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Final Report on Knowledge, Current Practice, Gender and Cultural Competency, SOTA, Gap Analysis and Recommendations

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Gaming for Peace

Gaming for Peace (GAP) was launched in September 2016. GAP is an EU H2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation project and the length of the project is 30 months. The main goal of GAP is to develop a curriculum in relevant 'soft skills' (cooperation, communication, gender and cultural awareness) for personnel from diverse organizations working in the field of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations. This curriculum will be embedded in an online role-playing game and renewed and updated by returning personnel playing the game. GAP fills a gap in training and offers an efficient and inexpensive way of delivering universal and standardized training in these skills.

The requirements to effectively operate and partake in conflict and post conflict situations for preventive measures and peacebuilding, compels the best of expertise and individual skill to adapt to fraught and complex environments. The demands on peacekeepers in recent years have been unprecedented and the need for specialised and more professional training has also increased. GAP, therefore represents an essential online training game for civilian, police, military, NGO personnel, humanitarians and others involved in peace operations worldwide.

Although personnel involved in peace operations generally have 'traditional based skills', (e.g. intelligence, investigation, weapons handling etc.) soft skills such as communication, cooperation, gender and cultural awareness and negotiation are less well emphasised. The GAP project proposes to fill this recognised training gap; embedding a base curriculum of soft skills that facilitates coordination and relationship building in an environment of organisational, gender and cultural diversity.

The GAP project will therefore identify the main characteristics and concepts in the field of conflict prevention and peace building and locate new areas for improvement and enhancement in existing training. Comprehending the intricate and often dangerous environment in which peace keepers are expected to operate, also requires a keen knowledge of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The ability to foresee and surmount social, cultural, or historical barriers necessitates the most up-to-date training for peacekeeping. Gaming for Peace represents an innovative technique for the training of personnel involved in peace operations.



List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACFLS	Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy
ADL	Advanced Distributed Learning
AOO/AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APSTA	African Peace Support Trainer Association
ASCOPE	Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organization, People, Events
CAMPO	Comprehensive Approach in Multi-Dimensional Peace Operations
CAR	Central African Republic
CAS	Chief Administration Support
CAS*	Complex Adaptive System
CDT	Core Diplomatic Training
CEPOL	Collège européen de police
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CMC	Crisis Management Centre (Finland)
CMS	Chief Mission Support
COS	Chief of Staff
CPPB	Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
CPT	Civilian Pre-Deployment Training
CPTM	Civilian Pre-Deployment Training Materials
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CULAD	Cultural Advisor
C34	Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DIIS	Danish Institute for International Studies
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DFS	Department of Field Support
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operation
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENTRI	Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FAO	Foreign Area Officer
FBA	Folke Bernadotte Academy
FET	Female Engagement Teams
FFPU	Full Formed Police Unit
FPD	Field Personnel Division
FPU	Formed Police Unit
HEAT	Hostile Environmental Awareness Training

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HTS	Human Terrain System
HTT	Human Terrain Team
HRVP	High Representative Vice President (EU)
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
ICRU	Iceland Crisis Respond Unit
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IEP	Improvised Explosive Devices
IIEA	Institute of International and European Affairs
IMTC	Integrated Mission Training Centre
INFO OPS	Information Operations
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
ITS	Integrated Training Service
LOOs	Lines of Operation
MNE	Multinational Experiment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NORDCAPS	Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
NORDBAT	Nordic Battalion
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OPSP	Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership
PCC	Police Contributing Countries
PoC	Protection of Civilians
PDT	Pre-Deployment Training
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
SHIRBRIG	Standby High Representative Brigade
SSSA	Scula Superiore Sant'Anna
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SOF	Special Operation Forces
SOP*	Standard Operating Procedures
SOP	Support of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
STAR	Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
TNA	Training Needs Assessment
UN	United Nations
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training
UNTAET	United Nations Traditional Administration in East Timor
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
SCR	Security Council Resolution (UN)
SGBV	Sex and Gender Based Violence
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
ZIF	Centre for Peace Operations



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Executive Summary

Maintaining international peace and security in recent years has increasingly become a daunting prospect for peacekeepers. The capricious nature of modern war and conflict has meant that the solutions employed to remedy inter-state conflict and persistent political violence has frequently met with only limited success. With intractable conflicts, the current refugee crisis, ambitious mandates, coupled with complex and dangerous missions, the supply of well-trained peacekeepers cannot keep up with the demand. Although effective training for peacekeepers is not a panacea to every peace and crisis management operation, it is an essential component that has all too often been overlooked. The purpose of this deliverable (D2.2.) is to examine and analyse the conceptual aspects of peacekeeping training and identify the obstacles and gaps in current practice and knowledge. This is achieved by analysing not just the existing training processes but also by identifying key areas of soft skills training, in particular by assessing gender and cultural competency. Utilising essential data from this deliverable will further enhance and develop the construction of the GAP virtual reality (VR) training game.

The first section reviews and analyses the existing literature and advancement of peacekeeping training for EU CSDP missions and crisis management operations. This section also describes the challenges inherent and embedded in the practice of training for UN peacekeeping missions. While outlining the conceptual basis for training, the report examines the multitude of training courses currently offered. Given the ad hoc modus and the difficulties of peacekeeping training, the predominate findings point to a lack of coherence, standardisation, and quality assurance across training courses. Presently, there are almost one hundred training centres in Europe. As such, given the large amount of training academies, colleges and institutions, training is not delivered within a homogenous model or comprehensive approach. In addition, the report demonstrates the imprecise method of monitoring and evaluating peacekeeping training in the EU. Consequently, training methods are extremely diverse. Despite the fact that it is impossible to evaluate all centres or even generalise across so many facilities, there are certain common characteristics that became evident throughout the research.

The lack of clear structures, coordinated approaches and pedagogical understanding between prevailing elements of training, in particular, pre-deployment training and actual missions in the field is considerable in this study. In reality, there is large disconnect between pre-departure training



(PDT) for missions and concrete experiences and evaluations of the missions. Presently, much of EU PDT delivered in Brussels is geared towards competency in EU institutions, EEAS (European External Action Service), i.e. CPCC (Civilian Planning Conduct Capability) and CMPD (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate). Consequently, much of the teaching emphasises the EU Comprehensive approach, now Integrated approach to crisis management operations, rather than accentuating the specific soft skills needed for field missions or the experience required to realistically operate in a peacekeeping and peacebuilding environment. This gap in training is quite significant and something GAP in turn can learn from and develop to strengthen soft skills linkages among actors as envisioned in the VR training game.

Although several courses are conducted in various training centres on gender training, human rights and cultural sensitivities, there is still a general lack of awareness and understanding of how these issues impact peacekeeping mission. Section three, four and five of the report focus on gender. The substantial increase in CPPB missions since 1991 and the move away from more traditional forms of peacekeeping has coincided with a growing awareness of the role of gender. This has been demonstrated not only in relation to the populations in conflict and post-conflict zones, but also the awareness of the paucity in numbers of female peacekeepers, and the heavily masculine culture of peacekeeping missions. The UN and EU have legislated to ensure greater participation of women, and there has been a small increase in numbers, and some training in gender awareness for peacekeepers has been made available, with many countries adopting National Action Plans to address these issues. However, numbers have plateaued, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) is endemic among peacekeepers, and women still suffer disproportionately in conflict areas. The possibility of ‘change at the edges’ in shifting the dominance in numbers and culture of men holds out some promise for progress. One innovation is the use of all female Full Formed Police Units, which challenge the stereotypes about women peacekeepers. The second is gender awareness training which requires peacekeepers to reflect on gender through considering ‘masculinities’ and ‘femininities’ and how peacekeepers’ gendered and cultural understanding of what being a ‘man’ or a ‘woman’ is in different contexts, can affect their role as peacekeepers.

The report analyses the importance of cultural competency in training in sections six and seven. In most of the armies described in the research piece (except the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany), operationalization of culture is rather limited to a few hours of training during the PDT preparation for the mission, and the use of cultural advisors during the operation. In such



circumstances it is pretty hard to realise the full potential of operationalization of culture, which comprises all the process and skills involved in identification of vital for military activities features of the culture of any object of the activity. Moreover, training universal cultural skills that expedite the processes of acculturation and gaining regional knowledge during soldiers' vocational education, commands, staffs and reserve training is not carried out in a systematic manner in any of the countries. PDT trainings of regional knowledge rather than skills, are mandatory in majority of armies, however they are usually limited to a few hours of lectures on basic aspects of culture. Only in some countries, the lecture system is supplemented by seminars, discussions, simulation games, role-playing, distance learning and multimedia support. The situation should be changed due to the fact that cross-cultural competence embraces a set of interdisciplinary skills that cannot be developed only through participation in lectures.

Proper training needs to be constantly re-evaluated and improved. In particular, the demands of a dynamic and constantly changing security environment require a constant level of upskilling and refresher courses. Therefore, the aim of these sections is threefold. Firstly, to outline the theoretical foundations of training cross-cultural competence for military and civilian personnel (with particular to those involved in creating and executing the CSDP of the EU). Secondly, to review best practices in 3C training worldwide and identify gaps and finally, to provide materials, ideas and projects of online solutions that were, or can potentially be used in training cross-cultural competence for CSDP purposes.

Section eight of the report assess the rapid and constantly evolving ICT development. The introduction of innovations in cross-cultural competence training is a challenge that requires wide range of adaptive activities concerning all education participants and the training process itself. The potential of developing ICT-based training tools is truly promising, yet will always have certain weaknesses. It can never, for instance be the only medium, and will in most cases be only a support to real-life research, self-education and properly designed training – therefore, a transmedia learning approach would be the most suitable one in this case. In the globalization era, the value of intercultural competence education and training increases. Advancing our knowledge and experience, making new and innovative didactic materials, making research on modern tools seems to be of crucial importance, also in wider perspective - for building positive relations and shaping the future security environment.



The final section of Deliverable 2.2. outlines strategic and fundamental actions to advance SOTA and training in soft skills. The gap analysis therefore, includes areas of both lessons identified and lessons learned which can be employed and implemented into the GAP training game.

Objective, methodology and structure of Deliverable 2.2

The purpose of this report is to assess the current system of training, gender and culture in CPPB missions. It is the second GAP deliverable report on training for peacekeeping operations and as a consequence, it examines and identifies the missing elements of training as well as analysing areas for improvement. In addition, the study represents an investigation and assessment of the current practice of gender and culture in peacekeeping. The methodology employed in the report includes desk research from a variety of sources including EU and UN publications, academic journals and articles, interviews with military personnel on cultural training and direct experiences of pre-deployment training in Brussels. This is coupled with the diverse experiences from the authors in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The study comprises an introductory section on peacekeeping training and focuses on the European Council conclusions on operational planning, EU's ability to effectively deploy CSDP civilian and military missions, addressing the main arguments outlined by analysts and practitioners. This section also provides an overview of key findings in the field of training for crisis management operations. The report documents the lack of gender perspective in peacekeeping (currently, in 2017, only 4% of military personnel are female, 10% are police are female and 30% of civilian personnel are female).) and the central developments in gender equality in what is a largely a male dominated field. The structure of the D2.2. gives an analysis on culture, in particular in the military and outlines the theoretical foundations of training cross-cultural competence for military and civilian personnel and reviews best practices in 3C training worldwide and identifies gaps.



Introduction

‘The global challenge is no longer only about managing centres of power but also in building them in fragile states. We see this manifested clearly in the work of peacekeepers deployed throughout some of the world’s most insecure territories. In its earliest form peacekeeping sought to manage state’s power, but now its task is to help build it from scratch. This is a profoundly new and ambiguous task that the UN and its member states must address together.’¹

The end of the Cold War gave rise to conflict, inter-state violence, political and state instability and marshalled a new era for international peacekeeping. As a consequence, multi-functional and multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations were frequently dominating conflict and post-conflict environments. The composite role of peacekeeping operations, the over-stretched nature of missions and the blurring of lines between what or how peacekeepers are expected to contribute to peacekeeping operations means that peacekeeping is fast becoming an indefinable process. Complex problems are leading to complicated responses and there are less and less adequate solutions to protracted and injurious violent conflict. If peacekeepers have more roles to play and more duties to perform, achieving effective interoperability is a prerequisite for successful peace missions. The analysis conducted thus far in the GAP project has highlighted the need for more adequate, new and effective forms of training. Given the increase and scope of peacekeeping missions and a lack of overall understanding of the use of soft skills, more standardisation, coordination and coherence of programmes from training providers is currently necessary for peacekeeping training.

In 1995, United Nations Secretary –General Boutros-Ghali declared: ‘The UN found itself asked to undertake an unprecedented variety of functions: the supervision of cease-fires, the ...demobilisation of forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mining programmes; the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment of new police forces; the verification of respect for human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; the observation, supervision and even organisation and conduct of elections; and the coordination of support for economic

¹ Jean –Marie Guéhenno. 2015. *The Fog of Peace. A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century*. Brookings Institute Press: Washington D.C. p.309



rehabilitation and reconstruction.² While peacekeeping components in terms of military, police and civilian forged ahead and increased in intensity and diversification, training for peacekeepers lingered substantially behind. In reality, peacekeepers were expected to do a number of extra duties, under the umbrella of multi-dimensional peacekeeping without the training required to excel in these operations. Moreover, effective training and cooperation between civilian, police, military personnel failed to go in tangent. The UN Chief of Policy and Best Practice Service Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) recently argued that it is time 'to rethink what we mean by peacekeeping and peacebuilding' and not to constantly respond to crisis but prevent conflict for breaking out in the first place.³ This will need a coherent approach which indeed training organisations should be striving for. With this in mind, peacekeeping training needs the introduction of new, effective and innovative approaches to adapt to the rapidly changing environment of twenty-first century peacekeeping. The production of the GAP training game is therefore necessary and timely given the current environment of peacekeeping and the prerequisite for efficient and valuable training of personnel.

1. Peacekeeping, Training and Multidimensional Operations

Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in more recent years is frequently defined as both diverse and complex. In fact, contemporary peace operations can be said to consist of the 3Ms – multidimensional, multifaceted, and multifunctional. Apart from the mix of the military, police and civilians, peace operations include a range of other organisations, such as regional actors, humanitarian actors, NGOs and non-state actors. Peacekeeping missions usually incorporate many elements including 'political, economic, social and/ or cultural elements as well as military-security components.'⁴ According to the former UN under-Secretary General for UN Peacekeeping Operations, 'peacekeepers are increasingly operating in contexts where risks and threats are higher. In Mali, for example, peacekeepers must be prepared for improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and other asymmetric threats. We will need improved capacities and innovation to

² Boutros Boutros-Ghali. 1995. 'UN Agenda for Peace: Supplement.' The UN Secretary –General released this paper on 3 January 1995 on the UN's 50th anniversary. It comments on the UN Agenda for Peace released in June 1992.

<http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/un-agenda-peace-supplement/p24231> (Accessed 10 October 2016)

³ Renata Dwan, Chief of Policy and Best Practice Service DPKO and DFS. 2017. 'Peace Building in a Divided World: What is the Role of UN Peacekeeping?' Institute of International and European Affairs. (IIEA) Dublin, Ireland. (27 January 2017)

⁴ Kristine St-Pierre. 2008. 'Then and Now: Understanding the Spectrum of Complex Peace Operations. A report for the Pearson Peace Centre.



respond. We must be ready to meet new challenges and to adjust to changing security situations.’⁵ Presently, the total number of personnel serving in peacekeeping operations in the UN, EU, OSCE, AU and other organisations is over 170,000 with the majority of personnel serving on UN peace operations (over 120,000). The following diagram is a list of world’s concentration of sixteen UN peacekeeping operations (2016).⁶



Figure 1.1. UN Peacekeeping Missions (2016)

From the early stages of international peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping training was given only minimal attention. It was rarely seen as a fundamental priority to mission effectiveness. Most peacekeeping personnel in those early years performed peacekeeping duties without any standardised form of training for peace or without any degree of what is commonly known today as pre-deployment training. In 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) to conduct a comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations.⁷ ‘In 1989, a C-34 report encouraged member states to establish national training programmes for military and civilian personnel for peace-keeping operations’ and, ‘requested the Secretary-General to prepare training manuals’ for member states.⁸ The first UN peacekeeping training guidelines for military personnel were created in 1991. Despite statements declaring that training should become

⁵ Hervé Ladsous. ‘UN Peacekeeping must adapt to new challenges.’ Interview with Hervé Ladsous, Under-secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations. Year in Review 2012. United Nations Peace Operations.

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2012.pdf> (Assessed 26 January 2017)

⁶ See UN Current Peacekeeping Operations. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml>

⁷ Alberto Cutillo. 2013. ‘Deploying the Best. Enhancing Training for UN Peacekeepers. Providing for Peacekeeping.’ No. 5. IPI (International Peace Institute). https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/the_3.pdf (Accessed 12 January 2017)

⁸ Ibid.



a more integral and necessary element to peacekeeping missions, it has significantly varied in terms of prioritisation within the UN and EU system of crisis management.

1.1. The concept and Practice of Training For Peace Operations

‘Training is important to peacekeeping, as it is to other endeavours that employ military forces, because it imparts skills, discipline, leadership abilities and professionalism and plays a role in performance.’⁹

There has been a considerable gap regarding training in the literature on peacekeeping. Several components of peacekeeping missions are examined, including mission readiness, mandate effectiveness, defence and security issues, rebel groups and hostile elements in post conflict environs etc. without analysing the level of training peacekeepers receive. This is still evident today given the lack of well-document studies on the efficacy of peacekeeping training. In addition, training for peacekeepers did not come under much examination until the 1990s and 2000s, when several peacekeeping missions were seen as unsuccessful and the potential dangers and risks to peacekeepers increased.

As authors point out, ‘historically, the military contingent of a peacekeeping operation was often forced to grapple with unexpected situations that the planners never imagined, and soldiers dealt with these situations by relying on their “soldiers first” or combat training, ...but additional skills came into focus in the post-Cold War peacekeeping environment with missions that required personnel to encounter new conditions in-theatre.’ These new conditions largely meant a civilian component and a police component which added a new dynamic to the more traditional elements of peacekeeping. ‘Development and post-conflict peace-building also became integrated components of... peacekeeping, and as a result peacekeepers encountered humanitarian tasks and interaction with non-governmental organisations at an increasing rate. These new dimensions meant that peacekeepers were often involved more directly with local populations, rather than maintaining distance while manning operation posts or conducting patrols along a demilitarized zone.’ This necessitated an unprecedented expertise in “contact” skills.

⁹ Grant-Waddell, Trista. 2015. “Soldiers First”: The Evolution of Training for Peacekeepers in the Canadian Forces, 1956-2000. (2014). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. Paper 2015.



According to Kraiger et al, 'training can be defined as a systematic process designed to impart, attitudes, concepts, knowledge, rules or skills in trainees, and result in improved performance or other organisational outcomes of value.'¹⁰ Peacekeeping training can also be 'defined as any activity which aims to enhance mandate implementation by equipping military, police or civilian personnel, both individually and collectively, with the knowledge, skills and attitude to enable them to:

- Meet the evolving challenges of peacekeeping operations in accordance with the DPKO and DFS principles, policies, and guidelines as well as lessons learnt from the field
- Perform their specialist functions in an effective, professional, and integrated manner
- Demonstrate the core values and competencies of the UN'¹¹

Training for peacekeeping developed in incremental steps both in the EU and UN systems, especially so for civilian capabilities. The 1999 European Council decided to set up a European Police College (CEPOL – Collège européen de police) for the training of senior law enforcement officials from EU member states and candidate countries.¹² CEPOL was later established as "a network of existing national training institutes, without precluding the establishment of a permanent institution at a later stage" and in 2004 it gained legal personality, operating as an agency of the EU and financed by the general EU budget.¹³ The role of CEPOL is to train 'senior police officers and develop a European approach to common problems in the fight against crime, crime prevention and the maintenance of law and order and public security, in particular the cross-border dimensions of those problems.'¹⁴ Beyond providing common curricula, e-learning tools and exchange programmes between colleges which CEPOL offers, national police colleges are still expected to perform their own training of personnel for crisis management operations. This training does not exclude the police from taking part in Pre deployment training (PDT) in Brussels which is open to all 28 Member States. The Feira European Council in June 2000, called for 'the development and the implementation of EU capabilities in civilian aspects of crisis management' and in 2001 the European

¹⁰ Kraiger, Kurt; Passmore, Jonathan; Rebelo dos Santos, Nuno ; Malvezzi, Sigmar (Editors): 2014. *The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of the Psychology of Training, Development, and Performance Improvement*. p.207

¹¹ UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub. <http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/Training> (Accessed 18 January 2017)

¹² European Council, 'Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, Tampere, 15-16 October 1999'. See also Gstöhl, Sieglinde. 2012. 'European Union Diplomacy: What role for training?', EU Diplomacy Papers, (College of Europe, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies) No. 3.

¹³ Gstöhl, Sieglinde. 2012. 'European Union Diplomacy: What role for training?', EU Diplomacy Papers, (College of Europe, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies) No. 3.

¹⁴ Ibid



Commission launched a pilot project on ‘Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management’.¹⁵ The ESDC (European Security and Defence College) was established in 2005 to provide a wide range of training and in 2011, the capacity-building programme ‘Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management’ (ENTRI) was launched. ‘The main focus lies on the preparation and training of civilians that are either going to, or already working in, crisis management missions worldwide. Such missions include those of the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the African Union (AU), as well as other international crisis management missions.’¹⁶

Despite some shared initiatives, the primarily responsibility for training lies with member states. Much like the EU, the UN training system depends on member states to deliver and finance their own training for conflict prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB) related missions. Despite the fact that the EU can seem cumbersome with its complicated institutions, the EU has a lot to offer as an international actor for peace and conflict prevention. Its geographical scope, and Europe’ position as the world’s largest trading block, coupled with the perception as a ‘balanced actor’ in world affairs, should in theory lend itself to a centre of excellence in terms of CPPB training. From its first CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) mission to Bosnia in 2003, the EU currently has 15 missions, consisting of 6 military missions and 9 civilian led missions. This accounts for more than 5,000 people presently deployed and working in a variety of geographical areas from Georgia’ s EU monitoring mission to EU CAP Sahel in Niger. Some of the objectives include: ‘keeping the peace, preventing conflicts, strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, prevention of human trafficking, piracy, UN arms embargo and training of Libyan coast guard.’¹⁷ Although, peacekeepers perform an assortment of duties, all need adequate training before deployment, so that they can begin their work as soon as they arrive on the peacekeeping or CSDP mission.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ See <http://www.entriforccm.eu/> (Accessed 10 November 2016)

¹⁷ See EEAS (European External Action Service) https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en (Accessed 25 January 2017)




Figure 1.2. EU CSDP Missions (2017)

1.2. Training Centres in Europe

The EAPTC (European Association of Peace Training Centres) are a vital source in facilitating the exchange of effective training methodologies. EAPTC is a loose association of training institutions fostering training cooperation and coordination at the European level while promoting a '*comprehensive approach*'.¹⁸ In terms of curriculum, there have been significant advances toward inclusion of gender in conflict training as a core competency in both EU and UN courses. However, there is no oversight mechanism to ensure states involved in peacekeeping related missions send personnel for such training prior to deployment.

¹⁸ See EAPTC at <http://www.eaptc.org/>



Figure 1.3. Outline of Training Centres in the European Continent¹⁹

The EU Foreign Policy Report in 2014, stated that the EU has the opportunity to ‘combine, in a coherent and consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and human rights, as well as justice and migration.’²⁰ Notwithstanding the EU’s ability to combine resources, given the existence of almost 100 training Institutions in Europe, insufficient co-ordination between centres as well as many specific shortcomings means that training is in need of proper initiatives and investments.

¹⁹ See ZIF (Centre for Peace Operations) website for more detailed information on peacekeeping training centres around Europe and world peace operations maps. <http://www.zif-berlin.org/en.html>

²⁰ Brussels Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 12th May, 2014. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142563.pdf (Accessed 18 January 2017)



1.3. Training Courses for Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Crisis Management



Figure 1.4 Conflict series - 1. What is a conflict? Course Conducted by UNITAR²¹

Presently, hundreds of courses are being offered under the loose umbrella of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In general, training is delivered through two ways, class based lectures and e-learning platforms. While some are conducted 'in house' in training centres around the world, increasingly the vast majority of courses in peacekeeping are offered online. The following is a list of just some of the courses currently offered by training centres such as the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) in Sweden, ZIF Peace Operations Centre in Germany, KAIPTC, (Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre) in Ghana and UNITAR (UN Institute for Training and Research):

General Courses:

²¹ According to UNIAIR, 'the course is a self-guided, self-paced, web-based course that is on-going and can be accessed at any time. The material is presented in an interactive visual and text format with web-based reference resources. Multiple choice quizzes at the end of each lesson serve a dual function of assessing and evaluating the students' understanding and retention and provide a further didactic function by reviewing the content.' See



- Election Observation courses
- Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT)
- Rule of Law
- Supporting Peace Negotiation & Mediation
- The Comprehensive Approach in Multi-Dimensional Peace Operations (CAMPO)
- Mentoring in Civilian Crisis Management
- Integrating Gender into Peacebuilding Training
- Women, Peace & Security
- Functioning of the UN Security Council and Birth of a Mandate;
- The Strategic Environment of UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- United Nations Staff Officer Course
- Training Module “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (LGAN)
- Living and Working in Hostile Environments Training (LWHE)
- Mediation & Negotiation in the Field
- UN Peacekeeping Operations, Structure and Components;
- UN Mission HQ and Force HQ, Structures and Chain of Command;
- The UN Logistics System;
- Medical Support and Planning Procedures, Stress Management;
- The Role of Elections in Peacekeeping Operations;
- Principles for Civil-Military Co-operation in Peacekeeping Missions;
- Rules of Engagement (RoE) and Code of Conduct;
- Integrated Analysis Planning (IAP) and Military Operational Planning Process (MOPP);
- Tactical Elements of Peacekeeping;
- Force Generation for UN Peacekeeping Missions.
- Core Course Peace Operations
- Mentoring in Civilian Crisis Management (ENTri-Course)
- New Media: Tools & Techniques for Civilian Crisis Management
- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - Coordinated Assessment and Information Management Training
- Religion and Mediation
- Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience (STAR)



E-learning courses in recent years are developing at a rapid scale as learning does not necessarily require class based lectures. E-learning is a much more convenient way to acquire new knowledge and skills and most training facilities have established various e-learning platforms, most of which offer web-based courses that are offered provided free of charge. The following are just some of the online courses conducted by UNIAR:

- Cultural Diplomacy in a Multipolar World
- Multilateral Conferences and Diplomacy
- Climate Change Diplomacy: Negotiating Effectively Under the UNFCCC
- United Nations Protocol
- Overcoming Negotiation Deadlocks
- Chairing International Conferences
- Introduction to the United Nations System
- Climate Change Diplomacy: Negotiating Effectively Under the UNFCCC
- Mediation Skills
- United Nations Protocol
- Introduction to Water Diplomacy
- Cosmopolitan Communication: Connecting across Diplomats, Business Leaders and Civil Society Actors
- E-Tutorial on Global Framework for Climate Services
- Confronting Trauma - A Primer For Global Action
- Strengthening Civilian Capacities to Protect Civilians.
- Conflict series - 2. Conflict analysis course
- Conflict series - 1. What is a conflict?
- Gender Matters
- UN CC: Learn Introductory e-Learning Course on Climate Change
- Milestones in UN Peacekeeping
- Introduction to environment, natural resources and UN peacekeeping operations
- Environment, natural resources and UN peacekeeping operations: Restoring Governance of Natural Resources
- Introduction to security sector reform
- Introduction à la réforme du secteur de la sécurité



Under ENTRI II free to use e-learning modules were developed such as Stress Management and Inter-Cultural Competence. Training providers such as the ASPR (Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution), CMC (Crisis Management Centre) Finland, Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute (BDI), Clingendael – Netherlands Institute of International Relations, and Scola Superiore Sant’Anna (SSSA) in Italy offer e-learning courses on a variety of topics. The following is a list of just some of the several free online e-learning courses available:

- Stress Management
- Inter-Cultural Competence
- UN Peacekeeping Operations
- Elections
- EU | CSDP
- Security Sector Reform
- Mentoring and Advising
- Police training
- Mediation & Negotiation
- The Sphere Project
- Project Cycle Management
- Security
- Anti-Corruption
- First Aid
- Child Protection
- International Humanitarian Law
- Human Rights

Most training centres therefore, institutions and colleges offer several levels of e-learning courses for peacekeeping personnel, NGOs and humanitarian workers. Some offer free programmes while others apply fees to their courses. Presently no accurate mechanism exists to assess any of the merits of any of these online courses. ‘ELMS (E-Learning for Mission Staff) provides training on peace support, humanitarian relief, and security operations to mission staff. ELMS allows free access to 12 courses in the POTI (Peace Operations Training Institute) curriculum to all AU, UN and hybrid mission personnel (military, police, and civilian). This free programme is designed to increase the professional capacity of mission personnel through the study and completion of the online, self-



paced, on-demand courses.²² The POTI curriculum covers a variety of topics on peace support, security, and humanitarian relief operations and is available in English, French, and Spanish. Courses are well structured and clearly written by field practitioners and recognized experts. All military personnel, police, and civilians serving on missions are eligible to study the e-learning courses on peacekeeping listed at no cost from the (POTI) through the generous support of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden. Although many centres provide these e-learning platforms, the quality of e-learning is not assessed especially when it is a 'free for all' and the standards applied are questionable. While feedback from personnel is often in-built, lessons learned do not seem to apply.

Diplomatic Training and Peacekeeping

Diplomatic training, or the training of high level personnel, political officials, policy and legal officers as well as logistical officers undergo training similar to the military and police. These are pre-deployment, mission specific and induction training, in addition to specialised training for diplomats. This is often referred to as Core Diplomatic Training (CDT) and is separate to PDT. For example;

- 'CDT is practice-oriented training provided to diplomats and other beneficiaries at major UN locations so that they can perform effectively in a multilateral context.
- CDT covers training in international cooperation and multilateral diplomacy, and is aimed at enhancing the understanding of the UN system and its organs and procedures, strengthening the skills relevant to conferences and negotiations and supporting efforts to build a more effective multilateral system.
- UNITAR has been delivering CDT courses since its inception in 1965 and the courses are traditionally considered the "core" training of the Institute. The nature of the training is "on the UN for the UN by the UN". By definition, CDT implies training that is multilateral in character and offered in a multilateral context. All Member States and the United Nations, collectively, benefit from greater knowledge on how to operate in the multilateral setting and perform effectively and efficiently.

²² POTI. <http://www.peaceopstraining.org/programs/elms/>. See also IAPTC. 'Peacekeeping Education and Training Award 2009.' <http://www.iaptc.org/iaptc-peacekeeping-education-and-training-award-2009/> (Accessed 20 January 2017) and IAPTC. The Evolution of the IAPTC, Roles, Responsibilities, Customs and Practices. <http://www.iaptc.org/evolution-of-iaptc/>



- CDT is face-to-face learning provided through executive style training (concise, accessible and directly applicable) that is highly interactive. The average duration of a CDT course is between one and two days and courses are delivered in either English or French.
- In order to ensure the on-going participation of least developed countries and other developing countries in CDT courses, UNITAR offers a number of fellowships.²³

Notwithstanding this, the activity centred around diplomats in terms of demands for mediation, negotiation, cooperation and dialogue as well as dispute and problem solving skills requires specialist training.

To date, there are few studies that address the mechanisms for adequately assessing the quantity of this type of training and quality, or the quality of e-learning platforms that produces peacekeeping training and courses for peace operations. While there are of certainly many courses that offer what have been determined as soft skills training, communication, mediation and negotiation, the extent to which these can be evaluated with appropriate feedback from users is questionable.

1.4. EU CSDP Missions and Training for Peace

The most predominate factor regarding training for CSDP missions among EU Member States is that it is extremely diverse. In particular, Member States 'have different traditions of diplomatic training and diverging views on the additional need for training of their diplomats. Also the EU institutions appear to have a preference for the preservation of their own training initiatives at the expense of a more ambitious and more coherent approach.'²⁴

Several approaches have been underway to streamline training for CSDP, formerly ESDP missions. EU training policy, which encompasses both the civilian and military dimension, can be defined as 'a training regime, conducted in common, which contributes to a better understanding and sense of purpose of [CSDP] and provides knowledge and, if required, skills for its implementation'.²⁵ Acknowledging a need to establish "a holistic and co-ordinated approach on training matters", this

²³ UNITAR. Core Diplomatic Training. <https://unitar.org/cdt> (Accessed 12 January 2017)

²⁴ Gstöhl, Sieglinde. 2012. 'European Union Diplomacy: What role for training?', EU Diplomacy Papers, (College of Europe, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies) No. 3.

²⁵ Jacob, Gauthier. 2011. 'EU Training for Civilian CSDP – which coherence? Security Policy Brief. No.28. <http://aei.pitt.edu/33467/1/SPB28-Jacob.pdf> (Accessed 17 January 2017)



policy set up an overarching framework for training initiatives, firstly by developing an EU training dimension – which would draw on and be complementary to trainings already delivered by national authorities – and secondly by ‘establishing links and strengthening synergies between the different training initiatives at EU level.’²⁶

In 2004, a holistic and co-ordinated EU training concept for military and civilian crisis management was encouraged in order to create a European security culture under the ESDP²⁷ (European Security and Defence Policy, now CSDP). According to the Council of the EU, this would entail:

- strengthening synergies between the different training initiatives at EU level within ESDP
- increasing the interoperability between all the actors involved,
- focusing particularly on the interface between military and civilian areas, including police,
- supporting the overall goal of improving civil-military as well as civil-civil coordination within ESDP.

In order to achieve these objectives, the Council outlined another set of objectives for training in ESDP and the requirements necessary for improving synergies. Therefore, training in ESDP needs to:

- Support the development of ESDP
- Be based on regular assessment of ESDP training requirements
- Comply with the European Security Strategy
- Meet Crisis Management operational needs
- Ensure a comprehensive approach between civilian, police and military training activities
- Reflect the EU Crisis Management capabilities
- Integrate lessons learnt from operations and exercises
- Identify and share best practices
- Be cost-effective with the best use of resources
- Take into account the EU guidelines in Crisis Management related fields (e.g. Children and Armed conflict)
- Contribute to the integration of a gender perspective within the ESDP framework
- Include the relevant aspects of International Law including International Humanitarian Law
- Complement ESDP training provided by Member States and international organisations as appropriate.²⁸

²⁶ See Council of the European Union, 2004.

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/documents/pdf/trainingconcept_en.pdf/

Jacob, Gauthier. 2011. ‘EU Training for Civilian CSDP – which coherence? Security Policy Brief. No.28.

<http://aei.pitt.edu/33467/1/SPB28-Jacob.pdf> (Accessed 17 January 2017)

²⁷ Council of the European Union. 30 August 2004.

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/documents/pdf/trainingconcept_en.pdf (Accessed 12 January 2017)



While the EU continued to develop its training policies in light of CSDP, a number of initiatives were established with the aim of achieving more coherent policies. For instance, the establishment of the European Group on Training, (EGT), CEPOL and ESDC (European Security and Defence College) and the European Police Force Training (EUPFT) all had specific purposes of enhancing European levels of training for CPPB missions given the increase demand for missions and personnel.




Figure 1.5: A growing Demand for CSDP Personnel




Figure 1.6. CSDP Budget (2003-2013)

²⁸ Ibid.



1.5. The ESDC and PDT Training

The ESDC carries out pre-deployment training for CSDP missions in Brussels. It provides 80 training activities annually and its pre-deployment course was developed to ensure personnel coming from different backgrounds are on a common level of understanding for CSDP missions. The college has a network that comprises of over 90 national and multinational training institutes from all 28 EU member states: these include diplomatic, police and defence academies as well as peace universities.²⁹ Online training is provided through IDL (Internet –based Distance Learning) and residential modules, which are outsourced to national defence academies, universities and research institutions of member states. Courses are offered to all personnel involved in CSDP missions including military, police, civil servants and diplomatic staff. In addition, courses are offered to UN personnel. To date, the ESDC has provided courses for over 5,000 participants.

Given the courses the ESDC provides, relatively low numbers attend Pre-Deployment Training (PDT). For example, in a recent ESDC course on CSDP PDT, (November 2016) eight of the eleven participants on the course were going on separate CSDP missions to Mali, Somalia, Georgia, and Palestine. A disproportionate number of participants were from Northern Europe as opposed to Southern Europe, with a majority coming from Sweden, Finland, Netherlands and Belgium. The low numbers from other EU member states leads to the fact that PDT is compulsory for some nations but not for others.

²⁹ See the ESDC website for more information: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/4369/european-security-and-defence-college-esdc_en (Accessed 12 October 2016)




Figure 1.7. ESDC Training Cycle & Duty of Care³⁰

Although the ESDC can account for low numbers in terms of limited space in holding venue, the numbers point to the fact that training as a whole is in need of re-evaluation and standardisation across Europe. The following graph shows the category of male / female participating in ESDC courses in 2016.




Figure 1.8. Category and Gender: 99 participants from 27 countries.

³⁰ The following figures, 1.7., 1.8, 1.9 are from the ESDC.



Given that troops are largely the majority of personnel deployed on CSDP missions, the majority of personnel as figure 1.8. demonstrates are male, while the majority of personnel being deployed are on civilian missions as opposed to the military.




Figure 1.9. Types of Deployment

While PDT is run over the course of four days in Brussels and participants' attendance is with the assistance of their own EU Member States, the course is lacking in fundamental requirements for 'actual real life missions.' PDT is extremely well versed on the overall organisational level of EU institutions, EEAS, CMPD and CPCC and provides excellent and many well-knowledgeable individuals to present these topics during the course. The problem remains that the course is entirely geared towards the institutional nature of the EU, explanations of how 'Brussels works,' without many lesson plans on mission capability or soft skills. Even though training is not expected to demonstrate every possible scenario that may arise on peacekeeping operations, it is expected to train individuals in at least some valuable skills for field missions and to a high standard. The persistence of 'power point' presentations and overload of information leaves very little room for actual interaction with participants. Classroom based lectures encourage passive learning whereas active learning and participating in the lecture talks themselves is a far more ideal way in the process and acquisition of knowledge and learning. In fact, classroom based learning in today's modern digital society is fast becoming outdated and obsolete as new forms of learning, including role playing are encouraged. The over-reliance on lectures on the institutional arrangements of Brussels does not correlate with mission readiness, and therefore does not provide the necessary skills to perform on CSDP missions.



(This is not to suggest that individuals trained in this way can't perform effectively, rather it demonstrates that they could have been much better trained on PDT). In addition, soft skills training and learning on gender and human rights is inadequate. Although some lectures provide first-rate clarity and expertise on the EU Comprehensive approach and in particular on monitoring, reporting and mission support, when it comes to soft skills training and mission readiness, PDT in Brussels in its current format is not fit for purpose for CSDP missions. In essence, what is needed is a student-centred or personnel-to-be-deployed centred approach to training.

Training courses need to meet the job peacekeepers will be doing. As Julardzija comments, trainers of peacekeeping courses, 'often load too much unnecessary information into the course, the material isn't organized from a learner perspective and, without the proper structure, experts like to tell "war" stories when doing the training delivery. When war stories are told, the focus is on the trainer and not the learner. To be an effective trainer, you need to be a facilitator...not a lecturer. The best design is done by learning professionals working with subject matter experts using adult learning principles. When these conditions are in place the learners generally "hit the ground running" when they arrive in mission.'³¹

1.6. Obstacles to Peacekeeping Training

According to Alberto Cutillo, in *Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for UN Peacekeepers, Providing for Peacekeeping*; the role of training in the success or failure of UN peacekeeping operations is generally understated. It is often taken for granted or considered less relevant to the outcome of an operation. But the UN's historical experience has shown that underprepared peacekeepers cost lives and endanger missions.³² Peacekeeping has been plagued by a high number of vacancy rates, slow deployment of personnel as well as a lack of 'qualified personnel.'³³ However, as Cutillo argues, in practice, 'special training is needed because UN peacekeeping involves more than the basic military tasks for which soldiers are—or should be—already trained. If soldiers might have managed in early UN observation missions, tasked with straightforward and limited mandates,

³¹ Semir Julardzija. 'Human Terrain System in Peacekeeping Missions.' Peace Operations Training institute. A thesis presented in partial completion of the requirements of the Certificate of Training in the United Nations Peace Support Operations. <http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/julardzija.pdf> (Accessed 12 January 2017)

³² Alberto Cutillo. 2013. 'Deploying the Best. Enhancing Training for UN Peacekeepers. Providing for Peacekeeping.' No. 5. IPI (International Peace Institute). https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/the_3.pdf (Accessed 12 January 2017)

³³ Andun Solli, Benjamin de Carvalho, Cedric de Coning and Mikkel F. Pedersen. 2011. 'Training in vain? Bottlenecks in Deploying Civilians for UN Peacekeeping.' *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 18. No. 4.(pp.425-438)p.427



this is not the case in modern multidimensional operations, where a number of different and sophisticated skills are required.’³⁴ The lack of soft skills was also identified in a 2012 report produced by the IAPTC (International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres). According to the report; ‘the sustainability of any intervention depends on developing local capacity. This requires that peacekeepers have mentoring skills,... in addition to mentoring skills, the importance of ‘more focused’ pre-deployment training.’³⁵ Amongst the observations that emerged from the IAPTC Conference titled ‘Effective Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Challenges for the Training Community’ was the recommendation to develop ways to establish a ‘needs driven approach’ that can ensure that the training that is being delivered is relevant and effective. Another observation called for the ‘need to establish core competencies to achieve effective peacebuilding in the areas of mentoring and advising, managing projects, educating the mission leadership team to reduce the civilian-military cultural divide, and creating real understanding of gender issues to include the implementation of 1325.’³⁶ Other recommendations called for the ‘harmonising training and exercises and establishing firm links not only among the various training centres but primarily between those delivering the training and the field where the missions are conducted.’³⁷ The IAPTC 2012 conference identified three core challenges and posed the following questions to participants:

- *Challenge 1:* We are told that the men and women who deploy into missions are not adequately trained. Collectively, our respective organizations have trained hundreds of thousands of military, police and civilians; many millions of dollars are spent every year by our governments on training peacekeepers. We are the ones with the knowledge and the ability to do something to change this situation. If training is deemed inadequate, is the status quo an option?
- *Challenge 2:* Peacekeepers as early peacebuilders are members of a team comprised of civilians, military and police who work with a host government, in building a nation, and supporting change; these are not the traditional roles that uniformed personnel are usually trained for. Civilians are seldom trained as robustly as our military and police colleagues. What competencies are needed by this team to be effective in these roles?

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ IAPTC 2012 Report. ‘Effective Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Challenges for the Training Community.’ http://www.iaptc.org/wp-content/themes/brightpage/iaptc2012conferencereport_web-%20final.pdf (Accessed 14 January 2017)

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.



- *Challenge 3:* We can't possibly train everyone to know everything they need to know...the environment into which they are being deployed is too complex. The knowledge and skill required is extensive and the time available for training is limited. The reality is that there is no developed training culture (or the necessary resources) in some organisations. What then can we do to make sure that the training they get is great? ³⁸

As the above has demonstrated, there are many difficulties to effective training, not least of all the absence of approved and comprehensive training needs analysis in many countries and in particular African training centres. Moreover, the UN 2010 TNA (Training Needs Assessment) identified many levels of training that should be delivered through course training for police, military and civilian. The challenges discussed here relate to challenge two and three. Firstly, 'if we accept that peacekeepers are early peacebuilders, and are part of a team that is to mentor, support, secure, help manage change, and create the conditions for sustainable peace, ...there are two competencies that are mandatory. Peacekeepers are change agents if you think about a peacekeeping mission being a change or transformation process: two competencies would lead to more success in achieving mission mandates: inter-cultural literacy and adaptability; and change management.' ³⁹Secondly, as IAPTC suggested; 'We can't possibly train a peacekeeper to know everything s/he will need to know given the unpredictable, ever-changing, complex environment into which they are deploying. That is why there is an increasing demand for specialists.' Notwithstanding this, there are some training techniques and methodologies which are considered best practice as the following diagram discusses:

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.



'Just because people receive training – they will be able to perform. Not true! Not all adults learn the same way. Generally, adult learners retain 10% of what they read, 20% of what they hear and 90% of what they do. This suggests that our training methodology makes a real difference. We can't lecture for 15 days and think learners will leave the classroom knowing exactly what they need to do. We need to actively engage the participants in role playing, small group discussions and problem solving. Practicing decision making allows mistakes that are not measured in human lives, and supports learning by doing. Experts are the best trainers, and anyone can design learning product –... (however), they often load too much unnecessary information into the course, the material isn't organized from a learner perspective and, without the proper structure, experts like to tell "war" stories when doing the training delivery... To be an effective trainer, you need to be a facilitator...not a lecturer. The best design is done by learning professionals working with subject matter experts using adult learning principles. When these conditions are in place the learners generally "hit the ground running" when they arrive in mission. So, what does effective training look like? First and foremost to the extent that you can, ensure that the learners on your course are appropriate for the subject being taught. And make sure that your course meets the needs of the job they are going to be doing.'⁴⁰

As the diagram above outlines, there are several obstacles to effective training, not least of all what is delivered by the lecture in a classroom based scenario. Courses frequently do not meet the needs of the participants when they are expected to do 'on the job' training. Active learning versus passive learning is paramount to good training particularly, when role playing and simulation is applied. This is one of the fundamental elements which users of the GAP training game will benefit from.

⁴⁰ Ibid.



Passive Vs. Active Learning

‘Adults learn best by doing. The methodologies of active learning and problem based learning have proven that learners are better prepared to do the work than if they have been trained using more traditional training methods. As proof, medical schools use this approach to train doctors, as do other professions such as law and engineering. There are many different ways to provide active learning opportunities to a learning audience. Most importantly, though, learning should be designed for maximum small group discussion of the problems with facilitators as mentors and guides to the learning process. Presentations by the facilitators are kept to a minimum. Webinars, discussion threads, communities of practice, learning aids are excellent ways to supplement this training and it is effective in both classroom and e-learning. What is achieved by active learning methodology is that the learners develop problem-solving and critical thinking skills. This is the most useful element of the learning, because they cannot be prepared for every situation they might encounter in the field. This skill will make the difference between a good peacekeeper and a great peacekeeper.’⁴¹

The training needs of peacekeepers will be substantially augmented by the GAP virtual reality training game.

The EU of course has many instruments that can be produced at every level for crisis management operations and in theory should be conducive to pre-deployment training. Apart from PDT, specialised training, induction training and in-missions training is also provided. However, according to authors Allen, Rosén and Tarp, ‘the existence of training resources in itself does not ensure that peacekeepers arrive in missions with an understanding of their responsibilities as well as operational possibilities and constraints when it comes to protecting civilians. What is required is a focused PDT with fresh information from mission areas as well as some mechanisms for testing that the troops learn the core lessons that training is design to convey.’⁴²

1.6.1 The Military Dimension

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ross Allen, Frederik Rosén and Kristoffer Tarp. 2016. DIIS Report 2016:10. ‘Preparing for Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.’ http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/731173/DIIS_Report_2016_10_Web.pdf (Accessed 12 January 2017)



According to Hummel and Pietz, training coordination requires standardised approaches to the qualification of field personnel. 'Cooperation on the planning, implementation, evaluation and harmonisation of training courses is key, and will only be achieved in the future if both actors truly align the current revisions of training policies and architectures. One achievable target is the establishment of a compatible training recognition system for both organisations which acknowledges the competencies of their respective staff.'⁴³

Although a large number of peacekeeping training centres are located with European countries (see figure 1.3) making consistency and standardisation between them challenging, there remains many obstacles to peacekeeping training, especially within the military structure. The military structure has three distinct military planning levels.

- 'The strategic level can be described as the level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them.
- The operational level can be described as the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.
- The tactical level can be described as the level at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units.'⁴⁴

The roles and duties peacekeepers have performed in recent years have been in marked contrast to the conventional forms of peacekeeping. Britt for one, argues that in the late 1990s soldiers became subject to a 'new' set of identity images including 'peacekeeper, peacemaker, humanitarian, mediator, observer and multinational interactant.'⁴⁵ According to this logic, such identities are 'forced' upon the soldiers, who, by and large, will have joined the armed force with the primary role

⁴³ Wanda Hummel and Tobias Pietz. 2015. Partnering for Peace: Lessons and Next Steps for EU-UN Cooperation on Peace Operations. ZIF Operations Germany. http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Hummel_Pietz_EU-UN-Partnerships_ENG_Feb2015.pdf (Accessed 10 January 2017)

⁴⁴ Martina Lindberg (Swedish Defence University) and Yvette Foliant (Ministry of Defence, The Netherlands). 'Teaching Gender in the Military'. 2016. A Handbook DCAF a centre for security, development and the rule of law with the support of the Swiss Government. "Gender education and training in the military" in PfPC SSRWG and EDWG, (Geneva: DCAF and PfPC).

⁴⁵ Curran, David. 2016. *More than Fighting for Peace? Conflict Resolution, UN Peacekeeping, and the Role of Training Military Personnel*. Springer. p120



of defending national interests through the use of force.⁴⁶ This is not to suggest that the military are expected to change their mind-set from soldier to peacekeeper or that the peacekeeper mentality is literally forced upon them, but there are significant challenges for the military in PKOs. A report in 2000 by the UK Ministry of Defence claimed that a ‘serviceman trained and equipped for war may do an effective job on a peacekeeping operation...but one just trained for peacekeeping is not ready for high intensity operations.’⁴⁷ The dominance of combat training still prevails within the military with less emphasis on skills primarily used in peacekeeping or skills that could undermine combat capabilities.

Kernic’s 1999 study of the Austrian military experience argues that rather than ‘insisting that soldiers be better trained in ‘civilian skills’, they demanded tougher combat training for soldiers before and during peacekeeping operations.’⁴⁸ It would appear then that shifting the focus to other types of skills within the military framework will be challenging or at least slow to implement. Thierry Tardy’s study of the French military has similar observations. The French military in this instance has an identity crisis – between the traditional soldier ‘warrior’ identity and the functions and skills of peacekeepers.⁴⁹ This study also claims that although the French military has been involved in several peace operations in the post-Cold War era, ‘it has been keen to maintain the primacy of the combat functions of its soldiers’, and this was ‘not to be jeopardised by the contribution to peace operations.’⁵⁰‘Within the French debate, peace operations are not considered as a specific category of military operations in which different principles would apply. French doctrinal texts of the last decade are explicit on the need to ensure that wherever the French armed forces are deployed, they are engaged in accordance with some key military principles, among which the freedom of action and the possibility to resort to coercion. Also a contribution to peace operations must not jeopardize the identity of the soldier as a “warrior”’.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p123

⁴⁸ Kernic, Franz. 1999. ‘The Soldier and the Task: Austria’s Experience of Preparing Peacekeepers’, *International Peacekeeping*, 6:3, pp. 113–28. See also Catherine Baker. 2010. ‘It’s not their job to soldier’: distinguishing civilian and military in soldiers’ and interpreters’ accounts of peacekeeping in 1990s Bosnia-Herzegovina. *University of Southampton Journal of War and Culture Studies* 3:1 pp.137–50.

⁴⁹ See also Curran, David. 2016. *More than Fighting for Peace? Conflict Resolution, UN Peacekeeping, and the Role of Training Military Personnel*. Springer. p123.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Thierry Tardy. EU Institute for Security Studies. Revised 16 May 2016. See <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/France-Tardy-16May2016-1.pdf> (Accessed 10 January 2017)



From the outset, the military was also not expected to do any kind of special training or extra training for peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping training is a relatively recent phenomenon for both the police and the military. What is significant from previous research and studies in this area then is that any kind of institutional change for the military will be difficult to implement, particularly so when it comes to long standing traditions. In addition to this, Gooven's study of the Dutch military argues that 'militaries are strongly attached to traditions; to familiar embedded practices; and to standard operational procedure that have withstood the test of time.'⁵² According to Tardy, 'since the 1970's, studies have sought to understand international peacekeeping as a necessary stage in conflict de-escalation, and ultimately transformation. From this, there is a history of engagement including studies which seek to understand the skills peacekeepers may need to assist them in their day to day activities, and the role that international peacekeeping plays in wider projects of conflict transformation.'⁵³

What is clear is that countries are still paramount when it comes to peacekeeping, particularly in terms of active involvement in sending personnel to peace operations, civilians, PCC (police contributing countries), TCC (troop contributing countries) and in sending equipment. Ireland for one, has a long history of peacekeeping and has sent troops to UN peacekeeping missions since 1958. However, as previously stated, serious training for peace missions has only become a requirement in more recent years. A 2015 Irish White Paper on Defence, announced the establishment of an 'Institute for Peace Support and Leadership Training which would have international standing and contribute to the overall development of knowledge and experience in the areas of peace support and conflict resolution.'⁵⁴ The Institute would be supported by the UN Training School. While acknowledging that the solutions to conflict resolution 'cannot be addressed by military means alone and requires the fusion of civil and military capabilities to comprehensively prepare for conflict resolution in the twenty-first century.'⁵⁵ In reality, military, police and civilian dimensions of PKOs cannot exist as separate entities or function well without the existence of many other factors. The focus in this section on the military dimension demonstrates the extent to which the military will adopt 'peacekeeping skills' as opposed to soldier skills or warrior mentality. Despite

⁵² Curran, David. 2016. *More than Fighting for Peace? Conflict Resolution, UN Peacekeeping, and the Role of Training Military Personnel*. Springer. p123.

⁵³ ⁵³ Thierry Tardy. EU Institute for Security Studies. Revised 16 May 2016. See <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/France-Tardy-16May2016-1.pdf> (Accessed 10 January 2017)

⁵⁴ Curran, David. 2016. *More than Fighting for Peace? Conflict Resolution, UN Peacekeeping, and the Role of Training Military Personnel*. Springer. p124

⁵⁵ Ibid.



the necessity to adopt certain skills conducive to peacekeeping, changes will be slow and perhaps difficult to implement. Hence, the importance of interoperability in peacekeeping which the following section explores.

1.7. Interoperability and Peacekeeping

‘CSDP must become more rapid and effective. Europeans must be ready to rapidly respond to crises in full compliance with the UN Charter. This requires Member States to enhance the deployability and interoperability of their forces through training and exercises.’⁵⁶

In EU CSDP Missions and UN peacekeeping operations, personnel composed of many diverse backgrounds have to interact to perform their peacekeeping tasks. Interoperability is defined as the ‘ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.’⁵⁷ The EU in particular stresses the importance of interoperability on CSDP missions. According to EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini’s Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, states ‘*we must further develop our civilian missions – a trademark of CSDP – by encouraging force generation, speeding up deployment, and providing adequate training based on EU-wide curricula.*’⁵⁸

Similarly, interoperability is relevant for peacekeeping given the interaction of many actors. Moreover, ‘participants in UN peacekeeping missions face difficulties both in relating to the people in the areas to which they are deployed and in working together effectively with others serving the mission, both military and civilian.’⁵⁹ They also have to interact with NGOs and the local population. All UN peacekeeping operations are expected to be interoperable with its military and non-military

⁵⁶ Mogherini, Federica. 2016. ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.’

⁵⁷ This is generally seen as a NATO definition adopted by many organisations including the European Union. See <http://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm> (Accessed 12 January 2017)

⁵⁸ See *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy*. https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (Accessed 17 January 2017)

⁵⁹ United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Maritime Task Force Manual September 2015. <http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/387297/United%20Nations%20Peacekeeping%20Missions%20Maritime%20Manual.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (Accessed 12 January 2017)



components including its international, regional, governmental and non-governmental organisations.⁶⁰

Some countries have advanced the level of interoperability required for successful peace operations. For instance, interoperability has been a high priority in Norwegian peace operations since the early 1990s: 'the importance attributed to interoperability was reflected in the decision to engage in the joint training prior to the deployment of NORDBAT 2 (Nordic Battalion) in Tuzla in 1993, and it is clear in the way the need for interoperability has been one of the key drivers of the internationalisation of the Norwegian armed forces.'⁶¹ According to Jakobsen, this has been driven by the interoperability requirements established by NATO, but also other multinational initiatives such as NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support).⁶² In 1996, seven nations, including Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden, founded the Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations, or SHIRBRIG.⁶³ Participation in SHIRBRIG aimed to create a UN Standby force with a rapidly deploying peacekeeping force as well as the EU's rapid reaction forces which serves to enhance interoperability. As of today, 14 nations are active in SHIRBRIG which is the most advanced multinational mechanism for peace operations under the Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter.⁶⁴ SHIRBRIG brigades consist of 4000-5000 troops, comprising a headquarters unit, infantry battalions, reconnaissance units, as well as medical, engineering and logistical support of the contributing countries: the brigade should be able to deploy with 15-30 days and operate in principle for 6 months.⁶⁵ SHIRBRIG now 'enjoys a reputation among African military staffs, policy-makers and military experts as an effective, experienced and impartial partner. Despite these successes, however, SHIRBRIG also faces several external and internal limitations and challenges.'⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen. 2006. *Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making*. Taylor and Francis. p.163.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Joachim Koops and Johannes Varwick. 2008. 'Ten Years of SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned, Development Prospects and Strategic Opportunities for Germany'. GPPI (Global Public Policy Institute) Research Paper Series No. 11. http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2008/Koops_Varwick_2008_Ten_Years.pdf (Accessed 20 January 2017)

⁶⁴ Ryszard M. Czarny. 2017. *A Modern Nordic Saga: Politics, Economy and Society*. Springer Publications. p.288

⁶⁵ Ibid. SHIRBRIG deployed its first mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) IN 2000 and 2001. SHIRBRIG also participated in other peacekeeping missions such as UNMIL, UNAMI, UNOCI, and UNMIS. See SHIRBRIG: Ready to Deploy. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/2006/shirbrig.htm> (Accessed 20 January 2017)

⁶⁶ Joachim Koops and Johannes Varwick. 2008. 'Ten Years of SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned, Development Prospects and Strategic Opportunities for Germany'. GPPI (Global Public Policy Institute) Research Paper Series No. 11. http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2008/Koops_Varwick_2008_Ten_Years.pdf (Accessed 20 January 2017)



The ability to achieve effective and close cooperation between peacekeeping actors and improve interoperability should in theory lead to the smooth running of a peacekeeping missions. Interaction that takes place among various kinds of international actors participating in peacekeeping is referred to as 'horizontal interoperability', and the interactions of those people with local populations, 'vertical interoperability'.⁶⁷ While each organisation, military, civilian, police have their own organisational uniqueness, they also have their own practices, nuances and culture. Therefore, there is a military way or culture of performing duties and tasks and there is a police culture. Naturally there is a wide-spectrum of cultures that affect peacekeepers ability to interact with each-other. The attempted harmonisation of these strands can be difficult to achieve in a peacekeeping operation.

Moreover, multifunctional missions in the 1990s, or the 3Ms as explained previously, intensified interactions between all actors, military, police, civilian of which they were unprepared for. According to Rubinstein, 'the difficulties experienced in the interactions among military, civilian, humanitarian and UN agencies in the missions in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia raised issues of horizontal interoperability for explicit examination.'⁶⁸ Many studies therefore began to analyse the 'practical need to understand and overcome the difficulties in civil–military interaction' highlighting the differences among military and non-governmental organisation (NGO) actors, or how these differences were problematic for missions.⁶⁹ Most of this work centred around 'describing or prescribing various mechanisms for smoothing civilian–military interaction through joint training, in-field coordination, and developing shared operating procedures to ease likely points of tension.'⁷⁰

1.7.1. Horizontal Interoperability

As previously mentioned multidimensional peacekeeping requires a variety of actors 'each with their unique organisational structures as well as operational cultures and practices. Major actors that are

⁶⁷ Robert A. Rubinstein, Diana M. Keller and Michael E. Scherger. 2008. 'Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions'. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.4, p. 540

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.



usually organisationally part of the peacekeeping mission include a multi-national military component, an electoral component, a human rights component, a UN police component, a civil affairs component and others depending on the nature of the mission's mandate.'⁷¹ In order to understand the in-depth nuances that occur in a peacekeeping operation, the concept of culture as an analytic lens through which to examine problems in horizontal interoperability has gained momentum in accounting for the points of tension among actors in complex missions.⁷² Some authors therefore have 'identified cultural factors as being at the root of the breakdown in the Canadian Airborne's behaviour in Somalia,...and identified cultural factors which transform peacekeeping into organisations that are essentially masculine and militaristic in character.'⁷³ As Marshal Sahlins states, 'In all its dimensions, including the social and the material, human existence is symbolically constituted, which is to say, culturally ordered.'⁷⁴

Culture for one, cannot neatly be fitted into the standard categories used to plan or implement peace operations: culture cannot be easily fitted to the common distinctions among 'strategic, operational and tactical levels of information used in planning and evaluating missions. Rather, the cultural nature of actions at each level are importantly interlinked.'⁷⁵ There are many organisations such as UNHCR, USAID, ECHO (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operation) and CIDA (Canadian International Agency) that also require effective cooperation and interaction to carry out their work. Whether military, police, civilian, UN, NGO or other agencies, a large degree of interoperability among themselves as is demonstrated by the term horizontal interoperability, results in mutually respectful and equal partnership in mission planning and implementation, all needed for effective peace operations.⁷⁶ This understanding of interoperability in peace operations will prove crucial for the development and implementation of the GAP training game.

For example, peacekeeping mandates are often highly ambitious. Due the scope and size of peacekeeping operational tasks, potential for miscommunication and misunderstandings is endemic.

⁷¹ Semir Julardzija. 'Human Terrain System in Peacekeeping Missions.' Peace Operations Training institute. A thesis presented in partial completion of the requirements of the Certificate of Training in the United Nations Peace Support Operations.

<http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/julardzija.pdf> (Accessed 12 January 2017)

⁷² Robert A. Rubinstein, Diana M. Keller and Michael E. Scherger. 2008. 'Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions'. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.4, p. 540

⁷³ Ibid.


⁷⁴ Marshall Sahlins, 'Two or Three Things That I Know About Culture', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol.5, No.3, 1999, p.400.

⁷⁵ Robert A. Rubinstein, Diana M. Keller and Michael E. Scherger. 2008. 'Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions'. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.4.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p.551



This is again potentially a flaw in PKOs that *Gaming for Peace* aims to alleviate. 'If there is a lack of clear understanding of all the various organisational elements by each other, conflict often occurs impacting negatively on execution of the peacekeeping mission' mandate. Therefore, along with the need for cultural understanding on the part of the peacekeepers for the foreign population/culture in which they are deployed, there are other areas as well that need cultural awareness, training and understanding.'⁷⁷ According to Semir Julardzija, 'horizontal cultural awareness and understanding is especially important for the senior leaders of the various components as they establish policies and direct the work of their organizations in working with the other components to achieve a unified mission effort.'⁷⁸ A study by Woodhouse and Duffey points out that intercultural contact in peacekeeping environments occurs on a number of different levels, including between: "(1) the national contingents that comprise a peacekeeping force; (2) the diverse personnel who work with diplomatic, humanitarian and other civilian agencies; (3) the military and civilian organizations involved in establishing and sustaining the mission; (4) the peacekeepers (military and civilian personnel) and the local population; and (5) the different cultural or ethnic groups who may be in conflict.'⁷⁹



⁷⁷ Semir Julardzija. 'Human Terrain System in Peacekeeping Missions.' Peace Operations Training institute. A thesis presented in partial completion of the requirements of the Certificate of Training in the United Nations Peace Support Operations.

<http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/julardzija.pdf> (Accessed 12 January 2017)

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid. See also Woodhouse and Duffey. 2008. 'Culture, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping' in H. Langholtz (eds.), *Peacekeeping and International Conflict resolution*, Peace Operations Training Institute, page 173.



Figure 1.10 Cultural Interaction in Peacekeeping

Along with the humanitarian community, diversity is expressed through the 'different nature of the organisation (e.g., its objectives, size, expertise, quality) and different cultural background of its personnel. The "MilitaryMilitary" relationship of peacekeeping forces means that although serving under UN flag and wearing blue beret or a blue helmet, troops are from different nations and cultures and those forces have different "mission objectives and standards, rules of engagement, use of force, staff procedures, chains of command, etc.' ⁸⁰ In relation to the military-civilian relationship, each organisation has its own operating structure. In fact, several organisations operate in contemporary peacekeeping environments: international/diplomatic (e.g., UN, OSCE), military, civilian police, NGO (international humanitarian, human rights, development and conflict resolution, and local/grassroots). ⁸¹ In order for a peace keeping mission to be successful, each part of the international and local actors/ agencies will need to understand the motives and operations of the other in turn to perform.

Unsurprisingly, disagreements between military and civilian agencies have negative impacts on operations. Many authors have argued that modern peacekeeping has changed dramatically in recent years away from more conventional forms. The fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping points to the principles of impartiality, consent and non-use of force have altered the meaning of the conventional peacekeeping. While traditional peacekeeping still exists, the 'doctrinal peacekeeping principles' have 'seriously been damaged for the sake of humanitarian intervention in some "recent" peacekeeping missions, (e.g., Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda).' ⁸² As de Coning, Aoi and Karlsrud have pointed out, recent UN peacekeeping in the 'Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, South Sudan and Sudan have been given mandates that significantly challenge the traditional UN peacekeeping principles... and the limited use of force. In the DRC and in Mali, the UN is supporting governments against insurgencies and violent extremists and in CAR, Darfur and South Sudan, the UN is protecting civilians without an overarching peace agreement in

⁸⁰ Semir Julardzija. 'Human Terrain System in Peacekeeping Missions.' Peace Operations Training institute. A thesis presented in partial completion of the requirements of the Certificate of Training in the United Nations Peace Support Operations.

<http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/julardzija.pdf> (Accessed 12 January 2017)

⁸⁰ Robert A. Rubinstein, Diana M. Keller and Michael E. Scherger. 2008. 'Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions'. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.4.

⁸¹ Semir Julardzija. 'Human Terrain System in Peacekeeping Missions.' Peace Operations Training institute. A thesis presented in partial completion of the requirements of the Certificate of Training in the United Nations Peace Support Operations.

<http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/julardzija.pdf> (Accessed 12 January 2017)

⁸² Ibid.



place.’⁸³ According to Karlsrud, the UN PKOs, in CAR, DRC and Mali ‘were in 2013 given peace enforcement mandates, ordering them to use all necessary measures to ‘neutralise’ and ‘disarm’ identified groups in the eastern DRC and to ‘stabilise’ CAR and northern Mali.’⁸⁴ The nature of peacekeeping has become even more diverse and demanding, adding to the difficulties of interoperability.

1.7.2. Vertical Interoperability

Efficient peacekeeping inherently requires a high degree of interoperability with local actors in a peacekeeping mission. It is well known that ‘integrated missions require people from diverse backgrounds to work together and to work with local populations with whom they may be unfamiliar. In both instances, cultural differences can present challenges or opportunities.’⁸⁵ The relationship between the local population and international peacekeepers can therefore determine the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission. For instance, work by Marianne Heiberg on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon showed that the relationship developed with local populations was critical for mission success, Mohamed Sahnoun showed how developing food relief distribution systems consistent with local social understandings was critical to success in Somalia, ...while Tanja Hohe argued that the clash between local conceptions of political authority and the international community’s making a fetish of ‘free and fair’ elections was problematic for the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).⁸⁶

According to Rubinstein, Keller and Scherger, ‘respect and partnership serve as key elements or symbols for vertical interoperability. However, based on numerous reports, peacekeeping missions have generally failed to communicate these values in their actions. The main challenges in achieving interaction between peacekeepers and local population is to get them sharing common understandings towards the meanings for the actions undertaken by both the mission and local

⁸³ Cedric de Coning, Chiyuki Aoi and John Karlsrud. 2017. *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats*. (Global Institutions.) Routledge: New York.

⁸⁴ John Karlsrud. 2015. ‘The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali.’ <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2015.976016> (Accessed 20 January 2017)

⁸⁵ Robert A. Rubinstein, Diana M. Keller and Michael E. Scherger. 2008. ‘Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions’. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.4. p.540

⁸⁶ Ibid. p.542



population. Thus, peacekeepers need to be familiar with issues of identity and memory and how those issues affect the perception of the mission.’⁸⁷ Achieving vertical interoperability will depend upon the skill of the peacekeeper and using those skills to interact with the local population. ‘That interaction should be done by expressing genuine partnership and respect for the key symbols of their world perception. ...Successful vertical interoperability requires correct interpretation of social interaction and communication, of verbal and non-verbal messages, and of symbolism and perception... Thus, for international actors operating in integrated missions, knowledge of language, symbols, rituals and behavioural models – while essential – is not all-inclusive.’⁸⁸ In order to comprehend this further, seven principles of action aiming to elucidate how peacekeepers can better understand and use culture to improve the success of peacekeeping operations.⁸⁹

- *Be aware of meaning:* Peacekeepers need to be as flexible as possible to absorb and respond to the cultural cues they encounter.
- *Pay attention to symbols:* symbols take on particular meaning and interpretation of them goes beyond the simple observers of peacekeepers.
- *Avoid Attributing Motive:* ‘One of the most common aspects of cross-cultural miscommunication is the supposition that others act with the same motives as we do.’
- *Conflict management and culture:* ‘The methods of conflict management and adjudication of disputes indigenous to the area of operation may differ from those ordinarily used by the internationals.’
- *Ensure Cultural Expectations Are Explicit:* From the outset, it is essential to communicate consistently with the local population to make mutual expectations known.
- *Avoid Creating In-Group/Out-Group Formations:* Interacting with local populations necessarily means encountering the divisions that exist in any community. Social distinctions are an important part of all human communities.
- *Stay Apprised of Power Difference:* Other less overt hierarchies always exist within a community, simply as a matter of power concentration within that community. Difference can include the following: who in a social interaction has standing and legitimacy; who has

⁸⁷ Semir Julardzija. ‘Human Terrain System in Peacekeeping Missions.’ Peace Operations Training institute. A thesis presented in partial completion of the requirements of the Certificate of Training in the United Nations Peace Support Operations.

<http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/julardzija.pdf> (Accessed 12 January 2017)

⁸⁸ Robert A. Rubinstein, Diana M. Keller and Michael E. Scherger. 2008. ‘Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions’. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.4.

⁸⁹ These seven principles are taken from Rubstein, Keller and Scherger.



the appropriate status to negotiate and give assurances; who has the power to intervene; and who should be called upon for counsel.

Given the large amount of UN peacekeepers serving on PKOs presently, adhering to these principles necessitates individual dexterity, acuity and skill. In addition to empathy and leadership, the head of missions of PKOs need to carefully manage the synchronisation of the various actors involved. Given that organisations typically align among different operational lines and have essentially different cultures, this can pose many problems. Given that military, police, civilian and humanitarian actors differ significantly in their actions, effective Civil-Military (CIMIC) cooperation in peace operations still remains challenging.

1.8 Evaluating Training: The Challenge of Appropriate Criteria for Measurement

Notwithstanding the merits of international peacekeeping, the effectiveness and/ or non-effectiveness of training is difficult to accurately evaluate. There are no appropriate criteria for measurement or assessment in evaluating training. Cutillo points out that there are two reasons for this: 'because of its technical nature and because the link between training and performance is elusive and hard to track, especially in the absence of agreed frameworks to assess peacekeeper's performance.'⁹⁰ This view is also endorsed by a 2010 UN report which stated that there was 'no methodology or standards for the evaluation of the performance of military contingent units in peacekeeping missions.'⁹¹ As previously mentioned, there is a high vacancy rate on many UN peace operations. Studies have shown that the UN and other agencies lack the ability to both identify and recruit a satisfactory supply of highly qualified personnel to meet the needs of peace operations.⁹² The demand is nearly always higher than the numbers available. 'However, only a select few international training programmes have conducted studies to track the deployment rate of past trainees.'⁹³ The EU in particular is currently reviewing its training policies, best practice and assessing its training for pre-deployment on CSDP missions.

⁹⁰ Alberto Cutillo. 2013. 'Deploying the Best. Enhancing Training for UN Peacekeepers. Providing for Peacekeeping.' No. 5. IPI (International Peace Institute). https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/the_3.pdf (Accessed 12 January 2024)

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Andun Solli, Benjamin de Carvalho, Cedric de Coning and Mikkel F. Pedersen. 2011. 'Training in vain? Bottlenecks in Deploying Civilians for UN Peacekeeping.' *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 18. No. 4.(pp.425-438)p.428

⁹³ Ibid.



The 2010 Policy on Training for all UN Peacekeeping Personnel set by the DPKO-DFS, determines that the Integrated Training Service (ITS) has the responsibility to conduct periodic training needs assessments (TNAs), to identify what priority training is required to implement Security Council mandates. The *2012-2013 Global Peacekeeping TNA* was conducted by ITS with the objectives of 1) determining the knowledge, skills and behaviours required for effective mandate implementation, 2) identifying performance and skill gaps that can be addressed through training and 3) assessing current peacekeeping training activities and mechanisms.⁹⁴ The ITS is part of the DPKO's Policy, Evaluation and Training Division of DPKO at UN Headquarters. The ITS provides UN Mission orientation training material and has developed Mission-specific training modules that, when applied, help transform and re-align UN elements to the tasks and challenges of peacekeeping operations.⁹⁵ ITS is responsible for providing peacekeeping training standards for all phases of training, based on departmental priorities and policies, lessons learned and best practices. ITS disseminates required standards to all peacekeeping training partners, including Member States and field Missions.⁹⁶

For instance, key professional qualities that should be addressed in training for maritime personnel involved in PKOs include 'military planning, the ability to integrate and orchestrate diverse sources of specialist personnel and equipment, communications skills (both oral and written), the development of a versatile and flexible mind-set, cultural awareness and sensitivity, language skills, and knowledge of the UN communications and information technology system.'⁹⁷ Apart from military, police and civilian training which is the responsibility at every organizational level of member states, generic UN peacekeeping training, includes the 'various training phases such as Pre-Deployment Training, Induction Training, Ongoing or In-Mission Training (a command responsibility vital to ensuring the maintenance of operational effectiveness) and on-the-job training'⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Integrated Training Service Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support United Nations. Training: A Strategic Investment in UN Peacekeeping Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment, Final Report - 2012-2013.

<http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/89581/2012-2013%20Global%20TNA%20Report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

⁹⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Maritime Task Force Manual September 2015.

<http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/387297/United%20Nations%20Peacekeeping%20Missions%20Maritime%20Manual.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (Accessed 12 January 2017)

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Maritime Task Force Manual September 2015.

<http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/387297/United%20Nations%20Peacekeeping%20Missions%20Maritime%20Manual.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (Accessed 12 January 2017)



1.8.1. Assessment of Training

Building accurate measures for assessment of peacekeeping training is currently needed. As previously mentioned, training for CPPB is an intricate process with many phases to the learning, and development of skills needed to perform on peacekeeping missions. The layers of training consist of basic training to advanced or specialised courses such as HEAT,

(Hostile Environment Awareness Training). At any given time, there are five phases to training:

1. *Generic Basic Peacekeeping Training* (this is done by the central training institute, (in-house) military or police academy)
2. *Pre-Deployment Mission Training*
3. *Debriefing Course / Induction Training*
4. *Specialised Course – for Senior Leadership Personnel, courses on mentoring in civilian crisis management, courses on Inter-cultural management and behaviour, competencies, and intensive language courses etc.*
5. *In mission training.*

Given that the task of this report is to assess state-of-the-art approaches to training, identify future training challenges and requirements as well as identifying possibilities, subject areas and methodologies, it should be noted that few proper evaluation tools are readily available. For example, how do you evaluate training needs for peacekeepers when peacekeeping personnel must act as peacebuilders as well? Personnel are therefore expected to possess all the traditional characteristics of classical peacekeeping in addition to the skills of mentoring, advising, mediating, cooperating, negotiation etc. For example; ‘peacekeepers are called upon to use their knowledge, skills, methods, and capabilities not only to secure the peace, but also to promote the resiliency of such peace to prevent the relapse into conflict. This includes addressing the drivers of conflict while helping the national authorities and local communities to strengthen or rebuild the capacity that will lay the foundations for sustained peace.’⁹⁹ Challenges and limitations in this area of skills remain an obstacle to an effective assessment of training, since evaluating this type of skill is more difficult to quantify. one methodology for evaluating training practices is based on the Kirkpatrick and ROI (Return on Investment) model. This method, also applied by the UN, evaluates programmes based on five levels:

⁹⁹ IAPTC 2012 Report. ‘Effective Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Challenges for the Training Community.’ http://www.iaptc.org/wp-content/themes/brightpage/iaptc2012conferencereport_web-%20final.pdf (Accessed 14 January 2017)



Level 1 - Reaction: Level 1 evaluations measure participants' satisfaction with the training programme as well as their plans to use what they have learned.

Level 2 - Learning: Level 2 evaluations assess how much new knowledge and skills participants have learned. This is done using pre-/post-tests, role plays, simulations and/or other assessment tools.

Level 3 - Application: Level 3 evaluations assess whether (and how much) participants applied the new knowledge and skills on the job.

Level 4 - Business Impact: Level 4 evaluations measure the extent to which business measures have improved after training. Typical Level 4 measures are output, quality, costs and time.

Level 5 - Return on Investment (ROI): ROI is the ultimate level of evaluation. It compares the monetary benefits from the programme with the programme costs.

Figure 1.11: Methodologies for Evaluating Training¹⁰⁰

By examining this method, there are certain components attached to training that the participant will perceive as beneficial. After participating in the training programme, the participant will: i) perceive the training to be relevant to the job, ii) perceive the training to be value added in terms of time and resources invested iii) rate the trainers as effective iv) recommend the training to others.

¹⁰¹ In the past decade, the UN Secretary General, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C-34) and other reports have acknowledged the need for better trained peacekeepers. Given the complaints of peacekeeping actions and personnel in some countries, negative publicity and allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), it seems likely that training centres are failing short of their objective of producing highly skilled peacekeepers. Training is also under scrutiny when budgets are limited, since training budgets are generally the first item to be cut. The standards countries' apply to training vary considerably as it is up to member states to train personnel using the UN and EU guidelines. 'Unfortunately, quantity often wins out over quality, as the benchmarks for ensuring quality are weak, and the need for sufficient boots on the ground is great. In order to be more effective and to have strong alignment,... training institutions can and should be more insistent on at

¹⁰⁰ UNDPKO/ DFS/ ITS. 'A practical Guide to Peacekeeping Training Evaluation.'
<http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/90560/Practical%20Guide%20to%20Peacekeeping%20Training%20Evaluation.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y#> (Accessed 12 January 2017)

¹⁰¹ Ibid.



least meeting the ITS standards and ensuring as much as possible the knowledge transfer with trainees.’¹⁰²

In order to develop a base curriculum of training for peacekeepers, it is interesting to examine a report conducted by ITS in 2008 where the following questions were addressed and then a comparison with the 2012-2013 report. This will be assessed in relation to the relevance for GAP. Although there are several studies pointing to requirements for more effective peace training for personnel, it is striking and significant that quite a high majority of personnel in 2008 did not receive any PDT. In particular, the breakdown of category between civilian, military and police with over 80% of civilians with no PDT.



Figure 1.12. UN PDT before arrival in Mission¹⁰³

¹⁰² Ibid. p.23

¹⁰³ The following figures, 1.12, 1.13, 1.14, 1.15, 1.16, 1.17 are from the Evaluation 2012-2013 *Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment* and the 2008 *Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment*.




Figure 1.13. Breakdown of Category, Civilian, Military, Police.



Figure 1.14. Mission Specific Induction Training

This is contrasted with a significant majority receiving:
Mission Specific Induction Training once in the Mission.




Figure 1.15. Breakdown of Categories for Mission Specific Induction Training




Figure 1.16. UN HQ Induction Training

The evaluation from the 2012-2013 *Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment* report and the contrast with training 2008 Report should (in theory) see a definite improvement. The military and police levels of training is still quite high, while civilian training has advanced to 54% receiving training, compared to only 18% in 2008. When compared with military and police, civilian training remains low but on a positive note is civilian training is increasing. This can be partly explained by the mandatory measures many countries have put in place to make PDT compulsory. Scandinavian countries and Germany have requested all personnel serving on missions to attend PDT. The EU in



particular is attempting to put this requirement in place for all member states. While significant measures need to be addressed in this area to increase the percentage for civilian training, the quality and standard of PDT is paramount to any effective deployment on field missions.




Figure 1.17 Skills and Knowledge for Civilian, Military and Police

The 2008 Report identified communication, management and leadership as key priority training areas. In contrast, the central focus and recommendations from the 2012-2013 Report include cultural awareness, management training, integration and strategic investment as important areas for training. The recommendations are as follows:

1) *'Move Towards a Culture of Learning'*: in which training is viewed as a strategic investment rather than a budgeted cost. Peacekeeping training should be viewed as a means to an end – improved performance and a resource for mandate implementation – not an end in itself.

2) *Strengthen Senior Management Training*: to better equip managers with the essential knowledge and skills required in complex and multi-dimensional missions. This includes strengthening knowledge of peacekeeping, the strategic vision required to effectively oversee mandate implementation and familiarization with the UN system, rules and procedures as well as skill enhancement related to key strategic challenges that senior managers confront in their missions.



3) *Encourage More Integration and Less Fragmentation*: identifying clear direction and clearly-defined strategic priorities. By defining and agreeing upon training priorities, based on operational needs, improved synergies may be developed amongst various actors involved in peacekeeping training.

4) *Do Better with Existing Tools and Materials*: addressing gaps in awareness of and access to training, policies and guidance. Based on set priorities, there is a need to improve learning methodology and delivery in collaboration with Member States and training institutions.

5) *Focus on Impact*: assessing and evaluating the impact of training, in order to support it as a strategic investment.¹⁰⁴

1.9. Peacekeeping Training: Misunderstood and Undervalued

Training of peacekeepers sets international organisations an enduring test. ‘Presented with serious challenges, the inferior responses of peacekeepers related to the protecting civilians in a number of recent cases point to the need for a serious re-evaluation of training and training needs.’¹⁰⁵ Although certain EU documents have stressed the importance of training for peacekeeping missions, much more needs to be done in this field. The 2016 Global Strategy on the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy ‘*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*,’ mentioned training four times in its sixty pages’ document. The first mention of training was referred to in relation to migration policy, another in relation to better training and equipment in cyber and digital technologies and training was referred to twice in relation to CSDP. According to HRVP Federica Mogherini: ‘We must further develop our civilian missions – a trademark of CSDP – by encouraging force generation, speeding up deployment, and providing adequate training based on EU-wide curricula. A responsive CSDP also requires streamlining our institutional structure.’¹⁰⁶ A more

¹⁰⁴ Integrated Training Service Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support United Nations. Training: A Strategic Investment in UN Peacekeeping Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment, Final Report - 2012-2013.

¹⁰⁵ Rosen, Federick, Ross Allen & Kristoffer Nilas Tarp. ‘Better Training needed for UN Peacekeepers’. Survey conducted by DIID indicates that much is left to be done. <http://www.diis.dk/en/research/better-training-needed-un-peacekeepers> This is especially in light of the failure of UN peacekeepers to protect civilians in South Sudan, Juba in July 2016.

¹⁰⁶ Mogherini, Federica. 2016. ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.’



Integrated EU approach is currently being advocated as opposed to the Comprehensive approach towards EU infrastructure. This was created to support streamlining institutions, however, 'enhanced cooperation between Member States' or coherent and sustainable policy on training in crisis management has yet to be convincingly explored within the EU. Too often the value of training for missions has not been prioritised and there is a disconnect and misunderstanding between what PDT can offer to mission readiness. The correlation between the two is paramount if training is to be seriously developed and enhanced in EU member States.

For instance, a three hundred pages' document on The *Handbook on CSDP* for the EU, contains six pages of the ESDC and a mere three pages on Training for CSDP. Prioritising training is essential if any degree of change is to occur. The EU and research institutions have often produced documents on what is usually determined as 'lessons learned' from CSDP missions, but progress in learning these lessons has been painstakingly slow. The more appropriate term would be to determine lessons identified in missions and where training could dramatically improve without the constant incremental approach which often characterises the EU. As Federica Mogherini has determined there is a to 'strengthen operational planning and conduct structures, and build closer connections between civilian and military structures and missions, bearing in mind that these may be deployed in the same theatre. Enhanced cooperation between Member States should be explored in this domain.'¹⁰⁷ Acknowledging that cooperation is essential in training missions is key in these areas will go some way to keep training for peacekeeping on the agenda, particularly when budgets are eroded and resources are scarce in light of the economic crises.

Conclusions

Peacekeeping can be said to be both an admirable and an arduous task. Yet, thousands of people are deployed in various peacekeeping missions around the world which makes constructing comprehensive training platforms that embody all the pre-requisite for best practice in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, challenging. In addition, presently, the large amount of training centres in Europe, any degree of coherence and coordination between them is highly improbable. Not only do European states differ in terms of their strategic culture and national approaches

¹⁰⁷ Mogherini, Federica. 2016. 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy.'



toward CPPB and training but the military, police and civilian organisations have their operational methods for command and control. Sharing that type of control over an operation requires the effective communication and the utmost skill of a peacekeeper.

The 2016 Report on Training Requirements for CSDP operations stated that :‘Developing skills and competencies in the area of operations planning cannot be achieved only through formal training. Therefore extending the time spent in classical training by practicing skills in exercises (simulating on-the-job training) should be considered a norm. Multi Layer, EEAS Exercises, Military Exercises (MILEX) and national level exercises offer excellent conditions for practicing these skills in a comprehensive context.’¹⁰⁸ It also called on the ESDC ‘consider the review and/ or development of the following training activities in support of military (and possible civilian) training requirements on CSDP operations planning: Develop a short high-level training interacting opportunity (e.g. reflection seminar, decision exercise on real-life operations / missions / situations for the EU military (and potentially civilian) decision makers). Develop a new course "Civilian and Military Contribution to Planning at the Political Strategic Level Course’.¹⁰⁹ The predominate findings in the gap analysis point to need to develop real-life scenarios for training, to take into account the experience of individuals on past missions and lessons learned and formulate a new wave of intensive and high quality training. This is something which the GAP training game can very much facilitate to create an improved level of trained personnel.

Given that only a fraction of Europe’s 1.6 million military personnel is actually deployable (54,000 troops representing 3.5% of the total military personnel were deployed in 2011), EU ‘Member states should consider focusing on smaller but better trained and more expeditionary forces while enhancing the capabilities indispensable to perform missions in distant theatres.’¹¹⁰ Aside from providing the context for the current debates on peace building and training, an essential issue underpinning this report is how best to train personnel involved in peace missions which GAP can then build upon. A high-level UN report on peacekeeping highlighted how ‘peacekeepers often lack training on how to deal with traumatized people and communication challenges are often

¹⁰⁸ Council of the European Union. 2016. European External Action Service (EEAS) To: European Union Military Committee (EUMC) Subject: Final Report Training Requirements Analysis - Operations Planning. Brussels, 26 February 2016 <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6546-2016-INIT/en/pdf>

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Eva Gross and Anand Menon. (Editors). 2013. ‘CSDP between internal constraints and external challenges. Report No. 17 (October) p.31-32 http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_17.pdf (Accessed 17 January 2017)



compounded by language barriers’.¹¹¹ This is a sensitive and emotional issue but one which GAP must provide for. In addition, mandatory induction training, both pre-deployment and in-mission, should incorporate ‘context-specific and scenario-based gender training’ while reflecting human rights responsibilities.¹¹² As Federica Mogherini has pointed out ‘the quality and effectiveness of the international staff has been enhanced through a more systemic approach to training, including during the pre-deployment phase. However, due to the often very specialised skills needed in civilian CSDP missions, the force generation process for civilian missions remains primarily based on individual applications.’¹¹³ Without acknowledging the essential need for in depth training of specialised skills in peacekeeping, challenges will remain. Unless training for peacekeeping is radically adjusted and prioritised into the framework and mind-set of Member States, the lack of effective training for peace operations will continue to be an obstacle to peace.

¹¹¹ UN High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace* [...]: 66

¹¹² Ibid. 60-¹.

¹¹³ HRVP / Head of the Agency report ahead of the June 2015 EC.

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/documents/pdf/report-ahead_european-defence-agency.pdf



2. Gender and Peacekeeping

2.1. Introduction

From 1957-1989, only twenty uniformed women served as peacekeepers under the auspices of the United Nations. Today, out of 125,000 military, police and civilian personnel, 5,160 are women. Women are deployed in all 16 UN peacekeeping missions. There are 3 all-female UN police units deployed around the world. 29% of civilian personnel are female, 10% of police are female, and 4% of military personnel are female.¹¹⁴ There is no equivalent precise data for the EU, but estimates are that it is similar to that of the UN figures.¹¹⁵

The three decades since the Brahimi Report has seen a long series of UN resolutions to address the deficit of women at every level of the peace and security agenda.¹¹⁶ By 2017, it can be said, that *“After a long process the international legal scaffolding related to gender is largely in place”*.¹¹⁷ However, there is continued and protracted conflict, high levels of violence against women, and a plateau has been reached in the numbers of women in military, police and civilian positions in peacekeeping missions. Clearly there is a persistent gap between legislation and enforcement. The institutions of the security and peace agenda, from the UN itself, through the EU political and military bodies, nation states, the constituent implementing organizations (militaries, police and civilian administration) are deeply gendered. But this ‘gendering’ is invisible and problematizes ‘gender’ as ‘women’, ignoring the relational aspect of masculinities and femininities, which as currently understood, constituted, and acted out unreflectively, undermine all efforts at establishing an equitable and sustainable peace. An understanding of this helps us answer the question of why missions continue to be dominated by military men when so many functions and the majority of clients in peacekeeping are civilian and women.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml>

¹¹⁵ http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_3_Gender.pdf

¹¹⁶ The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, reported to the U.N. Secretary-General on 17 August 2000: *U.N. Doc. A/55/305*.

¹¹⁷ Theidon, K. and Phenicie, K. with Murray, E. 2011 ‘Gender, conflict, and peacebuilding state of the field and lessons learned’ USIP. Available at <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Gender%20conflict%20and%20peacebuilding.pdf> (Accessed on 22nd February 2017).

¹¹⁸ Steihm Hicks, J. 2001. Women, peacekeeping and peace-making: Gender balance and mainstreaming. *International Peacekeeping* 8(2):39–48.



2.1. The legal Infrastructure

A call for gender mainstreaming by the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (the Fourth World Conference on Women Beijing Declaration 1995) specifically in relation to “peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls” began the process. According to the UN Economic and Social Council¹¹⁹ gender mainstreaming is:

the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.

In 1999, the UN deployed its first gender units (in Kosovo and East Timor) to facilitate more productive interaction between female civilians and peacekeepers and expand the role of women in post-conflict reconstruction.¹²⁰ These units also signalled the beginning of a new phase of UN activism to address problems of sexual abuse, sexual violence, and gender imbalance in peace operations, fuelled by civil society pressure for greater inclusion of women in all matters of peace and security and by gender mainstreaming within the UN bureaucracy.¹²¹

This call for gender equality, most significantly for peacekeeping, resulted in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)¹²², which emphasizes that women and men are both essential to promoting sustainable peace and stresses the necessity to involve women in conflict prevention, peace building, post-conflict reconstruction as well as to increase women’s participation in politics and security institutions.

This was the first time the Security Council expressly mentioned in a resolution the impact of war on women and women’s contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace. To publicize the resolution and make it accessible to women all over the world, UNIFEM has translated the text into

¹¹⁹ UN Economic and Social Council, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/ECOSOCAC1997.2.PDF>

¹²⁰ Whittington, S. 2003 ‘Gender and Peacekeeping: The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor.’ *Journal of Women in Culture and Society*. 28(4): 1283-1288

¹²¹ Harrington, C. 2010. *Politicization of Sexual Violence: From Abolitionism to Peacekeeping*. Ashgate: Burlington, VT.

¹²² UN Security Council resolution 1325, On women and peace and security, S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000), available at documents.net/sr1325 (Accessed on 20th February 2017)



more than seventy languages. Shepherd¹²³ highlights that 1325 is legally binding on UN Charter signatories, that over one hundred translations of the Resolution are available, and that several countries have developed national action plans (NAPs) for implementing the Resolution, incorporating recruitment of women to the armed forces.¹²⁴

Beginning in 1992, reports began to surface that an all-male UN peacekeeping force deployed to Cambodia had engaged in sexual assaults, the solicitation of prostitutes, the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, and extramarital affairs with civilians. The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 57/306 in April 2003, urging the Secretary General to address sexual exploitation resulting from the presence of UN peacekeepers in post-conflict zones. The subsequent revelation in 2004 of sexual exploitation of civilians by UN forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo prompted an institutional review of all reports received during prior UN missions.¹²⁵ This review and others, revealed the presence of sexual abuse and exploitation not only in Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo but also, from the early 1990s through to the mid-2000s, during operations in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Timor Lest, and West Africa.¹²⁶ “The incontrovertible conclusion drawn from the report is that such abuse was persistent, far-reaching, and widespread.”¹²⁷

The SG commissioned report in 2005 report comprehensively reviewed the extent of SEA (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse) and this was presented to the GA in March 2005. It called for improved standards of conduct, investigative processes, command responsibility, and individual accountability with regard to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers. In 2009, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1888 and 1889 which provided mechanisms to deal with problems of sexual violence in conflict and to foster gender mainstreaming and women’s involvement in post-conflict reconstruction which are outlined as follows:

¹²³ Shepherd, L.J. 2011. ‘Sex, Security and Superhero(in)es: From 1325 to 1820 and Beyond.’ *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 13(4): 504-521.

¹²⁴ See for example Maki-Rahkola, A. and Myrntinen, H. 2014. ‘Reliable Professionals, Sensible Dads and Tough Fighters: A Critical Look at Performances and Discourses of Finnish Peacekeeper Masculinities’ *International Feminist Journal of Politics*. 16(3): 470-489. Rokvic, Vanja and Svetlana Stanarevic 2016. ‘Toward Gender and LGBT Equality in the Serbian Armed Forces’ *Women’s Studies International Forum*. 55: 26-34.

¹²⁵ United Nations General Assembly. 2005. A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Available at <https://cdu.unlb.org/Portals/0/Documents/KeyDoc5.pdf> (Accessed on the 22nd February 2017).

¹²⁶ Vandenberg, Martina 2005. “Peacekeeping Alphabet Soup, and Violence against Women in the Balkans,” in Dyan Mazurana, Angela Raven-Roberts, and Jane Parpart (eds.) *Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping*, Rowman and Littlefield: Oxford, UK.

¹²⁷ Crawford, K. F. Lebovic, J. H. and Macdonald, Julia M. 2015. ‘Explaining the Variation in Gender Composition of Personnel Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations’, *Armed Forces & Society*. 41(2): 259



- * Creating Special Representatives and Special Envoys of the SG tasked with addressing sexual violence in conflict
- * Women's Protection Advisors in peacekeeping missions
- * The need for troop and police contributing countries to deploy more female peacekeepers
- * Charging the Secretary General with the task of a full report on progress towards these objectives.¹²⁸

In 2008, Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1820 went further and recognized rape as a weapon of war and a threat to international security. The resolution noted that "women and girls are particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instil fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group."¹²⁹ Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General has also issued various reports and opened debates on issues related to women, peace, and security.

Gender mainstreaming was adopted in EU in 1996 (European Commission, 1996).¹³⁰ At the Nice European Council in 2000, it was decided that new political and military bodies (the Political and Security Committee [PSC], the EU Military Committee [EUMC], and the EU Military Staff [EUMS]) would have to be established to ensure political guidance and strategic direction for EU operations. The CSDP was divided into three components: military crisis management, civilian crisis management, and conflict prevention. In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty confirmed this commitment with the solidarity clause, the creation of the External Action Service and the appointment of the High Representative.

While the High Representative of European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the PSC are important policy-making and administrative bodies for the CSDP, the key organizations in peacekeeping are the EUMC, the EUMS, the battle groups, and selected EU Missions. The EUMC is responsible for providing the PSC

¹²⁸ See UN Security Council resolution 1888, On women and peace and security, S/RES/1888 (30 September 2009) available at un-documents.net/sr1888. (Accessed on 20th February 2017)

UN Security Council resolution 1889, On women and peace and security, S/RES/1889 (5 October 2009) available at un-documents.net/sr1889. (Accessed on 20th February 2017)

¹²⁹ UN Security Council resolution 1820, On women and peace and security, S/RES/1820 (19 June 2008), available at un-documents.net/sr1820. (Accessed on 20th February 2017)

¹³⁰ European Commission. 1996. "Incorporating Equal Opportunities for Women and Men into All Community Policies and Activities." *COM (96), 67 Final*. European Commission: Belgium.



with military advice and recommendations on all military matters and directs military activities within the EU framework. The chair of the EUMC attends meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken and gives direction to the EUMS. EUMS is a source of military expertise and military planning within the EEAS and under the authority of the HR. It provides support for EU-led military crisis management operations, such as EU NAVFOR1; European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea, European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia, and EUTM Mali. The European Battle groups are operational military organizations under the CSDP that are headed by the member states alone or in cooperation.

All are dominated by men, reliant as they are on nation state governments and militaries. They are white European men mostly from security organizations. Yet they represent a Europe that is 50% female with significant numbers of non-white people.¹³¹ The ongoing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse concerns also implicate all European sending states to peacekeeping missions.

In recent years, numerous other organizations (including NATO and the OSCE) have stated in their official documents that inclusion of women in all spheres of society is an essential prerequisite for attaining peace and economic and social development. For example, the NATO gender policy, outlined in Bi-SC Directive 40-1.¹³² To reiterate, *“after a long process the international legal scaffolding related to gender is largely in place.”*¹³³ Yet, the gap between legislation and enforcement, continues and warrants further research into ensuring more effective implementation and evaluation of efforts.

2.2. Modern Militaries, Police and Peacekeeping

The EU has been involved in 34 CPPB missions in three continents since 2003. The trend in number and scale of missions is moving upwards, and the problems underlying these missions are becoming more complex and challenging for the EU to respond to strategically and operationally. In 2005 the European Council issued the *Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the context of the ESDP* (45) paper, with numerous initiatives following, such as the Council of the European Union (eg. (46)), the European Parliament (among others: (47, 48) and the EAAS (among others (49)), the creation of the

¹³¹ Kronsell, A. 2016 ‘Sexed Bodies and Military Masculinities: Gender Path Dependence in EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy’ *Men and Masculinities*. Vol. 19 (3) 311-336

¹³² See Olsson, Louise, Martin Ahlin, Marielle Sundin, Anna Lidstrom (2014) ‘Gender, Peace and Security in the European Union’s Field Missions’, Folke Bernadotte Academy: Stockholm.

¹³³ Theidon et al, 2011. Op cit.



Gender, Peace and Security Working Group by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office in 2006, and the introduction of *Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into ESDP* handbook in 2008(42).

The Council conclusions on Gender Mainstreaming, were that gender equality and human rights should be fully integrated in the planning and conduct of all ESDP missions and operations, and the support for improved gender sensitivity must be assured throughout the chain of command, along with setting training activities, tailored to the needs of the military and civilian personnel taking part in the ESDP operations, in particular on gender equality and human rights as well as gender-based violence.

Today's peacekeeping operations are multidimensional, including humanitarian, military and police components. This broader approach has highlighted the importance of gender equality for international peace and security. Military peacekeeping has increasingly become part of one large, 'integrated' or 'complex' peace support operations (PSOs) that have civilian and military components and involve a great deal of interaction with other national and international actors, including aid organizations and other non-governmental organizations.

As GAP is developing a curriculum for a game to train military, police and civilian personnel, this report focuses on the impact of gender on the operational level.

Militaries

Since the Balkan operations of the 1990s, there has been a trend towards increasing participation in operations under EU or NATO command. Notwithstanding this, South Asian forces form the mainstay of peacekeeping forces and the bulk of peacekeeping personnel, military, police and civilian, come from poorer countries.¹³⁴ There has been a significant organizational shift from territorial defence to peacekeeping operations.¹³⁵ According to Persson this organizational change can also be perceived as a gendered and gendering process, particularly after the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325, which has recognized the critical role of women in peacebuilding as well as in conflict prevention and resolution.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Maki-Rahkola & Myrntinen, 2014

¹³⁵ Moskos, C. 2000. Toward a postmodern military: The United States as a paradigm. In C. Moskos, J. A. Williams, and D. R. Segal (eds). *The postmodern military*. Oxford University Press: New York: (pp. 14–31).

¹³⁶ Persson, Alma. 2013. "Gendered Military Divisions-Doing Peacekeeping as Part of the Postnational Defence." *Kvinder, Køn & Forskning* 2



In many countries, voluntary military service has replaced obligatory military service abolished. In several countries, this has been followed by an increase in the number of women doing military service as the professionalized forces are not able to recruit a sufficient number of male personnel on the labour market, making it necessary to employ women as well. In Serbia for example, voluntary military service has been in place since 2010 and from March 2011 to March 2012, 1684 recruits, 230 of them women (13.6%) engaged in voluntary military service¹³⁷.

Integration of women in armed forces has become important for non-economic reasons as well, specifically, adherence to the principle and laws of equality, respect for human rights and elimination of discrimination. In developed countries diversity is becoming a democratic imperative in that the professional army reflects the makeup of the entire population, women constituting 50% of the population in almost all countries.¹³⁸

Owing to organizational and technological developments (computers, digitalization, etc.) as well as changes in form of warfare (cyberwarfare, drone warfare, etc.) physical strength is no longer the only requirement for work in the armed forces and, in addition, an increasing number of positions that are not gender specific are being created in the armed forces. More diversity also includes LGBTQ+ people. "Diversity is critically important for defence organizations to survive and thrive in the twenty-first century security environment."¹³⁹

*"In order to respond more efficiently to new threats and accomplish set missions, the armed forces must expand their military skill sets. Therefore, it is vital that defence organizations recruit skilled personnel on talent rather than gender, sexual orientation or gender identity."*¹⁴⁰

From the perspective of the UN and EU, most militaries have a low proportion who are female. It is therefore unrealistic to ask for an equal contribution (50:50) of male and female personnel. So the first task is to recruit more females into national militaries.¹⁴¹

The extent to which women will serve in the armed forces, the kind of jobs they will do and the sort of attitudes that will prevail are dependent, as Carreiras¹⁴² noted, not only on social and cultural

¹³⁷ Rokvic, Vanja and Svetlana Stanarevic. 2016. 'Toward Gender and LGBT Equality in the Serbian Armed Forces' *Women's Studies International Forum*. 55: 26-34.

¹³⁸ ibid

¹³⁹ Polchar, J., Sweijjs, T., Marten, P., & Galdiga, J. 2014. P. 11. LGBT military personnel a strategic vision for inclusion. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. Available at http://hcss.nl/report/lgbt_military_personnel_a_strategic_vision_for_inclusion_1 (Accessed on 22nd February 2017).

¹⁴⁰ Rokvic and Stanarevic, 2016: 27

¹⁴¹ Bridges, D. and Horsfall, D. 2009. 'Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping' *Armed Forces & Society*. 26(1) 120-130.



factors, but also on changes in the military organization itself. For instance, Finnish Peacekeeping Forces consist of roughly 10% professional military personnel and of 90% reservists, that is, civilians who enlist voluntarily for peacekeeping duty. Reservists are seen as 'ideal' for interacting with the host population in (post) conflict settings because of their civilian background.¹⁴³

Numerous surveys have confirmed that the presence of women improves the effectiveness of the armed forces, especially in the field of peacekeeping missions and in terms of civil-military cooperation. There is increasing evidence that non-combat missions are best served by a better gender mix, particularly in terms of interaction with local communities.¹⁴⁴ Bridges and Horsfall¹⁴⁵ point out that the peacekeeping missions that have been successful in the past are those which have had close to equal members of males and females participating.

Growing female participation is critical to

- Empowering women in the host community
- Interviewing victims of Gender Based Violence (GBV)
- Mentoring female cadets at police and military academies
- Reducing misconduct rates and unlawful behaviour of peacekeeping forces

One of the reasons for the recurrence of conflict is the absence of women and gender from the conflict analysis, and design and implementation of peacebuilding interventions into those conflicts.¹⁴⁶ Sandole and Staroste¹⁴⁷ point out 3 sets of tools that can help

- Women's experience
- Women's knowledge

¹⁴² Carreiras, H. 2006. *Gender and the military. Women in the armed forces of western democracies*. Routledge: London p. 41

¹⁴³ Maki-Rahkola & Myrntinen, 2014

¹⁴⁴ Groothedde, S. 2013. Gender makes sense: A way to improve your mission. Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE). Available from <http://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Gender-Makes-Sense.pdf> (Accessed on 22nd February 2017).

UN DPKO/DFS 2010. Integrating a gender perspective into the work of the United Nations military in peacekeeping operations. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/dpko_dfs_gender_military_perspective.pdf (Accessed on 22nd February 2017)

United Nations General Assembly. 2005. A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Available at <https://cdu.unlb.org/Portals/0/Documents/KeyDoc5.pdf> (Accessed on the 22nd February 2017).

¹⁴⁵ Bridges and Horsfall 2009: 122

¹⁴⁶ United Nations Women 2012, p. 120

¹⁴⁷ Sandole, S. And Staroste, 2015 'Making the Case for Systemic, Gender-Based Analysis in Sustainable Peace Building.' *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*. 33(2):119-147.



- Women's skills.

However, while globalization and other reform processes have brought about shifts in rigid military gender regimes in terms of an increase in the inclusion of women in the peace and security agenda, these shifts have occurred mostly on the fringes.¹⁴⁸ In terms of women's participation in numbers and culture, the military organization is still largely considered a gendered, male-dominated organization controlled by a culture of masculinity.¹⁴⁹

Police

Today's police peacekeepers work under the UN's authority and in EU missions to protect civilians, enable humanitarian work, and foster conflict resolution and reconciliation. Peacekeepers defend the operation's mandate, other parts of the operation, and themselves while participating in the everyday life of diplomatic, security and local communities.

While historically UNPOL took a backseat to the military mission, in recent years it has risen in status and is increasingly acknowledged as crucial for successful UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁵⁰

Citizens and governments are often more accepting of police missions than military operations, which are exponentially more expensive to deploy. Most of the police in the UN and EU missions are recruited as individuals from their state police forces. Delivering police services in these cross-cultural contexts, often in unstable situations, poses significant challenges.

On UN missions, 10% of all currently deployed police are female, with variation among missions. Some missions, e.g. Nepal have 25% female police officers, but this is unusually high and the others vary mostly between 5 and 15%. While officers are recruited as individuals, similar issues arise as with women in the military. They are still a small minority in mixed-gender units dominated in numbers and culture by male police officers with consequent problems of harassment, exclusion, stereotyping and negative impact on the security of women in the host populations. Since 2007, a new initiative, all female full formed police unit (FFPU) which has countered both the problem of numbers and culture and has been very successful.

¹⁴⁸ Sasson-Levy, O. 2011. 'The military in a globalized environment: Perpetuating an 'extremely gendered' organization'. In E. Jeanes, D. Knights, & P. Y. Martin (Eds.), *Handbook of gender, work and organization* Sage: London. p.404

¹⁴⁹ Carreiras, H. 2006. *Gender and the military. Women in the armed forces of western democracies*. Routledge: London. Carrerias, H. & Castro, C. 2013. *Qualitative methods in military studies: Research experience and challenges*. Routledge: London: New York.

¹⁵⁰ Greener, B.K. 2009 'UNPOL: UN Police as Peacekeepers.' *Policing and Society* 19(2):106-18.



The use of formed police units (FPUs) both male and female, has increased as a lower-cost way to show local populations that post-conflict demilitarization is occurring while also demonstrating credibility around dealing with high-risk situations and training local police to deal with future problems.¹⁵¹

Unlike standard police units of the UN, FPUs are recruited as a cohesive unit from an individual member state, rather than being employed by the UN as individual UNPOL officers. First deployed to Kosovo and East Timor in 1999, they are intended to be more quickly deployable, better armed, and better equipped for independent operations than regular UNPOL units, allowing them to deal with diverse scenarios. They must be deployed only in full units consisting of 120-140 persons, or in a functional subset with a minimum of ten to twelve officers. Paramilitary police are expected to fulfil 3 kinds of high-risk missions: managing public order, protecting UN personnel, and assisting UNPOL and local police units in especially high-risk situations.

‘Policing’ generally signifies law enforcement, so ‘paramilitary police’ are understood to share characteristics of military and police institutions, which they may complement or even replace at times. However, it has been argued that all police institutions are paramilitary to some degree, though the level of militarization varies to a great extent. FPUs are seen to ‘act as a key bridging unit between the military component of a peacekeeping mission and lightly-armed, often institutionally weak local police.’¹⁵²

There are currently 3 FFPUs deployed in Liberia, Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Liberia, the FFPU is drawn from a paramilitary police organization (India’s Central Reserve Police Force), in Haiti and DRC, the FFPUs are from Bangladesh).¹⁵³

Civilian

Civilian peacekeepers are particularly important for EU missions, and have the highest participation rate for women (estimated at 30%).¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ Anderholt, C. 2012. ‘Female Participation in Formed Police Units: A Report on the Integration of Women in Formed Police Units of Peacekeeping Operations.’ US Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Available at www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA568616 (Access on 22nd February 2017). P. 4

¹⁵² Pruitt, L. J 2016. *The Women in Blue Helmets: Gender, Policing, and the UN’s First All-Female Peacekeeping Unit*. University of California Press: California.

¹⁵³ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml>

¹⁵⁴ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml>



The bureaucracies are also hierarchical and based on rank, but the culture is not the hegemonic masculinity of the uniformed services.

3. Gender Mainstreaming – ‘All Talk, Not Enough Action.’

The discrepancy between the goals and legal requirements of gender mainstreaming and daily life at every level – from the UN in New York, the EU policy bodies in Brussels, and the militaries, police organizations and civil administrations – is significant. A review of EU Gender Policy conducted in 2012 (see Olsson and Sundstrom et al, 2012) show that in all working areas of CSDP field missions, there is a recognition that there is a need to create stronger organizational capacity, and in parallel to this a need to develop the professional capacity of personnel, primarily through training. The focus is on translating policy from the UN and EU into action, with a recognition that a more strategic and institutionalized approach is needed.¹⁵⁵

3.1. International Organizations

The problems begin at the top. However, progress has been limited, particularly in the peace and security realm and women’s participation in peacekeeping specifically. Gender mainstreaming often does not occur at all or is interpreted in ways that fail to improve women’s positions. Some researchers have found that even those within the UN have found the agenda to be ‘all talk’ and ‘not enough action’ by UN bodies and member states.¹⁵⁶

Gender mainstreaming is ultimately abstract and hence tends to be interpreted differently both across and within governmental and nongovernmental organizations, humanitarian agencies, and international institutions. In many cases, gender policies lack thorough or sincere implementation and accountability. Another contributing factor is the array of mandates, ideologies, and goals of institutions and organizations, which affect their overall orientations.

¹⁵⁵ See Olsson, Louise and Karin Sundstrom with contributions by Gabriela Elroy, Marielle Sundin and Martin Ahlin, 2012. European Union’s Gender Policy for CSDP Missions: Contents and Gaps: An Assessment of Existing Policy on ‘Women, Peace, and Security’ with examples from EUPOL COPPS, EUMM Georgia, EULEX Kosovo and EUPOL RD Congo. Dnr: 07804-12-00868-2. Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy.

¹⁵⁶ Whitworth, S. 2004. *Men, Militaries, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO.



Such variation in gender policies is found not only among institutions, but also within them. In fact, a USIP-commissioned report cited the U.S. government for a lack of cohesion on this front, to the detriment of furthering gender awareness and equality:¹⁵⁷ Despite rapid progress within the U.S. government to recognize the importance of women's inclusion in stabilization and reconstruction operations, no overarching strategy, mandate, or program exists to ensure implementation. Initiatives, funding, and projects remain ad hoc; research and best practices have not been consolidated; and much depends upon the individual knowledge, commitment, and insight of relevant staff at headquarters and in the field. Not all women want to include men in gender and development and some are even hostile. Meanwhile, certain men lament, and at times, ridicule, the challenges they have faced when working on gender issues, which is generally "assumed to be a woman's job." Gender sensitive men seek equality for both genders and in turn, all genders lose if men are marginal to the very programs that seek to transform gender relations.

*"Evidence is compelling that new policies and practitioner models are required for advancing a gender-sensitive agenda."*¹⁵⁸ Although mainstreaming has succeeded in certain spheres, it has not generated the desired degree of institutional or attitudinal changes. Even within institutions that pay attention to gender, the gap between a general policy of mainstreaming and its implementation can be significant, undermining efforts to maintain a consistent focus across activities. Kronsellsays the persistence and path dependent nature of gender norms was demonstrated when new organizations bodies are set up in the CSDP:¹⁵⁹ the EUMC, EUMS, the battle groups and the military mission, and all were staffed overwhelmingly by male (white) military figures. There is a "global culture of gender mainstreaming that views women's involvement in peacekeeping as 'legitimate' or 'appropriate' only when it comes in the form of participating in a small minority in male-majority units."¹⁶⁰ This 'limited ideology' obscures the many ways that women in male-majority units have been excluded from full participation in peacekeeping.

3.2. The Role of States

¹⁵⁷ Camille Pampell Conaway, "The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction," report, United States Institute of Peace Stabilization and Reconstruction Series No. 3, August 2006, 1.

¹⁵⁸ Theidon et al. Op cit. p.12

¹⁵⁹ Kronsell, A. Op cit.

¹⁶⁰ Pruitt, I J. 2016. Op cit. p.13



Crawford et al looked at whether the political character of a government could determine its level of participation in UN operations.¹⁶¹ Democratic or gender-rights observant governments are conceivably more inclined to consider female participation when contributing UN peacekeepers. How? Firstly, these governments given their legitimizing principles, domestic protections and agendas, and normative predispositions – strive for greater diversity in their police and military units, which will carry into international missions. Secondly, governments relationship to international institutions could affect its participation in UN missions. They might contribute female personnel out of concern for their ‘reputations’ in the international community or a sense of ‘appropriateness.’ By contributing female personnel, a country can signal its deference to gender equality to domestic and foreign audiences.

They conclude that the contribution of female personnel to UNPOs is driven by the democratic nature and rights observance of member states but that gender diversity is not a primary goal of most contributors and is largely an unintended by-product of force sizes.¹⁶² Peacekeepers reflect the male-dominated character of nation state governance structures and personnel.

3.3. Militaries, Police, Civilian Organizations

Recruitment and Training

It begins with recruitment. At the same time as the army turns into what can be termed as a less glorified and masculine job and opens its doors to more women (at least as far as policy goes), it also exaggerates excitement and adventure in the most conspicuous and distinct way that excludes women. The problem is that the army (masculine) hypes up combat aspects of peacekeeping but its social and communication skills that matter. Which should make a bigger role for women – but the armies don’t adapt rhetoric and training for fear of being perceived as ‘unmasculine.’¹⁶³

Although peacekeeping training is explicitly gender-neutral, it clearly assumes as its model the experiences of male soldiers. The challenges that women face during peace missions are not addressed. These peace missions deal mostly with peace building and humanitarian tasks, which women can perform as well. Yet the military organization’s ambivalence toward the missions and

¹⁶¹ Crawford et al, Op Cit.

¹⁶² Ibid. p.259

¹⁶³ Sion, L. 2008. ‘Peacekeeping and the Gender Regime Dutch Female Peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo.’ *Journal of Ethnography*. 37(5): 561-585



soldiers' wish to define them as combat caused the soldiers to perceive women as a danger to the missions' prestige.¹⁶⁴

This in turn produces frustration and boredom among male soldiers as while peacekeeping training is violent and exciting, peacekeeping missions are typically peaceful and more humanitarian. The qualities required on a peacekeeping mission are more stereotypically 'feminine'. Instead of recognizing that the qualities needed have broadened to reflect the nature of the missions and the fact that 50% of the world's population, including that in the host countries, are female, this is resisted by my masculine army culture and causes confusion and harm.

4. Persistent Problems

4.1. Limiting Stereotypes in Peacekeeping

The benefits of having gender balance on peacekeeping missions is well documented. Advocates argue that it is easier for female peacekeepers to establish a dialogue with local civilians than it is for their male colleagues. The involvement of women would also reduce sexual harassment and benefit all aspects of the operation through the greater variety of experiences they would add.¹⁶⁵

Research indicates that having female peacekeepers present may result in: calming dangerous situations, better behaviour among mission staff across the board – including reduced criticisms of male staff behaviour; greater mission effectiveness; enhanced legitimacy; fewer cases of HIV; fewer abandoned children fathered by male peacekeepers and fewer brothels around peacekeeping posts.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Sion, Liora. 2008. 'Peacekeeping and the Gender Regime Dutch Female Peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo.' *Journal of Ethnography*. 37(5): 561-585

¹⁶⁵ Enloe, C. 2001. 'Gender is not enough: The need for a feminist consciousness.' *International Peacekeeping*. 8(1): 95–97. Olsson, L., and T. L. Tryggestad, (eds). 2001. *Women and international peacekeeping of international Peacekeeping*. Frank Cass: London. Carey, H. F. 2001. 'Women and peace and security: The politics of implementing gender sensitivity norms in peacekeeping.' *International Peacekeeping*. 8(2):49–68

¹⁶⁶ DeGroot, G 2001; Hudson, H. (2005) 'Peacekeeping Trends and Their Gender Implications for Regional Peacekeeping Forces in Africa: Progress and Challenge' in D. Mazurana, A. Raven-Roberts and J. Parpart (eds.), *Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping*. Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, MD. (pp. 111–133); Mazurana, D. 2003 'Do Women Matter in Peacekeeping? Women in Police, Military and Civilian Peacekeeping Components.' *Canadian Women Studies Journal* 22(2):64–71; Simic', O. (2010) 'Does the Presence of Women Really Matter? Towards Combating Male Sexual Violence in Peacekeeping Operations', *International Peacekeeping*. 17(2): 188–199; Sion, 2008, *ibid*; Stiehm, J.H. 1999. 'United Nations Peacekeeping: Men's and Women's Work' In M.K. Meyer and E. Prugl (eds.) *Gender Politics in Global Governance*, Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, MD. (pp. 41–57).



Peacekeeping missions that have been successful in the past have had close to equal numbers of males and females participating. The special advisor on gender issues for the UN in 1999 arranged studies on peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador, Kosovo, Namibia, and South Africa to analyse in-depth case studies of the involvement of women. The results of these studies suggest that female service personnel provide roles in host nations that males cannot easily provide and are not trained to provide in masculine cultured militaries.

- Women in states of conflict confide in female peacekeepers and are understood better by them, and when at least 30% of peacekeepers are female, local women become more involved in the peace process.¹⁶⁷
- Female military personnel are able to work with women and children who have endured conflicts with gender-based violence as well as those who have been victims of rape and sexual exploitation.
- In some host countries, it is culturally sensitive to have women work with female personnel and insensitive to have them work with male personnel.
- Females can set an example for their male colleagues about the inappropriateness of sexually exploiting women in host nations.
- Female personnel have also proved to be role models to other women¹⁶⁸
“Clearly, female personnel are an untapped resource in peacekeeping.”¹⁶⁹

In 2003, Ministers of the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee for Equality between Women and Men agreed that rebuilding democracy and creating a “stable society” in war-torn states is not possible if women are omitted from the peacebuilding processes.¹⁷⁰

Arguments for gender balanced peacekeeper units are:

- Its allegedly greater attentiveness to the differing security needs of men and women¹⁷¹
- Its appearance as more benign to local populations¹⁷²
- Its resemblance to home society with its norms and social controls that could reduce deployment related sexual abuse and exploitation¹⁷³

¹⁶⁷ Carey, 2001, Op cit. Whitworth, 2004, Op cit.

¹⁶⁸ Pruitt, 2016, Op cit.

¹⁶⁹ Bridges & Horsfall, 2009. Op cit. p.122

¹⁷⁰ European Council. 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World: A European Security Strategy. Brussels, Belgium: The European Union.

¹⁷¹ Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, Women Count: Security Council Resolution

1325: Civil Society Monitoring Report 2012. New York: Global Network of Women

Peacebuilders, 2012), Available at https://issuu.com/suba_gnwp/docs/women_count_civil_society_monitoring (Accessed on 22nd February 2017)

¹⁷² DeGroot, 2001. Op cit.



Care must be taken to avoid gender stereotypes in calling for more women peacekeepers, as the UN and the media have often referred to them as ‘naturally’ more peaceful. These arguments for more operational effectiveness rely on ‘affirmative gender essentialisms’ while principle-based arguments, like the notion that more women peacekeepers would help achieve gender equality in peacekeeping tend to be marginalized, with the SG stating that gender parity ‘is not an end in itself’¹⁷⁴. Women face many barriers to participating at all levels of peace processes, including stereotypes of peacefulness, responsibilities for family and work, limited access to training and education, and the reluctance of some men to give up power. Lopes suggests that ‘Peacekeeping operations still embody a hyper-masculine militarized environment and thus, female peacekeeping personnel do not feel welcome, they often experience ridicule for being ‘feminine’ and worst of all, they often become victims of sexual harassment and abuse.’¹⁷⁵

When women do participate, it should not be assumed that they will ‘naturally’ improve the plight of other women since researchers have reported female peacekeepers noting that locals would react to their uniform rather than their sex.¹⁷⁶ The danger of small numbers of women in a male dominated environment is that those women are under pressure to ‘conform’ to ideals of femininity and their small numbers make them highly visible, prompting others (including the men) to see them as representatives of their gender, ‘tokens’ rather than colleagues. In an organization dominated by a culture of masculinity, the SAF include, women ‘live under the microscope’¹⁷⁷ and the failure of a woman is generalized and always explained by the fact that ‘she is a woman’, whereas the failure of a man is always an individual failure and not a failure of all men.¹⁷⁸ Numbers and proportions do matter. Small numbers (under 15%) lead to tokenism.¹⁷⁹ But scholars studying bureaucracies have argued that a critical mass of women, typically defined as about 30%, can alter the operating procedures of male-dominated institutions, allowing them to strategically advance feminist

¹⁷³ Allred, K. J. 2006. ‘Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It.’ *Armed Forces & Society*. 33(1):5-23.

¹⁷⁴ Jennings, K.M. 2011. ‘Women’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Agents of Change or Stranded Symbols?’ *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center (NOREF) Report*. Available at <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/137505/Women%E2%80%99s%20participation%20in%20UN%20peacekeeping.pdf> (Accessed on 22nd February 2017). Pp 1, 4-5.

¹⁷⁵ Lopes, H. 2011. *Background Paper: Militarized Masculinity in Peacekeeping Operations: An Obstacle to Gender Mainstreaming*. Peacebuild Paix Durable: Ottawa.p.3

¹⁷⁶ Karame, K. 2001 ‘Women in Military Positions in Peace Operations: Experiences of the Norwegian Battalion in UNIFIL, 1978-1998,’ *International Peacekeeping*. 8 (9), pp. 85-96.

¹⁷⁷ Herbert, M. S. 1998. *Camouflage isn’t only for combat*. New York University Press: New York.

¹⁷⁸ Bjelos et al, 2012:45 cited in Rokvic, Vanja and Svetlana Stanarevic, 2016

¹⁷⁹ Kanter, R. M. 1977a. *Men and women of the corporation*. Basic Books: New York. Kanter, R. M. 1977b. Some effects of proportions on group life: Skewed sex ratios and responses totoken women. *American Journal of Sociology* 82:965–90.



strategies from the inside.¹⁸⁰ A 30% is seen as a critical threshold which if reached would transform the gender culture of peacekeeping.

4.2. Sexual Harassment/Discrimination in Male Dominated Institutions

Once in the organization and on mission, Herbert¹⁸¹ argues that women are continually faced with challenges about their right to be in the military, their competence, and not seldom, their sexuality. Some surveys show that women are expected to constantly prove themselves as soldiers, and when they prove themselves to be as capable as men, they are likely to find themselves in a situation where their sexual orientation is questioned, where they are labelled 'butch' or otherwise discriminated against. On the other hand, when they are shown to be as good as men or better, their hard work and results go unacknowledged.

Although there are thought to be many cases of sexual harassment and discrimination, they do not get reported because it is believed that nothing would be accomplished by doing so, that is, that the victim would suffer the consequences of reporting the perpetrator.¹⁸²

4.3. Violence

Many cultures, modern ones included, are dominated by patriarchy which represents a social system in which the bulk of power, prestige and other socially important resources are allotted to men, enabling male rule and domination over women.¹⁸³ Connell¹⁸⁴ argues that patriarchy is enforced by the implicit threat of violence, from the state down to individuals, and that individual men, even if disagreeing with gender inequality, benefit from being a man, what Connell calls 'the patriarchal dividend.' He also says that resistance is actively pursued and can be successful. Social movement scholars argue that transnational feminist networks have pushed the UN to include violence against

¹⁸⁰ Acker, J. 1990. 'Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations.' *Gender & Society*. 4(2): 139-58; Cockburn, C. 1991. *In the Way of Women: Men's Resistance to Sex Equality in Organizations*. Zed: London; Rao, A. And Stuart, R. 1997. 'Rethinking Organizations: A Feminist Perspective.' *Gender and Development*. 5(1): 10-16.

¹⁸¹ Herbert, 1998; *ibid*

¹⁸² Bjelos et al, 2012:48 cited in Rokvic, Vanja and Svetlana Stanarevic, 2016

¹⁸³ Spasic, D., et al. 2015. Survival in an "all boys club": Policewomen in Serbia.

Women's Studies International Forum, 48: 57–70.

¹⁸⁴ Connell, R. W. 1987. *Gender and power*. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA.



women in its security agenda.¹⁸⁵ Gibbings¹⁸⁶ says that in the lobbying phase leading up to UNSCR 1325's passage, advocates were seeking to change perceptions to seeing women as potential agents for peacebuilding rather than solely as victims. Indeed, some would argue that UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960 and 2106 that followed marked a significant shift toward recognising SGBV in conflict as a crucial security matter.

Scholars and practitioners alike have documented a disturbing connection between the presence of an all-male peacekeeping force and sexual exploitation and violence in post-conflict situations that impresses a need to improve the gender balance of the UN force¹⁸⁷. Besides the significant increase in prostitution when peacekeepers are present, 'structural violence'¹⁸⁸ in the form of rampant 'transactive' or exploitative sex with desperate women, increases with the presence of peacekeepers. Aroussi charges that sexual violence remains so pervasive due to the larger problem of the UN's agenda being mired in a masculine, conservative framework that prevents it aiding most people affected by such violence in conflict zones.¹⁸⁹ The sexual violence is an inevitable outcome of a highly unequal gender environment within the international organizations and the host societies.

4.4. Stereotypes and Essentialism

Some scholars in the early years of the post-Cold War peacekeeping wave claimed that women's characteristics, such as their gentle nature, conciliatory attitude, and ability to control violence, make them effective peacekeepers, possibly more effective than men. These stereotypes were referred to as 'women's peace' and 'men's war'.¹⁹⁰

As the SEA scandals emerged, advocates for more women participating in peacekeeping missions argued that that in local societies where women and their dependents often constitute the majority of the population, it is an advantage to have a large number of women in various peacekeeping

¹⁸⁵ Harrington, 2011: 557

¹⁸⁶ Gibbings, S. L. (2011) 'No Angry Women at the United Nations: Political Dreams and the Cultural Politics of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325.' *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 13(4): 250-272.

¹⁸⁷ Chiyuki Aoi, C, and Thakur, R. (eds). 2007. *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*. United Nations University Press: Tokyo, Japan; Whitworth, 2004, *ibid*.

¹⁸⁸ Galtung, Johan. 1969. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6, No. 3. pp. 167-191.

¹⁸⁹ Aroussi, S. 2011 'Women, Peace and Security: Addressing Accountability for Wartime Sexual Violence.' *International Feminist Journal of Politics*. 13(4):pp 576.

¹⁹⁰ Burguières, M. K. 1990. 'Feminist approaches to peace: Another step for peace studies.'

Millennium. 19(1):1-18; Kaplan Duhan, L. 1994. 'Women as caretaker: An archetype that supports patriarchal militarism.' *Hypatia*. 9(2):123-33; Tickner, J. A. 1992; Carey, H. F. 2001. 'Women and peace and security: The politics of implementing gender sensitivity norms in peacekeeping.' *International Peacekeeping*. 8(2):49-68; Boulding, E. 1995. 'Feminist inventions in the art of peace making.' *Peace and Change*. 20(4) 408-38; DeGroot 2001; Salla, M. E. 2001. 'Women and war, men and pacifism'. In I. Skjelsbæk and D. Smith (eds). *Gender, peace and conflict*. Sage: London. (pp. 68-79).



capacities. Today, advocates argue that it is easier for male peacekeepers to establish a dialogue with local civilians than it is for their male colleagues. The involvement of women would also reduce sexual harassment and benefit all aspects of the operation through the greater variety of experiences they would add.¹⁹¹

But then the question arises as to why missions continue to be dominated by military men when so many functions and the majority of clients in peacekeeping are civilian and women.¹⁹²

4.5. Essentialism

Pruitt suggests that women are better at reaching women, but rather than ‘natural’ this is because of

- women’s distrust of men because of gendered violence
- women’s experience-based understanding of the harm of gendered stereotypes applied to women
- women making the effort to LEARN how to help victims – something that men working in peace and security roles should certainly also be expected to do.
- Participation in FFPUs may offer the women who participate in them significant leadership opportunities and relevant security experience that may be used in later FFPUs but also in mixed-gender contingents, which remain the majority of contingents in UN peacekeeping.
- Women are not all the same. “A police officer does not have a sex” says a Brazilian female police officer cited in Pruitt. Like male police, female police can discriminate on identity factors like race and class – gender is not stand alone.
- Indian FFPUs may be assumed to have a strong commitment to secularism, and the troops are multi faith and ethnically diverse. But caste persists in India and in All Girl Squad (BBC documentary on the FFPUs) some of the Indian police officers looked down on Liberian’s sexual behaviour and culture, viewing themselves as more respectable.¹⁹³

Sandole & Saroste list 3 sets of tools that can help and debunk the essentialising femininity approach.

- Women’s experience
- Women’s knowledge

¹⁹¹ Enloe, 2001; Osson and Tryggstad, 2001; Carey, 2001

¹⁹² Steihm Hicks. 2001. Op cit.

¹⁹³ Pruitt, L.J. 2016 Op cit. 2016



- Women's skills.¹⁹⁴

5. Gender

5.1. Local Gender Orders or "Not all the same"

Local gender orders can play a role in feeding conflict and making peace more elusive by encouraging men and boys to participate in violence while creating disincentive for women and girls to get involved in security work. Feminist scholars, advocacy groups, and the UN have all formally recognized that creating more peaceful societies will require participation by both men and women.

- This requires including women in formal conflict resolution attempts, as substantive studies on the impact of conflict on life expectancy, indicate that on average, compared to men, women are more adversely affected by civil and interstate wars.¹⁹⁵

Local gender agendas are not a seamless fit between international assumptions regarding gender equality and how best to achieve it. Post-conflict recovery may assume forms that bear scant resemblance to the increasingly standardized models routinely exported to various war-torn corners of the globe.

Narrow conceptions of what constitutes gender sensitivity may also prove detrimental to women in many parts of the world, particularly if those conceptions are based on Western feminist theories. For instance, rigid notions of what women need to be equal may obscure spaces where women have traditionally found comfort. E.g. in Bosnia, Oxfam resisted a knitting project because of its association with traditional roles of women. But staff discovered that many of the women had lost their husbands or other family members during the conflict, and viewed knitting as a way to reconnect with their roles in a society torn asunder. The project grew into 'Bosfam' (short for Bosnian family). To help sustain it, the project proposed a fashion show, again resisted by Oxfam for feminist reasons but it produced what Oxfam desired in the abstract – 'It was incredible an fantastic, a sort of glittering parade, in total contrast to all the gloom outside. Young refugee women, ground down by bereavement and violence, their futures bleak and hopeless, were striding up and down a catwalk, tripping up and down playfully in silken evening dresses and gorgeous woolly jumpers. The

¹⁹⁴ Sandole & Saroste. 2015. Op cit.

¹⁹⁵ Raven-Roberts, Angela. 2005. "Gender Mainstreaming in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Talking the Talk, Tripping over the Walk." In *Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping*. Mazurana, Dyan, Angela Raven-Roberts and Jane Parpart, (eds). Rowan and Littlefield: Lanham, MD.



atmosphere was bursting with self-confidence. They were lovely, exciting, sexy, had the audience rapt.¹⁹⁶

Bevan¹⁹⁷ in her work on New Zealand UN Police, stressed a tendency by peacekeepers from industrialized countries to see themselves as being 'natural' gender equity experts as opposed to 'less developed' peacekeepers such as Africans, Asians or Latin Americans. However, as Maki-Rahkola and Myrntinen¹⁹⁸ found in Finland, such confidence sat alongside stereotypically negative views of women as peacekeepers. Also, it is India and Bangladesh, both countries who rank low on the Human Development Gender Equality Index, who have contributed the first female Formed Police Units, which are contributing significantly to increasing the numbers of female peacekeepers and challenging the masculine culture of missions.¹⁹⁹ Recognizing that women's experience are diverse and influenced by other forms of inequality, Pruitt asks how such an initiative by the Indian state, staffed by Indian women, fits into broader discourses of gender equality in the international sphere, where a tendency to more highly value or regard approaches developed by Western states and women leaders that represent them has led to an unnecessarily narrow view of what steps can be taken to improve women's access to and participation in peace and security. The Indian establishment of an FPU represents a broader, more nuanced approach to 1325.

In short, efforts at including more women in peacekeeping may be limited or stalled by strict adherence to existing global culture around gender mainstreaming and a failure to critically engage with alternatives that may do more to achieve gender equity.

5.2. Gender Does Not Equal Women

Using gender as code for women limits the transformative potential of endeavours in the research, policy, or practitioner areas. With troubling frequency, however, gender is used interchangeably with women, conflating the two and leaving men as the unmarked, default category—the generic human against which others are compared and potentially deviate. Although the term gender equality denotes equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women and men, and girls and

¹⁹⁶ Fiona Gell, deputy country representative at the time, cited in Theidon et al, 2011:13

¹⁹⁷ Bevan, M. 2011. The Hero Stuff' and the 'Softer Side of Things': Exploring Masculinities in Gendered Police Reform in Timor-Leste. MA Thesis, Victoria University. Available at

<http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/1905/thesis.pdf?sequence=2> (Accessed on 22nd February 2017).

¹⁹⁸ Maki-Rahkola, A. and Myrntinen, H. 2014.

¹⁹⁹ Pruitt, L. J. 2016. Op cit.



boys, in practice it typically refers to women's equality. This inevitably begs the question: why does 'gender' sometimes seem limited to 'women's issues'?

Dominant approaches offer favour gender neutrality rather than gender mainstreaming, and research has found that gender-neutral approaches to legislation and policies have differing impacts on women and men and can sometimes worsen the situation for women.

Even the UN acknowledges that progress toward implementing 1325 has been varied, as the DPKO's ten-year impact study reached a mixed verdict, noting that gains have been modest in the area of protecting women from conflict-related Sex and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) and attracting more women to work in peacekeeping roles.²⁰⁰ The dominant discourse "assumes gendered violence is not a security concern" and there is a need to train students to recognize and contest SGBV.²⁰¹

5.3. How Change Happens: Institutions and Interactions

Militaries, police and civilian organizations are also institutions and as such have strong norms as well as rules, but these norms are ongoing, negotiated and shaped through every day performance and interaction.

Institutions are arrangements of roles grounded in norms, beliefs, functions, and structures. They are "composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artefacts. Institutions operate at different levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to localized interpersonal relationships. Institutions by definition connote stability but are subject to change processes, both incremental and discontinuous."²⁰² Agents are partly formed through institutions and most often reproduce existing structures, but the process of their doing so is always in flux, so in some times and in some ways, agents may make choices that have transformative

²⁰⁰ Ospina, S. 2010. 'Ten-year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping: Final Report to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations'. New York: Department of Field Support, Peacekeeping Best Practices Division, United Nations. Page 5.

²⁰¹ Pruitt, L. J. 2015. 'Reflections on Possibilities and Challenges of Discussing Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) in Role-Play Simulations.' *Politics*. 35 (1): 88

²⁰² Scott, R. 1995. Op cit. p. 33



impacts on existing structures. Institutions can and do change. Individuals working with and within these institutions recognize such changes and respond to them.²⁰³

Annica Kronsell argues that when institutions built on hegemonic masculinity take in 'others' for example by including women, they may create space for the institution to develop and alter gender relations.²⁰⁴ We need to look at the knowledge gained from the stories of women engaged in such institutions and at how the institutions themselves are constituted, understood and transformed in response to the women's experiences.

Performance

The way peacekeeping work is carried out in practice, or 'performed' to use Butler's term²⁰⁵, is heavily dependent on how the ideal model of peacekeeping is imagined in the particular country context. As is the case with other gendered military role identities, peacekeeping masculinities are constructs which are re-imagined and re-performed but follow a basic 'script.' That script is defined, among other influences, by social class, institutional culture, the setting in which peacekeeping occurs (e.g. post-conflict scenario or combat zone) and what tasks the individual peacekeeper is performing (e.g. back office work, logistics, guard duties, conducting patrols or participating in active combat). The performances are highly standardized, laid out in RoEs and standards of behaviour, drilled and repeated through training and routine. The aim of the performances is to create 'security' in the insecure environment of a conflict/post-conflict environment, and the routine adherence to the particular form of performing peacekeeping is seen as proof of professionalism and discipline.²⁰⁶ For instance, the notion of actively performing the role of a peacekeeper for Finns²⁰⁷ is underlined by a number of factors:

- Most of the PKFs are civilians who 'slip into' the peacekeeper role voluntarily for a predefined time
- They are trained in the script and rehearse it prior to deployment (including dress rehearsals such as training crowd control with mock crowds)

²⁰³ Hays, S. 1994. 'Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture'. *Sociological Theory* 12(1):57-72.

²⁰⁴ Kronsell, 2016: 18.

²⁰⁵ Butler, Judith (2006) [1990]. *Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity*. New York: Routledge

²⁰⁶ Maki-Rahkola, A. and Myrtilinen, 2014; Myrtilinen, H. 2008. 'Striking Poses: Notes on the Performances of Violent Masculinities in Conflict Situations', *Nordic Journal for Masculinity Studies*. 3(2): 132-49; Higate, P. and Henry, M. 2010.

'Space, Performance and Everyday Security in the Peacekeeping Context', *International Peacekeeping* 17 (1): 32-48.

²⁰⁷ Maki-Rahkola and Myrtilinen, 2014. Op cit.



- In theatre are expected to wear a particular costume distinct from their normal civilian clothes (i.e. military uniform), carrying props such as weapons, and in UN missions displaying the iconic 'blue helmets and white armour'²⁰⁸

Practical performance elements include

- The style of uniform
- Wearing or not wearing of body armour and helmets
- Display of weapons and other apparel
- Bodily stances and tones of voice taken up when interacting with others
- Orders to take off shades when addressing host population civilians
- Rules on alcohol consumption

All of these send different messages to the host population, to fellow peacekeepers and to the peacekeepers themselves.²⁰⁹ "The effects of a constantly repeated performance – for example, patrolling – is productive of identity."²¹⁰ Hence, as Kathleen Jennings has argued, it is important to understand the everyday lives and interactions of peacekeepers and the gendered form and implications of such interactions.²¹¹

Norm Entrepreneurs

In conditions of stability, such as in the Cold War, 'fields' of human endeavour, such as international relations and peacekeeping missions are characterized by stability and the same actors dominate. However in times of turbulence, such as that brought about by the interaction of globalization and new technologies, individual actors, either people or states, can have significant impact in reshaping institutions.²¹² Mark Kroeker of the UN, Kiran Bedi of the Indian police acted as norm entrepreneurs, promoting the inclusion of women in policing and peacekeeping in general and promoting the creation of all-female units as a practical way to achieve greater participation by women.²¹³

²⁰⁸ Ben-Ari, E. and Elron, E. 2001. 'Blue Helmets and White Armor: Multi-Nationalism and Multi-Culturalism among UN Peacekeeping Forces', *City & Society*. 13(2):271–302.

²⁰⁹ Myrntinen 2008; Higate, P. and Henry, M. 2009. *Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and Performance In Haiti, Liberia and Kosovo*. Zed Press: London. Pp. 109-17

²¹⁰ Higate, P. and Henry, M. 2010. 'Space, Performance and Everyday Security in the Peacekeeping Context', *International Peacekeeping* 17 (1): p.37

²¹¹ Jennings, K. M. 2014. 'Service, Sex, and Security: Gendered Peacekeeping Economies and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.' *Security Dialogue* 45(4): 31-30.

²¹² Fligstein, N., 2001. Social skill and the theory of fields. *Sociological theory*, 19(2), pp.105-125.

²¹³ Pruitt, L.J. 2016.



This approach drew on India's historical context of gendered approaches to policing, including the use of all-women units in the Central Reserve Police Force and all-women's police stations in the Indian Police Service. Key actors such as Indira Gandhi used their political leadership and connections to enshrine such women-focused policing efforts in state policy. Such initiatives then served as inspiration for creating FFPU's.

Moves toward including women and the very presence of women in policing are likely to challenge conservative gender norms in a variety of contexts and lead to contestations, and there are benefits also for the women officers themselves and their communities when they return home.

5.4. Gender, Society and Peacekeeping

"In our gendered political institutions, men are the default assumption."²¹⁴ This remains the case despite an increased frequency of rhetoric around gender equality, since stereotypes that leaders must behave in masculine ways persist, as does the notion that men in general can and should embody masculine characteristics, such as rationality and lack of emotion, while women are unable to do so. These characteristics associated with men and masculinity are situated as 'neutral' and 'best' practice. Indeed, "with troubling frequency, gender is used interchangeably with women, conflating the two and leaving men as the unmarked, default category – the generic human against which others are compared and potentially deviate."²¹⁵ In this way, supposed gender neutrality can obscure the assumptions of masculinity that make gender inequity difficult to see, or when it is seen, make it appear 'natural.'

By insisting on locating sex and gender as co-terminus and natural, "the UN is not only dismissing extensive research that contradicts this claim (see for example, the work of Judith Butler and other queer theorists), but is also failing to encourage consideration on the part of the peacekeepers that there are multiple types of men and women, and that different cultures (whether national cultures, workplace cultures, gang cultures, etc) may preference a particular type that, in turn, encourages us as individual men and women to behave in certain ways in order to be seen as normatively man or normatively woman...Such a complex approach to gender – which is necessary if we are to

²¹⁴ Theidon et al, 2011. Op cit.

²¹⁵ Ibid



encourage reflection on how notions of masculinity help to produce the self as man – is denied any space through the appeal to sex essentialism.”²¹⁶

It is not about demonizing ‘masculinity’ but to recognize that to do so would be as limiting as conflating ‘gender’ with ‘woman.’ Gender constructions are relational. Masculinity and femininity are constructed in opposition to each other and the tasks, characteristics, and behaviours associated with the pair are complementary. This implies, using Connell’s words that ‘masculinities do not first exist and then come into contact with femininities; they are produced together, in the process that constitutes a gender order.’²¹⁷ To understand gender power it is important to consider how relations between different masculinities are constructed and upheld.²¹⁸ Military institutions foster different types of masculinities and organize male bodies differently.²¹⁹

When UN and international institutions don’t have critical engagement about the absence of women or femininity and the related dominance of men and masculinity, they may perpetuate or even foster gender inequality in areas where peacekeepers are deployed. They can even import gender inequalities, especially where they fail to reflect on their own masculinist biases and perpetuate the practice of replacing men in power with other men in power.²²⁰ Their doing so is reinforced by stereotype of women as homogenous, evaluation of policy approaches according to a ‘logic of ranking rather than problem solving’, and tendency to label women from the global south as victims rather than agents.

There is also the assumption that, irrespective of cultural backgrounds and the impacts of those backgrounds on practices of gender, all peacekeeping personnel have the capacity – perhaps even an assumed natural capacity – to act out their masculinity differently now that they are physically located outside their home cultures. This negates the continuing impact of the home cultural habits and norms on behaviours in the field. It implies that the UN does not fully appreciate the impacts

²¹⁶ Laplonge, D. 2015. ‘The Absence of Masculinity in Gender Training for UN Peacekeepers’ *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*. 27(1):94

²¹⁷ Connell, R. W. 1987. *Gender and power*. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA.p. 7

²¹⁸ Connell, R. W. 1995. *Masculinities*. Polity: Cambridge, MA; Connell, R. W. 2002. *Gender*. Polity: Cambridge, MA:

²¹⁹ Higate, P. 2012. ‘Martial Races and Enforcement Masculinities of the Global South: Weaponising Fijian, Chilean, and Salvadoran Post-coloniality in the Mercenary Sector’. *Globalizations* 9 (1): 35–52.

²²⁰ Kronsell, A. 2006. “Methods for studying Silences: Gender Analysis in Institutions of Hegemonic Masculinity” in B. B.Ackerly, M.Stern, and J.True (eds) *Feminist Methodologies in International Relations*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. (Pp. 108-128).



that internalized understandings of gender have on the way we behave, are expected to behave, and are rewarded to behave.²²¹

Military, and to a lesser extent, the police, have their own 'masculine' culture. There has been a general understanding that the military creates men out of boys, as training for military capability becomes intertwined with training masculinity. Paradoxically, and this is what happens when norms are deeply embedded in institutions, "they are naturalized and appear normal."²²² The profession of a soldier is normalized in the male body and is how military organizations construct gender identity.²²³

The dominance of male bodies in militaries confer obligation (to give his life and body for the nation and sacrifice for a good cause), but it also confers power. Cynthia Enloe writes that it legitimizes masculinised men as protectors, as actors, and rational strategists.²²⁴ Men, and likely militarized men, are the ones put in charge of the policies and operations of defence and security activities. If women are viewed stereotypically as nurturing and gentle, it's seen as a double-edged sword. They 'soften the masculine atmosphere', but bring problems and scandals, mainly sexual.

5.4.1. Masculinities

To a great extent (only 4% of military peacekeepers are female) the military body in peacekeeping missions is a male one. Few women are there. War has been associated most often with men and more particularly with the characteristics expected of men – masculinities. As a result, institutions tasked with military, defence, and security activities have traditionally been treated as men's property and dominated by men's bodies, a feature that has necessarily influenced the policies, politics and agenda of security institutions. Drawing on Connell's work,²²⁵ Pruitt states: "Institutions tasked with security, such as the DPKO, have been widely conceptualised as sites of hegemonic masculinity, since, in addition to being dominated by men, they situate a specific form of masculinity as the norm."²²⁶

The specific masculinity associated with militaries and police is associated with rank and hierarchy. R.W. Connell argues that the military has had a particularly important position as the most

²²¹ Laplonge, D. 2015. Op cit. p. 95

²²² Kronsell, A 2016. Op cit. p. 16

²²³ Acker, 1990

²²⁴ Enloe, C. 2004. *The Curious Feminist. Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire*.

University of California Press: Berkeley. P.154.

²²⁵ Connell 1987, 1995. Op cit.

²²⁶ Pruitt, 2013. Op cit.



important arena for the definition of dominant masculinity.²²⁷ “Dominant masculinity is powerful because it is normative.”²²⁸

But what are the norms and associated behaviours with different masculinities? What precisely is meant by masculinities? How are they forged or sustained? What is the relationship between wartime and peacetime masculinities? What are the resulting effects on women?

Military/Combat Masculinity

Militaries are closely related to practices of war and it implies that they either engage in warfare or are preparing for it, in order to engage or avert war. Militaries are part and parcel of a norms system that sees ‘war-making’ as a legitimate way to handle conflicts. The monopoly on the use of force is conferred to state military organizations, and it is the skills around the use of force and violence that sets the military apart from other organizations. Although there is a range of other skills taught in and executed by military organizations, the combat function is at its core.²²⁹ Combat, as historically envisioned, is challenged when military organizations, as is the case in Europe and for the CSDP, gear their activities in the direction of peace enforcement, peacekeeping and conflict prevention.²³⁰

Many studies have been based on the premise that the armed forces are a gendered, male-dominated organization or ‘extremely gendered organization’²³¹ with hegemonic masculine culture.²³² By enlisting only men, often the case in conscription systems, or mainly men, the military organize and materialize gender relations through rules of access and entitlement.²³³ “Military organizations have not only been monopolized by men’s bodies, but the norms of the military as an organization are defined on the basis of male bodies and masculine practices.”²³⁴

As highlighted by Carrerías,²³⁵ the military in general have been seen as a proving ground for masculinity, and being a woman in the military means being subjected to endless scrutiny and

²²⁷ Connell, R. 1995. Op cit. p. 213

²²⁸ Kronsell, A. 2016. Op cit. p 319

²²⁹ Coker, C. 2001. *Humane Warfare*. Routledge: London, UK. pp. 105-110.

²³⁰ Kronsell, 2016.

²³¹ Sasson-Levy, O. 2003. ‘Feminism and military gender practices: Israeli women soldiers in “masculine” roles’. *Sociological Inquiry*. 73:440–65

²³² Carrerías & Castro, 2013, *ibid*; Rokvic, Vanja and Svetlana Stanarevic, 2016, *ibid*

²³³ Pru“gl, E. 2011. *Transforming Masculine Rule. Agriculture and Rural Development in the European Union*. The University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor. Pp.29-32.

²³⁴ Higate, P. and Hopton, J. 2005. “War, Militarism and Masculinities.” In M. Kimmel, J.Hearn, and R. Connell (eds). *Handbook of Studies on Men & Masculinities*, Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA. (pp. 432–47

²³⁵ Carrerías, 2006:41



criticism.²³⁶ Combat proximity or identity determines attitudes towards female soldiers. If a unit is more combat oriented, it is more likely to exclude women. Rank makes a difference: soldiers are more generally open towards women's participation in the unit than their commanders, NCOs or officers, in other words, men who perceived themselves as the caretakers and gatekeepers of the 'correct' masculine image of the army. Different parts of the military have different emphases in their masculinity. Infantry soldiers have a lot more prestigious and masculine self-image than artillery.²³⁷

Protector Masculinity

Military masculinity is a 'protector' masculinity and the protector needs someone to protect.²³⁸ The protector masculinity foregrounds benign aspects of a military masculinity related to acts of heroism, chivalry and virtue. Iris Marion Young²³⁹ writes about the protector/protected binary: "Central to the logic of masculinist protection is the subordinate relation of those in the protected position. In return for male protection, the woman concedes critical distance from decision-making autonomy." Kronsell notes that an EU homeland femininity is present in terms of the protected ones, important subjects for the CSDP's military endeavour.²⁴⁰

Quotes from a conversation with Cynthia Enloe, who in a conversation about men who wage war suggests that an organization becomes patriarchal not because of the existence of men within the organization, but rather because of the insistence of these men that 'a certain form of masculinity' should be more valued than other forms and that this gives them the right to protect and control 'people who are less masculine'.²⁴¹ Laplonge argues that this is true of the UN and it deploys military personnel whose understandings and applications of masculinity result in the practice of patriarchy during peacekeeping operations.

Authors such as Whitworth²⁴² also see peacekeepers as reproducers of ugly aspects of military masculinities such as violence, oppression of the weak, misogyny, homophobia and racism, while others such as Higate²⁴³ call for a more nuanced approach (while not denying these problems).

²³⁶ Herbert, M. 1998. Op cit.

²³⁷ Sion, L. 2008

²³⁸ Hicks Stiehm. 1982. Op cit.

²³⁹ Young, I. M. 2007. *Global Challenges. War, Self-determination and Responsibility for Justice*. Polity Press: Cambridge, UK. p.21

²⁴⁰ Kronsell, A. 2016. Op cit.

²⁴¹ Laplonge, D. 2015. Op cit. p.91

²⁴² Whitworth, S. 2004. Op cit.



Heterosexual masculinity

USIP found that in the US military language and training is saturated with sexual imagery, much of it misogynous. Traditional wartime constructs and propaganda similarly objectify women: “The enemy is portrayed as he who will rape and murder ‘our’ women; the war effort is directed at saving ‘our’ mothers, daughters and wives.” (page no?) The same military bases installed in the name of security may lead to an increase in sexual violence or prostitution, underscoring the degree to which security itself is a gendered good. Sexualized imagery and abusive content cannot be explained by small group norms or one bad apple: it appears to be systemic within many militaries, including that of the US.²⁴⁴

USIP cite the group Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW), who reacted to this concern by embarking on a campaign that attempted to ‘rehumanize the Other.’ Cami Rowe reported that these veterans ‘described experiences of discrimination, sexual abuse, rape and harassment’ within the US military, and that their comments pointed to the conclusion that ‘gender discrimination is intricately linked with the construction and conduct of war.’ Gender discriminatory behaviour has also been found in the peacekeeping forces sent to provide security and aid. In many cases, populations that have suffered the consequences of war and extreme conditions have been confronted with peacekeepers who engage in sexual violence or economic coercion, leading women to trade sex for food, protection, or aid to which they are entitled. “The upshot is that soldiers and peacekeepers contribute to an array of gendered violence, abusing the very people they are meant to protect.”²⁴⁵

One veteran insisted that a man’s attitudes towards homosexuality may be a factor in his abuse of women. Of note, the performative nature of gang rape signals to other participants that each of their perpetrators is a ‘real man.’ Thus it is not only soldiers’ views about women, but also their views about sexuality – particularly homosexuality – that can drive them to commit sexually violent crimes.²⁴⁶

The armed forces are a gender organization with a dominant masculine culture, and there is a belief that morale, unity and fighting spirit are also affected by the presence of homosexuals.²⁴⁷ Although homosexuality is becoming more accepted in contemporary western societies, research has shown

²⁴³ Higate, 2003, 2007. Op cit.

²⁴⁴ Elizabeth Hillman <http://library.uchastings.edu/library/bibliographies/faculty/Elizabeth-L.-Hillman>.

²⁴⁵ Theidon et al, 2011. Op cit. p. 16

²⁴⁶ Ibid. p.15

²⁴⁷ Rokvic, Vanja and Svetlana Stanarevic. Op cit.



that in many organizations, particularly the male dominated ones such as the armed forces, homosexuals are portrayed by as deviants from the masculine norm.²⁴⁸

Research by the OSCE concluded that there was a discrepancy between the official policies of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence that are not discriminatory toward LGBT persons on the one hand and the belief of LGBT persons that they would be discriminated against by these institutions on the other. LGBT persons do not place sufficient trust in security organizations, above all the police force.²⁴⁹ In Serbia, a poll by Petrovic, 2013 showed that discrimination was nominally forbidden, but at the same time it was not acceptable for soldiers to publicly declare themselves as gay or transgender persons. This was confirmed in practice in 2014 when a major of the Serbian Armed Forces publicly declared herself as a transgender person. Despite the official anti-discriminatory policy, the public declaration of a transgender person resulted in her being discharged from military service for 'harming military reputation.'²⁵⁰

Post Conflict/Compromised Masculinity

Just as militarization and armed conflict are highly gendered, so are the demilitarization processes that follow. Militarized men, no longer having an external enemy to fight, shift their violent practices to the home.

Colleen Duggan suggests the term 'compromised masculinity' to refer to the loss of status and identity crisis that can affect men after armed conflicts end.²⁵¹ 'Compromised masculinity' is not confined to former conflict zones. Domestic violence including among returning military personnel is a significant problem. A pressing question for peacekeeping missions is how gender regimes can be reworked, in particular to more effectively disarm masculinities – in the aftermath of war.

Peacekeeper Masculinity

Academic interest in peacekeeper masculinities as a subset of military masculinities has grown. As with military masculinities in general, there is no single version of peacekeeper masculinity. The

²⁴⁸ Winslow, D. (2010). Gender and military sociology. Swedish National Defence College. Department of Leadership and Management, p.5 Available at https://www.fhs.se/Documents/Externwebben/om-fhs/Organisation/ILM/Sociologi%20och%20ledarskap/Dokument/Gender%20and%20Military%20Sociology_webb.pdf (Accessed on 22 February 2017).

²⁴⁹ Radoman, J., et al. (2011). LGBT people and security sector reform in the Republic of Serbia. OSCE Mission to Serbia: Belgrade

²⁵⁰ Rokvic, Vanja and Svetlana Stanarevic. Op cit. p. 32

²⁵¹ Theidon et al, 2011. Op cit.



multiplicity of peacekeeping masculinities is dependent (among other factors) on class, ethnicity, one's position in the institution of the military (e.g. officers, support staff, administrators, combat troops) and the institutional culture of the armed force in question, not to mention the role of individual agency.²⁵² Peacekeeper roles vary greatly between troop-contributing countries, their respective RoE and mission specific standards of behaviour.

In any particular military there is a hegemonic ideal of peacekeeper masculinity instilled into peacekeepers through public discourse, drills, training, ROEs and institutional culture, especially in militaries such as the Finnish one which has a five-decade history of participation in peacekeeping operations. This hegemonic ideal, however, should not be regarded as immutable. Anne Maki-Rahkola and Henri Myrntinen²⁵³ took the notion of multiple masculinities as a starting point, discussing the discourses and performances of Finnish peacekeeping forces.

They developed three indicative categories of Finnish peacekeeper masculinities: 'amateur professionals', 'peacekeeper fathers' and 'tough fighters', the former two create space for military peacekeepers to show aspects of masculinity not associated with traditional military masculinities. The latter harks back to more traditional 'warrior' concepts. "The hegemonic ideal is that of a blue-helmeted (male) soldier, who is impartial, stoic, tough, professional, incorruptible and asexual – although this latter point is not usually spelled out explicitly."²⁵⁴

The Finnish peacekeepers consist of roughly 10% professional military personnel and of 90% reservists, that is, civilians who enlist voluntarily for peacekeeping duty. Reservists are seen as 'ideal' for interacting with the host population in (post) conflict settings because of their civilian background.

As Haaland²⁵⁵ notes, peacekeeping as a non-traditional kind of soldiering – involving minimal use of force, increased interaction with civilians and need to gain the trust of the host population – requires different kinds of skills and attributes than a kind of soldiering based on aggressiveness.

²⁵² Higate, P. (ed.) 2003. *Military Masculinities: Identity and the State*. Praeger: London.

Higate, P. 2007. 'Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation', *Men and Masculinities* 10 (1): 99–119.

²⁵³ Anne Maki-Rahkola and Henri Myrntinen, 2014.

²⁵⁴ Maki-Rahkola and Henri Myrntinen, 2014: 476

²⁵⁵ Haaland, T. 2012. 'Friendly War-Fighters and Invisible Women: Perceptions of Gender and Masculinities in the Norwegian Armed Forces on Missions Abroad', in A. Kronsell, and E. Svedberg, (eds) *Making Gender, Making War: Violence, Military and Peacekeeping Practices*, Routledge: New York. P. 64.



Duncanson²⁵⁶ (2009) goes so far as to raise the question of whether ‘peacekeeper masculinity’ is indeed an alternative kind of military masculinity that has the potential to challenge the hegemony of the warrior masculinity model.

Cultural Masculinities

Peacekeeping forces are multinational rather than transnational, and PKFs tend to be identified and identify themselves according to their particular nationality.²⁵⁷ How an ideal peacekeeper is imagined and performed varies from one military to the next and may also vary greatly between missions or contingents. While some stress a ‘robust’ attitude to peacekeeping (e.g. Australia, USA) relying heavily on a demonstration of the willingness to use lethal force, others stress a softer approach, reaching out to communities with civic projects.²⁵⁸

Bevanin her work on New Zealand UN Police, stressed a tendency by peacekeepers from industrialized countries to see themselves as being ‘natural’ gender equity experts as opposed to ‘less developed’ peacekeepers such as Africans, Asians or Latin Americans.²⁵⁹

Ironically, gender inequalities can be imported by international organizations that come into post-conflict countries to facilitate transitional periods. Even as some men who were in power are losing power, other men are taking their place, thereby maintaining a male-dominated dynamic. The irony of ‘exporting Western military models to transitioning states as presumed ideals of virtue’.

5.4.2. Femininities

Research on the role of women in the military is riddled with stereotypes, such as the stereotype of men as ‘just warriors’ and women as ‘beautiful souls’²⁶⁰ or the one mentioned by Tickner – ‘to be a soldier is to be a man, not a woman.’²⁶¹ Herbert states that perceptions of gender are used to make

²⁵⁶ Duncanson, C. 2009. ‘Forces for Good? Narratives of Military Masculinity in Peacekeeping Operations’, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*. 11(1): 63–80.

²⁵⁷ Ben-Ari, E. and Elron, 2001. Op cit.

²⁵⁸ See Krishnasamy, K. 2003. ‘Bangladesh and UN Peacekeeping: The Participation of a “Small” State’, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 41 (1): 24–47.

²⁵⁹ Bevan, M. 2011. The Hero Stuff’ and the ‘Softer Side of Things’: Exploring Masculinities in Gendered Police Reform in Timor-Leste. MA Thesis, Victoria University. Available at <http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/1905/thesis.pdf?sequence=2> (Accessed on 22nd February 2017).

²⁶⁰ Elshtain, J. B. 1995. *Women and war*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

²⁶¹ Tickner, J. A. 1992. *Gender international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security*. Columbia University Press: New York.p.40



assessments of one's sexual orientation and that femininity is viewed as 'inconsistent' with military services and women as a group less capable of performing military services.²⁶²

Ashley Nicolas says that during her service in the US armed forces she encountered a lot of myths and stereotypes, two of which she singles out: 'women do not have upper body strength' and 'women are too emotional to lead in combat.'²⁶³ Some authors argue that women in the armed forces would lead to higher rates of attrition, greater need for medical care, lesser physical ability, dual-service marriages, fraternization, sexual harassment, sexual promiscuity, etc. All of which affect unit cohesion, morale and the fighting spirit of the armed forces.

The soldier's image of 'correct femininity' is what Connell calls 'emphasized femininity'.²⁶⁴ Like 'hegemonic masculinity', emphasized femininity as a cultural construction is very public, though its content is linked to the private realm of the home and the bedroom. It is organized as an adaptation to men's power and emphasizes compliance, nurturance and empathy as womanly virtues. Many soldiers feel threatened by women who do not look and behave according to emphasized femininity (or are better than them at something). Female soldiers have commonly had to adopt one of two strategies: be one of the guys or become a sex object.

Androgynous Femininity

Or 'Be One of the Guys'. Research shows military women tend to be conservative in their ideological attitudes and to venerate the traditions of the military.²⁶⁵ But acceptance comes at a cost²⁶⁶ – suppression of sexuality and femininity – the effect is to 'neuter'²⁶⁷ i.e. attempt to render notions of femininity and masculinity absent from one's sense of self. But the reward is that it is difficult to penalize that which is absent. As was expected from 'real' men, one soldier said she never

²⁶² Herbert, 1998

²⁶³ Nicolas, A. 2014. *Women in military are hurt by the bigotry of low expectations so help them by holding them to standards of excellence*. Foreign Policy. Available from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/04/women-in-military-are-hurt-by-the-bigotry-of-lowexpectations-sohelp-them-by-holding-them-to-standards-of-excellence/> (Accessed on 22nd February 2017).

²⁶⁴ Connell, 1987. Op cit. 573

²⁶⁵ Barrett, F. J. 1996. 'The organizational construction of hegemonic masculinity: The case of the U.S. Navy.' *Gender, Work and Organization*. 3(3):29–42; Titunik, R. F. 2000. 'The first wave: Gender integration and military culture.' *Armed Forces and Society* 26(2):229–57 Williams, C. L. 1989. *Gender differences at work: Women and men in non-traditional occupations*. University of California Press: Los Angeles.

²⁶⁶ Fine, G. A. 1987. 'One of the boys: Women in male-dominated settings'. In M. S. Kimmel (ed), *Changing men—New directions in research on men and masculinity*. Sage: Newbury Park, CA. (pp. 131–47)

²⁶⁷ Herbert, 1998. Op cit.



complained or talked much; she worked hard and was not 'soft'. But being a non-woman did not make these female soldiers full members of the male group.²⁶⁸

Emphasized or Compliant Femininity

Or Accommodation strategy, i.e. fit the stereotype of how a woman should behave. i.e. conforming to the image of a preferred femininity, which is marked by a tone of cooperation and compliance, a desire not to threaten men's sense of competence or superiority.²⁶⁹ The feminine strategy upholds a paternalistic/protector masculinity, and women who adopt it often openly seek men's attention.

In Sion's study, a female soldier Sabine's overt enthusiasm to spend time with the men and what seemed to be her constant need for attention made her unknowingly cross the fine line between trying to be one of the guys and becoming a sex object. Aka Kanter,²⁷⁰ women when in a male dominated environment have to be careful to avoid adopting the role of 'seductress' or sexual object, which introduces an element of sexual competition and jealousy.. *"Women are compelled to strike a balance between the 'feminine demands' of their sex role and the 'masculine demands' of their work role."*²⁷¹ The female soldier is caught - both types of gender violations (being one of the boys or compliant femininity) can easily result in attributions of 'deviant' sexuality (Herbert, 1998).

Women's participation in peace missions challenged men's combat and masculine identity. Miller (1997) pointed out that most of the men that object to women's increased participation in the army fear negative consequences for expressing their objections openly. Women are officially able to serve, so exclusion has to be informal. Therefore, male soldiers react to interactional or indirect forms of protest by engaging on the basis of 'emphasized femininity.'

Protected Femininity

Female soldiers on mission found that their roles had changed from that assigned before deployment. Instead of the function assigned before mission, they were given simple and unchallenging administration work during the mission. Most women are restricted to camp area, sometimes because their commanders feared exposing them to the local population. The Dutch in Kosovo said women were not interested in going outside. This contradicts the assumption that

²⁶⁸ Sion, 2008. Op cit. 572

²⁶⁹ Connell, 1987. Op cit.

²⁷⁰ Kanter 1977a, 1977b. Op cit.

²⁷¹ Sion, 2008. Op cit. p. 573



women make effective peacekeepers because it is easier for them to establish a dialogue with local civilians than it is for their male colleagues.²⁷² However Sion's²⁷³ research found that the main reason though was lack of opportunity (being confined to camp).

Weak (Not Physically Strong) Femininity

Exclusion of women is rooted in the naturalization of discursive practices and the ways in which women's bodies are ruled out of order and used against them. Women's bodies are used to restrict and exclude women from army activities and tasks. The debate here is about peacekeeping physical fitness, not combat. Yet the rhetoric that soldiers use to exclude women is that of combat. The effect is to exclude or limit women's activities and movements.

Distracting Femininity

Men use sexuality to establish a hierarchy that separates men from women and keeps women 'in their place.' In Kosovo, male peacekeepers could wear whatever they wanted after working hours, while women had to be careful not to attract attention and sexually arouse the men. "It is difficult when men look at you. But if you are irritated by their attention, they blame you for being too sensitive and a complainer."²⁷⁴

The experience of female soldiers is that of being token numbers in a male-dominated environment. The negative consequences of tokenism seem to occur only for members of social categories that are of lower status relative to the majority, with gender status as one example. Tokenism affects the result of being a woman, being numerically scarce, and working in an occupation normatively defined as men's work. Negative implications include performance pressure, social isolation, and role encapsulation. Sexual allegations are usually part of it.²⁷⁵ Women are easily blamed for being sexually promiscuous (they joined the army for male company) or for being lesbians (they joined the army for female company). Gender differences in peacekeeping missions are maintained through functional, physical, social and sexual exclusion of women from taking any substantial role in the peace missions.

²⁷² Enloe, C. 2001. 'Gender is not enough: The need for a feminist consciousness.' *International Peacekeeping*. 8(1): 95–97; p Olsson, L., and T. L. Tryggstad, (eds). 2001. *Women and international peacekeeping of international Peacekeeping*. Frank Cass: London; Carey, H. F. 2001. 'Women and peace and security: The politics of implementing gender sensitivity norms in peacekeeping.' *International Peacekeeping*. 8(2):49–68.

²⁷³ Sion, 2008: 577

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Kanter, R. 1977a, 1977b. Op cit.



The literature about women in peacekeeping operations is still quite limited, and there is hardly any ethnographic work, despite the growing importance of the topic.

5.5. Gender Training in Peacekeeping

The extent to which peacekeeping personnel receive any form of gender training is dependent on the capacities, cultural contexts, and resourcing of contributing member states. There has been an evolution from no training in gender awareness to some limited training focused on women, to the recognition that reflection and understanding of gender norms, including masculinities, are crucial for recruiting and retaining women peacekeepers and to reduce sexist behaviour and sexual abuse and exploitation.

The UN in TES programme piloted in East Timor in 2001 found that the principal lessons were: the material needs to be presented in the utmost simplicity; most participants were first time peacekeepers with no previous experience on which to draw, little knowledge of other peacekeeping efforts, and ‘remarkably, little imagination.’ There was also a wide range of participants in the classroom, from corporal to colonel, a fact that inhibited discussion among the hierarchical culture of the military in which senior officers are always showed deference. Poor English language skills, working as self-starting groups was difficult, participants would generally defer to the senior person present and were reluctant to voice an opinion. The conclusion was that broad, generic training with a wealth of contextualized examples was needed.²⁷⁶

A training package, titled Gender and Peace Support Operations, was then developed to cover a 3 day working session and was aimed at a broad cross-section of the peacekeeping community – not specifically military or civilian institutions – and to serve as a body of reference material to be delved into, developed, and customized by interested organizations. The project undertaken by the Training and Evaluation Service (TES) of the DPKO at the UN did just that, embarking on a customized training package specifically for the ‘uniforms’ – military and civilian police.

The course aimed to do 3 things:

1. Provide knowledge and information on how the relationships between men and women and their gender roles and responsibilities are transformed by violent conflict;
2. develop basic skills of gender analysis and a recognition of the differing needs, capacities, and expectations of men and women
3. make peacekeepers aware of the implications of their actions.

²⁷⁶ Mackay, A. ‘Training the Uniforms: Gender and Peacekeeping Operations’ *Development in Practice*. 13(2/3): p. 220



What is Gender?

Gender and human rights.

What can I do?

But masculinities were not mentioned.

Laplonge looked at the extent to which existing practices of gender training for peacekeeping personnel include any consideration of masculinity.²⁷⁷ He looked at the standard training materials have all been issued by the UN to support member nations to provide gender training to their peacekeeping personnel: The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)'s "The Standard Generic Training Module (SGTM) 6C on Gender and Peacekeeping," issued in 2003; UNDPKO's "Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations," issued in 2004; and, UNDPKO's "Gender and Peacekeeping Operations In-Mission Training," issued in 2001.

Gender training for UN personnel is recognized as needing to include 'reflection and debate' on gender issues (UN-INSTRAW)... 'to enable participants to understand the different roles and needs of both women and men in society, to challenge gender-biased and discriminatory behaviours, structures and socially constructed inequalities, and to apply this new knowledge to their day to day work' (UN-INSTRAW) cited in Laplonge, the extent to which this includes reflection and debate on the impacts of cultural understandings of masculinity on individual and group behaviours during peacekeeping operations needs, however, to be explored.²⁷⁸

Laplonge noted there was no guidance:

- on how a facilitator might encourage the participants to reflect on how cultural understandings of masculinity may affect what we as individuals and as groups of men come to define as sexual violence.
- Equally, there is no attempt to encourage the participants to explore how sexual violence against women by men may, at times, reflect the normalized practice of normative masculinity;

²⁷⁷ Laplonge, 2015. Op cit.

²⁷⁸ Ibid. UN-INSTRAW p. 92



- and how the male peacekeepers may seek to address this given they are likely to be spending a lot of time working in close proximity to other men in highly volatile contexts.²⁷⁹

He concluded: “The focus is on an understanding of gender as it is experienced externally by others. There is no reference to the need for peacekeepers to reflect on how their own internalized understandings of gender may impact the way they view the gender culture of the peacekeeping operation, and therefore how they behave as individuals and as a group within this context.”²⁸⁰

Conclusion: Future Directions – Changes at the Edge?

There is a dire need for gender awareness training that is cost effective and universally available yet customized. The goal is to address and rebalance the masculine nature of peacekeeping, this will help with recruiting more female peacekeepers, military, police and civilian, and it will help achieve the goals of the missions. The failure to include more women in peacekeeping roles is significant because, as the chairperson from Ghana noted at a UN Policy Dialogue, “While the presence of women does not provide a guarantee against continued violence and return to conflict, their absence virtually ensures it.”²⁸¹

A recent WPS resolution, Resolution 2122 (2013),²⁸² takes the important step of seeking more than gender balance in terms of numbers: it calls for consulting as well as including women in peace talks; developing and deploying women’s technical expertise in peacekeeping and mediation; and providing enhanced access, through Security Council briefings and reports, to data and research on how women are affected by conflict and how women participate in conflict resolution. But the focus is still on gender as ‘women’ – until that becomes masculinity and femininity and the relation between these spectrums, it will be difficult to achieve change.

It is also important to look at initiatives that work. The all-female FFPU is one such, as Pruitt (2016) states, “a potentially transformative policy while still being pragmatic. Indeed, it represents a policy innovation within the existing global gendered context.” She poses the question of whether FFPU’s can destabilize the institutional reliance on hegemonic masculinity?²⁸³

²⁷⁹ Laplonge, 2011. Op cit. p.94

²⁸⁰ Laplonge, 2015. Op cit. p.96

²⁸¹ UN Peacekeeping. 2006. “Policy Dialogue to Review Strategies for Enhancing Gender Balance among Uniformed Personnel in Peacekeeping Mission: Final Report.” UN:New York.

²⁸² UN Security Council resolution 2106, On women and peace and security, S/RES/2106 (24 June 2013) available for documents.net/sr2106. (Accessed on 20th February 2017)

²⁸³ Pruitt, 2016. Op cit. p. 20



Once they hit the ground in Liberia, the FFPU showed themselves more than fit for their key responsibility of providing security in a post-conflict context. Not only did they provide security, but they also challenged gender stereotypes that situate women as needing protection and as being incapable of providing protection. In doing so, they encouraged more local women to taken on roles in the security sector, pursued greater use of nonlethal weapons, saw increased reporting and decreased incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, and shook up expectations by showing that in fact, self-proclaimed 'girls' and 'mothers' can create secure environments as effectively as men, and in some circumstances perhaps even more effectively. Indeed, “the presence of the FFPU may challenge binary views of masculinity and femininity.”²⁸⁴

The FFPU also facilitated economic empowerment for women and girls by (1) helping to uphold the rights of women and girls – both to accessing security institutions and to participating in them, (2) supporting women’s and girl’s access to education, and 3) providing decent employment with comparatively high pay, helping local women where peacekeeping missions are to avoid having to use their sexuality to gain from the mission’s political economy.

The FFPU’s presence disrupts widely accepted narratives that pressure men and boys to participate in violence in order to ‘prove’ their manhood and that marginalize the participation of women in peace processes by limiting what roles are perceived to be ‘appropriate’ or ‘natural’ for women. This is a direct challenge to discourses that represent women as victims in need of protection.

While globalization and other reform processes have brought about shifts in rigid military gender regimes, these shifts have occurred mostly on the fringes.²⁸⁵ The military organization is still considered a gendered, male-dominated organization²⁸⁶ controlled by a culture of masculinity. Moving past these limitations will require both men and women within the UN and beyond to question existing norms.

²⁸⁴ Pruitt, 2016. Op cit. p 12

²⁸⁵ Sasson-Levy, 2011. Op cit. p. 404;

²⁸⁶ Carreiras, 2006; Carrerías & Castro, 2013. Op cit.



6. Operationalization of Culture for Security and Defence

Socio-cultural factors have played major role in the majority of military operations during the majority of military operations that NATO, EU and other armies have been engaged in since the end of Cold War. The emergence of the concept of population-centric operations (such as the Afghan or Iraqi missions), has raised a demand for profound understanding of cultural factors of the area of operation. In the conflicts in question, we are facing a shift of the centre of gravity towards the area of operation population (the “human terrain”), whose support must be won to achieve the operation’s goals, as the enemy is hiding and operating among them, and clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants is no longer possible.²⁸⁷ The complexity of those operations can be best summarized by the following graphic:




Figure 6.1: Contemporary military operations environment.²⁸⁸

In addition, NATO nations have understood the significance of that fact, which reflected on the shape of the Multinational Experiment 6 (2008-2010), in particular in the objective 4.3, which focuses specifically on cultural aspects. The major gaps and cultural issues within contemporary

²⁸⁷ Gentile, Gian. A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army. US Navy, 2009. www.public.navy.mil/usff/Documents/gentile.pdf p. 5

²⁸⁸ Wunderle, William. *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries*. Combat Studies Institute Press: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007. p. 25



operations have been outlined in Multinational Experiment 6. Baseline Assessment 2008, which has stated that:

- The ability to understand the dynamics of the operational environment, accounting for the social, cultural, political, legal, economic, and physical conditions is crucial when facing irregular threats.
- Few personnel outside of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community are educated in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency, or receive cultural awareness training.
- Cultural awareness at the macro and micro level are of equal importance and it is necessary to develop guidelines to accommodate cultural differences and avoid offensive and ineffective communication.
- Forces must train in foreign languages, cultural intelligence, negotiation, and dispute resolution.
- An effective interagency framework for building partner capacity rooted in a deep understanding of the indigenous culture that the threat has emerged from, unity of effort among the various agencies involved, and sustained interaction and relationships with the host country over time is required.
- Commanders need to appreciate the underlying interagency issues (such as institutional cultures, policies, resources, and differences in procedures) in order to effect real integration for waging Irregular Warfare.²⁸⁹

6.1. Operationalisation of Culture

Although a variety of efforts was undertaken to cater for the need of cultural knowledge and competence during operational conduct, there still seems to be a gap between operational plans, training of the forces and proper cultural conduct and inclusion of cultural factors into military operations in the field. Research conducted among military officers from 20 countries, who, answering the question: Do you think there is still a gap between cultural, ethnographic knowledge (from reach back centres/advisers/other units engaged in collection and analysis of such data in the

²⁸⁹ Pamplos, Francesco and Jacinto Pena. Ed. Cross-Cultural Awareness: Analytical Concept. MNE 6 Goal 4.3. Draft Version. SP TRADOC Directorate for Research, Doctrine and Materiel. Granada, 2010 (p. 18-19)



field) and operational plans, claimed that the gap is still there and it does influence operational effectiveness.²⁹⁰ Moreover, some of the interviewed added precious remarks on the issue:

- Cultural mistakes completely undermine many months good the work of the unit and the authority of the forces.

The “gap” might always be there, as it is hard to use the - usually strictly theoretical - knowledge you get during pre-deployment training in stress conditions where nothing is predictable or constant.

Minimalizing the gap would be possible if there was continuity in exchange of experiences between deploying and returning units.

In order to effectively comprehend operationalisation of culture in military operations, the essential question must be: what is culture? Having analysed a variety of military definitions ²⁹¹, which in majority of cases are not sufficient for proper application to the operational environment, an anthropological understanding of the phenomenon that illustrates its complexity and dynamics seems more appropriate. Culture, is hereby understood as a fundamental, yet not the only factor that motivates and determines human behaviours, modes of thinking and interpreting the world, which provides the frames and methods of knowledge acquisition and giving meaning to the environment one lives in. It manifests in artefacts and non-material creations such as language, values, norms, institutions, religious beliefs, legends, ideologies and ideas; symbols and taboos, clothing and dining forms, modes and the attitudes towards other cultures. It is not objective, hence both the researcher and the research subjects change in the process of mutual interactions. Of course, all of those constitutive parts of given culture are realized differently by individuals, considering psychological and societal differences within one culture. And, last but not least –

²⁹⁰ This part of research work focused on Afghanistan, where possible also Iraq for comparative analysis. Any other operations’ reflections were welcomed. A total of 22 surveyed (military professionals from major to general engaged in military operations and operationalization of culture processes) from 20 countries have been interviewed according to the survey questions. Kamila Trochowska, State Security Institute, War Studies University. Forthcoming 2017 publication.

²⁹¹ Military definitions of culture analysed for the purpose included those in: U.S. Department of Defence. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02. DoD: Washington, 2011 (p. 91), NATO Standardization Agency. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. AAP-6. NSA: Brussels, 2010 (p. 2-c-20), Bados, Victor in Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations. Best Practices. SP TRADOC Directorate for Research, Doctrine, Organization and Materiel, Granada, 2010, p. 7, Salomoni, Barak i Paula Holmes-Eber. Operational Culture for the Warfighter. Marine Corps University: Quantico, 2008 (p. 35-37), FM 3.24 and 3.24-2, Afghanistan Country Handbook: A Field-Ready Reference Publication. DoD: Washington, 2008 and others.



culture is dynamic, similarly to a complex adaptive system reacting and evolving constantly due to internal and external stimuli.²⁹²

This vital issue was neglected in majority of the solutions in the field of operationalization of culture. Culture is most of all a pattern of reactions and adaptation schemes towards changing environment. That was the part that was not taken into account in the majority of existing endeavours of operationalization of culture, and the knowledge of culture of the area of operation was drawn from sources that were created before the deployment of the forces. Which might indeed give us some hints on the nature of the threat we will be facing, but constant and professional monitoring of the social changes and shifts of the behavioural aspects of given entity is needed. We must realize that no society we study is not set in stone, and a society which comes into contact with any kind of external influence, will change vastly. The presence of uniformed formations along with a threat posed by irregular warfare are definitely an altering factor, and the knowledge of population's behaviour modes that we have gained before the deployment, and that is so important operationally, might no longer be relevant. We must also remember that our own culture and behaviours are pre-determined in the same way as of the area of operation population's. Hence, considering cultures in isolation, and not understanding our own cultural biases, might lead to the inability of internalizing adversaries culture – which is a crucial step towards higher operational culture skill, the cultural competence and genuinely effective use of operationalization of culture.

This leads to another conclusion that is hardly ever mentioned in military literature pertaining to culture of the AOO: conflict and post-war societies, in particular with the presence of external armed forces in the region, are not subject to the same mechanisms that societies in state of peace and relative balance. In any kind of research on such societies then, the anthropology of post-war societies should be applied additionally.²⁹³ Only then operationalization of culture understood as all the process and skills concerning identification of vital for military activities features of culture of any

²⁹² The definition of culture was coined after reviewing existing definitions of culture found among others in: Kroeber, Alfred Clyde Kluckhohn. *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*. Vintage Books: New York, 1952, Barnard, Alan i Johnatan Spencer. *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*. Routledge: London and New York, 2002, Nowicka, Ewa. *Świat człowieka-świat kultury*. Antologia tekstów klasycznej antropologii. PWN: Warsaw, 2007.

²⁹³ Anthropology of war and post-war societies is a branch of social anthropology. More about its methods, processes and mechanisms in, among others: Lubkeman, Stephen. *Culture in Chaos. An Anthropology of the Social Condition in War*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2008; Snyder, Jack. „Anarchy and Culture. Insights from Anthropology of War.” *International Organization*. Volume 56, Number 1, Winter 2002 (p. 7-45) or Bhathia, Michael. *Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict*. Routledge: New York, 2008



object of the activity (so either the AOO/AOR population, the "enemy" or allied forces) and integrating such knowledge and skills into planning, pre-deployment preparation and conduct of operations can be truly effective.²⁹⁴

6.2. The Influence of Cultural Factors on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Cultural factors can have a significant influence on effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. It is then not only the CMIC or PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) components that should undergo cultural training, but to proper extent, all those engaged into operation. Assessing what is the influence of cultural factors on the conduct and effectiveness of the operation at the tactical and operational levels, all of the surveyed agreed that it has great impact, in particular at the tactical level where specific tasks are being implemented.²⁹⁵ Hence, it is crucial to train lower-rank soldiers in cultural awareness and skills, as usually it is them who have the most contact with local population, and their behaviour influences local perception of military activities as such. Also, at the operational level where campaign plans are designed, the commanders without proper preparation can create plans and objectives that are counter-effective in given specific cultural reality. Similarly to the previous question, the respondents underlined the importance of understanding the culture of the AOO, a non-judgmental approach, respect towards traditions different than their own and refraining from imposing one's own cultural perspective as the only proper one.²⁹⁶

Cultural factors, however, are present in a variety of ways at different levels of the operations. "Cultural awareness", the term that NATO has designated to all levels of operationalisation of culture in the initial period of the MNE 6 (Multinational Experiment No.6), is not an all-covering skill for deployed personnel, since the influence of cultural factors on the mission's overall success will be different at each of its levels, and different set of skills pertaining to cultural competence will be demanded. At the strategic/political level, cultural aspects of the area of operation and their awareness by the decisive components, will be the major determinant of shaping the political goals and the strategic aims of the operation. Improper inclusion of the cultural factors in the planning

²⁹⁴ Definition based on Bados, Victor. Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations. Best Practices. SP TRADOC Directorate for Research, Doctrine, Organization and Materiel: Granada, 2010 (p. 7)

²⁹⁵ Kamila Trochowska, Forthcoming publication 2017.

²⁹⁶ It was particularly stressed by respondents from countries where Islam is a dominant religion.



processes might render the goals difficult or hard to achieve. At the operational level, cultural factors shape the chain of command decisions and impact the level of security in the area of operation, as wrong inclusion of the cultural data hinders gaining local population's support, lowering hence the effectiveness of either counterinsurgency or counterterrorism. At the tactical level, where the forces have most contact with the culturally diverse environment, even minor cultural mistakes and misunderstandings might lead to the negative perception of the forces by the local population, whose support, as aforementioned, must be gained. Not to mention the fact that any cultural blunders at the higher levels of planning and command, will be passed on to lower levels of the operation, creating a spiral of mistakes.

Another point to consider is that the perception of culture of the AOO will be always influenced by one's own cultural perspective. Research results have shown, 91% of the respondents have confirmed that their own culture, and specific features if their military culture do influence operational effectiveness, both positively and negatively.²⁹⁷ The factors that were indicated as those that have meaning operationally are:

- Liberal understanding of gender roles and focus on individual rights that makes the cooperation with traditional and conservative societies difficult (USA).
- Religion – it is easier if either the religion of the AOO is the same as the units', or the unit can display enough of religious tolerance and sensitivity. (Afghanistan, South Korea)
- Openness, respect and tolerance towards other cultures (Australia, Pakistan).
- Willingness to create friendly relations with the local population to maintain harmony (South Korea).
- Tradition of multiculturalism in one's mother society (Australia, Germany, Singapore, Canada).

The danger of misunderstanding the cultural dynamics *hinders both full situational awareness and perception of the enemy and irregular threat, was already noticed centuries ago by the Chinese classic of strategic thought, Sun Tzu. As he stated: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy, but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and yourself, you are certain*

²⁹⁷ This research and studies referred to in this section on cultural competency were completed by Kamila Trochowska, in forthcoming publication 2017.



in every battle to be in peril".²⁹⁸ The particular significance of the self-awareness and the ability to internationalize adversaries' culture in facing any asymmetric opponent, was also expressed in the Operational Culture for Deploying Personnel U.S. Marine Corps manual. As it claims, the purpose of the double, in-depth awareness is to keep the deployed personnel "in the same ballpark and the same sport as the enemy, who is able to control this aspect of the game because it is his country, his culture, and his language. The insurgent gets to define who he says he is, not the foreign army who is fighting him. In other words, you have to defeat him on his cultural terms, yours".²⁹⁹

6.3. Levels of operationalisation of Culture

To systematize the levels of operationalization of culture, and the range of knowledge and skills demanded from different components engaged in given an peace operation, paradoxically, the lower the operational level, the higher the responsibility. The popular concept of cultural awareness, that in most of the military literature covers all levels, is only the first stage of operationalisation of culture. The range of cultural information and intercultural skills required from the forces, will vary at different levels of the operation. The most comprehensive model of the type of skills demanded at various levels of the operation is based on Bloom's Taxonomy for Cognition, recommended in the executive report of the 2008-2010 NATO's Multinational Experiment No 6, goal 4.3. devoted to shaping cultural awareness for the purpose of military operations:

²⁹⁸ Tzu, Sun. The Art of War: The Denma Translation. Schambala Publications: Boston, 2002

²⁹⁹ CACOL USMC. Operational Culture for Deploying Personnel. Center for Advanced Operational Culture




Figure 6.2: Bloom's Taxonomy for Cognition: Levels of operationalization of culture.³⁰⁰

The importance of Bloom's hierarchy rests on the creation of a scale to portray levels of a staff's abilities to use culture operationally. At the base of the scale stands the ability to identify and describe given culture, which equals cultural awareness (cultural understanding). Further on, lies the ability to internalize culture, i.e. the skill of taking the investigated object's point of view as one's own for better understanding of certain phenomena and threats, and accurate prediction. Over cultural understanding we find the ability to use cultural information across Lines of Operation (LOOs), which demands high-level cultural competence. Bados provides a perfect example of the application of the taxonomy on a battlefield situation: "a team may benefit from being trained to understand that certain cultural ideas or terms apply to an operational environment. They may be able to recognize some of these terms and use them in the development of operational plans: to understand, apply, and repeat back. It does not necessarily mean that the team is capable of performing in-depth analysis and evaluation that permit them to determine operational relevance in certain bits of cultural information. Without analysis and evaluation, it is difficult to determine second and third level effects, or to break previous inaccurate perceptions. If they are unable to do this, they may be incapable of progressing to the highest step in Bloom's hierarchy, to create innovative plans that achieve the appropriate effect".³⁰¹

³⁰⁰ Bados, Victor. Operationalization of culture.... Op. cit. (p. 9)

³⁰¹ Ibid.



However, those categories do not embrace merely cultural knowledge – the higher the level, the higher the demanded cultural knowledge range. The American Psychological Association have defined three domains for effective intercultural cooperation, which are: cultural self-awareness, cultural awareness (knowledge) and cross-cultural skills that enable the use of the knowledge and awareness once mastered in interpersonal relations.³⁰² Division between cultural knowledge (specific) and intercultural skills that are universal enable swift adaptation to culturally new environment, even if the ethnographic knowledge range is limited. Yet, they are hardly ever trained before deployment. This is one of the central difficulties with current training on culture in peacekeeping, i.e. strategic skills that enable effective activity from strategic to tactical level. Specific cultural knowledge serves only one operation.³⁰³ The problem is, that as aforementioned, most of contemporary cultural training it is the specific knowledge that is being focused on, although in stress conditions, in constantly shifting environment, most of the knowledge cannot be used without proper enablers. In the military operations field today, personnel often have to join an operation where there will be not much time to prepare, in which case those skills will be invaluable.

6.4. Cross-Cultural Competence Training Methods

The theoretical deliberation on intercultural competence for the purposes of security and defence should begin with defining basic terms. Knowledge about cultural studies, intercultural awareness and intercultural competence is not widely spread and it is often misled. Yet, critical spheres for effective intercultural communication defined by the American Psychological Association include: awareness of own culture, opinions, beliefs, convictions that influence our perception of the world and different cultures; intercultural awareness that focuses on knowing and understanding regional culture mechanisms in material and non- material aspects; and finally, the universal cultural competence that enables us to use the first two resources of knowledge.³⁰⁴ It is especially important while approaching the key division between specific cultural knowledge and the universal

³⁰² Aghop Der-Karabetian, Christopher T.H. Liang, Glenn C. Gams. Handbook of Multicultural Measures. "Multi-cultural Competence Measures". Sage Publications Inc: Black Oaks, 2011. www.sage-ereference.com

³⁰³ Glick-Turnley, Jessica. Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF are. JSOU Report11-1. Joint Special Operations University: Tampa, 2011


³⁰⁴ Der-Karabetian, Aghop, et al. Handbook of Multicultural Measures, "Multicultural Competence Measures", Sage Publications Inc: Black Oaks, 2011.



abilities that let us operate in foreign culture (intercultural competence) even if we lack full ethnographical knowledge concerning the given region. These universal competences are “strategic capabilities that let us act effectively from strategic to tactical level.”³⁰⁵

The problem arises because cultural trainings for defence purposes, both in homeland and abroad, the main effort is put to the specific culture knowledge of a specific region where the operation will be conducted. Such an approach leaves less space for intercultural competence development. Abilities for adaptation in constantly changing socio-cultural environment are also limited and they are absolutely essential while facing stressors or unpredictable events.

Intercultural competence training may be divided into following segments: universal intercultural competence training (conducted by means of experimental and didactic methods) and training of competences that may be useful in a specific culture or region (also conducted by means of experimental and didactic methods). To anchor these methods of intercultural competence training in the military methodology we may assume that subject and object methods belong to didactic methods, while practical and problematic methods are experimental.



³⁰⁵ Glick-Turnley, Jessica. Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF are JSOU Report11-1, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa 2011, p. 33.



Figure 6.3: Methods of intercultural competence training³⁰⁶

The experimental methods in this matter are used to create the cultural relativism. They include:

Simulations and decision-making games conducted both by means of computer programs as well as during direct interaction of students. Problems of intercultural interaction may be raised by:

- provocation methods - the tool for creative thinking (according to de Bono) the aim of which is to reverse the frames of thinking and to consider completely new situations that widen the creativity;
- mental maps that consist of visual representation of given subject by means of drawings, pictures, photos, newspaper cuttings, symbols, ideograms and short, dynamic keywords, (the set point is any complex problem).

Shaping own intercultural awareness by exploring stereotypes of own culture, developing the network or mandalas of connections with other cultures or creating the profile of own identity based on cultural features. Acquiring intercultural competence by interactions with representatives of different cultures or spending some time living or working in regions of different culture. However, shaping the regional competence by means of didactic methods include:

- Lectures with multimedia support of the culture and its relations to other cultures;
- Discussions on the culture;
- Language training;
- Case studies on alternative scenarios;
- Self-studies with literature on the given region and culture, internet sources or courses like ADL that widen knowledge on the culture.

The range of experimental methods available in this matter is the key to shape the practical regional intercultural competence. This should, first of all, include:

- Intercultural communication workshop, best with presence of target culture representative.
- Processing the knowledge on the culture derived from didactic part of studies, mainly by creating maps or mandalas of historical, social or culture connections to the other culture or by confronting differences between cultures with scenarios such as “Poles in Kazakhstan”.

³⁰⁶ Kamila Trochowska, Forthcoming publication 2017. Based on: Landis, Dan et. al. Handbook of Intercultural Training, Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, 2004 (p. 39-40).



Simulations and decision-making games, both computer aided and conducted among students, where problematic situations may be solved by:

- decision tree method, based on stating the possible ways out of the problem;
- decision table method, that allows the choice of specific solution from given criteria;
- decision paths method that points out, which solutions may be available in future when the method of proceedings is chosen and decisions made;
- negotiation method;
- conflicts map method that teaches to define the conflict, demands, needs of both sides, and redefines conflict with possible solutions;
- Role playing and other methods of culture schemes internalization.

Effective training on intercultural competence covers the obligatory component of general competence studies. Only then regional competence studies may be applied with different experimental and didactic methods. The whole educational process may be diversified with the use of ICT, which - while smartly used - support the acquisition of universal and regional intercultural competence.

6.5. Cross-Cultural Competence for the Military

In 2009, the US Army implemented the Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS), the aim of which is to integrate various levels of cultural knowledge and skills in not only pre-deployment, but also life-long officer career development. It indicates specific and general cultural knowledge and skills domains that the Army needs to function effectively in all circumstances.³⁰⁷ The domains that the document enlists for general cultural skills development are:

- Knowledge: understanding one's own cultural determinants, the ability to use the tools to analyse intercultural relations and the influence of cultural factors on operational conduct and effectiveness.
- Skills: interpersonal skills, adaptability, cross-cultural communication skills and the ability of modifying one's behaviour to given

³⁰⁷ U.S. Army HQ. Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy. U.S. Army HQ: Washington, 2010 (p. 9)



- Attitudes: non-judgmental, open and tolerant approach, empathy, the ability to internalize other cultural patterns.³⁰⁸

Concerning regional competence that is needed for specific operation and enables effective adaptation to culturally different environment, those domains will be as follows:

- Knowledge: key historical, cultural, political and religious aspects of the given country, terrain, AOO or specific social group of interest
- Skills: the ability to take up different cultural perspectives and regulating one's own attitudes, behaviours means of communication and expression according to the given situational context
- Attitudes: positive attitude towards local population, willingness to learn a new culture.³⁰⁹

Still, the question is how to distribute those knowledge and skills domains between various ranks, at different operational levels. According to the survey research, the division will be most effective when lower rank soldiers and NCOs will be trained in basic cultural awareness and specific cultural knowledge, but not least important for them is self-cultural awareness and internationalization of culture skills.³¹⁰ The officers should be equipped, apart from the above, in deeper understanding of culture that enables effective cooperation with the population and implementation of operational goals, plus the skill of integrating cultural specificity of the AOO in operational plans and conduct. The commanders then, having mastered the previous skills, must possess also high extent of cultural expertise, to be able to understand second- and third-degree effects of their actions, whereas from civilian specialists, full cultural expertise is demanded. The proportions might be best summarized by the following chart:³¹¹

³⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 30-32

³⁰⁹ Ibidem (p. 20-22)

³¹⁰ Kamila Trochowska. Forthcoming 2017

³¹¹ The research was made available to Kamila Trochowska courtesy of General Jens Prestegard from US CENTCOM, and has not been published yet. More about the project of Helena Wallenberg at <http://www.lemshaga.se/helena/>.




Figure 6.4: Cultural skills demanded at various levels of command.

We see that the aforementioned universal cultural skills are equally important for all ranks engaged in given operation – if not more important than specific cultural knowledge. Moreover, the surveyed have stressed in their answers that focus on training higher-rank soldiers, instead of lower ones is a mistake, as they are the one that put the foot forward for the whole component, and usually are the once that have most contact with the local population, and that respect for other culture is the very basis of any cultural understanding and successful interaction. Proper cultural training of all components engaged in operation is crucial.

Another theoretical model of dividing cultural knowledge and skills bases on the tactical, operational and strategic levels division has been created by Jennifer Chandler. She suggests a three-stage model of intelligence preparation for the forces, focusing hence more on region- specific knowledge rather than the skills, but it does outline well ranges of knowledge that should be distributed during pre-



deployment training.³¹² The list provided is a very detailed outline of the ranges of cultural knowledge demanded at basic, intermediate and advanced level of cultural understanding, and was used in creating knowledge bases for each level of command. Effective operationalization of culture is an indispensable toolkit for today's soldiers, and the surveyed have outlined that proper level and proportions of cultural knowledge and skills, makes the conduct of operations easier, enables effective adaptation of the soldiers to the environment, thanks to which the stress and PTSD levels are vaguely diminished. Other benefits mentioned by the respondents can be summarized in the following chart.³¹³




Figure 6.5: The influence of cultural knowledge and competencies of the soldiers on operational effectiveness.

Of course, those skills are not the only aspect that enables operational success, but in population-centric operations they are a key one, since armed forces that do not respect local rules and fail to understand cultural dynamics. In this way, they are not only undermining the effectiveness of the operation – they are also a cultural threat to the local population.³¹⁴ And this fact completely contradicts their basic function nowadays: providing widely understood security.

³¹² Chandler, Jennifer. Why Culture Matters: An Empirically-Based Pre-Deployment Training Program. Naval

³¹³ Kamila Trochowska. Forthcoming 2017

³¹⁴ Cultural threats category includes among others violating human rights and basic freedoms, cultural and religious prejudices, ethnic/religious/civilizational discrimination, imposing cultural schemes and the destruction of native cultures. They usually occur due to low level of cultural education and xenophobia. Jakubczak, Ryszard and Józef Flis. (Ed.) Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XXI wieku: Wyzwania i strategie. Ch. 3.2., XIII and XIV. Bellona: Warsaw, 2006



To systematize the above considerations, we can characterize stages of operationalization of culture through the division of competences, knowledge and skills levels demanded at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operational planning and conduct.³¹⁵

At the strategic level, where operation's strategic and political goals are designed, and the size of force and methods of its application are specified, the political and military components need a wide range of geostrategic knowledge. Not only the global environments dynamics should be understood, along with the nature of contemporary threats, but also the specific regional situation of the area in which the operation will be conducted. It is also crucial to take into account the nature of threats in the future AOO, as it is the prerequisite to proper assessment of the kind and size of military force to be deployed. Profound analysis of political and strategic and security culture, along with socio-cultural dynamics is demanded at this level, as otherwise the strategic goals set might be completely unrealistic, as it was in the case of Afghanistan, where the political system that was to be built, was utterly contradictory to cultural realms of the region.³¹⁶ We must also be able to predict second- and third-order effects of our actions in political, economic and social spheres for the region – and the whole global security environment. Moreover, the ability to predict and analyse the new potential social movements and phenomena that will result from those decisions is also demanded, as alternative lines of action can be prepared, in case negative phenomena of this nature should occur.³¹⁷

Concerning universal cultural skills, intercultural competence is demanded, as it enables profound analysis of socio-cultural aspects of the operational environment, complemented by intercultural creativity that enables coining knowledge and actions into strategic effect.³¹⁸ Other inevitable skills will be: understanding the complexity of cultural contexts, the ability to create a perspective enabling effective operation in complex environment and using cultural symbols in direct and media communication to create common group identity with the recipients.

³¹⁵ The division by strategic, tactical and operational level is based on the outlines given in NATO Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-01. NATO Standardization Agency: Brussels, 2010

³¹⁶ Methods of analysis of political, strategic and security culture have been outlined in, among others, Lewellen, Ted. *Political Anthropology: An Introduction*. Praeger: Westport, 2003; Johnson, Jeannie. *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum Project*. Science Applications International Corporation, Fort Belvoir: Virginia, 2006; Kim, Yiyul. *Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy*. Letort Papers Series. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle, 2009.

³¹⁷ Theories that will be of use to support this issue would be Merton's adaptation to anomie theory (Merton, Robert. "Social Structure and Anomie". *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 3, No. 5/October 1938 (p. 672-3), social movement theory (Chandler, Jennifer. "The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory". *Strategic Insights*. Volume V No. 5/2005). <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA521540>) or cultural trauma theory (Sztompka, Piotr. "Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change". *European Journal of Social Theory* 3(4). Sage Publications: London, 2000).

³¹⁸ More about shaping strategic skills in: Simmons, Anna. *Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy: What It Is, and Why We Need It*. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College: Carlisle, 2010



During cultural training at this level then, the advanced knowledge template created by Jennifer Chandler can be of use.³¹⁹

ADVANCED LEVEL TEMPLATE (STRATEGIC LEVEL)

- Intermediate Level JIPOE Template
- Seminar / Panel Discussions / Scenario Discussions on Strategic Analytical Issues, Impact on Mission, 2nd and 3rd Order Effects and Consequence Management
- Strategic Issues and Analysis
- Civil Military Relations Concepts and Frameworks and Debates
- Comparative Politics Concepts and Frameworks and Debates
- International Relations Concepts and Frameworks and Debates
- Political Economy Concepts and Frameworks and Debates
- Use of Violence
- Tactics (reasons for use, suicide bombings)
- Spiral and desensitization
- Discriminate vs. indiscriminate use and effects
- Use of religion
- Motivating interests
- Historical Analysis and Debates
- Post conflict and reconstruction issues and concerns
- Nation building issues and concerns
- Democracy debates
- Colonial era lessons learned
- Building legitimacy and the local level
- Counterinsurgency Concepts / Frameworks / Debates
- Modernization / Globalization and Impact on Identity Development
- Religion and Political Ideology
- Media and IO and Influence Issues
- Current Events and Situation Dynamics

³¹⁹ Chandler, Jennifer. Why Culture Matters... Op. cit.



Concerning the operational level, where campaign plans are shaped, the proper situational assessment is the basis of implementing effective solutions to achieve established strategic goals. Profound analysis of first of strategic, then military/organization culture of either the state or target group is demanded.³²⁰ Secondly, deep understanding of socio-cultural dynamics will be of use, to predict most serious problems that might occur while working with the local population, gaining its trust, separating it from the enemy, and state building activities. The aforementioned ability to analyse new socio-cultural phenomena, along with methods of enemy component culture investigation should be implemented here.³²¹ It is also crucial to create alternative modes of action, as the situation will be constantly changing, and so do have to the plans and solutions we will be implementing at this level. It will be also useful while adopting aid projects, which, as Afghan and Iraqi operations experiences show, seem reasonable from forces' cultural point of view, but completely inadequate to the reality of the AOO.

Concerning universal cultural skills at this stage, it will be most visible whether cultural aspects of the AOO have been integrated into operational plans. Hence, internalisation of culture skills are a must, to be able to understand how military activities will be perceived by the local population, whose trust must be gained. During creating training programs at this stage, the Jennifer Chandler's intermediate level knowledge template will be proper, including:

INTERMEDIATE LEVEL TEMPLATE (OPERATIONAL LEVEL)

- Current Situation and Mission
- Conceptualization of the Operational Environment
- Introduction General Geographic Orientation and Overview
- Social Organization and Culture – Mission-Relevant Aspects
- Density and Distribution of Population/Demographic Groups
- Social Structure and Organization
- Public Health

³²⁰ Guidelines on military and organizational culture analysis can be found, among others in NATO, RTO. Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors. RTO, November, 2008.

³²¹ At this point, the influence of socio-cultural factors on operational effectiveness should be taken into account, along with methods such as Root Cause Analysis, SWOT or intercultural marketing targeting analysis. More about those in: Okes, Duke. Root Cause Analysis: The Core of Problem Solving and Corrective Action. Milwaukee: Quality Press, 2009; O.C. Ferrel and Michael Hartline. Marketing Strategy. Cengage Learning: Mason, 2011 ; Usunier, Jean-Claude and Julie Lee. Marketing Across Cultures. Pearson Education: Harlow, 2005



- Religion
- Economic Organization and Dynamics
- Political Organization and Dynamics
- Law and Justice
- Media Analysis
- What Government Services are Vital to Mission Success
- Detailed Analysis of Opposition Groups
- Analysis of Key Leaders (Government, Elite, Opposition Groups)
- Analysis of Administration / Bureaucracy
- Analysis of Political Programs or Resources that Might Generate Favourable Support, Stabilize Neutral Groups or Neutralize Potential Threats
- Elites
- Regional Issues
- Military or Paramilitary and/or Security Force Organization and Dynamics
- Historical Dynamics and Analysis
- Cross Cultural Communication
- Some of this may be incorporated into other areas
- Motivation: Why Study and Historical Examples of Failures
- Ethnocentrism Issues and Examples and How Impacts Mission
- Weaver's CCC Comparison
- Social Structure
- Philosophic Outlook
- Psychological Orientation
- Thought Patterns
- Basic Values
- Perception
- Interaction
- Protocol / Customs and Courtesies
- Greetings
- Gestures and hand signs
- Visiting
- Negotiations and business
- Displays of affection



- Dating and marriage
- Gifts
- Expectations / Do's and Don'ts
- Clothing
- Food/Diet/Eating
- Work and recreation
- Monuments and Historical Buildings / Sites Overview
- Names (if needed)
- Negotiation Training (as needed)
- Language Basics (as needed)
- Current Events Discussion
- Sources and Resources.³²²

The range is, however, also dependent on the command level and function, and must be complemented with the development of universal skills, attitudes and enablers.

Lastly, at the tactical level, where most of the interaction with local population takes place, a more detailed and profound knowledge about the AOO is needed, including enemy's organizational culture and military culture of given state – in case local security forces should be trained. Moreover, understanding own and allied military cultures, along with the organizational culture of non-military components working in the AOO is necessary for the armed forces as thus the cooperation will be more effective. The same pertains to the socio-cultural dynamics of the AOR of given components, since they should be operationalized by higher command positions, both for planning and execution of kinetic and non-kinetic tasks. Lower-rank components that have contact with local population, should be moreover well trained in intercultural communication and proper cultural behaviour. It indeed makes their adaptation into the environment easier, and the forces will be better perceived by the local population. Otherwise, as aforementioned, improper behaviour of a single soldier can ruin the whole component's months of work.

The universal cultural skills needed at this level that are indispensable for proper use of the above knowledge range are first of all the ability to understand one's own cultural perspective and

³²² More detailed categories can be found in Chandler, Jennifer. *Why Culture Matters...* Op. cit.



internalize other cultural schemes with more ease. Then we can understand how the local population will perceive our actions, and there will be greater chance to avoid the enemy use our mistakes for his advantage. Moreover, the intermediate and advanced skills outlined by Selmeski will be of use here, such as the ability to interpret cultural symbols and behaviours, the skills of effective cooperation with culturally diverse groups, and the flexibility to adapt our behaviours to the context, as only then reaching our goals would be more probable. Also the ability to present our own cultural background and values will be demanded, as it is good to familiarize the local people with another culture in a way, and through behaviours that do not violate or offend anybody.

During cultural training for that level, cultural knowledge and skills should be integrated with operational demands – instead of serving raw sets of abstract ethnographic knowledge. The basic template created by Jennifer Chandler can be the good knowledge source, including the following knowledge fields:

BASIC LEVEL TEMPLATE (TACTICAL LEVEL)

- Current Situation and Mission
- Conceptualization of the Operational Environment
- Broad Country Orientation
- Keep this tailored to mission relevant aspects of each topic
- Geography / Terrain
- May or may not want to include this – can leave it to Intel to do
- National / Regional / Local AOR intro – towns, cities, rural areas, big picture look
- History
- Overview
- Historical ties impacting or influencing current situation
- Regional Issues
- Interests in influences of other foreign powers
- Demographics & Societal Look
- Transportation
- Religion
- Continuum of beliefs
- Concepts of war
- Significant Religious and Historical Dates



- Economics
- Political and Military Overview
- Contentious Politics / Opposition Continuum
- Threats / Local Issues / Narratives
- Based on mission and unit location
- Views of U.S. and Use of Media / PA Issues / IO Concerns
- If not covered by PA and Ops/Intel folks
- Protocol / Customs and Courtesies
- This sections depends on deploying location of support personnel, they may or may not need this
- Greetings
- Gestures and Hand Signs
- Visiting
- Negotiations and Business
- Displays of Affection
- Gifts
- Expectations
- Do's and Don'ts
- Clothing
- Diet
- Monuments and Historical Buildings / Sites Overview
- Names (if needed)
- Cross Cultural Communication
- Motivation: Why Study and Historical Examples of Failures
- Modified Klein's Cultural Lens Model
- Identity (similarities and differences)
- Time Horizon
- Achievement vs. Relationship
- Locus of Control
- Tolerance for Uncertainty
- Power Distance
- Hypothetical vs. Concrete Reasoning
- Attribution (Root Cause vs. Systems Approach)
- Differentiation vs. Dialectical Reasoning



- Ethnocentrism Issues and Examples and How Impacts Mission
- Placed in context of unit deployment location and mission
- Placed in context of problem solving issues: problem definition, planning, prediction, coordination, and training
- Military relevant solutions
- Short vs. Long term goals and needs
- Discuss U.S. versus local interests
- Initial Language Basics (if needed)
- Related to mission duties
- Sources and Resources.³²³

7. International Experiences in Operationalization of Culture – Existing Solutions

With the emergence of population-centric operations, an urgent need of considering cultural factors of the Area of Operation emerged. However, the missing link between the awareness of the cultural aspects of threats, and operational plans that consider them, has not yet been found and fully utilized in military planning and conduct of operations. Due to the wide spectrum of cultural and societal factors influencing the operational environment, those operations gave priority to non-kinetic military activities, such as psychological operations (PSYOPS), information operations (INFO OPS) or the significance of civil-military cooperation components (CIMIC), which base on in-depth understanding of the cultural aspects of the reality they work in.

Hence, contemporary operational success can only be achieved when the situational awareness of the operational environment is full and in-depth, and cultural awareness of the area of operation is a vital component of overall situational awareness. Therefore, we face a need for the skill of operationalization of culture, understood as all the process and skills involved in identifying vital for military activities cultural features of any object of the activity (so either the AOO/AOR population, the "enemy" or allied forces), and integration of such knowledge and skills in planning, pre-deployment preparation, decision-making process and general conduct of operations. It also includes the integration of universal cultural competences training into the overall officers' career training development. The culture-general competences training is proven to be an optimal solution

³²³ Chandler, Jennifer. Why Culture Matters... Op. cit.



that enables the soldiers not only to adjust to the culturally „alien” operational environment, but also the more effective cooperation within multinational environment. Therefore, a critical review of guidelines and experiences in NATO and non-NATO countries was done, including the experiences of Germany, Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, Australia, Singapore, Romania, Thailand, Pakistan, Armenia and Afghanistan.

7.1. NATO'S 'Cultural Turn'

Both the "cultural turn" of the U.S. Department of Defence and the deteriorating situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, brought changes in NATO operational doctrines and solutions. They were summarized in the recommendations after the Multinational Experiment No. 6 (MNE 6) that ended in 2010. In particular, within goal 4.3, which focused exactly on improving the efficiency of operations through the increase of cultural awareness of soldiers operating in an operational environment that is "alien" in terms of traditions, social relations, ways of life and culture. As detailed in the initiating report Multinational Experiment 6 Baseline Assessment 2008 USJFC, basic cultural issues in the operational environment, addressed in the edition of the MNE were primarily:

- Lack of ability to understand the dynamics of the operational environment in the social, cultural, political, legal and economic aspects.
- A Negligible number of staff beyond the special forces trained in combating asymmetric threats and counterinsurgency operations (COIN), and educated on the issues of cultural awareness and cross-cultural communication.
- Lack of effective intercultural communication strategies.
- The diversity of the organizational cultures within the operational environment and problems with procedural and operational coordination between the different military, governmental and non-governmental organizations working in the area of operation.
- Joint forces and other interagency components must reach a common understanding of the operational environment.
- Commanders need a comprehensive training in the competencies and capabilities of combined, international and other governmental organizations (OGA).³²⁴

³²⁴ Pamplos, Francesco and Jacinto Pena. Ed. Cross-Cultural Awareness: Analytical Concept. MNE 6 Goal 4.3. Draft Version. SP TRADOC Directorate for Research, Doctrine and Materiel. Granada, January 2010 (p. 18-19).



After the NATO Bucharest summit of 2008, five key regions of allied activities were set out that included planning, conduct and coordination of military and non-military tasks within operations; assessment of the environmental impact of operations and activities on civilians in post-conflict reconstruction phase; consolidation, development and the exchange of operational experiences between countries, training and educational programs to prepare for participation in operations, development of cooperation with international actors and organizations in the context of civil-military relations, and the issues of public diplomacy and the quality of the stabilization and reconstruction in all phases of operation.³²⁵

Aspects of multiculturalism in collaboration of multinational and multiagency components were also explored during the Multinational Experiment 7 (2011-2012). Here, however, effective intercultural cooperation in security management of maritime, airspace and cyberspace were focused on.³²⁶

MNE 6 was based on the comprehensive approach to effectively combat asymmetric opponents also through the emphasis the social determinants of developments in the area of operations, cross-cultural awareness and the enhancement of an integrated civil-military reconstruction process. The intended targets to be achieved by the sixth edition of MNE in relation to our terms were:

Goal 4. Common situational understanding of the operating environment.

- 4.1. Development of methods, processes, structures, personnel and tools that enable the collection and analysis of information by multinational military components.
- 4.2. Development of capacity and skills of the coalition forces, their international partners, government agencies and NGOs to combat asymmetric threats and guerrilla warfare.
- 4.3. The development of the cross-cultural awareness concept for military operations and the use of cultural studies' tools to create training programs for the implementation of cross-cultural awareness among soldiers and commanders of the allied forces.
- 4.4. Improvement of logistics in the ISAF operation.
- 4.5. The creation of operational and strategic model of logistics management in the asymmetric threats environment.³²⁷

³²⁵ NATO. "A Comprehensive Approach". NATO A-Z. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm (Accessed 25 October 2010)

³²⁶ NATO. "MNE 7: Access to Global Commons", 16 May 2011. <http://www.act.nato.int/top-headlines/mne-7-access-to-the-global-commons> (Accessed 20 November 2011)

³²⁷ Royal Norwegian Army. Multinational Experiment 6. Multimedia presentation. Oslo, 9 June 2009. www.mne.oslo.mil.no:8080/Multinatio/Briefer/Presentasj (10.10.2010)



To sum-up goal 4.3., a set of recommendations was created on the basis of allied solutions and best possible in the field of operationalization of culture for the purpose of military operations. They were summarized in three products of the goal, namely Guidelines for Commanders and Staffs: How to Engage with Local Societies During Military Operations, Guidelines for Commanders and Staffs: Operationalization Of Culture Into Military Operations (Best Practices) and Guidelines for Commanders and Staffs: How to Incorporate Cross Cultural Awareness into Syllabi/Curricula and Training Programs.³²⁸ The basis of the concepts and solutions was laid out in Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations. The solutions proposed in the publication are the concept of training foreign area officers and employing cultural advisers (CULADs) the use of Human Terrain Teams, and Red & Green Teaming and Re-framing/Profiling actors' analysis method.

The concept of regional officers – cultural specialists (FAO) and cultural advisors originated from the U.S. military. Such position is usually attached to the Marine Expeditionary Force component or other units, depending on their geographical locations where such officers serve as advisors to commanders on cultural matters. Their main role is the expertise in the integration of cultural factors in the planning and conduct of operations, and assistance in predicting the secondary and tertiary effects of the operation on the local population and culture.³²⁹ Advisors also participate in exercises, simulations, conferences and workshops to maintain an appropriate level of professionalism. Interestingly, the process of training lasts from two to five for the FAO and the last ten years or more for a CULAD.³³⁰ It includes an in-depth education on the culture, mainly in the form of living and working in the area.

Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), the second recommended concept, base on the American concept under the same name, but due to some lessons learned during the original HTT activities, they are modified. They still are five- to nine-person teams of social sciences and operational background, deployed by the Human Terrain System (HTS) to support field commanders by filling their cultural knowledge gap in the current operating environment and providing cultural interpretations of

³²⁸ Multinational Experiment 6. Campaign Report. 4 February 2011.
<http://mne.oslo.mil.no:8080/Multinatio/MNE6produkt/MNE6FinalR/file/MNE6%20Final%20Report.pdf> (Accessed 11. October 2013)

³²⁹ Bados, Victor. Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations: Best Practices. SP TRADOC: Granada, 2010 (p. 13-14).

³³⁰ Ibid.p.38



events occurring within their area of operations. Their goal is also the same: to fill the cultural knowledge void by gathering ethnographic, economic, and cultural data about the AOO and provide databases and tools to support analysis and decision making processes. The NATO-recommended HTTs, however, have a way much more developed structure and support, and are built upon seven components, or “pillars”: human terrain teams, reach-back research cells, subject-matter expert-networks, a tool kit, techniques, human terrain information, and specialized training.³³¹ Their broader scope of research and reach-back support is supposed to spare the mistakes of the original American HTTs.

The last recommended solution is Red & Green Teaming and Re-framing/Profiling actors’ analysis method, a concept that has been convened by the Swedish Ministry of Defence, and is in principle a modified version of the aforementioned U.S. Army Red Teaming concept. The concept was developed to a point where it was possible to apply a method to generate all the involved actors’ analysis in order to become more holistic and comprehensive and engulf the different range of stakeholders that coalition forces has to confront. “It could be defined as a method to understand the mind-set of relevant actors in an area of operation and to contribute to the staff’s learning of the Operational Environment: the Red & Green teams give voice to the key actors in the operation and their main purpose is that of challenging Blue thinking. They discover hidden assumptions and mirror imaging. The method used by the Red & Green teams (Profiling/reframing) focuses attention on seeking to understand the actors’ frames of references in order to come closer to how they might think, what they might want, how they could interpret our actions, and how else we could interpret their beliefs and actions. As opposed to using Blue mind-set and frames of reference to guess what other actors might think or do. This, in turn, lays a better ground for the development of potential Red or Green Course of Action”.³³²

7.2. The American Global Military Culture

Along with NATO spread and the Americanization of global military culture, it would be the United States that sets the tone for other nations’ development, also in the field of cross-cultural competence training. In the US military, each branch of the military is responsible for training their

³³¹ Ibid. p.15

³³² Ibid p. 15



soldiers and civilian participants of operations in 3C. The effort of University of Foreign Militaries and Cultural Studies in Ft. Levenworth, Kansas, (that is responsible for training the Army), Centre for Advanced Operational Culture Learning in Quatico (responsible for the Marines), Joint Special Operations University in Tampa (that trains the Special Forces), US Air Force Culture and Language Centre (responsible for preparing the air force) and US Naval War College in Newport is coordinated by US TRADOC, and ever since the introduction of The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy – ACFLS in 2007 and full implementation of it in 2010, works on standardization are carried on. Out of existing American experiences, most of which have been described and analysed within the NATO context, two more might be worth closer investigation.

Human Terrain System

The flag, yet very controversial initiative that was supposed to improve cultural situational awareness of the area of operation was the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System deployed first in Iraq and later in Afghanistan. Due to requests of Iraqi and Afghan missions commanders, who have noticed that lack of cultural knowledge highly hinders any operational efforts they were undertaking. It was the JIED that was the initial founder of the venture as it had proven that some of the IED attacks were the local population's revenge for the lack of respect of the U.S. soldiers towards the local customs and significant places. Human Terrain Teams, were five- to nine-person teams whose task was to support field commanders by filling their cultural knowledge gap in the current operating environment and providing cultural interpretations of events occurring within their area of operations. The team was composed of individuals with social science and operational backgrounds and deployed with tactical and operational military units: the team commander, social scientists, a research manager and local culture experts. Their main goal was to assist in bringing knowledge about the local population into a coherent analytic framework and build relationships with the local power-brokers in order to provide advice and opportunities to Commanders and staffs in the field.

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Although at the beginning the commanders have witnessed improvement of security situation within their areas of operation, the program envisioned certain failures such as lack of trust of the local population (the patrols have been uniformed and treated as intelligence units although they were gathering unclassified information), unpreparedness of civilian scientists (such as

³³³ Finney, 2008, p. 14-26.



anthropologists and sociologists) to function in battlefield environment, along with objections and condemn of the use of social science for military purposes from the American Anthropological Association (CEAUSSIC, 2009), and eventually the program was suspended in July 2010 (Human Terrain System, 2011). The final conclusions pertaining to the program were not wholly negative though. Despite operational use of civilian scientists in the battlefield might be a matter of controversy, the methodology of the research and subject matters investigated by HTTs might be of use for deployed armed forces. Moreover, in the MNE 6 final report (2011), NATO has recommended the use of Human Terrain Teams during operations, however, in a bit changed shape caused by the lessons learned.

7.3. Operationalization of Culture in the British Army

In NATO countries, operationalization of culture takes numerous forms, but apart from the UK, Germany and Canada (and, of course, the U.S.), nowhere does it take the shape of an institutionalized system. In addition, the majority of the solutions are modelled on the American ones, and the way of their implementation is hence similar. It is worth, however, to have a closer look at a few approaches and solutions in the countries with the most extensive experience in the field.

One of such examples is the British Army, which has a well-designed pre-deployment training in intercultural competencies. Among other things it is thanks to a long tradition of multiculturalism within their own ranks and years of experience in conducting operations abroad. In addition to differences between individual citizens of the United Kingdom (and sometimes animosity, for example, among the soldiers of Scottish descent and the British ones), also more significant cultural differences occur. The British land forces consist of various national groups originating from various world regions including Nepal with 3,400 people (most in the Brigade of Gurkhas), 2,000 from Fiji, more than 900 Jamaicans, 800 from South Africa and Ghana and 600 from Zimbabwe. Other countries of British soldiers' origin include also Seychelles, Mauritius and Malta.³³⁴

Therefore, the British Army stresses the promotion of intercultural understanding, and above all respect as the basis of the soldiers' morale. As we read in the basic doctrinal document regulating

³³⁴ Directorate of Educational and Training Services (Army). British Army Cultural Guidance. Headquarters Land Forces: Wiltshire, 2008 (p.2)



these issues, the British Army Cultural Guidance, respect for others is one of the British Army's core values. Respect lies at the very heart of our fighting power and it is all about trust, cohesion, morale and unit effectiveness. Respect is earned and respect is mutual. You cannot force anyone to respect you just as you cannot be forced to respect someone else. Respect is built on an understanding of other people, taking time to find out who they are, what their background may be and how that background affects how they think and act.³³⁵ The document also contains basic information about the aforementioned national groups that constitute the Army, divided into categories of differences, similarities, hidden cultural patterns and cultural differences that may pose the greatest problems in daily cooperation.

The British Army has also the said Brigade of Gurkhas, composed of soldiers of Nepalese origin. Every year, out of more than 17,000 applicants, 230 are selected to be trained as snipers who will serve within British Army ranks. The new arrivals' training includes 37 weeks of military and language preparation, of which two weeks are spent on cultural familiarization and integration, both in the theoretical and practical dimension.³³⁶ The first phase of cultural adjustment focuses on general orientation and the use of public transport. The second phase is dedicated to functioning in daily life and the third contributes to the continued improvement of everyday functioning in a culturally different environment, either in military or civilian aspect. Some of the knowledge developed during the preparation is later used during pre-deployment training.

Cultural preparation to functioning in various AOOs for the British contingents is well established for the majority of components that need it and bases in vast part on the US Marine pre-deployment solutions in this field. Pre-deployment training is obligatory for all the troops, major attention however, is paid to the preparation of the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU). As of Afghanistan, its role was "to do what HTS does, and more: cultural awareness training for troops, and providing "cultural specialists" to be deployed (who appear to be, for the most part, linguists). A DCSU was involved in the recent failure, Operation Moshtarak, in the so-called "Marjah region." The DCSU is based at Royal Air Force base Henlow, and officially came into being this in April 2009. Lieutenant Colonel Steven Windmill, from the MOD's Afghan specialist implementation team, set up the DCSU. The DCSU's "cultural advisors," deployed in Afghanistan, perform a mission very similar to that of HTS: "They help to identify and understand issues relating to the local cultural, political, economic,

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ British Army. Ghurka Training "Cultural Orientation Programme". British Ministry of Defence. http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/training/18265.aspx (Accessed 11 February 2013)



social and historical environment to help commanders make better and more informed decisions.” There are 25 such individuals, assigned to senior military commanders, with the intention of increasing their number to 40. Each one speaks either Dari and/or Pashto.”³³⁷ Nowadays, however, with the change of training doctrine, the idea of incorporating cross-cultural competence into the lifelong professional development of the soldiers is emerging.

7.4. German solutions to cultural competency

The Bundeswehr began in 2011 the program of transformation and modernization that includes the incorporation of cross-cultural competence training in pre-deployment activities. It is the Central Command (Zentrum für Innere Führung) that is responsible for cross-cultural matters, with the Centre for Intercultural Competence in Koblenz as the research and coordination centre. The survey on intercultural competence in the armed forces performed on the 22nd ISAF rotation in 2010 brought valuable results to this field of activity of the armed forces.³³⁸ Among other findings, the following facts were established:

- Situations in which intercultural interactions create specific implications for the effectiveness of the armed forces, are more common among personnel responsible for security and training the Afghan army and police, where 41% of respondents claimed to have had that contact every day, and 42% indicated weekly encounters. For the rest of the component situation is as follows:

³³⁷ Forte, Maximilian. “More European Press Coverage of the Human Terrain System”. Zero Anthropology portal. July 17, 2010. <http://zeroanthropology.net/2010/07/17/more-european-press-coverage-of-the-human-terrain-system/> (Accessed 01 September 2013)

³³⁸ Hess, Julius. 2012. The Operational Relevance of Culture and the Effectiveness of Cross-Cultural Competence. Empirical Findings from a Panel Study among German Soldiers of the 22nd ISAF contingent. Multimedia presentation. CIMIC Center of Excellence: Enschede, 2012



**“How often have you been in contact with the
local population outside the camp?”
...by military branches**




Figure 7.1. The frequency of soldiers' contacts with the local population.³³⁹

The commanding component had the smallest share in dealing with the local population, but it does not mean that intercultural skills are unnecessary for them. On the contrary, those responsible for major decisions need a broader range of skills that will enable the creation of operational plans tailored to the socio-cultural reality of the AOO.

- Intercultural interactions are important for security since misunderstandings can easily turn into violent conflicts. Still, the majority of respondents experienced events of a positive nature, with 46% that had experienced minor verbal misunderstandings, and 34% that were a part of serious conflicts with the local population. It is still an indication for an increased focus on multicultural issues, as indicated in the following diagram.

³³⁹ Hess, Julius. 2012. The Operational Relevance of Culture and the Effectiveness of Cross-Cultural Competence. Empirical Findings from a Panel Study among German Soldiers of the 22nd ISAF contingent. CIMIC Centre of Excellence: Enschede.



“In the context of these contacts how often did the following occur?”




Figure 7.2. Cultural interactions with the local population.³⁴⁰

Intercultural competencies are mastered to varying degrees by soldiers at various levels of command, where the higher the rank, the higher the level of intercultural competence is, as shown in the following graph:




Figure 7.3. Intercultural competence training among soldiers of various ranks.³⁴¹

³⁴⁰ Hess, Julius. The Operational Relevance of Culture... Op. cit.

³⁴¹ Ibid.



Interestingly, a number of soldiers gain the most knowledge and skills while on operations, and the situation is reversed for higher rank officers. In their case we are dealing with a major abatement of the cross-cultural competence level in relation to the level achieved during training, which should be addressed in the design of pre-deployment training programs.

Concerning the effect of cross-cultural competence in the conduct of operations, it was found that the appropriate level of intercultural skills has a significant impact on reducing misunderstandings with the local population. It also plays a significant role in resolving debates and major conflicts and decreases the levels of stress and uncertainty associated with the operation conducted in a foreign culture.³⁴² In light of these studies, the Bundeswehr has expanded the scope and methods of cross-cultural training conducted by both the centre in Koblenz, as well as individual units. One of the tools used to improve the level of cross-cultural competence are, among others, study boards. Their aim is to develop both universal (Resolving Conflicts, Ethic in Warfare) and regional cultural skills (ISAF and KFOR Training Boards). Each consists of six to ten large format boards that lead the students through several discussions and problem-solving tasks during group work led by a qualified instructor.

7.5. Operationalization of culture in other NATO states

Other NATO states implement various solutions in the field of operationalization of culture at different levels. In most countries, except the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany, which are now beginning their program, operationalization of culture is rather limited to the preparations for the mission, and the use of cultural advisors during the operation. Concerning the attempts to integrate cultural factors into the decision-making process, in none of the countries are such attempts reported. And developing intercultural competence in life-long vocational education and training of commands and staffs, in addition to irregular initiatives, is rather not carried out in a systematic manner. An exception here can be the Nordic states approach – where such attempts are beginning to raise. Within the Coping with Culture Group, the most active one would be the Institute for Language and Culture of the Royal Danish Defence College (ILC). The institute is home to the two-year military linguist program in Arabic, Russian and Persian. The ILC is also responsible for the delivery of English and French courses to cadets and officers within the department and at the Army, Navy and Air Force officer academies. In addition to language teaching, the ILC develops and

³⁴² Ibid.



administers language tests to personnel across the Danish Defence in accordance with the NATO standardized agreement, STANAG, 6001. ILC staff also conduct research in operational culture. As well as publishing in this field, members of our staff teach courses in how to understand and use culture as an operational enabler to students on the Royal Danish Defence College's junior staff courses and master's programs.

Finally, the ILC also provides language, interpreting and cultural capabilities to support the Danish Armed Forces' national and international commitments and operations. In large part, this is possible thanks to a dedicated reserve corps of about 250 language officers who, under ILC command, complement the institute's 23 full-time staff.³⁴³

Concerning non-NATO states, the situation is no less various and worth investigating.³⁴⁴ The interviews in this group were conducted with the military representatives of such diverse countries as Australia, South Korea, Nepal, El Salvador, Singapore, Romania, Armenia and Thailand. In particular, that the group includes both Australia and South Korea, whose solutions for operationalization of culture should be regarded as good practices in the field.³⁴⁵

Table 7.1: Solutions in operationalization of culture in non-NATO countries (1).³⁴⁶

	Australia	South Korea	El Salvador	Nepal	Singapore
Average cultural pre-deployment training length	Depending on the position from a few hours (for example logistics) to a year (intel specialists).	A part of overall preparation for the operation from one to eight weeks, depending on	Few hours as a part of a general pre-deployment training, content depending on the position.	Few hours up to few days as a part of pre-deployment training, depending on the	No answer.

³⁴³ Royal Danish Defence College ILC. Copenhagen, 2017.

<http://www.fak.dk/en/research/institutes/LanguageandCulture/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed 22 February 2017).

³⁴⁴ The data was gathered from interviews conducted by the Author with multinational coalition forces representatives (land forces, with experience in operationalization of culture) conducted during the study visit to the US CENTCOM in 2012 and review of doctrines and other available documents. This part summarized mainly peacekeeping operations' solutions

³⁴⁵ For details see Zaytun Division. Civil-Military Operations Handbook. ROK Peace and Reconstruction Division: MND-NE Iraq, 2006

³⁴⁶ Based on interviews conducted by Kamila Trochowska, Forthcoming publication 2017.



	Australia	South Korea	El Salvador	Nepal	Singapore
		the position.		position.	
Organization of training. Forms and methods.	Typically, as part of the pre-deployment training conducted by the unit. Lack of a formalized program for the Army and other armed forces. Reconnaissance specialists subject to a year of cultural training in the target country.	Training consists of sequenced modules: general cross-cultural competencies for all, basic rules of conduct in a particular culture, cultural aspects of the procedures at the operational level, the principle of co-operation with cultural specialists and the appropriate language training.	Mainly the United Nations Training Package for Peacekeepers on Cultural Awareness is used. During the training basic information about the culture of the future AOO, a bit of skills enabling cross-cultural communication and rules of correct behaviour in given culture are taught.	Depends on the operation and should be realized in individual units. In reality, it is limited to basic socio-cultural information and the etiquette of given AOO.	A part of the pre-deployment training realized in a basic form of regional competence training.
Using foreign solutions in operationalization of culture	No	Yes, mainly American ones.	Yes, United Nations Training Package for Peacekeepers	No	Yes, Red Teaming and some solutions of the Human



	Australia	South Korea	El Salvador	Nepal	Singapore
			on Cultural Awareness.		Terrain System.
Are cultural advisors to the commander employed in the AOO?	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
What are the field solutions in operation of culture?	Working closely with local communities and respect for the customs in the AOO (eg Afghanistan: women do searches of women, all decision are consulted with the elders if possible).	The emphasis on ensuring good cooperation and friendship with the local population. It is also important to facilitate understanding of Koreans and their culture through initiatives such as the organization of a Korean culture day, and if the security conditions	Depending on the needs of the operation, the activities, tools and means are chosen.	Respect for the culture of the AOO and its rules. Cultural advisors to the commander and care for proper media image as a support.	No answer.



	Australia	South Korea	El Salvador	Nepal	Singapore
		allow, football matches or taekwondo classes.			
Is there system of feedback, assessment and lessons learned in the field of culture and 3C training?	Yes, an organized assessment system: surveys after each rotation and a lessons learned base.	Yes, an organized system of assessment and a lessons learned base.	Yes, an organized system of assessment based on surveys (irregular) and a lessons learned base.	Yes, a lessons learned base.	Yes, an organized system of assessment and a lessons learned base.

Other countries, such as Romania or Thailand, present no less interesting ways of realizing the operationalization of culture schemes. Also Pakistani and Afghan representatives agreed to contribute to the survey, which added a valuable perspective on cultural training in the countries that are usually the subject of cultural education:

Table 7.2: Solutions in operationalization of culture in non-NATO countries (2).

	Romania	Armenia	Thailand	Pakistan	Afghanistan
Average cultural pre-deployment training length and form	A day during 3 months of overall training.	Few hours up to few days depending on the position, but it is obligatory to all the forces deployed.	No answer	None. Religious and cultural similarity to the AOO makes it unnecessary.	The directorate of Religious and Cultural Affairs is the institution responsible for improvement of cultural awareness among the



					governmental , military structures and local population.
Organization of training. Forms and methods.	The entire unit/detachment to be deployed follows a specific program of cultural awareness through different courses (1-3 months).	Briefings in peacekeeping brigade for the entire deployed personnel, then familiarization with the culture of countries with which the army will be deployed.	An instructor to brief the troops is invited. A training on cultural issues important to the unit is conducted, for example on how to perform a body search in a different culture.	During the pre-deployment training negotiation is particularly focused on as a prerequisite to success.	Everyday cooperation with American other forces who train us is a kind of cultural training itself.
Using foreign solutions in operationalization of culture	No	No. Other Armenian Army units do use the American ones.	United Nations, in particular Indonesian experiences .	No	Yes. The Americans and other ISAF nations train us and we apply their solutions.
Are cultural advisors to the	No	No	No	No	Yes



commander employed in the AOO?					
What are the field solutions in operation of culture?	Using interpreters' experience. Cooperating with and using experiences of other deployed contingents.	Soldiers learn from their predecessors, none specific	No answer	Civil Affairs unit	The Directorate of Religious and Cultural Affairs has advisors for every unit (Religious and Cultural Affairs Officers).
Is there system of feedback, assessment and lessons learned in the field of culture and 3C training?	Yes. Surveys after service and a lessons learned base.	No	Yes. Surveys during/after service abroad. Lessons learned base.	No	Yes, collected by Afghan Lessons Learned Centre.

The above variety of solutions and experiences in the field of operationalization of culture poses the question of the effectiveness of training. Although, for instance, the United States has the most advanced training programs, the overall efficiency of their operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan is not always as high as expected. On the other hand, the non-kinetic operations carried out by the Dutch component (where the cultural training and deployment solutions are not as extensive) or Turkish stabilization activities (where there is practically no training) have gained



favourable opinions of both leaders and the local population.³⁴⁷ As proven in the conducted research, the impact of cultural awareness on operational effectiveness depends on many factors, beginning with the time of year (during the winter months in Afghanistan for instance, the number of attacks drops), through the ethnic composition, the security situation in given AOO, up to the cultural structure of the multinational military component that is responsible for a given region. Concerning the last factor, it might seem that the experience of living in a multicultural society expedites cultural familiarization. It depends, however, on the type of multicultural society one comes from. For example, the American multiculturalism model, is more “caste-like” and aims at providing a common cultural framework for all. This makes it more difficult for the soldiers to function in a culturally foreign area than it is for, for example, Dutch and Australian soldiers that come from more flexible and egalitarian societies.

7.6. Challenges to Cultural Competency

In light of the above considerations about the multitude of doctrinal and potentially effective solutions, the question of their operational effectiveness arises. A perfect case study in this aspect is provided by the flag “hearts and minds” operation – ISAF. On the one hand, many innovative operational initiatives undertaken in its frames were successful. On the other, as indicated by one of the interviewees (an Afghan major working for the Directorate of Religious and Cultural Affairs), much of the good has been destroyed in a second, since “ISAF forces still lack a lot of cultural sensitivity, skills and knowledge when dealing with local population. They get perfect training in theory, and then they come to us and break all the rules as if they have forgotten.

The indicator of the effectiveness of cultural competence of the troops may be also the degree to which the objectives of an operation were achieved. In case of ISAF the situation is unsatisfactory. Majority of efforts to provide security, support the reconstruction and development processes and provide full legitimacy of the government failed. Those assessments are reflected in both official summaries and Afghan opinion polls.³⁴⁸ It is difficult to argue otherwise when fewer and fewer

³⁴⁷ Eronen, Oskari. PRT models in Afghanistan. Approaches to civil-military integration. Crisis Management Centre Finland: Kuopio, 2008 (p.45)

³⁴⁸ Cordesman, Anthony. The Afghanistan-Pakistan War at the End of 2011: Strategic Failure? Talk Without Hope? Tactical Success? Spend Not Build (And Then Stop Spending)? Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington, 2011



respondents assess the current situation in Afghanistan as better compared with 2001. In addition, one third of the society is not satisfied with their situation, and 40% are dissatisfied with the direction in which the changes in Afghanistan are heading.³⁴⁹ To a large extent, it was the underestimation of cultural factors at the strategic level, such as the nature of Afghan society, its primary needs after the violent change of the political system and the need for adjusting the democracy to the people, not the other way round that contributed to a partial failure of the realisation of the strategic goals.

Moreover, while creating training and operationalization of culture solutions, Afghanistan and Iraq wars, may not be the only point of reference. First and foremost, due to the emergence of hybrid threats and warfare, there is a preoccupation with the activities in the Middle East, with Syria and Iraq and hostilities in Africa, in particular of the Sahel region. Hybrid warfare is successfully employed using a merge of blended conventional and asymmetric tactics, flexible and adaptive combat structures, use of terrorism, focus on strong propaganda and information warfare, support through criminal activity and complete disregard for international law. These are also characteristics of a hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine. In this context, it is not only facts and events that cause conflicts, in particular in a multicultural environment and conflict-supporting narratives that illuminate and justify intergroup divisions. They play a significant role in satisfying the basic socio-psychological needs of the involved individuals and collectives, determine human motivations, behaviours and change socio-cultural dynamics in a given region. The tipping point of this disturbance, in concurrence with external influences and corresponding events, leads to escalation of conflict. Analysis of the narratives and resulting changes in socio-cultural dynamics points to the socio-cultural homeostasis disturbed, and how to direct narratives to restore the equilibrium and facilitate further conflict prevention.

It has been particularly evident the in case of the Ukrainian Crisis when the concurring narratives present in the country, in particular in the conflict regions, but not exclusively, reverberated across the nation. The socio-cultural dynamics shifted in the whole country through a variety of interpretations, narrations and images conveyed not only by the official media (both Ukrainian and foreign), but also informal channels of communication such as social media, the Internet, audio-visual cultural artefacts, popular culture and even word of mouth.

³⁴⁹ Brookings Institute. Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan. January 30, 2012 (s. 29-30) www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex (Accessed 20 March 2013)



The question is then, how can the analysis of cultural identities and their relation to narratives, along with the resulting changes in socio-cultural dynamics in a conflict region, help solve the problems? Culture is most of all a pattern of reactions and adaptation schemes towards changing environment, therefore a society in times of change, unrest, crisis and conflict, should be treated as a complex-adaptive system (CAS). That was the part that was not taken into account in the majority of existing endeavours of socio-cultural analysis and operationalization of culture for security and conflict resolution purposes. Constant and professional monitoring of the social changes and shifts of the behavioural aspects of a given population is needed. The presence of uniformed formations, along with a threat posed by irregular warfare are definitely an altering factor, and the knowledge of population's behaviour modes gained before the deployment, which is so important operationally, might no longer be relevant. Moreover, the existing models of analysis of social mobilization and violent radicalization in population-centric operations (such as the Social Movement Theory) for counterinsurgency or counterterrorism purposes, might not necessarily apply in the case of hybrid ones. Understanding the dynamics of this kind of violent social mobilization is imperative, and the inclusion of research on distortion of cultural dynamics and narrative theory with its practical applications, must be in any training endeavours, including virtual ones.

8. Gender Cross-Cultural Competence for CSDP

As previously mentioned in the first section of this report on training for peacekeeping personnel, The 2011 Comprehensive Annual Report on CSDP and CSDP-related training emphasized training needs identified from feedback from civilian CSDP missions: reporting skills; mentoring, monitoring and advising skills; senior management skills; hostile environment security/awareness training; responsibility to protect; and mainstreaming human rights and gender aspects, all of which have elements of 'soft skills'. The complexity of problems requiring CPPB missions is increasing and hence the demand for skills that ensure all relevant operational actors are able to communicate and cooperate optimally and effectively.

8.1. Soft skills training for CSDP



Personnel deployed on CPPB missions, particularly in high risk areas, need to be equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge to perform successfully from the start of their tour of duty in the respective CSDP mission or operation. Every mission member should understand the comprehensive crisis management and functioning principles of the CSDP. They need the basic skills to tackle safety and security risks in the mission area and comply fully with the EU Code of Conduct. Most of the competencies can be secured through efficient recruitment focusing on relevant education and work experience. However, working in a multicultural mission environment requires specific skills and knowledge that can be obtained only through relevant training. Training can be seen as bridging the gap between required and existing competencies. They need to know the roles of different actors in theatre, to possess the necessary communication and cooperation skills to operate effectively in a temporary network organization comprising militaries, police and civilian actors, and to understand the importance of gender and cultural diversity. Training in these 'soft skills' for enhancing CPPB operational effectiveness is an essential pre-requisite for anyone being deployed to crisis management missions and GAP is a cost effective and flexible means of delivering this training.

The state of the art for 'soft skills' training in European countries, where such preparation lies within the responsibility of member states, is in vast majority of cases limited to a few hours of training during the pre-deployment preparation for the mission, usually during the cross-cultural awareness training, and the use of civilian advisors during the operation. In such circumstances it is hard to realize the full potential of the operationalization of socio-cultural aspects of the operational environment, which comprises all the processes and skills involved in identification of military activities features of the culture of any object of the activity (so either the AOO/AOR population, the "enemy" or allied forces and agencies), and integration of such knowledge and skills in planning, pre-deployment preparation, decision-making process and general conduct of peacekeeping operations and other activities.

The ESDC has adopted some initiatives to address soft skills training with a focus on the Comprehensive Approach to Gender in Operations course and Cross-Cultural Competence for CSDP Missions and Operations that has been organised since 2015. They run annually – and the rule of ESDC courses is that they work on voluntary basis - participating institutions are welcomed to but are not obligated to nominate participants to any of the training, so in the times of economic turmoil, they might not be on the priority lists of respective governments. The first pilot activity on PDT for International Contracted Personnel that also aimed at improving the quality of interagency



cooperation in CSDP missions and operations was undertaken only in 2014 which calls for more endeavours in the field.³⁵⁰

Still, training in universal soft skills is not carried out in a systematic manner in any of the countries researched during the initial assessment of needs performed for the purpose of establishing the curriculum of Cross-Cultural Competence for CSDP Missions and Operations Pilot Course for the ESDC.³⁵¹ Pre-deployment trainings of regional knowledge rather than skills, are mandatory in most armies, however they are usually limited to a few hours of lectures on basic aspects of the AOO culture. Only in some countries (such as the UK, Netherlands, Denmark or Germany), the lecture system is supplemented by seminars, discussions, simulation games, role-playing, distance learning and multimedia support. The situation should be changed due to the fact that cross-cultural competence embraces a set of interdisciplinary skills that can be developed through proper training.

8.2. ICT in Cross-Cultural Competence Training

There is a growing interest in subject of multiculturalism in the world of business, politics, international NGOs and security sector. As a consequence, the security sector extended its educational offer by introducing intercultural competence training. By developing this type of competence, it intends to adequately prepare personnel participating in missions all over the world. This intercultural competence training was run in different countries with many different methods. The results of efforts in this matter were questionable. We were - and still are - facing many controversies, as it usually happens while using science and technology in the scope of military safety.³⁵² One of the methods of combining aims and means of civil and military activities are multimedia courses such as Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL), which make possible to abolish the time and space boundaries. This education method is based on widely understood application of informative and communication technology in didactics. One example of application of these

³⁵⁰ EEAS. "Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) for international contracted staff – pilot activity". http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/european-security-defence-college/news/2014/20140331_en.htm (Accessed 7 August 2015)

³⁵¹ Kamila Trochowska, "International experiences in operationalization of culture for military operations – field research results". *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, Volume 13, Issue 3, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies: Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 2014, p. 83-103 <http://connections-qj.org/article/international-experiences-operationalization-culture-military-operations-field-research>

³⁵² More on the issue in Trochowska, Kamila, Małgorzata Gawlik-Kobylińska, „Information and communication technologies in intercultural competence training for the purpose of ministry of national defence. Introduction to cultural awareness course”, *Journal of Science of the Military Academy of Land Forces*, Volume 47 Number 2 (176) 2015, ISSN, p. 79-94, DOI: 10.5604/17318157.1179657



technologies in didactics is the e-learning course on intercultural awareness made in National Defence University. It was assumed that the course in this form will improve the dissemination of knowledge in this field and will favour its acquisition and consolidation. Moreover, the interactive tool that was used can be applied both in asynchronous and synchronous mode of education. Also it may be used in e-learning only and blended learning.³⁵³

It is worth mentioning that transferring educational contents into virtual reality became common since 1997. This was possible by a ADL initiative that was established on the motion of Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Personnel and Readiness of the US Defence Department. Its aim was to create new and effective educational methods for civilian and military personnel. The ADL initiative joins partnership laboratories within the web and is responsible for e-learning standards that include so called Next Generation Learning Environment.

8.2.1 E-Learning in Training 3C

One example of supporting the ICT studies is applying the interactive e-learning course on shaping intercultural awareness. The course designed in 2012 by the National Defence Academy: Introduction to Cultural Awareness is aimed at wide range of audience. While its issues are very general, they may be used both by military and civil personnel or even students.³⁵⁴ In the didactic process, the course may be:

- the medium to learn new situations, phenomena and processes;
- used to supplement observations made by other didactic means;
- illustrate oral information given by the teacher;
- used to organize operational exercises;
- supporting the examination of students' knowledge.³⁵⁵

Due to its universal issues, the course fits many different teaching programs. The main aim of the course is to widen knowledge about cultural differences as well as train effective functioning in the environment culturally diversified. The course is aimed especially at:

³⁵³ ADL official website. <http://www.adlnet.gov>. (Accessed 12 August 2016)

³⁵⁴ The course was published at the educational platform LMS ILIAS and it is available for registered users.

³⁵⁵ Highlighted features are given on the basis of study made by K. Gębura from Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, http://www.pdf.amu.edu.pl/I_d_i/srodki_dydaktyczne.php (Accessed 12 August 2016).



- enhancement of self-confidence, openness and ease towards the immigrants;
- understanding the behaviour of other culture representatives, which may be helpful in conflict situations caused by cultural differences;
- exercises in receptive skills in English.

The form of decision making game with theoretical introduction causes, that the course does not resemble typical studies where context is provided first and then knowledge is examined. The course participants are acknowledged with issues concerning intercultural awareness and has to fulfil all the tasks to successfully complete the course. According to the course scenario, solutions to the issues should give the participants appropriate patterns of behaviour and record habits that would be used

About the Course



The aim of the course:



- » The aim of the course is to increase learner's awareness and understanding about the issue of cultural awareness as well as to present a mosaic of cultural issues that influences our everyday lives.

Lessons: from Monday to Saturday:



- » The structure of the course is based on six week days, from Monday to Saturday. Each day stands for one lesson.
- » Each lesson covers mixed topics presented in a form of case studies (questions with one answer correct).
- » According to the rules of experiential learning, the immediate feedback aims to teach you.
- » After each lesson/day you can see a questions overview.

Test and Resources:



- » The course ends with a Test of twenty questions.
- » Should you extend your knowledge, get acquainted with Resources.

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in real life situations. The teaching module ends with knowledge examination.

Figure 8.1: Formal conditions towards course completion – screenshot.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁶ Introduction to Cultural Awareness Course: ADL AON



It should be also mentioned that the evaluation of studies in the course consists of completing all course elements and correct completion of all the questions (each question may be considered three times). The course may be paused at all times and participants are allowed to continue after the break.

8.2.2. E-learning process stages

While planning this course, three basic levels of e-learning have been considered: acknowledgement level - behaviours and abilities that activate the thinking process. This is the action that causes the student to sense the need for gaining knowledge and abilities; influence level (according to the authors it may be also called the “emotional level”) - individual attitude, emotions, feelings that motivate the participant for further education;

psychomotor level - responsible for causing the action and physical movement of the participant (by commands such as: “move”, “click”, “drop”, “enter”). While designing the course, it was considered to include many layers of content – e.g. hiding details in interactive maps and tabs. This prioritisation

Gestures



Be careful with gestures! A gesture that in one culture means O.K., in other might mean “sod off” to put it mildly. For best reference check the course’s special gestures section.

Look at the hand gestures below and check their meaning and history. See where you have to avoid them (the countries/regions will be shown on the map).

A-Okay

History

The oldest reference to the positive aspect of the gesture can be found in Roman rhetorician Quintilian's (ca. 35-95 BC) textbook on eloquence: "If the index finger and middle finger touch the thumb, this gesture is suitable for the expression of approval". In some Mediterranean countries, as well as in several South American countries, it represents vulgar expressions, due to the resemblance of a certain body part.

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of content allows the participant to focus on what is the most important.



Figure 8.2: Many layers of content applied in interactive objects (example by interactive graphics) – screenshot.³⁵⁷

Influence level (emotional level) is supposed to keep attention of students and encourage them for further research. Energizing materials, interesting content and humoristic accents in the course additionally motivate for gaining knowledge.³⁵⁸ Psychomotor level concerns on task planning in a way to ensure eligible concentration level by fulfilling tasks such as “drop”, “drag”, “mark”. This level may also concern abilities for group learning using additional functions, such as chat, forum and blog. So called social learning let us increase the learning effectiveness because it enables the learner motivating contact with the teacher and other course participants.

8.3. NATO ACT Innovations Hub and virtual tools of training 3C for CPPB

The NATO Innovation Hub, a branch of the NATO Allied Transformation Command, is a network-based unit that invents online tools for the improvement of soft skills among civilian and military personnel of the member countries. It also connects majority of European and American specialists in cross-cultural competence within the frames of the Human Environment Capability Project. Efficient online communication and collaboration between military or defence personnel and anyone else beyond time and space constraints is what the Innovation Hub offers. People who are willing to collaborate with NATO are entitled to join the Innovation Hub community and get an account on its online collaborative platform. Any topic relevant to NATO can be addressed at the Innovation Hub from the discussion of shared interests and the development of collaborative initiatives to the design and implementation of new solutions. New projects stem either from the community members or from the NATO priorities. While many Innovation Hub projects are directly linked to human aspects such as the Gender Focus Project or the NATO Social Media Project, all the projects contribute to improve NATO’s interaction with people online and leveraging social networks. The various functions of the platform include brainstorming, community building, collaborative solution design, improved videoconferencing and social learning. Its tools and functions are available to all members and to any project supporting NATO’s priorities. As such, individuals can join the community to collaborate on projects while institutions can partner with the Innovation Hub to launch new projects.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Isaken, Greg, et. al. Motivation & Online Learning, Norwegian Defence Academy, Oslo 2004, p.5

³⁵⁹ NATO Innovation Hub official website. <https://innovationhub-act.org/content/about-human-environment-capability-project> (Accessed 13 February 2017)



Their landmark activity, the Human Environment Capability Project is based on the premise that to understand and effectively interact with the human environment in operations is a critical ability that defence personnel must acquire and maintain. Even if the legitimate use of kinetic force remains the most specific task assigned to western armed forces, the achievement of operational and strategic objectives also demands that the military conduct a wide array of other tasks bringing them closer to the people. This is due to both the complexity of the environment and to the nature of operations. Local actors and populations' support and collaboration are indeed critical in missions such as counterinsurgency, stabilization, reconstruction or security forces assistance. In addition, today's communication technology and its resulting social dynamics bring each military in direct contact with the whole connected world while their actions immediately impact the global public opinion. In return, the soldiers' opinions and behaviour are also impacted, as anyone is, by the fierce information warfare waged over the internet as a prominent component in modern society. In response to this need, many capabilities and assets have been developed and continue to be developed in order to keep up with the evolving requirements stemming from a highly dynamic environment.

Since then, Allied Command Transformation has been designing and implementing assets that meet the requirements. While several are still in development, three of them are readily available to anyone in military and defence organizations:

- The Innovation Hub Online Collaboration Platform
- The Extended Hand Cross-Cultural Skills Development Tool
- The NATO Social Media User Open Online Course

8.3.1. Cross-Cultural Skills Development Tool: Extended Hand

Acquiring the needed cross-cultural communication skills which lead to building trusted relationships with people from other cultures requires coordinated and sustained efforts. Even if nations have, for example, flown Afghan people to Europe in order to support troops' pre-deployment training, it is not the most cost effective solution to be offered to all personnel. Today, only basic skills are acquired before deployment. Skills acquisition and relationship building are thus delayed, and mostly happen through onsite interactions with local actors during a deployment. Unfortunately, these onsite interactions are still significantly constrained by time, distance and security considerations.

This project has received funding from the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation HORIZON 2020 under the agreement 700670. Agency is not responsible of any use that may be made of the information it contains.



This is why Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has developed a solution that allows military personnel to acquire cross-cultural communication skills, and build relationships with people from areas of interest through online video communication. Compared to onsite interaction, online conversations offer several advantages. First, they allow improved pre-deployment training. Second, they can reach out to people not otherwise accessible. Third, they are cheaper (in money and time) than to have to gather people in a physical location, and impose no risk to military personnel. Of course, if not properly structured, a conversation over the internet may not be as efficient as an onsite engagement. This is why ACT offers a solution where highly trained facilitators guide the conversations and ensure that the audiences receive maximum benefit in the form of improved skills development and relationship building. This solution is called *Extended Hand*. It started developing in 2012. It consisted of conversations between US Army cadets and people from Iran and Palestine. After five years of intercultural online dialogues, World in Conversation was able to provide high-level expert facilitators to guide the conversations. This pilot demonstrated both the feasibility and the benefit of such an innovative solution. Based on this initial success, *Extended Hand* was refined into a no-risk, cheap and easy-to-use platform that meets the demand of military education and pre-deployment training. The tool is now offered to all nations. Upon request, *Extended Hand* staff will discuss with candidate national institutions and tailor the platform to their specific needs. This is already happening with ten NATO nations. The network built by World in Conversation engages with countries such as Iran, Palestine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Haiti and China. The final objective is to connect military education and training institutions with any place in the world. There is almost no limit to the *Extended Hand* outreach.

8.3.2. NATO Cross-Cultural Awareness and Social Media

No technology has ever impacted more the social interactions than social media. When considering the 21st century Human Environment there is no option but to dedicate much attention to the social media phenomenon since it is intertwined with the life of half of the world population. It has also become the space and the weapon of the information battles that now come with any major conflict. In addition, failing to be present in the social media environment would cut the military off the populations they are meant to protect. Therefore, it is important that as many people as possible are willing and able to efficiently and safely use the social media in support of peace and stability goals.

This project has received funding from the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation HORIZON 2020 under the agreement 700670. Agency is not responsible of any use that may be made of the information it contains.



Various institutions are providing cultural awareness training, but many defence personnel are still unable to access it or get the most out of it. It is NATO's role to help bridge this gap. NATO's massive open online course aims to provide easy to access efficient training, but also to provide the experts with the outreach they deserve, including all defence personnel within NATO, nations and their partners. The online campaign and design of the course content is to meet the operational requirements and national expectations. The course provides knowledge but also focuses on practice through online intercultural video dialogues facilitated by experts in intercultural communication. All experts in cross cultural competence are invited to join the course development team.³⁶⁰

8.4. Advanced Distributed Learning Repository for 3C for CSDP Course

8.4.1 Organization of the repository

The ADL Repository used by the participants, provided both online decision games and interactive content, and material that was to be used by the participants as additional support for the training. It was organized in the following structure that corresponded to the residential course organization:

- The Introduction to Cultural Awareness Course (in English and French)
- The Cultural Awareness Afghanistan Course
- Knowledge repositories
- 3C for security
- 3C for the strategic level
- Operationalization of culture
- Presentations from each training module
- Web links
- Ethics and controversies
- Good practices and lessons learned
- Future and way ahead

³⁶⁰ NATO Innovation Hub official website. <https://innovationhub-act.org/content/about-human-environment-capability-project> (Accessed 13 February 2017)



The course repository served not only as a virtual training ground for the 3C for CSDP Missions and Operations Course, but also as support for other training initiatives in the field of cross-cultural competence, for ESDC, but also other security and defence institutions.

8.5. Cultural Awareness

Thousands of books have been written on Cultural Awareness, not to mention the rich anthropological literature, which, essentially, is cultural awareness without naming it. Moreover, a basic few-day cultural awareness course for business purposes can cost from \$4,000 up so it is indeed a valuable set of skills.³⁶¹ Cultural Awareness has great significance due to the demands of the globalized, interconnected and multipolar world today in which we no longer limit interaction to members of our own culture. Not to mention that our own culture is versatile within itself, with different subcultures governing its own specific rules and codes of behaviour such as ethnic, professional or age groups, and diversification of behaviours that a real culture comprises, is a serious problem even at the very basic level of pure description.³⁶²

Culture shapes our world view and drives our behaviours, as humans are like animals suspended in webs of significance they have created themselves.³⁶³ Therefore, cultural awareness has versatile applications: facilitates intercultural communication of all sorts (dating a foreigner, traveling, studying/working in a different culture or multicultural environment)³⁶⁴ aids business matters (negotiations, expanding branches to different countries and managing multicultural personnel)³⁶⁵ is useful in all kinds of educational activities (language teaching and learning, coaching) has been widely utilized in medicine (in particular in psychological counselling)³⁶⁶ is inevitable in the military world (working in multinational forces, taking part in missions abroad where one has to deal with culture significantly different than our own)³⁶⁷ became a significant skill required in politics

³⁶¹ For instance <http://www.communicaid.com/course-detail-culture.php>, for reference only, no advertisement intended

³⁶² Linton, Ralph. *The Cultural Background of Personality*. D. Appleton-Century Co.: New York, 1945

³⁶³ Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Basic Books: New York, 1973

³⁶⁴ Bennett, Milton. "A Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity". University of Wisconsin: Madison, 2009

³⁶⁵ Hofstede, Geert. *Culture's Consequences – International Differences in Work-Related Values*, Sage Publications. Beverly Hills, 1998

³⁶⁶ Aghop Der-Karabetian, Christopher T.H. Liang, Glenn C. Gams. *Handbook of Multicultural Measures*. "Multicultural Competence Measures". Sage Publications Inc: Black Oaks, 2011

³⁶⁷ Wunderle, William. *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for U.S. Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle East Countries*. Fort Leavenworth CSIP: Kansas, 2007



(diplomacy, creating strategic goals)³⁶⁸ international relations at macro level, as culture governs also interactions of political entities.³⁶⁹

Cultural awareness, in short, teaches us the basics of other culture, and if we master it well enough, we can maximize communication and the outcome of any interaction in the fields above, at best to mutual benefit of the participants. Since culture, as some say, is like the Invisible Elephant.³⁷⁰ Many aspects of culture are invisible, but culture has an enormous impact on our lives. Like with an Invisible Elephant, if ignored, these aspects can lead at vast extent to misunderstanding, stress and conflict. Dealing with cross-cultural issues can be like trying to control an Invisible Elephant. Therefore, courses in this field of cultural awareness are expected to help unearth the invisible.

Cultural awareness is a most general and basic term that embraces the knowledge and skills necessary to understand the nuances and interact effectively with individuals or groups from different cultures. In literature many terms are used, such as cross-cultural awareness, intercultural sensitivity³⁷¹ cultural, cross-cultural or intercultural competence, among others. Cultures are different because of diverse geographical conditions they originated from that demanded from the people different modes of adaptation to the environment. They started organizing their groups and societies, customs, gender roles, rituals or the way they dressed in a way that suited best the demands of survival and development, giving symbolic meaning, significance and mythology first to objects that were around them.³⁷² What is interesting, without major contact between cultures, and with differences in the development directions, all human cultures have established differently, yet the same categories of for instance kinship systems, power division, mythology, land ownership regulations or rites of passage, which are still common today regardless of the culture are analysed. Later on, the cultural schemes were passed on from generation to generation, changed by historical events, generational variables and migrations that enabled processes of diffusion, namely passing certain elements of one culture to another if they were to perform any function in given society.³⁷³ Nowadays, cultures develop even more dynamically due to the parallel processes of globalisation powered by mass communication systems, such as the Internet or ability to travel without major effort at long distances. In comparison, some indigenous cultures struggle to survive, although most

³⁶⁸ Kim, Jiyul. *Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy*. Carlisle: USAWC, 2010

³⁶⁹ Fisher, Glen. *Mindsets. The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*

³⁷⁰ Verghese, Tom. *The Invisible Elephant: Exploring Cultural Awareness*. Synergistic Press: Melbourne, 2006

³⁷¹ Bennett, Milton. *A Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity*. University of Wisconsin: Madison, 2009

³⁷² White, Leslie. *The Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome*. McGraw-Hill: New York, 1959

³⁷³ Boas, Franz. 'Evolution Or Diffusion'. *Race, Language and Culture*. Macmillan Company: New York, 1948



of their traditions gradually vanish (for instance Native American tribes, the Inuit or the nomadic tribes of Iran).

Boundaries between cultures disappear when people can communicate effectively with members of another culture, thanks to the will to understand, appreciate and respect other culturally inflected behaviours. Also, cultural relativism and reflexivity are inevitable to interact effectively and overcome cultural boundaries. Cultural relativism is the conviction that making any universal, cross-cultural, ethical judgements is both incoherent and unfair because different cultural behaviours, institutions, customs or moral values are a product of each culture's unique developmental history, and can, thus, only be judged in relation to that history. There can be no division between "better", more civilized cultures and the "worse", "primitive" ones, as all cultures are equal, and so should different variations of behaviours, traditions and customs be valued and respected. Whereas cultural reflexivity refers to the awareness on the ways our own cultural and ideological convictions and biases influence our perception of other societies.³⁷⁴




Figure 8.3. Hofstede's Cultural Value Country Comparison

³⁷⁴ Barnard, Alan and Johnathan Spencer. Encyclopaedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology. Routledge: London and New York, 2002



Most of contemporary anthropologists' goal is to develop cultural awareness through giving to wider public the results of their field work and analyses of cultural diversity in the world.³⁷⁵ Better understanding of the varieties in which behaviours, values and institutions, common for all human societies are realized and performed, broadens our world view and teaches us non-judgmental, effective way of accepting and tackling cultural differences in everyday situations. The most famous contemporary anthropologists are, among many others, Herbert S. Lewis, Alan Barnard and Anthony Giddens.

8.6. Conclusions – Cultural awareness v. cultural expertise—how much can we learn about a culture?

The skills and knowledge acquired during courses on cultural awareness are the first (yet an essential) step towards further development of cultural competence and knowledge. Yet this is the tip of an iceberg given the very basic patterns, values and beliefs that are the core of a culture are hidden deep within its structures. Cultural understanding and awareness are necessary but insufficient components upon which broad cultural capability can be built. By exploring and learning to move along the webs of significance of other cultures however, skills are necessary to reflect and internalize new cultural patterns, and eventually be able to operate effectively within a variety of multicultural contexts and backgrounds. According to military experts on operationalizing culture³⁷⁶ (that could be in broader sense applied elsewhere, with necessary modifications), gaining cultural competence can be approximately measured in the following periods:

1 Year: Average soldier's culture exposure during a deployment – tactical/operational survival.

2–5 Years: Focus on language/culture education, additional tours of duty

10-30 Years: Period of high level study, living and working in the region – one can then be considered a cultural expert/advisor (CULAD).

More than 30 Years: This level of expertise is if you are originally from the given culture, as the cultural patterns that have formed are a basic cultural identity and will always work, even subconsciously.

³⁷⁵ American Anthropological Association. Code of Ethics of the American Anthropological Association. June 1998. <http://www.aaanet.org/committees/ethics/ethcode.htm>

³⁷⁶ Bados, Victor. *Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations: Best Practices*. SP TRADOC: Granada, 2010 (p. 38)



Cultural diversity is as necessary for the global “human system” as biological diversity is for any given ecosystem – it keeps it alive, rich and balanced. Military culture, despite its specificity, undergoes the same cultural pattern change as any other organization, and any society or group. When we look at Trompenaars and Turner’s QinetiQ model of organisational culture, it provides a clear framework to understand organizational culture (also of military) and its changes.




Figure 8.4. Model of Organisation Culture

- 1) Layer One – Artefacts and Practices. This is the behaviour and tangibles of an organization. This includes such things as groupings, hierarchy, and uniform. Essentially, the surface layer is easily changed and easily adapted by the people in the organization. It represents the observable aspects of culture.
- 2) Layer Two – Attitudes and Expectations. These are the attitudes and expectations that make individuals feel that Layer One is right. It is more conceptual, and consists of doctrine, customs, and traditional practices. It represents those truths held by the organization, which resist change but which can be adapted in time.
- 3) Layer Three – Deep Structure. This is the source and structure from where attitudes and expectations are generated. This inner layer represents basic assumptions that have underpinned the culture of military forces for centuries, tightly connected with the mainstream core cultural patterns, hard to change externally.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁷ NATO, RTO. Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors. RTO, November, 2008. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA496055>



Women rights in this case are the deep aspect of culture. No rights, even human rights are universal, and they cannot be changed by external forces if the society doesn't accept them. Every society governs with its own rules, and what might seem discrimination, is often accepted as a norm and tradition by the discriminated themselves. Due to traditional religious basis or its ages-long interpretation (which cannot be changed in societies for which religion is the basis of identity), some aspects of societies can be changed only due to internal processes and internal need for change. This includes the position of women, political organisation and other aspects of functioning of societies. Given the lack of consistencies in cultural programmes and courses across Europe, much needs to be done to highlight the importance of culture in peace operations in particular. However, as has been outlined even within this sphere cultural awareness, nuances and understanding of cultural sensitivities is possible and every attempt should be undertaken to achieve this in CPPB missions.



Conclusions

'The greatest shortcoming of the international community today is its failure to prevent conflict and maintain global security. As secretary-general of the United Nations, I have called for a surge in diplomacy for peace and appealed for 2017 to be a year for peace. The United Nations was born from war. Today, we must be here for peace.'³⁷⁸

This report has demonstrated that peacekeeping is not without its challenges. Significantly, the analyses and findings point to several improvements that could be implemented in training, gender and cultural aspects. It must also be admitted that the EU in particular has made significant progress and investment in training personnel in CPPB, in the development of the ENTRi initiative and other projects aimed at improving training for personnel deployed on missions. ENTRi was launched to improve the need for standardised and rigorous training of crisis management personnel, yet much more could be achieved in this area. The UN's new secretary-general Antonio Guterres has recently called for UN peacekeepers to be 'better trained and more respectful of human rights' and they also need effective cooperation with regional organisations such as the African Union.³⁷⁹

While training has been described as the 'cornerstone in carrying out peacekeeping mandates', progress has been slow at both an EU level and UN level in terms of achieving this goal. The findings have pointed to the lack of standardisation and coherent approaches to training, in addition to difficulties with pre-deployment training. It is essential that such peacekeeping and peacebuilding training includes pre-deployment and in-mission training on child protection, sexual and gender-based violence as well as exploitation and abuse. Much more has to be done, including – but not only – by integrating a gender perspective into the training of military, police and civilian staff in

³⁷⁸ Antonio Guterres. 2017. 'My vision for revitalising the UN'.

<http://europe.newsweek.com/davos-2017-un-secretary-general-antonio-guterres-opinion-540326?rm=eu> (Accessed 12 February 2017)

³⁷⁹ 'New UN Chief says better training needed for peacekeepers. 28 November 2016

<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/21b9c26329394a90991a1dd3c5b5a431/new-chief-says-un-needs-be-more-nimble-less-bureaucratic>. (Accessed 12 February 2017)



peacekeeping operations.’³⁸⁰ Guterres also argues that ‘gender parity is also pivotal. I intend to make sure women take their rightful place at senior levels in the U.N., and to create a clear roadmap with benchmarks and time frames to recruit more women at all levels of the organisation.’³⁸¹

‘Ideas to Improve the System’

This study has identified several challenges embedded in the current knowledge and practice of training for peacekeeping operations. The report has analysed training within the EU and UN structure and in particular examined gender and cultural constraints in missions. Notwithstanding the argument that negative perceptions of lessons learned only feed the shaming and blaming exercise and thereby discourage cooperation, it is possible to shift this perception could to ‘ideas to improve the system’ or by including more best practices alongside lessons identified.³⁸² However, negative press of CSDP missions and or UN peacekeeping operations not only effects peacekeepers ability to the job but the lessons learned approach rarely includes ‘what if we are better trained for crisis management operations’. ‘Sensitivity of the actors involved in CSDP with regard to the content of lessons learned reports results in the ‘polishing’ and censoring of such reports,...political sensitivity also restricts access to lessons documents to EEAS bodies and relative committees.’³⁸³ This in turn, ‘limits the capacities of other relevant EU actors, such as Foreign Policy Instrument, the European Parliament, ENTRi partners...to use lessons reports to improve their performance, or assist with implementing solutions and best practices.’³⁸⁴ The present challenge to peacekeeping training therefore, could be significant helped by GAP’s VR game, given that it should substantially enhance the performance of personnel in peacekeeping and specifically in soft skills. As GAP proposes a feedback mechanism, lessons learned are immediate and implemented within the game.

In addition, ‘there seems to be limited capacity for vertical learning between the strategic and the operational level. One consequence of this disconnect is reflected in critiques of mission mandates.’

³⁸⁰ EU Statement – United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: General Debate. 16 February 2016, New York. Statement on behalf of the European Union and its Member States delivered by H.E. Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, at the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations General Debate.

<http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-statement-united-nations-special-committee-on-peacekeeping-operations-general-debate-3/>

³⁸¹ Antonio Guterres. 2017. ‘My vision for revitalising the UN’.

<http://europe.newsweek.com/davos-2017-un-secretary-general-antonio-guterres-opinion-540326?rm=eu> (Accessed 12 February 2017)

³⁸² DG External Relations Policy Department. CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons Learned Processes.

[http://www.tepsa.eu/download/CSDP%20Missions%20and%20Operations-%20Lessons%20Learned%20Processes%20\(DG-%20External%20Policies\).pdf](http://www.tepsa.eu/download/CSDP%20Missions%20and%20Operations-%20Lessons%20Learned%20Processes%20(DG-%20External%20Policies).pdf) (Accessed 11 February 2017)

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.



³⁸⁵ Effectively, ‘mandates are written in most cases on the basis of abstract concepts and are not informed by knowledge derived from the operational realities at mission level, the bridges between the operational/mission level and the strategic/mandate-writing level should be further strengthened to help ensure that mandated tasks reflect realistic capabilities on the ground. For example, in EULEX Kosovo, witness protection capacities were initially underestimated, and the mission was not fully capable to carry out its tasks without eventual adjustments.’ ³⁸⁶

The study also describes challenges to learning and understanding entrenched in a culture that is predominately male in peacekeeping. Ensuring that women are fully represented in all aspects to peace operations, improvement in interoperability and greater cooperation between all actors will go some way to alleviating many of the peacekeeping world’s current challenges. The ‘watershed moment in the history of UN peacekeeping occurred on 12 May 2014, when Major General Kristin Lund of Norway was appointed as the first female to serve as Force Commander in a UN peacekeeping operation — the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.’³⁸⁷ In this respect, the UN has come some way in enhancing women into leadership roles in peacekeeping operations. According to Herve Ladsous, Head of UN Peacekeeping: ‘Women can and must play a leading role in political participation, conflict resolution and the transition from conflict to peace.’³⁸⁸ Notwithstanding that, in 1993, only one percent of all deployed uniformed personnel were women. However, more than twenty years later, this has only move 3 percentage points, to 4 per cent in 2017. Progress has been incredible slow in this field. The reasons for these incremental steps point to: a lack of understanding of Resolution 1325 and in ‘gender equality in peace operations, a gap in data and analysis about women’s participation in national security institutions globally, and in UN peacekeeping in particular; and the prevalence of social norms and biases that perpetuate gender inequality within the security sector.’ ³⁸⁹

The quality and effectiveness of peacekeeping personnel can be enhanced through sophisticated systems and appropriate approaches to training in cross-culture competency. The need to establish rapport with the local population is essential in peacekeeping and this largely amounts to a nuanced

³⁸⁵ DG External Relations Policy Department. CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons Learned Processes.

[http://www.tepsa.eu/download/CSDP%20Missions%20and%20Operations-%20Lessons%20Learned%20Processes%20\(DG-%20External%20Policies\).pdf](http://www.tepsa.eu/download/CSDP%20Missions%20and%20Operations-%20Lessons%20Learned%20Processes%20(DG-%20External%20Policies).pdf)

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Ivanovic, Alexandra. 2014. ‘Why the United Nations Needs More Female Peacekeepers.’

<https://unu.edu/publications/articles/why-un-needs-more-female-peacekeepers.html>

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.



understanding of culture in peacekeeping. Moreover, in the times of rapid and constant ICT development, the introduction of innovations in cross-cultural competence training is a challenge that requires wide range of adaptive activities concerning all education participants and the training process itself. As this research work has shown, the potential of developing ICT-based training tools is truly promising, yet will always have certain weaknesses. It can never, for instance be the only medium, and will in most cases be only a support to real-life research, self-education and properly designed training – therefore, a transmedia learning approach would be the most suitable one in this case. In the globalization era, the value of intercultural competence education and training increases. Advancing our knowledge and experience, making new and innovative didactic materials, making research on modern tools seems to be of crucial importance, also in wider perspective - for building positive relations and shaping the future security environment.

For the last number of years, the quantity of personnel deployed for civilian and military CSDP missions/operations has remained consistent between five and six thousand. There is no reason to suggest that this number will decrease given the insecure nature of world politics, while UN peacekeeping numbers have continued to rise. It therefore seems highly appropriate to invest quality, time and resources to the improvement and enhancement of current training practices for peacekeeping personnel.



Recommendations

This report has demonstrated that delving beyond the traditional forms of peacekeeping clearly requires better trained peacekeeping personnel. GAP can make a significant contribution to this field by applying a systematic and coordinated approach to a scenario based training game in the promotion of knowledge, understanding and competency in peacekeeping. Given that EU Member States are responsible for training their own personnel, developing a game that requires the highest standards of peacekeeping will go a long way to alleviate many of the current obstacles. As well as the aspects that will be embedded into the training game, the cost effectiveness of the game itself, and the acquisition of knowledge and development of soft skills, the game should have the requirements to be a compulsory training game for all personnel involved in peacekeeping missions. As such, there is a collective responsibility on the part of all Member States to ensure the same standards and level of training. Although key elements devised from GAP interviews will play a central role in developing game scenarios, the following recommendations should also be considered.

❖ Dimensions of Soft Skills in Peacekeeping Training

It is clear from the research conducted thus far, that training in cooperation, communication and negotiation is predominately lacking in a substantial way in the current practice of peacekeeping training. This is not to suggest, that there are no training centres providing soft skills training, but this study has highlighted the need for effective courses in this sphere and the lack of effective communication between peacekeeping actors. What may be needed are qualities not traditionally associated with conflict prevention and peacebuilding, such as 'non-cognitive skills', emphasising relationships of mutual respect and trust between peacekeepers, leadership, empathy and managing relationships. Non-verbal communication skills are paramount. This study has highlighted the lack of co-operation and inability to analyse, share or learn from mistakes. The equal importance of interpersonal skills and an ability to see the bigger picture in an environment which requires a



response to persistent intercultural communication challenges, is paramount to twenty-first century peacekeeping.

❖ **Synchronised Method of Training Does Not Mean Generic Approach**

The overall objective of the GAP project is to produce a training game that accurately reflects the challenges and diversity of peacekeeping using a coordinated approach. The synchronised method will deliver training from all perspectives in the field in a holistic manner. Training needs to encapsulate the sentiments of the local population affected by violence or conflict along with the point of view of the military, police and civilian elements. This will mean developing a game that integrates the civilian and local components into a military and police mind-set. If this thinking becomes mainstream, it will become more natural for individuals to assimilate these elements into military and police operational planning. This is by no means an unproblematic task, but not an impossible one. The research has demonstrated both the existence of a common goal in peacekeeping operations and the different methods explored by actors in achieving this goal. Peacekeeping does not operate in a vacuum. While Gap advocates for the inclusive or synchronised method to peacekeeping, it must be remembered that there are several components making up the military dimension, the police dimension, the civilian dimension and the local dimension. Although the overall goal should be harmonisation between all actors involved, it is clear from this study that a 'one for all solution' or generic method to CPPB training is inappropriate. Training needs to be tailored to specific interactions between military/police/civilian. There needs to be a high level of awareness and understanding of the divergent roles of actors before any degree of synergy can happen.

❖ **Realistic Scenarios and People Centred Peace Operations**

Getting input from people from conflict-affected areas, refugees, IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons), people most affected by conflict has to be incorporated into the test phase of the game. Accessing this perspective can only enhance the game. Peacekeepers need an in-depth understanding of what it is like to be migrant or refugee through the degree of soft skills dimension and empathy in particular. People who work on conflict fragility, conflict prevention and analysis, as well as the new PRISM - Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/ SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation, and DG DEVCO should also be included in the test phase of the game.

❖ **Training Needs to be Conflict Sensitive**

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Gaming for Peace has to incorporate conflict sensitivity into the role playing game as well as culturally sensitivities. Being aware that actions personnel may adopt could have negative consequences for local people, means that involving as many actors as possible in decision making, including the local dimension and sharing information should be a key aspect to the game.

❖ **Different Needs for Different Missions**

Training has to be geared towards the mission and different missions have different requirements. This may pose challenges for the game scenario for GAP as several story-lines will have to be incorporated into the game as well as the specific role for police, military and political advisors etc.

❖ **High Quality Training**

Producing best practice among several training centres remains a significant obstacle. GAP needs to create a standardised approach that results in a central training platform for civilian, military and police. This also needs to include sub-sections for effective training. This would go a long way to alleviate current obstacles.

❖ **Quality Assurance and Best Practice**

Training approaches across Europe are somewhat undermined by a lack of 'quality assurance' mechanisms to measure effectiveness. Training methodologies vary across the different institutions. Generic core courses for peacebuilders are widely offered across training institutes in Europe but there is, however, no best practice approach. It also needs to produce the best outcome in terms of a knowledge based system. Better post-deployment 'lessons learned', and information sharing mechanisms which will develop best-practice and a 'repository of knowledge.' Centralised online repositories of 'best-practice' training material should be improved in this regard, but it is nevertheless difficult to gauge compliance and implementation. While all EU civilian missions collect data, there is currently limited pre-deployment and post-deployment data. There is a need for centralised intelligence sharing structures to adequately inform training practices across Europe. In addition, there is an issue with the low deployment of trained personnel.



❖ **Move towards Web Based Systems**

Methodologically, there has been a move toward institutionalising e-learning and internet based distance learning platforms to promote harmonisation of syllabus, access to material and to compensate for a lack of qualified instructors. This aspect would be reinforced by initiatives such as the GAP project.

❖ **Gender Approaches in Peacekeeping**

Although gender sensitivity as an aspect of soft skills in peacekeeping has been discussed in this report, the following factors must be considered for incorporation into the GAP game. Majority of peacekeepers are male and from the military. While gender advisors' positions are expected to be posted to all missions, gender issues and difficulties remain. There can be subtle ways to incorporate gender into the training game in a non-confrontational way, particularly given different traditions and cultures that have traditional not embraced gender equality.

❖ **Need to develop mechanisms for evaluating the readiness of personnel.**

At present, there is no evaluation of skills and knowledge for pre-deployment training. There is also no evaluation of skills used in crisis management operations or self-assessment test once personnel have returned from missions. Comprehensive training for new starters as well as refresher training for existing staff is needed, both of which GAP could address. Synchronised intelligence and reconnaissance should inform mission tailored training (could be incorporated into the game). Amplified by utilising technology such as satellite imagery.

❖ **Continuous Assessment**

Given the variety of training actors and methods, it is also necessary to ensure a level of continuous assessment, feedback and co-ordination in terms of the qualitative nature of such training.

❖ **Overcome Language Barriers**

Given the barriers to language, culture and effective communication, the GAP training game should be multi-lingual, and translated into UN official languages.



❖ **Maritime Dimension in Peacekeeping**

Operation Atlanta for example was an operation by the EU to protect trade route and aid vessels from piracy attacks. In light of the migrant crisis in particular and the military dimension in the rescuing of migrants, it will be important to develop a maritime component as part of the scenarios and simulations in GAP.

❖ **Building Resilience as a Soft Skill Among Peacekeepers**

How can the EU respond to crisis if its peacekeeping personnel are not adequately trained in resilience? Building on resilience, understanding this aspect of soft skills also needs to be developed within the game.

❖ **Certificate of Competency in Training: Quality Assurance**

Gap can offer a certificate of competence having completed the training game and ensure mechanisms for quality assurance.



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New Report Examines How to Enhance Training for UN Peacekeepers
A new IPI paper examines the United Nations' and member states' efforts to train UN peacekeepers

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