked in the eye to a local shop owner. Due to gender also, communication with local women for the male personnel was completely forbidden in Afghanistan, Iraq and Chad. It could only be performed in a limited scope by the female personnel.

However, communication with female American military personnel proved no less problematic. Polish soldiers are used to “chivalry”, caring attitude towards women, paying compliments and helping out whenever possible to their female colleagues, just because the female gender is traditionally regarded as a tad “weaker one”, so it should not be shouted at while giving orders or reprimanding, will be helped carried heavy equipment and so similar. An attempt to behave in this way towards an American female military member was taken (a compliment and offer to carry the heavy ammo box instead of her given by one of the Polish soldiers) as an offence, lack of professionalism and resulted in a heavy reprimand.

What is interesting, no such correlations were observed in the Ukrainian military, where despite the fact that the society is still rather traditionally oriented, with traditional division between “male” and “female”-proper roles in everyday, civilian life, military females are treated absolutely equally to men and no exception is made as to gender, concerning communication, division of tasks, or everyday functioning in contingent.

### **7.2.2 Experience of Communication within Own Organization**

Majority of respondents indicated that there were no problems in communication within one's own organization. However, some gender, interpersonal, individual and interpersonal factors, contributed to misunderstandings in the field. Moreover, respondents have noticed a thing in which they unanimously "agree". Language barriers and deficiencies in English were a major disadvantage of good communication, which by poorly translated things or bypassing certain things made it difficult to carry out the tasks of the operation.

### **7.2.3 Experience of Communication with Personnel from police forces**

Some problems connected to communication with Police forces occurred in case of individuals that were training local (Afghan or Iraqi) police and military, and it resulted from language barrier and lack of understanding of some basic operational concepts obvious for the NATO or coalition military.

### **7.2.4. Experience of Communication with Personnel from Militaries**

Concerning other militaries, once again language seemed to be the main issue. However, national styles of everyday communication made a difference, in particular in cases where high v. low contextuality (as in Hall's division) of communication impacted the contacts. This was observed by our soldiers in case when they had to work with for instance Pakistani, Indian or even Greek soldiers within one contingent, who characterize with very high contextuality (the message was not contained only in the verbal message but all the nuances and non-verbal layer, and they appreciated going round a subject and "talk about nothing" to establish a ground for common understanding). Polish soldiers on the other hand, preferred straightforward, direct type of communication (rather low-context one), therefore they would be sometimes confused or annoyed with ongoing "babble", whereas the other side was offended – they considered the direct approach sometimes simply rude.

Cross-cultural aspects came into account to no less extent in case of different nationalities that were placed together within one contingent (in particular in case of everyday communication – topics considered inappropriate or rude to be talked about, style of communication), but also with members of the local military. For example, the inherent inability of Afghan soldiers that one platoon leader was training to understand the concept and read maps for example, totally disabled any communication during a task that was performed.

### **7.2.5. Experience of Communication with International NGOs**

As for communication with other organizations – civilian ones, respondents approached this with a distance. They claimed that they only communicated when needed for the goals of the operation and didn't try to establish any other type of relationship apart from that. The major problem in communication was caused by the lack of understanding of the nature and sense of tasks of the NGOs by the military and vice versa, however in majority of cases there was not much contact with them as indicated by the respondents, also because of security reasons. For example, in Afghanistan, NGOs tried not to move around or near military convoys because they often became targets for the enemy. Both military vehicles and NGOs were fired at them. In other deployments, attacks on convoys with NGOs were sporadic because they were perceived (NGO) as needed and widely accepted by the local population.



#### **7.2.6. Experience of Communication with International Civil Servants**

No problems reported whatsoever – in case of UN representatives for instance the communication seemed seamless.

#### **7.2.7 Experience of Communication with Local Government**

The respondents repeatedly pointed out the need to use reliable local translators. Their experience, especially in official, critical situations requiring fast response, was crucial.

#### **7.2.8 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with own organization**

In case of communication failures within one own military, the major strategy to tackle them was constant “unofficial” briefing, clarifying and solving issues that happened wherever possible: during meals, a cigarette break, wherever possible once a problem occurred. The use of ad hoc “mediators” – in which case the role was taken by the most socially skilled and willing member of a given cell was a common practice.

#### **7.2.9. Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with Personnel from police and Personnel from militaries**

As reported by soldiers who were training the local army or police in Iraq or Afghanistan, “sign” language, gestures, google translate was used as communication aid at all times. To enhance written communication, all the documents, instructions Mixing languages (like one of the respondents noted: “a little broken English, a little broken Russian .. a little broken Dari, some sign language. And we actually communicated effectively!” – as one of the respondents claimed.

Moreover, it is important to note that concerning the intelligence gathering (which definitely is a communication activity), that was supposed to be delivered by own forces and specialized units, it was sometimes the local people or organizations that provided the most accurate data, even more accurate than from trusted sources. That however, happened for instance in Afghanistan or Kosovo, and sometimes in Chad, but only if given community saw its own interest in providing accurate information and was sure to be provided sufficient protection once the data was exploited.

#### **7.2.10 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communications with International NGOs and International Civil Servants**

Not enough reported interactions and data.

#### **7.2.11 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communications with Local Government and Local people**

Concerning the local people, government and local NGOs, in particular in Afghanistan, the communication was highly aided by the employment of interpreters, who served not only as the medium through which language issues were resolved, but if properly selected, they also were able to aid negotiations, serve as cultural advisors and solve conflict situations. However, it was reported in particular in Iraq that they would not be trustworthy, they might change the translated message for the benefit of their own/ their family or people they worked for, thus distorting the communication

process and execution of tasks or, in one case, it broke the negotiation on a completion of a project that was important for the military.

In case of the local population members that did not speak any other language than their own, communication was aided thanks to generally respectful approach of the soldiers and attempts from their side to initiate at least some basic understanding through using some very basic phrases in the local language (highlighted by almost all respondents as the major ice-breaker in initial contacts), gestures and “sign” language. Initiative like that, even though not really supported by serious professional skills and language expertise, always allowed to build bridges.

## 7.3. Cooperation

### 7.3.1. Why Cooperation is Important

Collaboration in one’s own organization, was considered in all cases one of the key aspects of successful operations. When there was no cooperation in own organization, it translated into bad cooperation with other organizations (another military, police). Thus, from the very beginning, from the training sessions, the emphasis should be on internal cooperation. Like one of the respondents, Andrzej said,  $\frac{3}{4}$  of his 3-month training consisted of building relationships with one another and it was worth every hour.

However the rest of the interviewed soldiers, both from the Polish and Ukrainian Army, identified *a posteriori* insufficient training in soft skills, in particular in case of cooperation. Some of them seemed not to understand the concept of soft skills, what points to a real need of emphasising such training, though all of them insisted that the knowledge of how to establish and maintain good communication between various actors on the ground is indispensable in order to realise mission objectives. They definitely lacked training in practical issues, daily-life differences, seriousness of approach to religious affairs, and awareness of issues they may face. Some of the most important were: culture of eating, issues with time, approach to honour and respect, and culture of gift exchange. Despite the fact that some of them were told that “people there may often be late” or “you need to give them something to gain trust”, interviewed soldiers sometimes had to figure it out on their own that in case they fail to grasp sensibility of such issues, they mission might be seriously obstructed and even impossible to realise.

For many interviewed soldiers, the fragility of cooperation due to such minor issues were realised only after unpleasant experience on the ground. To sustain such cooperation with local actors they established a habit of exchange petrol for favours, they try to emphasise (however untruly) the abilities of local actors to increase their sense of respect among foreign partners, some individuals offered small gifts such as new military boots, and spend time together eating (however disgusting it was for them) and talking about their families (despite the fact that for some it might looked like the waste of time, it helped to establish contacts and increase support among local population). To sum up, soldiers going for a mission, though had had some previous training in soft skills and cultural awareness, they definitely lacked practice and were not paying attention to “the nuance” – what turned out to be very important for the local partners. The typical military approach (hierarchical,

strict, and sometimes ignorant and disrespectful, even if not intentionally) definitely lack *sensibility* needed in cooperation with local actors.

### 7.3.2 Experience of Cooperation within and between Organizations

Inter-organizational cooperation was based on the principle that, as one of the interviewees put it, if had to do something together we would find a way to do it – no matter what. Of course, it was easier where rules for cooperation were standardized in operational documents, for example, in the KFOR and the Kosovar police, or with the ISAF and the Afghan police.

In general, cooperation was aided by:

- Clear structure and division of tasks
- Common goals or motivations
- Common identity
- Empathy and understanding
- Previous interactions
- Professional attitude
- Respect
- Responsibility for the team
- Understanding different organizational cultures (civilian/ military).

On the other hand, cooperation was hindered by:

- Different identity, motivation (national/ organizational).
- Lack of respect towards the local population.
- Stress and risk.

The major problem in most contingents that negatively impacted cooperation, was their size. They were not only multinational and multiagency, but they consisted of soldiers from many different units, for example in Syria an operational battalion of about 355 soldiers was supplemented by personnel from 44 units. This caused the necessity for a number of serious interventions in the command divisions. Much effort was put to the very coordination of the soldiers, the reduction of the differences in training, the learning how to maintain foreign equipment, etc.

### 7.3.3 Experience of Cooperation within Own organization

Concerning own organization, cooperation was usually satisfactory for all the respondents, unless in the team there were people who either did not respond well to the amount of stress and pressure inherent to the mission environment, or from certain reasons, displayed non team-player attitude, which wither resulted from the long-term deployment or simply bad recruitment.

Another problematic issue might be gender – in majority of the Polish military respondents view, peacekeeping missions are simply not a place for females in combat or commanding positions. However, it seems it was not necessarily the very fact the female personnel was incompetent, since in majority of cases it was competent enough to perform all the tasks given. The very problem that hindered cooperation was the negative stereotype and conviction that it is only medical/headquarters positions that female personnel is capable of performing.

As aforementioned, no such correlations were observed in the Ukrainian military, where despite the fact that the society is still rather traditional, with the division between “male” and “female”-proper roles in everyday, civilian life, females in the army are treated absolutely equally to men and no exception is made as to gender, concerning communication, division of tasks, or everyday functioning in contingent.

#### **7.3.4 Experience of Cooperation with Personnel from Police Forces**

Cooperation with the police forces – or military police, was seamless as long as it was not in culturally-distant countries, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, working with Afghan Police was hard because they delayed some things in time, and of course, they had to be encouraged by small “favours” such as refuelling their cars, handing over a certain amount of food rations, etc. As one of the interviewees put it, it was a collaboration on the principle of “You give me something, then I will give you something”.

#### **7.3.5 Experience of Cooperation with Personnel from Militaries**

Major problems in cooperation with personnel from other military or police forces, despite the presence of common operational procedures, was sometimes hindered due to the differences in national cultures, operational styles and also, different national caveats, which brought restrictions on operational functions. Moreover, such simple everyday issues as approach to sanitary issues, nudity, time or even different cuisine would highly complicate everyday life in a multinational contingent.

Apart from culture, there is the organizational cultures clash once again present and stressed by the military. Another very significant group of employees of a given contingent were civilian specialists working for the military. It was reported that the recruitment of them was rather problematic, and sometimes people who would be totally unprepared to perform their tasks in combat zones and high-stress mission environment, were employed only due to the fact they presented enough of expertise. That however, proved useless in extreme conditions they were unprepared for, and it happened even in case of cultural specialists.

#### **7.3.6 Experience of Cooperation with International NGOs**

It was advised that in order to be more effective in helping the local population, it would be good to cooperate more with NGOs than focus on the military doing everything. It is crucial for the military to know how those organizations work, what are the procedures, how they organize their work, what are their aims – generally to be familiar with differences in organizational cultures. As one of the Ukrainian interviewees noted: “Better connection of UN staff, especially with local NGOs, would be best. For example to develop agriculture in a village, or to provide some locals with fuel for

generators, maybe some medical aid and supplies – military observers do not have obligation to do it and do not know the local needs and grievances enough.” Maybe if we could or cooperated with NGOs on that would be better. We know a lot about the region, we could share information, and that would help the local people”.

However, the cooperation between the military and NGOs was strongly hindered by the different goals, different organizational cultures, and different priorities for both entities. This results not only from the diverse tasks, but the degree to which those two have insight into local population and understand its nature, culture and needs. Also, understanding of security – and how to provide it to members of one’s own organization truly complicated cooperation between the two entities.

### **7.3.7 Experience of Cooperation with International Civil Servants**

Lack of sufficient data.

### **7.3.8 Experience of Cooperation with Local Government**

A serious problem among PRT soldiers cooperating with the Afghan government for instance was timing. The rotation changed every 6 months while the projects for Afghan civilians lasted longer. As a result, the person running the assistance project usually did not see the results of the project or did the project beforehand. Thus, there were cases when the project was abandoned or changed due to a different approach to the problem in the new rotation, loss of personal contacts between the project executives on the Afghan side, which distorted the image and credibility of the forces in the eyes of local population.

### **7.3.9 Experience of Cooperation with Local people**

Concerning cooperation with the local people and government, but also military, it was definitely two factors that accounted for problems in cooperation. First was the unfavourable view of the organization (ISAF/ coalition forces) and its goals to be realized in a given country. However, in case of UN or NGO representative, there was no such problem, since those had a positive image in majority of local populations. Second was lack of cross-cultural competence and understanding, and resulting lack of respect from the military or police forces towards the local population. Also, the local interpreters were “a double-edged sword sometimes” when it comes to cooperation. Sometimes they established good relations with the soldiers and did a lot beyond their normal duties. However, there were situations in which for instance, they had come to the shelter before the mortar attack, which was a clear evidence that they had been previously informed of the attack or provoked it.

### **7.3.10 Improvised solutions to Problems in Cooperation with own organization**

Improvised solutions that were to promote cooperation and de-escalate conflicts included very simple, everyday bonding, like in the experience of one of the female participants who claimed that what kept them together and sane in Afghanistan, was the simple fact that she could go to a female colleague to chat, do some “girly stuff” like manicure they would not allow to do in the presence of male employees of the contingent, and simply unwind and get a distance to whatever was going on. Also, in the experience of another interviewee, the fact that the members of one team, served as support for each other (also psychological if necessary, in the absence of properly qualified

psychologists), and that there were “mediators” – who would always try to help solve a conflict in a group helped a lot.

### **7.3.11 Improvised solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Local people**

Cooperation with the local population had different backgrounds and different means were employed to ensure it in the absence of lack of cooperation. Acquiring information, ad hoc help provided by the forces (like handing over food). In each of these cases, trust was more or less influenced. In Afghanistan, it was that if you want to achieve something or get something, you have to give something first. In Kosovo, it was very different, the Serbs did not like the fact that other troops or police were stationed there, felt it was unnecessary, and the Albanians, on the contrary, felt more secure and wanted to cooperate, it was rather a national preference issue. However, there were situations in which the willingness to help the local population, compromised security. For example, there was a situation in Syria in which the soldiers wanted to provide some water to the local population when they were leaving and were transferred to various posts, some of the locals who came for water would take pictures of the cars, registration plates and the post itself – which was later passed to the fighting party and had truly negative consequences.

## **7.4 Trust**

### **7.4.1. Why Trust is Important**

Without trust in one’s organization, proper execution of the mission and its success is impossible. Majority of the interviewed claimed that trust within one contingent – one “side” was achieved easily. As one of the respondents noted that after a month of joint housing with a team, trust is sooner or later formed due to the fact that people get used to each other and test in various situations. They also knew that this was the most important aspect of a team's ability to perform tasks well, especially during a crisis, where it is essential to have confidence in partners, for example in an unrest or other risky situation. There were, however, issues with trusting for instance local militaries or police forces, in particular in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Concerning strategies used by the respondents to build trust within the contingent, with people who they cooperated with, were:

- Common activities (sports, spending free time together)
- Common experiences
- Building a common identity and sense of responsibility for the success of the operation
- Mutual respect
- Reliability and Accountability.

On the other hand, what seemed to undermine trust or sabotage any trust-building endeavours, was negative stereotypes – both as to the local population and other nationality militaries within one contingent, and simple lack of respect that resulted from that.

### 7.4.2 Strategies to build Trust among Organizations

Trust among organizations, as aforementioned, was built mainly through common activities and exchange of experiences, and building the imperative of providing security and functionality of a contingent as a whole. However, also organizing common religious/ national holidays celebrations was practiced. Like in the experience of Krzysztof from Lebanon deployment, the Italians or the French, for example, organized their days, such as "Pasta Day", "Pizza Day" combined with music. Common celebrations proved effective even in case of mixed ethnicity local army in Bosnia.

### 7.4.3. Strategies to Build Trust with Locals

The three mostly chosen strategies were:

- Helping attitude, where the military or civilian personnel is committed to improving either the security situation or living standards of particular communities or individuals.
- Impartiality and neutrality (however sometimes it was problematic).
- Mutual respect, in particular respect shown by the soldiers towards the local population, regardless of cultural differences.
- In extreme cases, where trust or cooperation could have not been gained in any other way, the key members of the local population were simply paid – which was not an illegal procedure, but funded by the certain part of ISAF or Coalition means.

It was in particular stressed by female respondents who worked at commanding posts, that it was on hand, more difficult for them to gain trust and sometimes any cooperation from the local military/ police/ government or local authorities representatives than to their male counterparts, only due to their gender. It happened equally in Chad, Afghanistan and Iraq, to lesser extent in Lebanon and Kosovo. However, as all three female interviewers stressed, adhering to cultural norms (for instance wearing the headscarf during official meetings), and displaying an attitude of dignity, distance and full professionalism, in particular if the locals saw them being respected and listened to by their own subordinates from the contingent, usually solved the issue within a couple of days.

On the other hand, it enabled the female personnel to the contact with local women – and in particular in Afghanistan they were the only ones who could have such contact. It enabled for instance the training of a female police platoon in one case, and saving a couple of lives in case of a female NGO employee.

Also, the fact of being associated to organizations such as UN or NGOs that bring medical or humanitarian aid (through emblems, symbols, uniforms visible from afar), was an instant accelerator of trust. Moreover, certain nationalities were preferred among the locals, since the contingent members that were before managed to build trust among local population, and by association, the next contingent was way much better perceived.

## **7.5 Peacekeeping personnel recommendations on soft skills, training and the Game.**

### **7.5.1 Soft skills identified as crucial by the interviewees**

In general, the soft skills that were indicated by the interviewees as crucial for performance of their tasks were: first of all cultural competence, understanding of different organizational cultures present in a given deployment, good communication skills – including language (official language of the mission and some elements of local language) and also understanding of non-verbal cues. The ability to gain trust and cooperate and the ability to negotiate and mediate was no less crucial than adaptability, creativity and initiative – highly valued in particular among officers that had commanding experience. Plus the ability to solve problems within a group as they arise and be able to keep the personal and private matters apart.

Moreover, in contacts with local population, the ability to develop an open, non-judgmental attitude and respect was observed as one of the most crucial skills that aided every activity and helped achieve mission goals. Also, empathy aided the performance of professional duties equally with the local population, and in maintaining group cohesion and proper work atmosphere. However it has to be accompanied by ability to control one's emotions accordingly to the situation – the term “emotional intelligence” was not used but best summarizes what the respondents tried to convey.

A lot of emphasis was put on also “human skills” and simply being a solid, “kind and moral” person in private life, which reflected in professional life also and improved it greatly.

### **7.5.2 Training the interviewees received in soft skills**

In general, training was limited to the general tactical training and concerning soft skills, there was only the cross-cultural competence module, which did embrace most of all basics of cross-cultural communication (including some language) and basic do's and don'ts. As to the quality of the training, the expertise provided was sometimes inadequate to what was on the ground (the problem of specialists that were regional experts but never deployed). Such training lasted from couple of hours to 2-3 days. In case of rapid deployments there was no preparation before, everything was improvised already on deployment. On the average, the training, unless it was a rapid deployment, was divided into the following stages: country training and training during the duty cycle, lasting from one week to two in the mission area. Then, but rarely and not on all missions, trainings were perfected when performing service tasks.

Majority of respondents found it more-less sufficient, since there was usually a follow-up on deployment and a variety of improvised and unofficial training initiatives happened there (colleagues who were already there shared experience, they discussed various matters in free time and were instructed then also on matters of their interest, et. al.). However, majority would like to have some more training with people from the region (locals).

Interviewees also indicated that although communication and cooperation are crucial for efficient functioning of a contingent and the achieving of mission goals, hardly anybody received any specialized training related to it, unless they were in specialized units such as CIMIC, PSYOPS or the



information affairs (press) detachment. Concerning training that majority of respondents got, it was in cross-cultural communication, hardly anybody was instructed or trained how to communicate efficiently with other militaries/organizations in the field, apart from strictly technical matters on military communication and confidentiality of information. Also, majority of respondents were missing for instance genuine cross-cultural communication training, or lack of well-prepared specialists that actually have been in the deployment before. There were many civilian theoreticians who did not understand the specificity of the military world.

What was also stressed was the importance of creating a lessons learned base and the employment of people who took part in missions. Surprisingly, all the respondents claim that the lessons learnt bases are either unavailable or not taken into account while creating subsequent training initiatives. Also, a reach-back access to the trainers that gave the training in the country, was considered very helpful, however very rarely did the soldiers have such opportunity.

A very interesting finding is the fact that the majority of interviewees did not rely only on the training officially provided, but came up with initiative (individually or in a group) and tried to improve their soft skills beyond the pre-deployment training that they were assigned to.

Concerning recommendations for training and advice for other peacekeepers, the interviewed indicated that:

- **Security first:** “First task it is to save yourself, and keep yourself in good condition, mental, physical and protect yourself from local diseases like malaria, because if You are in good condition, you can do all your tasks. It is important not to be careless. And keep attention always. Because as I discussed with my friends, it is very easy to get malaria there if you do not protect yourself”.
- **Avoiding academic, theoretical approach, focus on practice:** “The people who train should be primarily people who have a practice if they have no practice and are only theoreticians it will be a bad training. There are so many such cases we have only theoreticians. Not really unprofessional people those people were prepared, but theoretically, but the practice and the theory very often don’t match. Like, for example, I do not know, a gesture means something different in our culture, and in countries we call Muslim means something completely different.”
- **Using experience of those who were there:** “I think that the people who train should also stay in the area for a while so that they can communicate essentials later. We just have to remember one thing that our military problem is that it is not always good one hundred percent on its own. I think mixing the military and civilian perspectives in the training we got was very valuable. Also the employment of foreigners from the mission areas and knowing their perspective is essential”.
- **Keeping easy-access lessons-learned bases:** “It is essential to keep well-prepared lessons learnt bases. This knowledge disappears at the moment when the soldiers land and they are

going to be settled. All this knowledge is going, as you said to the garbage. Experience can be collecting only from those soldiers who came to the mission again. They already had their point of view. They knew more or less how to move. That does not mean that they willingly share this, because they also had their experience. But it should be noted. As soldiers are returning from a specific camp, from the particular town, what they met, what to pay attention and what may be encountered, in terms of positive, negative”.

- **Training everybody, from the driver to the commander:** “You should prepare people at all ranks. Because it is no matter at what rank you are. The private's experience may be as important for an officer as the officer's experience for a private. This is the amount of knowledge which is probably most needed. This should be properly categorized. But this is the thing which you can't read in books. It would be good to organize meetings with soldiers were on a mission, with the soldiers who have returned from there. It would be nice to talk about the experience, how I served, how my service went, with which I had problems, what to look for”.

Concerning the advice on organizing the virtual part of the training, the interviewees indicated first and foremost, the necessity to create a realistic environment that would embrace all the AO specificity, both culturally and in terms of the composition of the mission, assigned tasks, potential problems that might arise that result from the latter. It can be only achieved when in the creation of the game, and the role-play itself, apart from experienced trainers, also representatives of the local population would take part. Otherwise majority of the military interviewees agreed that the game will not fulfil its purpose.

Other recommendations for the virtual training and what should the game contain, the recommendations are as follows:

- “What must be covered... The region where the mission will take place, regional focus – that is one. Later.... all the national caveats – who can and cannot do what. Because of that not all can perform tasks equally. Would be good if it looked real, like the Sims something like that”.
- “Situations that might realistically happen there. How to cope with conflict situations. How to cope with routine activity, negotiations with local people. Idea of cultural environment. Maybe religion... And language issues? To have a short list of necessary words.”
- “Maybe the most important in this case would be how to maintain relationship inside your group, and how to cope with your HQ and to keep discipline... Maybe it is advisable to check the character of the officer who is supposed to be reliable and who has to be disciplined and punctual. So I think normal good human being characteristics should help to perform the tasks in mission”.
- “I think the alarms, explosions, shelling sounds. It would be very useful, because at that moment people, in part, would be able to feel the role of those people who are there on the

spot. The basic principle, as they shoot, once the alarm is on, then do not look back, just run to the shelter. First, basic principle”.

Of no less importance, according to also civilian respondents would be to create an environment in which the risk, stress and threat factors would be taken into account in some way. It can be done by role-play, like in an example provided by Wojtek: “Well... Let me tell you a story. In 2004 I went with such a small delegation to Slovakia. And among others I had the opportunity to see what the centre of the UN preparations for the Slovak army looks like. And I have to say that I have seen some elements that I have never seen in our training centre. The Slovaks showed us all this software they had, so I was able to see a very realistically done a scene of taking the wounded after a mine incident. This left us very impressed. The Slovaks also trained something like a real role-play situation when the building of the military observer's office was hit by artillery, then collapsed, and people were trapped in the basement, in this hole, without light, without water, etc. It's hard to say how it looked like, but it was a training for such typically stressful things. There was no such thing done for us before deployments. The Slovaks, however, trained such extreme situations. I was there 10 minutes, including dust, and I have to admit that real authentic conditions were created. Slovaks practiced sitting in this hole even for 48 hours”.

This was also stressed by the Ukrainian military members – that the missions abroad they have taken part in (like Iraq, Kosovo), were “safer” and very different in nature than ATO that is happening right now in Eastern Ukraine. There the rotations last a year or more, in morbid conditions, under constant threat and with perpetual disinformation going on.

Since the game should prepare the trainees for a wide range of future deployments, and what was described above is the real face of hybrid warfare, the experience of which can be gained easily from the participants of ATO, the Polish WSU research team decided to develop the range of the query to psychological and social realities of participation in the only hybrid war going around the EU territory. It is going to be performed as supplementary batch of interviews performed for the Deliverable 3.2.

### **7.5.3 The improvisations that people made in the absence of or limited training in soft skills – an overview**

The most significant finding concerning improvisations was that the interviewees patched not only the shortage or lack of some skills, but also the very training itself. The solutions in this aspect included enrolling in private courses (such as language ones), self-study of materials and general familiarization with the future area of operations, one of the female civilian respondents even enrolled as a volunteer in a refugee camp in her country of residence (Australia). As she claimed, camp with Syrian people, the camp that she remembered from Australia, also to prepare herself emotionally for the harsh conditions she expected. Also, as it was observed by Klemens, and experienced veteran of Iraq and Lebanon, trainings happened also in the mission outside of formal context, even when they were drinking beer together with fellow soldiers who have already been deployed there before. As he said, the knowledge from experienced peacekeepers was invaluable. Moreover, a part of the training was trips organized for the soldiers to get to know the country, indicated by participants of Kosovo, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon deployments. In particular that

sometimes there was simply no time for training, as in the case of the respondents to be deployed for Syria and Iraq, where they had no clue where (which base) they are going to land in, what will be their tasks or who are they are going to cooperate with.

Concerning communication – in the absence of certain language skills, improvised solutions included sign language, gestures, the use of translation apps like google translate. Also mixing languages (as one of the respondents noted: “a little broken English, a little broken Russian ... a little broken Dari, some sign language. And we actually communicated effectively!”).

When it comes to cooperation, in particular within the contingent, it was indicated that fixing conflicts after a while – in private, “during a cigarette break” or a coffee was more effective than any other mediation. Concerning the local population, the respondents always underlined the value of respect towards either the representatives of local population or organizations that served as a “fixer” in majority of potentially problematic situations. Moreover, common sports activities and inviting people from other nationalities or detachments/ organizations that were working on the base to celebrating some holidays together, also improved cooperation and mutual understanding. As Julita deployed to Afghanistan noted “the Americans we invited to our Easter were delighted and really amazed, that although so far away from home, in such a difficult situation, we were still together, celebrating, it felt like home”. Any attempt to create any resemblance of stable, “home-like” conditions, even through very simple attempts, like cooking and eating meals together, spending free time on watching movies, decorating common rooms in a simple way, celebrating holidays, really contributed to increasing cooperation and decreasing the insecurity and conflict potential within a contingent.

Concerning lack of cross-cultural understanding, a number of times interpreters served as cultural guides and deescalated many potentially troublesome situations. Like in case of Agata, a paramedic deployed to Afghanistan, who spat the tea she was offered at a village meeting (it had horrible taste and she couldn’t help it). The elders of the village were appalled and totally offended, luckily the translator explained everything to the elders, that it had nothing to do with disrespect, and the situation was rather saved. Also in cases when Polish soldiers were surprised with the Afghan and Iraqi men displaying a lot amity through close bodily contact, holding hands, cuddling and so on. They were explained that this closeness, although uncomfortable in Polish culture, was very demanded and a sign of trust in their AOs, so they learned to embrace such behaviors to the extent possible for them, that greatly improved cooperation.

In general, the soft skills that were indicated by the interviewees as crucial for performance of their tasks were: first of all cultural competence, understanding of different organizational cultures present in a given deployment, good communication skills – including language (official language of the mission and some elements of local language) and also understanding non-verbal cues. The ability to gain trust and cooperate, the ability to negotiate and mediate, adaptability, creativity and initiative were highly valued in particular among officers that had commanding experience. Plus the ability to solve problems within a group as they arise and be able to keep the personal and private matters apart were highly valued. Moreover, in contacts with local population, the ability to develop an open, non-judgmental attitude and respect was observed as one of the most crucial skills that

aided every activity and helped achieve mission goals. Also, empathy aided the performance of professional duties equally with the local population, and in maintaining group cohesion and proper work atmosphere. However it has to be accompanied by ability to control one's emotions accordingly to the situation – the term “emotional intelligence” was not used but best summarizes what the respondents tried to convey.

Concerning training as such, majority of respondents were missing for instance genuine cross-cultural communication training, or lack of well-prepared specialists that actually have been in the deployment before. There were many civilian theoreticians who did not understand the specificity of the military world.

For instance, for Andrzej, a platoon leader, the professional skills training lasted for about a month and a half, there was a language course, and a week of cultural competence course which consisted only of lectures.... Krzysztof received a full-package training in one place that lasted 1,5 months and it was based on getting to know the culture (couple of days) and procedures, and all the tasks that were mandatory for the mission. What is important, his intercultural training took place both in Poland and on-site (Lebanon). As he claims, “there were training sessions and also on the site, it was useful because actually, this cultural difference was visible and we tried not to provoke the locals and not cause conflicts”. On the other hand there were deployments in which the training was totally improvised, like for Jarek to be deployed in Iraq. The training he received as he described was improvised for about two weeks. At the time of recruitment and departure, he had only 2 weeks for quick training, in which, as he said, all was new to him and he was in contact for the first time. And there was no training on the spot, so in this case he had to rely on self-education and the experience of colleagues who were already there. However, in case of Afghanistan in later deployments, where the situation of the contingent was already established, there was the full, typical 3 month training before trip, ending with a certification exercise. The training took place in a military unit where the soldiers served. But even despite the fact, majority of soldiers said they still were unprepared for what was on the ground, in particular when it comes to the overall living conditions, different culture and stress

What was also stressed, was the importance of creating a lessons learned base and the employment of people who took part in missions. Surprisingly, all the respondents claim that the lessons learnt bases are either unavailable or not taken into account while creating subsequent training initiatives.

A very interesting finding is the fact that the majority of interviewees did not rely only on the training officially provided, but came up with initiative (individually or in a group) and tried to improve their soft skills beyond the pre-deployment training that they were assigned to. The solutions in this aspect included enrolling in private courses (such as language ones), self-study of materials and general familiarization with the future area of operations, one of the female civilian respondents even enrolled as a volunteer in a refugee camp in her country of residence (Australia). As she claimed, camp with Syrian people, the camp that I remember from Australia, also to prepare herself emotionally for the harsh conditions she expected. Also, as it was observed by Klemens, and experienced veteran of Iraq and Lebanon, trainings happened also in the mission outside of formal

context, even when they were drinking beer together with fellow soldiers who have already been deployed there before. As he said, the knowledge from experienced peacekeepers was invaluable. Moreover, a part of the training was trips organized for the soldiers to get to know the country, indicated by participants of both Kosovo, Israel, Lebanon and Syria deployments. In particular that sometimes there was simply no time for training, as in the case of the respondents to be deployed for Syria and Iraq, where they had no clue where (which base) they are going to land in, what will be their tasks or who are they are going to cooperate with.

Concerning recommendations for training and advice for other peacekeepers, the interviewed indicated that:

- “First task it is to save yourself, and keep yourself in good condition, mental, physical and protect yourself from local diseases like malaria, because if You are in good condition, you can do all your tasks. It is important not to be careless. And keep attention always. Because as I discussed with my friends, it is very easy to get malaria there if you do not protect yourself”.
- “The people who train should be primarily people who have a practice if they have no practice and are only theoreticians it will be a bad training. There are so many such cases we have only theoreticians. Not really unprofessional people those people were prepared, but theoretically, but the practice and the theory very often don’t match. Like, for example, I do not know, a gesture means something different in our culture, and in countries we call Muslim means something completely different.”
- “I think that the people who train should also stay in the area for a while so that they can communicate essentials later. We just have to remember one thing that our military problem is that it is not always good one hundred percent on its own. I think mixing the military and civilian perspectives in the training we got was very valuable. Also the employment of foreigners from the mission areas and knowing their perspective is essential”.
- “It is essential to keep well-prepared lessons learnt bases. This knowledge disappears at the moment when the soldiers land and they are going to be settled. All this knowledge is going, as you said to the garbage. Experience can be collecting only from those soldiers who came to the mission again. They already had their point of view. They knew more or less how to move. That does not mean that they willingly share this, because they also had their experience. But it should be noted. As soldiers are returning from a specific camp, from the particular town, what they met, what to pay attention and what may be encountered, in terms of positive, negative”.
- “You should prepare people at all ranks. Because it is no matter at what rank you are. The private's experience may be as important for an officer as the officer's experience for a private. This is the amount of knowledge which is probably most needed. This should be properly categorized. But this is the thing which you can't read in books. It would be good to organize meetings with soldiers were on a mission, with the soldiers who have returned

from there. It would be nice to talk about the experience, how I served, how my service went, with which I had problems, what to look for”.

Concerning the advice on organizing the virtual part of the training, the interviewees indicated first and foremost, the necessity to create a realistic environment that would embrace all the AO specificity, both culturally and in terms of the composition of the mission, assigned tasks, potential problems that might arise that result from the latter. It can be only achieved when in the creation of the game, and the role-play itself, apart from experienced trainers, also representatives of the local population would take part. Otherwise majority of the military interviewees agreed that the game will not fulfil its purpose.

Other recommendations for the virtual training and what should the game contain, the recommendations are as follows:

- “What must be covered... The region where the mission will take place, regional focus – that is one. Later.... all the national caveats – who can and cannot do what. Because of that not all can perform tasks equally. Would be good if it looked real, like the Sims something like that”.
- “Situations that might realistically happen there. How to cope with conflict situations. How to cope with routine activity, negotiations with local people. Idea of cultural environment. Maybe religion... And language issues? To have a short list of necessary words.”
- “Maybe the most important in this case would be how to maintain relationship inside your group, and how to cope with your HQ and to keep discipline... Maybe it is advisable to check the character of the officer who is supposed to be reliable and who has to be disciplined and punctual. So I think normal good human being characteristics should help to perform the tasks in mission”.
- “I think the alarms, explosions, shelling sounds. It would be very useful, because at that moment people, in part, would be able to feel the role of those people who are there on the spot. The basic principle, as they shoot, once the alarm is on, then do not look back, just run to the shelter. First, basic principle”.

Of no less importance, according to also civilian respondents would be to create an environment in which the risk, stress and threat factors would be taken into account in some way. It can be done by role-play, like in an example provided by Wojtek: Well... Let me tell you a story. In 2004 I went with such a small delegation to Slovakia. And among others I had the opportunity to see what the centre of the UN preparations for the Slovak army looks like. And I have to say that I have seen some elements that I have never seen in our training centre. The Slovaks showed us all this software they had, so I was able to see a very realistically done a scene of taking the wounded after a mine incident. This left us very impressed. The Slovaks also trained something like a real role-play situation when the building of the military observer's office was hit by artillery, then collapsed, and people were trapped in the basement, in this hole, without light, without water, etc. It's hard to say how it looked like, but it was a training for such typically stressful things. There was no such thing done for us before deployments. The Slovaks, however, trained such extreme situations. I was there 10 minutes, including dust, and I have to admit that real authentic conditions were created. Slovaks practiced sitting in this hole even for 48 hours.

This was also stressed by the Ukrainian military members – that the missions abroad they have taken part in (like Iraq, Kosovo), were “safer” and very different in nature than ATO that is happening right now in Eastern Ukraine. There the rotations last a year or more, in morbid conditions, under constant threat and with perpetual disinformation going on.


Since the game should prepare the trainees for a wide range of future deployments, and what was described above is the real face of hybrid warfare, the experience of which can be gained easily from the participants of ATO, the Polish WSU research team decided to develop the range of the query to psychological and social realities of participation in the only hybrid war going around the EU territory. It is going to be performed as supplementary batch of interviews performed for the Deliverable 3.2.



## 8. Regional Summary Report: Portugal

### 8.1 Summary Details of interviews

The Portuguese State Police participants can be seen as distributed in the various tables and figures below. Over all the sample of participants provided by the Portuguese state police varied within the different aspects perhaps most noticeably in terms of the roles/jobs of participants within the organisation, which ranged from agents, to sergeants, to government advisors. In fact the most common job/role of participants within this organisation was Chief, ten of our participants stated chief as their occupational role within the organisation, the only exception to this is one participant who did not clearly specify her job in the organisation. In a similar vein to their jobs/roles in the organisation, our participants brought an equally broad and varied array of deployment experience and had worked in a diverse range of regions. In total, twelve regions were listed among the 27 participants, with the three most popular regions of deployment being: 1) East Timor (with 15 persons); 2) Bosnia and Herzegovina (13 persons); and then Kosovo (8 persons); (see figure 2). In the area of gender, (as is shown in figure 1 below), there was a reasonable split, nine of our interviewees were female, and a further 18 interviewees were male.



**Figure 9:** Gender distribution of Portuguese Police participants.

Pseudo-Name	Gender	Rank/Job in Org	No. of Deployments	Deployment locations
Catarina	Female	General Secretary	1	East Timor
Rubio	Male	Chief	2	East Timor
Maria	Female	Agent	1	Kosovo
Mario	Male	Chief	4	Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo
Penelope	Female	Sergeant	2	Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia
Elissia	Female	Superintendent	1	East Timor
Carmelita	Female	Didn't specify position	2	Mozambique; East Timor
Jose	Male	Chief	4	Croatia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Democratic Republic of Congo
Felipe	Male	Commissioner	1	Georgia
Louisa	Female	Sergeant	1	East Timor
Luca	Male	Senior Inspector	5	Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; East Timor; Central African Republic; Haiti
Lorca	Male	Government Advisor	3	Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo; East Timor
Pedro	Male	Works in Police Academy	3	Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo
Anita	Female	Intendent	1	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Raul	Male	Chief	4	Mozambique, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo
Rico	Male	Super Intendent	1	Democratic Republic of Congo
Marco	Male	Senior Agent	3	East Timor
Jorge	Male	Commander	3	Bosnia and Herzegovina; East Timor
Bruno	Male	Chief	3	Western Sahara; Bosnia and Herzegovina; East Timor
Ruben	Male	Chief	5	Croatia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo; East Timor
Pepe	Male	Agente Principal	1	Kosovo
Tiago	Male	Sub- Intendent	2	Chad; Palestine
Carlos	Male	Chief	3	Mozambique; Bosnia and Herzegovina; East Timor
Luis	Male	Chief	4	Bosnia and Herzegovina; Western Sahara; East Timor
Ana	Female	Chief	1	East Timor
Joao	Male	Subcommissario	2	East Timor

Rita	Female	Chief	1	Kosovo
Total = 27				

**Table 8:** Summary table of PSP participants

## 8.2 Communication

### 8.2.1 Why Communication is Important

Within peacekeeping missions, the ability to communicate is an important factor in ensuring a successful deployment, which revealed itself when reviewing the qualitative data of twenty-seven interviews collected from the Portuguese Public Security Police, *Polícia de Segurança Pública*, (PSP). When asked directly about how communication was in their various deployments among the various different actors they encountered, participants noted their experiences in the field and how it impacted them both personally and more broadly in terms of the objectives of their missions.

An interesting finding that revealed itself from the interviews regarded whether the participants recognised that they received any specific training that focused on communication, either pre-deployment or as part of their induction training. Although none of the participants stated they received communications training specifically, displaying gaps that could potentially be filled, part of the general induction training they receive tends to focus on how to communicate with locals, albeit more focused on the knowledge associated with being considered ‘culturally competent’.

On the Meta level, when communication occurs it is regarded as a natural part of the job to ensure operational success, such as the ability to listen to people and control your body language, and not viewed necessarily as a ‘soft skill’ that can be developed in itself. Despite this, communication within participant’s own organisations appears to be fully functional, with no real major incidents of a complete break-down. How strong the communicative ties were, however, impacted upon the strength of the rapport build among the various actors, and helped participants to navigate the small intricacies of the various cultures they encountered which they noted can make all the difference. In addition, having women to communicate in incidents of sexual gender-based violence was said to significantly increase the level of acceptance among local populations, along with the importance of having females as interlocutors.

The ability to communicate in the right way in any given situation can also be the difference between escalating an incident, and causing potential negative knock-on effects, or resolving an issue on the spot. One such instance where communication was invaluable in de-escalating an incident involved a peacekeeper, Catarina, who accidentally crashed her car into a parked motorcycle belonging to a local. When she exited her vehicle, she was instantly surrounded by a group of locals, pointing their finger, and imposing themselves in her personal space. Because she was alone, Catarina initially considered showing that she was armed with a gun, particularly because she feared that others in the group might have knives. Choosing against this option, she instead tried to reason with the crowd and locate the owner of the motorcycle to ensure them that she will pay for everything. In the face of a volatile crowd, only through patience and controlling her body language to make it clear to communicate to them that she was there to help, was she able to resolve the incident. It was noted, however, that this incident was towards the end of the mission mandate in East Timor, and had it been five years previous when tensions were higher, a different outcome may have ensued.

In the following sections and subsections, differences in communication with other organisations are revealed in the interviews, particularly when dealing with militaries which are more rank-orientated and require a more direct way of communicating. Illustrative examples of the participant's experience of communication within and between organizations, and incidents of improvised solutions to problems in communication with other organizations can be found in Parts 2.2 and 2.4 respectively.

### **8.2.2 Experience of Communication within Own organization**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication among their own organisations. Any references made were positive, with no problems of note to report on this front.

### **8.2.3 Experience of Communication with Personnel from police forces**

The experiences of communicating with personnel from other police were, in general, positive and conducive to ensuring a collaborative working environment. Most of this centred around feeling that they shared a common identity with police officers, even though typically they were of a different nationality. The fact that they had all gone through the same types of training and had been selected to be on the peacekeeping mission led to an assumed standard of professionalism.

In terms of peacekeeping missions, communication with personnel from police forces in East Timor appeared to be the smoothest, due to the common links and history of East Timor as a former colony of Portugal. Due to this, it was noted that they treated them like friends.

Experiences of difficulties with personnel from other police forces were typically focused around language issues, with English not being the native language of most of the police personnel on deployment. Moreover, there were also certain cultural differences that caused slight tensions when not communicated in the right manner. A common example appears to be the amount of time and primacy given to lunch among certain nations, with the Anglo-American model of holding meetings while having lunch running contrary to the PSP participant's cultural ways.

The only other tension that arose was regarding working styles. One participant, Marco, noted how some national police forces appeared more worried about their position and the position they could get, in terms of promotion, rather than focusing on the job at hand. This meant that communication was hindered somewhat, because such people were more difficult to work with. In addition, pre-conceived ideas about the local populations in the countries peacekeepers were being deployed to was, according to Pepe, more prevalent among certain European nations, which could also impact upon the type of communication they had with locals.

### **8.2.4 Experience of Communication with Personnel from militaries**

Although they were viewed differently and in general regarded as detached from the day-to-day experiences of peacekeeping in terms of the local population, the experiences of the PSP in communicating with militaries was generally conducive to ensuring a collaborative working environment. The militaries were primarily confined to their barracks, unlike the police who, when they finish their job, live in the local areas and interact with the locals when shopping and going about their day-to-day activities.

One theme that came up is that when communicating with the military, due to their hierarchical structures, the importance of recognising the various ranks, and addressing them in the expected manner, is more engrained than the comparatively more horizontal structure of the police forces.

Another issue that revealed itself is that certain militaries sometimes have their own agenda, which runs contrary to the framework under which the police are tasked to adhere to, such as in East Timor. This, however, seems to be dependent on the year in which participants went out to East Timor, with another participant noting that they had a close relationship with the military, and that when problems involving local rebel groups emerged, they relied on military intelligence and support for some of the operations, such as where to pinpoint houses where they wanted to make arrests. During that time, there were daily meetings with the force commander of the military and the Police Commissioner, demonstrating strong communicative ties.

In other missions, such as Bosnia, one participant, Jorge, noted how they often used to go to the military bases for food and supplies, and as a consequence the lines of communication were much closer.

#### **8.2.5 Experience of Communication with International NGOs**

There was minimal experience of participants communicating with international NGOs, but in the few incidences where it did occur, communication was noted as being very good. As one participant, Carmelita, noted, any time they required help, they were able to assist, including taking a colleague who contracted malaria to the hospital. Most of the International NGOs that participants encountered appeared to have a medical focus, and because they were doctors and professionals, it was suggested they were easy to work with. Another participant, Elissia, noted that while her experience with NGOs was limited, she never experienced any difficulty and proposed that the fact they had Portuguese people working in the NGOs made any interactions with them easier. When called upon to work directly with an international NGO, such as the Red Cross, communication was effective, even in the difficult situation of having to confiscate the houses of locals from Serbians. Ruben noted that he had to explain to the local people that they were not responsible for this, and they were merely carrying out the orders of the EU in the aftermath of the Bosnian War.

#### **8.2.6 Experience of Communication with International Civil Servants**

For most participants, they did not mention any specific dealings with international civil servants. Only two mentioned working with EU and UN personnel.

One participant in particular noted how in Kosovo the original mandate from above changed which meant that what their unit was tasked to do altered in the middle of their deployment. Instead of performing the executive powers as police officers, they were tasked to patrol all of Kosovo, visiting the legal institutions, police stations and city halls in order to gather information for the mission because information was lacking at that moment in time and the command staff within the EU did not have reliable information to work with.

The other participant who worked with the UN, Rubio, noted that he often received information from them, typically reports, emails, and updates on the mission. Due to this, their working relationship was always conducive to achieve what they were tasked to do.

### **8.2.7 Experience of Communication with Local Government**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication with local government.

### **8.2.8 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with own organization**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication among their own organisations

### **8.2.9 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with Personnel from police forces**

Improvised solutions in communication with personnel from police forces primarily involved the ability to adapt to different ways of working. As one of the participants, Lorca, noted, while he generally had a good relationship working with personnel from other police forces, it involved adapting to their way of looking at professional matters and other issues such as the importance of obtaining a gender balance, which is more prevalent and emphasised in certain countries. Moreover, it was noted that the higher ranks were more sensitive to the religious habits of those of certain faiths and their habits over others, which could have been communicated better in order to avoid friction.

Another illustrative use of improvised communication involved one of the PSP participants having to figure out who was culpable in a minor car crash involving two UN peacekeeping police force members from two different nations. Both claimed to be innocent. In order to ascertain who was at fault, the participant, Rita, arranged to interview a group of the locals who were present at the time. She specifically arranged the seating of the police officers so that they could see everybody coming in for the interview and began the process. She noted that she was not so much focused on what the locals were actually saying as the important thing was that the police officer could see all the people going in for the interview and testifying. In her words, she was “playing with his mind”. She noted that the man was the best liar that she had ever encountered, but after twenty or so people went in, he finally admitted his fault.

### **8.2.10 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with Personnel from militaries**

Improvised solutions in communication with personnel from militaries tended to pivot around the understanding that, according to one PSP participant, that what you say to another member of the police, you cannot say to a member of the military because at times they can be offended if you treat them as an equal, due to the more rigid ranking structure inherent in the military.

The only instance of a breakdown in communication with militaries was in Chad, where Tiago mentioned that the local military and police forces were a real problem. They would rob people in the street and at times even tried to rob the peacekeepers. This happened to Tiago and his partner when the local military approached them, weapons in hand and demanded money and their uniform boots. Despite being shaken, they improvised on the spot by making clear the consequences of their actions, telling the guys in question of the problems with Generals they would face if they took their uniforms or if they shot them. Because of this, the local military members realised it was not worth it and left them alone.

#### **8.2.11 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with International NGOs**

Improvised solutions in communication with personnel from international NGOs was minimal. In the couple of instances that it did occur, the participants noted that while NGOs were often proactive and came to their station either to report issues or receive information, at times it involved being able to communicate to them that they could not help with every request and drawing the lines between the areas that they could assist in and those that they could not, without jeopardising the relationship. This often involved conveying in such a way that because they were outside of the UN structures, if they wanted certain information they had to go through the right channels and adhere to the hierarchy of who can and cannot provide certain information.

#### **8.2.12 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with International Civil Servants**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication with international civil servants.

#### **8.2.13 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with Local Government**

There were no substantive findings arising from the interviews regarding communication with local government.

#### **8.2.14 Improvised solutions to Problems in Communication with Local people**

Improvised solutions in communication with local people depended on the particular country of deployment and often the year in which the participant went, with tensions higher during certain periods than others. In general, a lot of communication occurred in informal situations, such as in shops and restaurants. More than one participant noted that the local populations liked their presence primarily because of economic reasons.

At times, problems with interpreters arose. The main common issue concerned being weary of whether they were accurately conveying the message that they were told to convey, and the response they were giving back. Because of cultural differences, it also involved treading a line of cultural awareness while at the same time ensuring that they made it clear that there was a certain way of doing things that had to be adhered to. Where possible, the participants tried to learn some of the local language in order to avoid using interpreters to speak directly with the local population to build a relationship with them.

Good communication was also important in order to get information from the local people. By establishing bonds, the people were willing to speak out and help the police with their enquiries and feel more comfortable to report incidents which the police could then send a patrol to confirm. This worked in certain missions, but in others that involved more ethnic conflict, such as Kosovo, greater care had to be taken to confirm the validity of the information and ensure that no sides were taken, as such. This was also prevalent in Georgia and because of the vital information that locals could only provide, the peacekeepers were encouraged to always interact, often over food or drink, with the locals, and never to say no, because they would often speak more once they had developed familiarity. In other missions, such as East Timor, they tried to introduce community policing in small communities and have an exchange of communication between police and the locals, such as the 'Chiefs of Suco', as one participant, Jorge, noted, in order to build up stronger communicative ties. Moreover, the ability to improvise and take leadership of a situation, such as a traffic accident where



you have to tell people to relax and get them to see the situation in a different way through soft persuasion, was viewed as essential when on missions.

A couple of key incidents of improvised communication involved participants being placed in potentially dangerous situations. One such incident involved Tiago in Palestine. He was in a local market, alone. Before going home, two Palestinian teenagers approached him, believing him to be Israeli because of the way he was dressed. Even when they asked him questions which he answered, clearly stating that he was not Israeli, they were still hesitant to take his word. Although their tone was more one of surprise and curious at an unarmed Israeli being in the area, it was only through improvising and finding ways to talk about Portugal, in this case he thought the best example was to talk about the footballer, Cristiano Ronaldo, that he could de-escalate the situation and find commonality. Through this, it instantly helped resolved any potential lingering tension.

A final illustrative incident of improvised communication involved a more heightened situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The situation involved a crowd among the local population attempting to catch and kill a girl they believe to be Rwandan. The PSP participant, Rico, and his comrade, covered the girl to protect her and called for back-up. This instantly led to accusations among the crowd that they were defending the Rwandan and thereby taking sides. Only through a long-process of attempting to de-escalate the tension, the situation was eventually resolved because of the relationship that they had developed with a local elder who confirmed that the girl was not Rwandan, and the girl was protected. Rico also noted the importance of being able to adapt to seeing how the locals in the Congo thought and how they interpret what is being said to them. The ability to adapt their communicative style to their surroundings was also noted by Rita who claimed that her direct way of communicating with people worked well culturally in Kosovo.

## 8.3 Cooperation

### 8.3.1 Why Cooperation is important.

Within a peacekeeping setting cooperation remains another important factor, this became apparent when reviewing the data collected from the Portuguese State Police participants on the project. When asked about how cooperation was in their various deployments, participants noted the implications and impacts of good and bad cooperation in the field, which impacted them personally and even more broadly in terms of the overall objectives of missions.

On the meta level, when participants stated that good cooperation occurred the knock-on effects are described and discussed in generally positive terms, making mission objectives, day-to-day jobs and interactions, and performing job roles easier and appears to result in less issues down the line. In a similar fashion, when cooperation was not good, the knock-on effects are generally negative and seem to result in further obstacles to achieving the goals of the missions and becoming a further hindrance to personnel achieving their objectives or adequately performing their roles on the mission.

An interesting point that arose from the interviews conducted with the participants was in relation to whether they recognised or noted that they received any specific training that focused on aspects of cooperation with the various actors potentially working within the mission region. Overall, we

found that 10 of our respondents appeared to explicitly state they received no training on the topic of cooperation, with a further 4 persons that seemed to infer they received briefings or at least a more generic level of training. As such the latter persons seemed to believe that they received some training like this, however it often seemed to be framed more appropriately as mission briefings of culture, and what to expect on the missions. Cooperation training appeared as an important dimension and pre-requisite for performance in peacekeeping missions from one particular example: Elissia, when asked about cooperation training explicitly stated that she received no training on this, and goes on to state that it was something that she feels should be dealt with before deployment. Specifically, she states that she had to deal with a variety of offices and actors and she didn't know who they were, what their role was, and how to coordinate with them. This then became something that she had to learn by herself, and admits that it took some time.

In a general discussion of cooperation within peacekeeping missions, an interesting distinction appeared within the data, 8 participants were asked how they identify who is the best person to cooperate and collaborate with when on the mission. The main response that emerged from this question for the Portuguese State Police participants was that they are both assigned contacts, while at the same time they tended to initiate contact themselves also. Those that discussed this tended to state that they were assigned contact (mentioned 5 times), and initiated contact (mentioned 6 times), however, in half of these cases, participants stated that they did both. For example, Mario made the suggestion that it depended on the timing of the mission, if you are deployed in the earlier phases of a mission, then you tended to initiate the contact, and similarly when it was the latter phases of the mission, the contacts tended to already be established and you simply worked with them.

In terms of what respondents believed helped cooperation occur, a wide array of responses were elicited, these included things like the role and impact of good leadership; personality (humour and friendliness); some also mentioned the impact of training on the likelihood of cooperation. However, perhaps two of the main themes or ideas that appeared to emerge from the interviews with participants in relation to what builds cooperation and helps it occur, were 1) what I broadly refer to as 'commonality', and 2) informality.

Taking commonality first, a number of participants (approximately 10), referred in various ways to the importance of commonality in relation to what helps cooperation in the field. Within this, there was some different areas that fell under this, ranging from common identity in terms of religion, language, history, and some also mentioned the importance of common purpose/agenda as an important factor shaping the realities of cooperation in the field. Perhaps as a somewhat specific example and case for Portugal, was their experiences in deployments to East Timor, a number of participants mentioned that East Timor was a 'special' mission for the Portuguese, given their shared history. One example of this came from Jorge, who mentioned that people from East Timor would be very affectionate and treated like royalty in some districts because of this shared history.

The second main theme/idea that emerged in relation to this was the importance of informality for cooperation (approximately 6 persons), similarly there were some variations within this theme, but overall interaction with other actors and organisations beyond formal and work centred interactions, was seen to positively impact on the realities of cooperation in the field. A few

respondents mentioned, for example, eating in restaurants, and talking with others as a way of building rapport and trust with other actors, enhancing cooperation.

In contrast to this, respondents were also asked in a number of interviews as to what they believed hindered cooperation in the field. Generally speaking the main theme that emerged from respondents interviews with regard to what hindered cooperation in the field tended to correspond with differences in identities and approaches (approximately 11 people alluded to this). There was some degree of variation within this also, such as referring to gender, issues with some nations and caste systems, and even for example the differences in approach between police and military in relation to crowd control were mentioned.

An additional, and perhaps the next most common theme that emerged in relation to what hindered cooperation in the field was in relation to a lack of training among peacekeeping personnel (approximately 3 persons mentioned this), interestingly some participants noted that between participating countries, the level of training, skill and approach to various elements of policing and peacekeeping work varied quite a bit, and this led to problems and difficulties when it came to performing, leading and effectively managing police work in the field.

In the following sections and subsections we will further examine aspects and examples of cooperation from within the field, as drawn from the experiences of the Portuguese State Police participants, specifically examining each of the potential actors in due course (where relevant). Furthermore, section 3.3 and its subsequent components will examine the ways in which some of the participants reported and discussed their own improvised solutions to problems surrounding cooperation with the various actors in the field.

### **8.3.2 Experience of Cooperation with Own Organisation**

No specific examples or sufficient data on this.

### **8.3.3 Experience of Cooperation with Personnel from police forces**

Aside from the previously mentioned issue that emerged from interviews with regards to the differing level of training, skill, and approach amongst some police forces within missions.

### **8.3.4 Experience of Cooperation with Personnel from militaries**

In a couple of interviews, some participants, for example Lorca, mentioned some of the difficulties in cooperation in relation to the different operational styles, giving the comparison between the police and the army. Others again talk about good cooperation with the militaries in relation to security issues and so forth.

### **8.3.5 Experience of Cooperation with International NGO's**

Perhaps on review, in a small number of interviews the experience of cooperation with NGO's was discussed, by comparison to other organisations it seems that NGO's were portrayed more negatively in terms of competitiveness, lack of willingness to cooperate, problems in beginning cooperation. However, it is important to note at the same time that in other interviews with others, some participants tended to portray NGO's in a favourable light in relation to their experience of cooperation with them.

### **8.3.6 Experience of Cooperation with International Civil Servants**

In a few instances, relatively few, some participants noted a distinction between cooperation in the UN setting, and an EU setting. One of the differences that they noted was the increased diversity of participants in the UN setting sometimes resulted in an increased likelihood of difficulty in cooperation, and similarly within an EU setting, it was 'more similar' and therefore less likely to result in difficulties. In contrast to this, a small number of participants again noted that structurally in the UN setting, cooperation was a little easier.

### **8.3.7 Experience of Cooperation with Local Government**

No specific examples or sufficient data on this.

### **8.3.8 Experience of Cooperation with Local People**

Some participants, for example Joao, discussed the benefits of living among the locals and paying for accommodation there, discussing how they believed that it helped them to build up relationships with them. Some participants also noted the power that local support can and does play in relation to the success of cooperation and achieving objectives of the mission, Elissia for example states that projects can be stopped without the support of locals.

### **8.3.9 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Own Organisation**

There were no real examples within the interviews for this particular setting, mostly it was in relation to others.

### **8.3.10 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Other Organisations**

Given what seems to be a relative lack of training which specifically focused on cooperation aspects within and between various potential agencies and organisations in a peacekeeping setting, and given some of the scenarios participants listed and discussed where cooperation was problematic, in some instances participants provided a number of examples where they improvised some solutions in response to these problems as a way of mitigating and resolving any negative impacts or results.

As a more general example of this, Tiago noted some of the difficulties in getting some organisations to work together and cooperate given their tendency to be competitive with one another (including with him). He admits he had to sit down a number of times with them and try to decipher their common interests, common aims, and any way of separating and managing them to reduce and mitigate this competitiveness. This helped make things run a little more smoothly he notes, though it didn't solve all problems entirely. He also stated that some groups are simply not used to such a 'diplomatic' strategy or approach such as this.

Similarly, in general terms, Felipe notes that they organised and participated informally with other organisations such as the police chiefs, and military staff, in this case they spent time together to talk and to play volleyball, all of which became a means of 'breaking the ice', which again would hint back to the idea of informality and its benefits to helping cooperation occur in the field.

In the sub-sections below, there are also a few additional examples of improvisations for cooperation problems in relation to specific actors where they appeared in interviews with participants.

### **8.3.11 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Personnel from Own Organisation**

No specific examples or sufficient data on this.

### **8.3.12 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Personnel from Police Forces**

Pedro discusses in relation to some UN missions where there is more of a diverse mix of people from a wider number of countries. Specifically he discusses some of the difficulties in working with police force members from other nations. More specifically he mentions some of the difficulty he encountered with police officers from countries where caste systems are embedded within their society. He states that being in a command position and having to deal with these can cause issues. One example he discussed was when he was driving and collected a female colleague and she sat in the front seat, when another colleague came and got in, he was offended that there was a woman in the car with such a lower social rank than he had. He tried to reason that the UN mission was an 'unranked' mission, but in response and as a solution to this, was to try and create more of a balance, avoiding having them meet, doing the same job and so forth

### **8.3.13 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Personnel from Militaries**

Jose outlines an example when members of the local community and members of the Canadian military had a problem in cooperation. He describes how the Canadian armoured personnel carrier (APC) was halted by locals who sought to look inside and make sure that they were not transporting prisoners (as was the rumour that the locals had heard), he was on good terms with the liaison in the local brigade and decided to go out to the scene and use his relationship to talk to the involved parties and resolve the situation by convincing the Canadians to allow a local representative to look inside the vehicle and confirm whether the rumours were true or false. He states that it took some time to convince the Canadian military to allow this, but eventually they agreed to let the liaison to the local brigade to have a look inside. Ultimately Jose states that it is because of his intervention that the situation was resolved peacefully and did not escalate further.

### **8.3.14 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with International NGO's**

Mario provides another example of improvisation when it came to some problems in dealing with international NGO's in the field. During his experience on deployments, he noted that there were a large number of NGO's operating in the field, but sometimes there was some ambiguity (among the police at least) as to their specific purpose and area of responsibility. As a result he sought out the NGO's to ask them what their role is and what area they were operating in, so as to pass the information on to relevant agencies and actors. He also discussed some of the difficulty in getting their help when it came to issues that extended beyond his own mandate. He mentioned that sometimes he had to mention that he would have to write reports as a European Union monitor and state in the report that he came to talk to the NGO and was not given any help, as a result of this, he then said he would often receive some support from the organisation after this interaction. He stressed that sometimes it had to start like this, he had to be diplomatic in gaining their support and help when it came to some particular issues and problems in the field during the mission.

### **8.3.15 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with International Civil Servants**

No specific examples or sufficient data on this.

### **8.3.16 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Local Government**

No specific examples or sufficient data on this.

### **8.3.17 Improvised Solutions to Problems in Cooperation with Local People**

Jose, when discussing how he figures out who to cooperate with, notes one of the strategies that he employs to try to gain the cooperation of local people on the mission. Sometimes on these missions he says that the locals don't understand why they are in their country for, or what their purpose is. He states that they are told that they have to enquire who are the local authorities, giving the example of the mayors and local religious authorities, once these are identified on the field, he states that they then begin a dialogue where they outline the mandate and their reason and goals for being there. Additionally, he states it also gives them a chance and allows the local leaders to give their input on the mission and specific goals and issues. As a result of this dialogue, he says it helps ensure that the local people are clued in with what the peacekeepers are there to do, and why they are there. This is then spread through the local community and he suggests that it makes them more likely to cooperate.

## **8.4. Trust**

### **8.4.1 Why Trust is Important**

The value of trust in peacekeeping missions was revealed in the interviews as having central importance; underpinning the strength or weakness of the interactions in terms of communication and cooperation that participant's encountered while on deployment.

In general, internal trust among the colleagues of the participants when on missions was assumed, independently of their nationality or gender, because the situation demands that you have trust in your partner, particularly in organisations such as the police. There is a common identity of all being police officers, and as Rubio noted, you all wear the same uniform and have passed the same tests. Nevertheless, trust among colleagues was also somewhat dependent among the national structure of the police organisation. For instance, for the Portuguese, if a member of the PSP gets promoted while on a peacekeeping mission to a higher rank, that does not affect their rank when they return from deployment. For other nationalities, they are rewarded. Therefore one issue that arose, as Ruben noted, is that you always have colleagues that "don't care if they stab you in the back" without hesitation to get a higher position while on deployment, so "you have to be aware of that situation." In a similar vein, competition between nations can lead to a lack of trust. It was claimed that when the Portuguese started peacekeeping missions, the Civilian Police was mostly a kind of private yard for the Nordic states. Ruben noted how they were used to being in charge of everything, but as different nationalities began working and bringing different ways of working and implementing policies, at times it caused friction. When other nationalities began to be appointed to higher positions, there was some rivalry, albeit never openly.

The levels of trust with local organisations and local people varied depending on the mission. Indeed, it became apparent that trust is situational, depending on the context in which the participants found themselves in. In terms of trust with the local population, in Chad, people in general were suspicious of peacekeeper's presence, which hindered the success of the mission. In Kosovo, although one participant, Rita, noted that they were told not to trust the locals because the ones that were nice to you may be the ones that will harm you, she said that because you lived in their houses and they had keys to your house, it was important to build trust in order to feel more secure.

Although the importance of being patient and respectful of the cultures of the countries that the participants were in was stressed, one participant, Caterina, noted that her trust was more Western-centric, as she found it harder to trust others outside of certain nations. Moreover, caution was urged when trusting local organisations and local people because it was claimed they might try to manipulate you for their own needs. Other issues that led to the deterioration of trust with certain local organisations was their supposed lack of professionalism and laziness, which was noted by two separate participants. Nevertheless, the importance of building and having trust meant that at times locals would help in dangerous situations. One such illustration is Penelope. In her mission in Bosnia, the local military came to a nearby border checkpoint she was at, drunk, and started to shoot. It was a local who saved her by pulling her down to the ground and telling her to be quiet.

Indeed, the importance of trust was notably demonstrated in its absence. Indeed, the absence of trust has the ability to prevent cooperation and break lines of communication between the peacekeepers and the local organisations. One such incident in East Timor involved a death of a person because of the local police. The local police then in turn blamed the PSP participant. Although the participant, Lorca, was able to easily prove that this was not the case, trust between them after that broke down. It also led to him changing his romantic view of missions of peacekeeping and the impact that they were having. The levels of trust were also very much mission dependent. For instance, in the war-zone environment of the mission in Croatia in 1994, levels of trust were lower due to heightened tensions. While on patrol, it helped having local police travelling with them because many of the roads were booby-trapped with landmines and the road-maps that they had displayed many roads that were off-limits. Even then, they preferred to travel with both Serbians and Croats, following them in the car in the belief that they wouldn't jeopardise their own lives by driving them into a dangerous situation, but they could never fully trust them because the situation was so tense.

#### **8.4.2 Strategies to build Trust among Organizations**

There was very little data that emerged in relation to strategies to build trust among organisations. The only couple of instances where strategies did emerge involved getting the senior officers within the organisations to trust in you, because then the others below will follow. Another strategy was to talk about things other than work to get to know the person behind the uniform.

#### **8.4.3. Strategies to Build Trust with Locals**

The main strategies for building trust with the locals involved displaying professionalism, typically through leading by example and working hard. Other themes that repeatedly came up were the importance of reliability, honesty, friendliness and being genuine.

The best strategy that repeatedly revealed itself was to build personal relationships over food and drink. Indeed, there was a consensus among participants that any invitations to have informal drinks with the locals should be accepted, even in instances where the participants did not necessarily want to. There was a feeling that a failure to accept would cause problems and jeopardise the trust they were trying to build.

By building personal relationships through mingling and showing respect to the local population, and not taking sides in areas of ethnic conflict, greater trust was able to be formed. In missions such as Chad, the importance of getting religious leaders on-board increased the likelihood of being



accepted within the local populations. This relationship, however, had to be carefully maintained and the importance of not overpromising or compromising what the main tasks were has to be communicated in order to maintain a mutual trust.

Other strategies to build trust involved making locals feel that their opinions mattered. Therefore, the importance of holding regular meetings within communities was noted, creating forums of discussion. Meetings were also a way of people getting to know each other in a semi informal setting. The same strategies applied when it came to parties as a way of getting people to talk and gaining each other's trust through building familiarity.

Finally, building upon a common identity also helps to build trust, such as when the PSP were in East Timor which is a former colony with strong familiar ties. Showing the locals that they were not much different from them also helped. The fact that the police also lived among the locals and interacted with them on a daily basis in informal situations also served to strengthen this trust. Learning some of the local language in order to build up personal relationships and avoiding the use of interpreters was another common strategy. For one participant, Ruben, because he was able to do this, everything that he had to ask for from the locals, most of the times he received without encountering any obstacles. Moreover, in executive missions where peacekeepers are armed, it was noted that you can build trust by being able to protect the local population.

## **8.5 Advice for Future peacekeepers in terms of soft skills**

Our participants from the Portuguese State Police offered an interesting insight within this specific area of examination. When directly asked about what advice they would like to give to new peacekeepers to better equip them to perform their duties and better manage on a peacekeeping mission, the responses varied quite a bit.

Upon closer examination, roughly speaking, 50% of the 14 participants who gave advice to new peacekeepers made suggestions that can be linked or viewed as soft skills recommendations. Catarina for example, give a few suggestions, she first makes a point about the quality of equipment, but in terms of training she suggests that training must be with a group of different people, from different countries. She says that this alongside more informal aspects like eating and talking with one another will create an environment where it will be easier to cooperate and work together. Carlos follows this with similar advice, he directly asks for more training on how to communicate, specifically with the local population. He states that if you can do this very well, then you can have 'an easy mission'.

Lorca give more specific advice, which can still be linked to certain aspects of soft skills, in particular he suggests that new peacekeepers should be made aware about the structures of the military, and how it is often more difficult to separate the individual from the structure itself. Namely the individual in the army tends to be following orders coming from someone higher up, and that's not their fault. In this case, the advice is clearly relevant to information on cooperation and communication with members of the military.



In considering other advice that is perhaps less directly linked to soft skills, Mario provides further advice given to new peacekeepers, stressing the importance of drawing on the experience of others who have previously been in your region of deployment. He seems to suggest that this personal lived experience of the colleague might help to illuminate the fact that “the theory, sometimes is different from the practice”. Perhaps suggesting that these experienced colleagues might help to educate and train new peacekeepers on what they experiences worked and didn’t work, what helped with certain groups and not.

One thing is apparent from the interview data and experiences offered by the participants of the Portuguese State Police, soft skills ranging from and not limited to communication, cooperation and trust, are all important dimensions within a peacekeeping setting. This summary report has outlined some of the main findings in relation to this, and some of the interesting examples of realities in the field, alongside, perhaps more interestingly, cases where participants improvised as a means of solving problems in cooperation and communication in the field.



## 9. Conclusions

The findings drawn from the regional reports would indicate that there is an increasing recognition of the importance of cultivating and developing soft skills in peacekeepers prior to deployment. In addition, it is concluded from the interview data that across all regional participants there is a discernible nuanced differentiation between requisite soft skills dependent upon the role and remit an individual will be expected to fulfil on deployment. This deliverable identifies the importance of considering soft skills not as a generic concept applicable to all peacekeepers but that soft skills needs are malleable in relation to military, police and civilian personnel. It is important to note that the data collated highlights that soft skills are critical in professional and personal as well as formal and informal contexts. Consequently in connecting the data from interviews contained within the regional reports with the gamification of soft skills training in the GAP Project it is evident that the in-game situations should be reflective not only of real-life conflict scenarios, but also based on participant responses soft skills are of equal importance in daily life situations experienced on deployment. Despite the recognition from participant experiences of the critical need for soft skills in both a professional and personal capacity on deployment the lack of formal training methods across the regional reports is indicative of a sizable gap in training.

It is concluded from the regional reports that irrespective of participant organizational affiliation that there is a commonality in core soft skills which participants believe to be necessary to develop for deployment on peacekeeping missions. These include an awareness and understanding of cultural competency; An understanding of different organizational cultures and operational remits on mission; A cognizance of the positive and negative impact of language, both verbal and non-verbal; an ability to gain trust and cooperate with others in the context of both local people and other organizations; A non-judgmental and respectful attitude; skills to be able to perform duties with an empathetic manner; an awareness of the importance of emotional intelligence.

### 9.1 Soft Skills identified from Interview Data

The data collected from participant interviews across the various European partner institutions and disseminated in the regional reports within this report indicates a strong correlation of findings pertaining to identifiable soft skills. It is concluded that there is a commonality of identifiable soft skills amongst military, police and civilian participants with distinct differences both in applicability and opportunity to avail of the soft skills within a peacekeeping context. Data indicates that the strategic role and organizational remit of participants can delimit the capacity for professional actualization of soft skills.

It is concluded that cultural competency was a critical skill to develop prior to deployment. Awareness and understanding of cultural practices was considered by participants to be acutely important in engendering knowledge for peacekeepers of how to modify their actions so as not to cause offence with local communities. It is important to note an oversight identifiable from the data collected in that participants discerned that whilst in the limited situations cultural awareness training was given it referred exclusively to the local culture of expected deployment and did not account for the cultural differences prevalent within a working context of police officers coming together on a multi-national policing operation. The only exception was indicated by a member of

the Defence Force of Ireland who experienced formal training by a member of the Finnish army prior to a dual-deployment of Finnish and Irish officers.

As a corollary to experienced cultural issues with other international peacekeepers military and police participants across all jurisdictions articulated difficulty in communicating and especially in cooperating with international officers lacking in comparable standards of training to what had been expected and to which participants had been accustomed to working with. Both the DFI and PSNI officers highlighted particular problems in working with American and North African officers. Americans were seen as gung-ho and too readily enthusiastic to resort to weapons. It is interesting to note the impact of national affiliation and its impact on fostering cooperation with both locals and other international officers. PSNI participants believed that by wearing the flag of the United Kingdom on their uniforms they gained respect, credibility and trust both with locals and other international officers who on seeing the flag perceived the PSNI officers as being highly trained and professional. Portuguese officers also discerned that they enjoyed notably positive relations with locals in East Timor due to the historic colonization of the area by Portugal. This awareness of the perception others may attach owing to your national association was supported by the Polish participants that noted that some international personnel were routinely regarded as trustworthy due to the actions of previous contingents to the area.

With regards to identifiable soft skills in relation to operating in a multi-national setting it is concluded that communicative skills and cultural knowledge is a multilateral process. Rather than focus on communicating with locals' participants identified the need to know how to communicate within their own organization and with other organization as arguably one of the most critical facets of a peacekeeping deployment. Senior members of the DFI regarded communication as an adjunct to leadership roles and as such believed they had received training on the requisite soft skills. Concomitantly junior members of the DFI did not see communication with other organizations as central to their roles rather the ability to communicate with local people was seen as more prurient. This is reflective of participant responses across the regional areas that there is a discrepancy in soft skill needs based upon the operational remit of organizations and the rank of the individual. Military personnel demonstrated that the organizational focus on rules and strident operating procedures precluded the identifiable need for soft skills of communication. The rigid adherence to procedure of military was in contrast to the community policing approach of PSNI and PSP officers who sought to utilize soft skills to inculcate an intelligence system of participatory governance.

The difficulty for military personnel in marrying communicative soft skills with the execution of expected processes culminated in communication and cooperation issues with both local people and in particular with police forces and civilian non-governmental organizations. As observed in the PSP regional report a prevalent theme emerged in relation to communicative difficulties with the military stemming from the hierarchal structures and the deferential ranking structure of the military in comparison with the comparatively more horizontal structure of the police forces. Indeed, this difficulty was accentuated by the rank-less nature of some peacekeeping missions. In response to the aforementioned difficulties in engaging with military personnel participants identified that soft skills should be developed to enable police officer and civilian peacekeepers to be aware of how to engage effectively with military organizations. It was concluded by DFI participants that engagement with military was effective when predicated upon standardized operating procedures and in line with military protocols. From a military perspective it was believed that a greater understanding

from non-military personnel of the necessity of adherence to protocols could establish a basis for enhanced engagement. In relation to the soft skills for non-military peacekeepers the PSNI officers not only possessed the requisite soft skills to communicate with military personnel but had active experience of doing so prior to deployment within the context of Northern Ireland. It was strongly emphasized by PSNI interviewees that in general they could communicate and work with military personnel more effectively than other international police officers due to their prior experience with the British Army in Northern Ireland through which they had learned specific soft skills that facilitated engagement.

International cooperation and the establishment and adherence to international standards of communication have emerged as an interesting theme between the regional reports. Non-English speaking participants, particularly from Finland and Bulgarian, commented that NATO guidelines and processes facilitated cooperation between organizations. This emergent theme can be extrapolated to support the finding of work package 2 that given the increase and scope of peacekeeping missions and a lack of overall understanding of the use of soft skills, more standardisation, coordination and coherence of programmes from training providers is required, GAP in developing a virtual learning package can fill this training void.

Communication and cooperation predicated upon internationally agreed systemic processes is reflective not of soft skills but of strategic communication central to senior roles on mission. The lack of soft skills became apparent as some participants observed the ineffectiveness in the subsidiary communication between ranks of organizations rather than between organizations at a command level. In relation to the gamification of soft skills this elicits the conclusion that soft skills within a hierarchical rank structure must be reflective of the need to exchange sensitive information on an intra- as well as an inter-organizational basis.

An additional facet that influenced cooperation with police officers was the preference of military to work with police officers from the UK owing to their application of skills in working and engaging with military personnel as well as their ability to speak English that was the language of the mission. Consequently, police officer participants indicated that having been put in positions of influence at the behest of military personnel they then had significant cooperation issues in interacting with international police officers who felt discriminated at being overlooked for key jobs and roles on deployment.

Analysis of the regional reports highlights the dichotomy between communication on a professional and personal context for peacekeepers across military, police and civilian organizations. Within an informal context participants identified that core soft skills include the need to live harmoniously with other people within a stressful environment. These nuanced skills were not covered in any training within the regional jurisdictions and although relatable to generic social skills there is a distinct difference in the social skills necessary to engage with people in an informal context of cafes, restaurants and other communal settings and skills of cohabiting with other people.

## 9.2 Training on soft skills

There was a unanimous void in specific training in communicative and cooperative soft skills across all interview participants. It is indicative of the reliance on individualized personality and experiential learning that training in core communicative soft skills is excluded from formal training processes prior to deployment. The absence of formal training is even more striking given that participants from the DFI and the Polish interviewees referred to receiving instructions and commands on the importance of establishing trust with local people but there was no skills mentioned regarding how such an outcome may be achieved. This is supported by data collected from PSNI and NICO participants within Northern Ireland who concluded that whilst training on communicative soft skills would have been beneficial they inferred that due to their expertise and experience in policing a divided society in Northern Ireland they were expected to be competent and proficient in such skills already. Indeed, participants believed they were at a distinct advantage owing principally to their cultural background and professional experience in utilizing soft skills to engage effectively with local people and the military.

It can be extrapolated from the regional reports outlined above that the absence of training in soft skills extends not only across the regional participants in this research but to the majority, if not all, individuals deployed on peacekeeping missions. The lack of training in soft skills was accentuated when individuals were not proficient in spoken English on what were English-speaking missions. Participants indicated that the weakness of other international officers in seeking to interact with local people actually assisted their attempts to inculcate themselves with locals' as they were perceived to be more professional and empathetic in their approach to the mission.

In relation to cultural specificity any training received by participants prior to deployment centered upon cultural awareness of the environment participants were expecting to encounter on mission. Polish and PSNI participants noted that there was a strong dichotomy between classroom based learning and associative experiences whilst on deployment. It was concluded that the generic training failed to account for the nuanced differences between regions, specifically between rural and urban contexts, and as such participants remarked that they had to 'learn on the job' when it came to cultural awareness and sensitivity. Some participants, particularly from PSNI and NICO, felt that a lack of cultural knowledge could actually be used as a tool for assimilating yourself within a community, however, whilst acknowledging that this was an area soft skills would be critical they stated that they had never received training in relation to this.

It is interesting that some Polish respondents recognized the lack of formal training in communicative soft skills and how this might impact on their role on mission and undertook vocational training of their own volition. Some Polish participants tried to improve their soft skills beyond the formal pre-deployment training by enrolling in private courses in language, self-study of materials and general familiarization with expected area of operations. This mirrored the actions of some PSNI and NICO participants who stated that they would read extensively and research their expected area of deployment to gain a modicum of understanding but they did so out of their own innate curiosity and professionalism rather than being advised to do so.

It is important to note that the only participants to mention any training in how to interact with other international colleagues was the training given by a Finnish Officer to members of the DFI who

were going to be housed with Finnish officers on deployment. It was noted by participants from the PSP that there was significant cultural incongruence between Portuguese officers and their British counterparts, particularly in relation to eating and lunch-time meetings.

There is a marked difference both in terms cognizance of the theoretical basis for communicative soft skills and the practical aptitude between organization and area of deployment. The military participants acknowledge that their role was primarily the securitization of conflict zones and as such any deviation from standard operating procedures was problematic in relation both to the reasoning behind establishing relationships with others and the opportunity to do so. In operating in and residing solely on military compounds whilst on deployment military personnel were not routinely able to actualize soft skills in engaging with local people. Furthermore, any interaction with other organizations or international officers was governed by established military communication procedures. Some DFI participants did express that there was a lack of knowledge, understanding and appreciation of the limits within which military personnel could operate and engage from other organizations on deployment and this resulted in conflicting relationships with others, particularly non-governmental organizations.

It can be discerned from the data analyzed in the Polish regional report that there was a chasm between officers being instructed to communicate with others on deployment and a nuanced understanding and appreciation of how to or why it was necessary. It was concluded that a contributory factor to this lack of understanding was an absence in training of theoretical and practical situational training exercises. The Polish participants lacked training in daily-life issues, cultures of eating, issues with time management, approach to honour and respect and, in particular, the culture of gift exchange. A contrasting yet relatable finding from both the DFI and PSNI/NICO data indicates that the inherent soft skills implemented by officers on deployment is attributable to an ingrained cultural set of values and norms. The reputation for geniality and openness among Irish and Northern Irish personnel was expressed unanimously by participants as enabling them and their national colleagues to be able to engage with locals and international colleagues more readily than other nationalities.

It is important to note that some participants believed that such soft skills were cultural and as such were naturally occurring and could not be engendered in a training situation. However, participants from other regions, particularly Polish participants, maintained that it was important that practical training could tangibly relativize theoretical concepts of engagement to develop a nuanced understanding of the need to communicate as well as fostering skills to enable individuals on mission to do so. This was not an issue for PSP and PSNI officers who specifically mentioned that because in their normal job they would have been utilizing a community policing strategy it was natural for them to then adopt that approach whilst on deployment. Consequently, it was routine for PSP and PSNI officers to automatically employ soft skills to develop relationships with local people with the overarching aim of establishing systems of intelligence to aid the policing mandate on mission.

Participants across all regions remarked upon the lack of training in communicating and cooperating with and through language assistants as being a principle factor in inhibiting effective cooperation with local people. This indicates that in considering soft skills it is necessary to view it as a layered construct and that the soft skills needed to engage with language assistants is amplified by the nuanced soft skills needed to communicate through language assistants. Some participants noted

that they made a concerted attempt to learn key phrases in the local language both as a means of ensuring that they were being accurately translated by the language assistant but principally as a means of being able to communicate directly with local people. Communication within the context of an international post-conflict peacekeeping deployment is not limited to verbal expression or the use of language but includes the ability to communicate through intermediaries, in particular language assistants, and also the awareness of the power of non-verbal gestures. It was emphasized that communication with local people through a language assistant was critical in maintaining control and de-escalating conflict. Given the importance of communicating through language assistants it is interesting to note that no participants were trained in how to work with an interpreter. Indeed, the majority of participants acknowledged that the success of tasks on mission could be dependent upon the ability and competency of a language assistant. Participants noted that existing cultural and societal perceptions over the status of educated language assistants often manifested in impairing communication between English speaking individuals and local people. Language assistants were regarded as a privileged and well-paid position for local people on missions.

### **9.3 Improvisations made in the absence of or limited training in these skills**

It is important to note that the absence of, or in certain cases (Finland) limited forms of, training in soft skills did not totally prevent communication and cooperation within an organization, between organizations and with local people. There was a consensus across all regional reports that sport was critical in enabling personnel to form bonds and relationships with others. In a peacekeeping context participants noted how participation in and discussion of sports harnessed the power of communal activities and competition to foster a culture of homogeneity amongst a multitude of individuals. It was identified as a common tool of identifying with others both in a professional and personal context of finding binding themes of association. For example, a PSP respondent discussed that being from the same country as the footballer Cristiano Ronaldo resonated with local people in Palestine who had accosted him believing him to be an Israeli. Other examples of the execution of soft skills in building a commonality included asking about family member or social interests.

Improvisations ranged from passive to active expressions that made exchanges with others permissible. A striking example of instinctive passive non-verbal expression that served to de-escalate a potentially hostile incident was exemplified in the Ireland regional report whereby a participant recalled in a hostage scenario consciously holding out his hands with open palms facing the ground to express calmness in a non-aggressive manner.

There are two critical conclusions to be drawn from comparing and contrasting the regional reports outlined in this deliverable. Firstly the impact of improvisations cannot be viewed in isolation as distinctive and instinctive responses to hostile or tense situations. A thin analysis of the improvisations highlighted in the regional reports indicate resourcefulness and the capacity for prescient human soft skills in a peacekeeping environment that engenders communication and cooperation in the absence of sufficient and applicable soft skills training. However, a thick analysis emphasizes that the success of the improvisations should not be viewed as mutually exclusive of the previous application of soft skills in building relationships, irrespective of tenuousness, that occurred prior to the improvisation. From this perspective it is important to differentiate between the multi-faceted nature of soft skills that range from capacity and intelligence building soft skills and hostile



environment soft skills. The regional reports emphasize a correlation between personnel, particularly police officer participants, implementing soft skills on a daily basis with local people and then having that resonance with locals to engage within a hostile environment situation.

A second critical finding relates to the capacity and opportunity of personnel on deployment to actualize soft skills in the recourse of their professional and personal activities on mission. Specifically the role and remit of military on deployment in prioritizing the securitization and containment of conflict zones and personnel subservience to command rules and procedures prevents military personnel from utilizing soft skills for engagement. Military and non-military personnel across all regions noted that the flexibility and operational aims of non-governmental agents and police officers in comparison with military personnel afforded them plentiful opportunity to use soft skills in an informal and professional capacity. There was a strong emphasis in all the regional reports that soft skills were most useful in informal contexts such as socialization of peacekeepers in local bars and restaurants. As well as contributing to a local economy by being able to socialize with local people non-military personnel were a visual presence in a non-professional capacity. On the other hand, military personnel were limited in such informal settings as participants indicated a preference for remaining on a military compound unless on patrol missions. This highlights that it isn't just the absence of training in soft skills that precludes communication and cooperation it is also the lack of opportunity to practice and learn the skills whilst on deployment.

## Appendix 1: The Interview Guide

### Questionnaire for Military Personnel

Age?		
Gender?		
Organization name?		
Your position in the organization?		
How long have you been in the organization?		
How many and which deployments have you been on? [interviewer jot down]		
How long did each deployment last and when was it?		
Was it voluntary to go?		
Why did you go?		
What was your specific position/responsibility in each deployment?		
Topic	Questions	Check box
Preparation  [see what they identify or not as soft skills]	<p><b>You were told to 'cooperate' but were you told how to do this?</b></p> <p><b>What kind of training did you get?</b></p> <p><b>What did you expect?</b></p> <p>What happened in the field? What are the lessons to be drawn from your experience? What kind of training would you advise the mil to provide for anyone going on deployment?</p>	
	<p>How did you figure out who you are supposed to be working with? How do you establish a working relationship with them?</p> <p>How do you figure out who is the best person to talk to and find out what is going on?</p> <p>How do you figure out who you can</p>	

	trust?	
<b>Cooperation/Trust</b>	<p><b>What organizations did you work with on x deployment? For each organization, what was it like working with them? Were they easy to work with? Difficult?</b></p> <p><b>Can you think of a situation where cooperation helped/did not help achieve the goals of the mission?</b></p> <p>What helped cooperation in the field? What hindered it?</p> <p>Was status a problem? Who could give orders? Who would follow them?</p> <p>How did the amount of cooperation achieved affect the local populations?</p> <p>Were you given contact or did you have to make contact yourself?</p> <p><b>How do you get people to trust you in the field?</b></p> <p>How do you build trust?</p> <p>Is there a tension between trusting you as a person and trusting the organization</p> <p>Were there problems around • Decision-making</p>	<p>Daily or weekly routine</p> <p>Who do you interact with, what do you do?</p> <p>Difficulties/challenges?</p> <p>When do you feel you are making a difference</p>
<b>How so? Example? Story!! Why?</b>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accountability</li> <li>• Operational styles</li> <li>• Management styles</li> <li>• Use of force</li> <li>• Approaches to time</li> <li>• What was success</li> </ul> <p>Officers: what permission do you give your enlisted to gather intelligence? Act with initiative if necessary?</p>	
<b>Interaction/Communication</b>	<b>Were you given any training about how to talk to the</b>	

	<p>different people you'd encounter on deployment? [make sure to ask about other mil personnel, other organizations like police or civilians, different nationalities, the local populations]</p> <p>What was communication like between the organizations?</p> <p>With the local population?</p> <p>Describe the differences in communicating with personnel from</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Own force</li> <li>• Personnel from police forces</li> <li>• Different armies</li> <li>• International NGOs</li> <li>• International civil servants</li> <li>• Local people</li> <li>• Local government</li> </ul> <p>What were the difficulties?</p> <p><b>Can you think of a situation where communication helped/did not help achieve the goals of the mission?</b></p> <p>Where did you get information? How was it</p>
	<p>analyzed? How was it acted upon?</p> <p>Was there misunderstandings around what was polite or culturally appropriate (e.g. not talking to a woman not related to you in a conservative muslim country)</p> <p>Were there opportunities to interact with people outside work? How important was that?</p>
<b>Cultural sensitivity</b>	<p>Was there training in cultural sensitivity before you went on deployment? [preparation]</p> <p>Did that affect your mission? [experience]</p> <p><b>Can you think of a situation where cultural difference</b></p>

	<p><b>affected operations? (for good or ill)</b></p> <p>What would you advise the trainers as to what is needed in this respect, based on your experiences? [reflection]</p>
<p><b>Gender</b></p> <p><b>Is gender an issue in your organization?</b></p> <p><b>Was it an issue on the mission?</b></p>	<p>Have you worked with men/women only or in a mixed environment? How is it different in each case?</p> <p><b>Can you think of a situation where your gender made a difference? (for good or ill)</b></p> <p>Probe on this – any other examples??</p> <p>Pros and cons to single sex/mixed set up on deployment?</p>
	<p>I assume your organization has formal equality policy...how did that play out in the field?</p> <p>Most people working on peacekeeping missions are male – how does this affect the atmosphere of the mission? Is it masculine or ‘macho’?? What was your experience?</p> <p><b>Has there been problems with different norms around sexuality with the local population?</b></p> <p>Have you witnessed incidents on deployment where anyone was disrespectful of females?</p> <p>Could can things be improved?</p>
<p><b>Sexuality</b></p> <p><b>[LGBTQ+ issues and issues around officially forbidden fraternization either with Pking personnel or local populations]</b></p> <p><b>Is sexuality an issue in your organization?</b></p> <p><b>Was it an issue on deployment? How so?</b></p>	<p>How is sexuality dealt with on deployment?</p> <p><b>Is it an issue if a peacekeeper is gay or lesbian? In your org? In other organizations? In the local environment? How so? How is or can this be dealt with?</b></p> <p><b>Have you witnessed incidents where personnel in your organization have done or said something that might make someone who is gay uncomfortable?</b></p> <p><b>How do people cope with restrictions on their sexuality/sexual activity on a long deployment?</b></p> <p><b>Has there been problems with different norms around sexuality with the local population?</b></p>
	<p><b>population?</b></p>

	Do you think that policies and approaches to sexuality could be improved on? If so, how?
<b>Risk/Stress</b>  (loneliness, boredom, frustration, witnessing suffering, not being able to respond to insults etc)	<b>What was the most stressful thing about being on each deployment/ peacekeeping mission?</b>  Did you feel in danger? How was that dealt with? Well or badly? How well prepared were you to deal with dangers or risks experienced on deployment? How could you have been better prepared?

### Questionnaire for Police Personnel

Age?		
Gender?		
Organization name?		
Your position in the organization?		
How long have you been in the organization?		
How many and which deployments have you been on? [interviewer jot down]		
How long did each deployment last and when was it?		
Was it voluntary to go?		
Why did you go?		
What was your specific position/responsibility in each deployment?		
Topic	Questions	Check box
<b>Preparation</b>  [see what they identify or not as soft skills]	<b>You were told to 'cooperate' but were you told how to do this? What kind of training did you get? What did you expect?</b> <b>What happened in the field?</b> What are the lessons to be drawn from your experience? What kind of training would you advise police to provide for anyone going on deployment?  How did you figure out who you are supposed to be	
	working with (outside your org)? How do you establish a working relationship with them? How do you figure out who is the best person to talk to and find out what is going on?  How do you figure out who you can trust?	
<b>Cooperation</b>  How so? Example? Story!! Why?	<b>What organizations did you work with on x deployment? For each organization, what was it like working with them? Were they easy to work with? Difficult?</b>	

	<p><b>Can you think of a situation where cooperation helped/did not help achieve the goals of the mission?</b></p> <p>What helped cooperation in the field? What hindered it?</p> <p>Was status a problem? Who could give orders? Who would follow them?</p> <p>How did the amount of cooperation achieved affect the local populations?</p> <p>Were you given contact or did you have to make contact yourself?</p> <p><b>How do you get people to trust you in the field?</b></p> <p>How do you build trust?</p> <p>Were there problems around Decision-making Accountability Operational styles Management styles Use of force</p> <p>Approaches to time What was success</p>
<b>Trust</b>	<p><b>Who would you trust if you are in a potentially dangerous situation on the ground? specific organization, male or female, any particular nationality?</b></p>
<b>Interaction/Communication</b>	<p><b>What was communication like between the organizations?</b></p> <p><b>With the local population?</b></p>
	<p>Describe the differences in communicating with personnel from</p> <p>Own force Personnel from police forces Different armies International NGOs International civil servants Local people Local government</p> <p>What were the difficulties?</p> <p><b>Can you think of a situation where communication helped/did not help achieve the goals of the mission?</b></p> <p>Where did you get information? How was it analyzed? How was it acted upon?</p>

	<p>Was there misunderstandings around what was polite or culturally appropriate (e.g. not talking to a woman not related to you in a conservative muslim country)</p> <p>Were there opportunities to interact with people outside work? How important was that?</p>
<b>Cultural sensitivity</b>	<p><b>Was there training in cultural sensitivity before you went on deployment?</b></p> <p><b>Did that affect your mission?</b></p> <p><b>Can you think of a situation where cultural difference affected operations? (for good or ill)</b></p> <p><b>What would you advise the trainers as to what is needed in this respect, based on your experiences?</b></p>
<b>Gender</b> <b>Is gender an issue in your organization?</b> <b>Was it an issue on the mission?</b>	<p>Have you worked with men/women only or in a mixed environment?</p> <p>How is it different in each case?</p> <p><b>Can you think of a situation where your gender made a difference? (for good or ill)</b></p> <p>If bad, what did or could you do about it??</p>
	<p>Pros and cons to single sex/mixed set up on deployment?</p> <p>I assume your organization has formal equality policy...how did that play out in the field?</p> <p>Most people working on peacekeeping missions are male – how does this affect the atmosphere of the mission? Is it masculine or ‘macho’?? What was your experience?</p> <p>Have you witnessed incidents on deployment where anyone was disrespectful of females?</p> <p><b>How could things be improved?</b></p>
<b>Sexuality</b> [LGBTQ+ issues and issues around officially forbidden fraternization either with Pking personnel or local populations]	<p>How is sexuality dealt with on deployment?</p> <p>Is sexuality an issue in your organization? Was it an issue on deployment? How so?</p> <p>Is it difficult being a LGBTQ+ peacekeeper or on a peacekeeping mission? How so?</p> <p><b>Is it an issue if a peacekeeper is gay or lesbian? In your org? In other organizations? In the local environment?</b></p>



	<p><b>How so? How is or can this be dealt with?</b></p> <p><b>Have you witnessed incidents where personnel in your organization or other organizations were disrespectful of LGBT people?</b></p> <p>Do you think that policies and approaches to sexuality could be improved on? If so, how?</p> <p>Is there a formal policy in your org on sexuality? How does that play out in practice?</p>
<p><b>Risk/Stress</b></p> <p>(loneliness, boredom, frustration, witnessing suffering, not being able to respond to insults etc)</p>	<p><b>What was the most stressful thing about being on each deployment/ peacekeeping mission?</b></p> <p>Did you feel in danger? How was that dealt with? Well or badly?</p> <p>How well prepared were you to deal with dangers or</p>
	<p>risks experienced on deployment?</p> <p>How could you have been better prepared?</p>
<p><b>Daily or weekly routine</b></p>	<p>Who do you interact with, what do you do?</p> <p>Difficulties/challenges?</p> <p>When do you feel you are making a difference?</p>

### Questionnaire for NGO and Civilian Personnel

Age?		
Gender?		
Organization name?		
Your position in the organization?		
How long have you been in the organization?		
How many and which deployments have you been on? [interviewer jot down]		
How long did each deployment last and when was it?		
Was it voluntary to go?		
Why did you go?		
What was your specific position/responsibility in each deployment?		
<b>TOPIC</b>	Questions	Check box
<b>Preparation</b>	<b>You were told to 'cooperate' with other organizations in the field but were you told how to do this? What kind of training</b>	

[see what they identify or not as soft skills]	<p><b>What did you expect? What happened in the field?</b></p> <p>What are the lessons to be drawn from your experience? What kind of training would you advise NGOs/civil servants to provide for anyone going on deployment?</p> <p>How did you figure out who you are supposed to be working with (outside your org)? How do you establish a working relationship with them?</p> <p>How do you figure out who is the best person to talk to and find out what is going on?</p> <p>How do you figure out who you can trust?</p>
<p><b>Cooperation</b></p> <p>How so? Example? Story!!</p>	<p><b>What organizations did you work with on x deployment? For each organization, what was it like working with them? Were they easy to work with? Difficult?</b></p> <p><b>Can you think of a situation where cooperation helped/did not help achieve the goals of the mission?</b></p>
Why?	<p>What helped cooperation in the field? What hindered it?</p> <p>Was status a problem? Who could give orders? Who would follow them?</p> <p>How did the amount of cooperation achieved affect the local populations?</p> <p>Were you given contact or did you have to make contact yourself?</p> <p><b>How do you get people to trust you in the field?</b></p> <p>How do you build trust?</p> <p>Were there problems around Decision-making Accountability Operational styles Management styles Use of force</p> <p>Approaches to time What was success</p>
Trust	<p><b>Who would you trust if you are in a potentially dangerous situation on the ground? specific organization, male or female, any particular nationality?</b></p>
Interaction/Communication	<p><b>What was communication like between the organizations?</b></p>

	<p><b>With the local population?</b></p> <p>Describe the differences in communicating with personnel from</p> <p>Own organization  Personnel from police forces  Different armies  International NGOs  International civil servants  Local people  Local government</p> <p>What were the difficulties?</p> <p><b>Can you think of a situation where communication helped/did not help achieve the goals of the</b></p>
	<p><b>mission?</b></p> <p>Where did you get information? How was it analyzed? How was it acted upon?</p> <p>Was there misunderstandings around what was polite or culturally appropriate (e.g. not talking to a woman not related to you in a conservative muslim country)</p> <p>Were there opportunities to interact with people outside work? How important was that?</p>
<b>Cultural sensitivity</b>	<p><b>Was there training in cultural sensitivity before you went on deployment?</b></p> <p><b>Did that affect your mission?</b></p> <p><b>Can you think of a situation where cultural difference affected operations? (for good or ill)</b></p> <p><b>What would you advise the trainers as to what is needed in this respect, based on your experiences?</b></p>
<b>Gender</b>	<p><b>Is gender an issue in your organization? Was it an issue on the mission?</b></p> <p><b>Can you think of a situation where your gender made a difference? (for good or ill)</b></p> <p>If bad, what did or could you do about it??</p> <p>Have you worked with men/women only or in a mixed environment?</p> <p>How is it different in each case?</p>

	<p>Pros and cons to single sex/mixed set up on deployment?</p> <p>I assume your organization has formal equality policy...how did that play out in the field?</p> <p>Most people working on peacekeeping missions are male – how does this affect the atmosphere of the mission? Is it masculine or ‘macho’?? What was your experience?</p>
	<p>Have you witnessed incidents on deployment where anyone was disrespectful of females?</p> <p><b>How could things be improved?</b></p>
<p><b>Sexuality</b></p> <p>[LGBTQ+ issues and issues around officially forbidden fraternization either with Pking personnel or local populations]</p>	<p>Is sexuality an issue in your organization? Was it an issue on deployment? How so?</p> <p>Is it difficult being a LGBTQ+ peacekeeper or on a peacekeeping mission? How so?</p> <p><b>Is it an issue if a person on deployment is gay or lesbian? In your org? In other organizations? In the local environment? How so? How is or can this be dealt with?</b></p> <p><b>Have you witnessed incidents where personnel in your organization or other organizations were disrespectful of LGBT people?</b></p> <p>Do you think that policies and approaches to sexuality could be improved on? If so, how?</p> <p>Is there a formal policy in your org on sexuality? How does that play out in practice?</p>
<p><b>Risk/Stress</b></p> <p>(loneliness, boredom, frustration, witnessing suffering, not being able to respond to insults etc)</p>	<p><b>What was the most stressful thing about being on each deployment/ peacekeeping mission?</b></p> <p>Did you feel in danger? How was that dealt with? Well or badly?</p> <p>How well prepared were you to deal with dangers or risks experienced on deployment?</p> <p>How could you have been better prepared?</p>
<p><b>Daily Routine</b></p>	<p>Who do you interact with, what do you do? Difficulties/challenges?</p> <p>When do you feel you are making a difference?</p>



## Appendix 2: Coding Guide:

### ***DEPLOYMENTS***

NUMBER	NAME OR LOCATION	LENGTH

### ***JOB***


### ***DIFFERENCES IN COMMUNICATION WITH OTHER ORGS***

Own force				
Personnel from police forces				
Different armies				
International NGOs				
International civil servants				
Local government				
Local people				
EU				
UN				

### ***SCENARIO WHERE COMMUNICATION MADE A DIFFERENCE***

DE-ESCALATED INCIDENT				
PREVENTED INCIDENT				
BUILT TRUST INTER-ORG				
BUILT TRUST WITH LOCALS				

### ***HELPED COOPERATION***

PREVIOUS INTERACTION				
COMMON IDENTITY	GENDER	NATIONALITY	ORG	RELIGION
TRAINING				

### ***HINDERED COOPERATION***

PREVIOUS INTERACTION				
DIFFERENT IDENTITY	GENDER	NATIONALITY	ORG	RELIGION
LACK OF TRAINING				
LACK OF PREPARATION				
GO-IT-ALONE ATTITUDE				
CORRUPTION				
EXPLOITATIVE BEHAVIOUR				

### ***SCENARIO WHERE COOPERATION MADE A DIFFERENCE***

DE-ESCALATED INCIDENT				
PREVENTED				

INCIDENT				
BUILT TRUST INTER-ORG				
BUILT TRUST WITH LOCALS				

### ***PROBLEMS IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGS***

Decision-making				
Accountability				
Operational styles				
Use of force				
Management styles				
Approaches to time				
What was success				

### ***TRUST***

TRUST OWN ORG	ONLY OR MAINLY MEN IN ORG	BOTH MEN AND WOMEN IN ORG	ONLY SIMILAR CULTURE IN OWN ORG	EVERYONE
TRUST OTHER ORGS	ONLY OR MAINLY MEN IN OTHER ORGS	BOTH MEN AND WOMEN	ONLY SIMILAR CULTURE	EVERYONE
LOCAL POPULATION	ONLY MEN	ONLY WOMEN	ONLY SIMILAR CULTURE	EVERYONE

### ***STRATEGIES TO BUILD TRUST – OTHER ORGS ON MISSION***

HONESTY				
RELIABILITY				
IMPARTIALITY				



COMMON ROLES	PARENT	PARTNER		
COMMON EXPERIENCES	PREVIOUS MISSIONS			
COMMON IDENTITY	FELLOW SOLDIER/POLICE/CIVILIAN WORKER	NATIONAL	RELIGIOUS	GENDER
	OCCUPATIONAL	SEXUALITY		

### ***STRATEGIES TO BUILD TRUST - LOCALS***

HONESTY				
RELIABILITY				
IMPARTIALITY				
COMMON ROLES	PARENT	PARTNER		
COMMON EXPERIENCES	PREVIOUS MISSIONS			
COMMON IDENTITY	FELLOW SOLDIER/POLICE/CIVILIAN WORKER	NATIONAL	RELIGIOUS	GENDER
	OCCUPATIONAL	SEXUALITY		

### ***FIGURING OUT WHO TO COLLABORATE/COOPERATE WITH***

ASSIGNED COLLABORATOR(S)	
OBSERVATION OF WHO DOES WHAT	
IMPROVISES (MAKES UP AS GOES ALONG)	
INITIATES COOPERATION WITH OTHER ACTORS	

### ***ADVICE TO NEW PEACEKEEPER DIFFERENT FROM YOU (MAN VS WOMAN, OTHER NATIONALITY, MIL VS POLICE VS CIVILIAN)***